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THESIS SUMMARY 
The increasing interest in carrying out business in virtual environments has resulted 
in much research and discussion of trust establishment between the entities involved. 
Researchers over the years have acknowledged that the success of any transaction or 
interaction via the virtual medium is determined by the trust level between trusting 
agent and trusted agent. Numerous publications have attempted to address the 
various challenges of assigning a trust level and building trust in an interacting party. 
However, the building and allocating a value of trust is neither easy nor quick. It 
involves high cost and effort. Hence, the ensuing research challenge is how to 
maintain the trust that has been established and assigned. Due to the dynamic nature 
of trust, the trust evolution, and the fragility of trust in virtual environments, one of 
the most pressing challenges facing the research community is how trust can be 
maintained over time. This thesis is an effort in that direction. Specifically, the 
objective of this thesis is to propose a methodology for trust maintenance in virtual 
environments which we term „Trust Maintenance Methodology‟ (TMM). The 
methodology comprises five frameworks that can be used to achieve the objective of 
trust maintenance. 
In order to achieve the aforesaid objective, this thesis proposes a: (a) Framework for 
third party agent selection, (b) Framework for Formalization and Negotiation of 
service requirements, (c) Framework for Proactive Continuous Performance 
Monitoring, (d) Framework for Incentive Mechanism, and (e) Framework for Trust 
Re-calibration. 
The framework for third party agent selection is used for choosing and selecting a 
neutral agent who will supervise the interaction between two parties. This is the first 
step of our methodology. The neutral agent is involved throughout the course of the 
interaction between two parties and takes a proactive-corrective role in continuous 
performance monitoring. Once both parties have chosen a neutral agent, they carry 
out a formalization and negotiation process of their service requirements using our 
proposed framework. This is in order to create an SLA which will guide the 
interaction between two parties. The framework for proactive continuous 
performance monitoring then can be used to evaluate the performance of both parties 
in delivering their service based on the SLA. If a performance gap occurs during the 
course of transaction, the third party agent will take action to help both parties close 
the performance gap in a timely manner. A key salient feature of our continuous 
performance monitoring is that it is proactive-corrective. Additionally, we design a 
framework for providing an incentive during the course of interaction to motivate 
both parties to perform as closely as possible to the terms of the mutual agreement or 
SLA. By the end of the interaction time space, both parties will be able to re-assess 
or re-calibrate their trust level using our proposed framework for trust re-calibration.  
Finally, in order to validate our proposed methodology, we engineered a multi-agent 
system to simulate the validity of the TMM. Numerous case studies are presented to 
elucidate the workings of our proposed methodology. Moreover, we run several 
experiments under various testing conditions including boundary conditions. The 
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results of experiments show that our methodology is effective in assisting the parties 
to maintain their trust level in virtual environments. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we present an overview of the role and importance of trust 
maintenance in virtual environments in general, and business environments in 
particular. In Section 1.2, we discuss the importance of trust maintenance in virtual 
environments. Section 1.3 explains the pressing issues related to the research of trust 
maintenance in virtual environments. Section 1.4 presents the objectives of this 
thesis. Section 1.5 discusses the scope of the thesis and outlines clearly what lies 
within the scope and what lies outside it. 
Section 1.6 presents the importance or significance of this thesis. Section 1.7 
provides a very brief introduction to each of the remaining ten chapters of this thesis. 
Finally, Section 1.8 concludes this chapter and sets the scene for the second chapter. 
1.2 The Importance of Trust and its 
Maintenance in Virtual Environments 
The shifting of economic activities from the physical environment to the digital 
environment has been acknowledged as bringing many benefits. Some specific 
advantages of conducting business in virtual environments include an increase in 
productivity, adaptability, flexibility, agility and strategic competitiveness in 
providing and delivering product/service (Sieber and Griese 1998; Grabowski, 
Ayyalasomayajula et al. 2007; Wietrzyk and Takizawa 2003). Virtuality or 
virtualness is  defined as „the ability of the business entities to consistently obtain 
and coordinate critical competencies through its design of value-adding business 
process and governance mechanisms involving external and internal constituency to 
deliver differential, superior value in the marketplace‟ (Venkatraman and Henderson 
1998). Moreover, business in virtual environments can be defined as the delivery of 
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work, products and services using the advantage of Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT). Voss (2003) defines „service in a virtual environment (e-Service) 
as the delivery of service using new media such as the Web‟. In virtual business, 
physical location is not important since network technology and the Internet is used 
to link members or companies across the world. It allows them to share information, 
resources and costs that enable them to compete on a global scale. This type of 
business provides many advantages over traditional methods of business, including 
the ability to bridge time and space, and offer better utilization of distributed 
resources without physical relocation.  
However, the characteristics of virtual and physical relationships from a business 
perspective differ in several aspects. Interaction in virtual environments is 
characterized by anonymity, uncertainty, lack of familiarity, lack of face-to-face 
meeting etc. Kanawattanachai et al. (Kanawattanachai and Yoo 2002) assert that trust 
is one of the fundamental factors that drive the success and failure of virtual business 
relationships. This is because trust functions like the glue that holds and links agents 
together in virtual environments as they operate remotely from each other. For 
instance, unlike the customers in a traditional business setting, e-business customers 
may have no opportunity to touch the product or see the service before they decide to 
purchase. Their purchase decision is based on their trust that the product and/or 
service that they will receive will be the same as what they see on the computer 
screen or a virtual medium.  Selling and buying online can occur only if buyer and 
seller have a high level of trust in each other. Furthermore, (Chang, Dillon et al. 
2006) state „in a virtual environment, a trust relationship is established between two 
parties who normally have never met or may never meet and where communication 
takes place through a virtual interaction medium‟. Chang, Dillon et al (2006) also 
argue that trust makes one able to express opinions about products or services that 
they received from interactions in virtual environments. Hence, business in virtual 
environments may offer the best points of operation within a trust-based culture, in 
that it enables meaningful interactions between geographically dispersed parties, 
which was not possible prior to the birth of the Internet. 
Moreover, trust between entities in a networked economy is vital due to the 
expansion of service exchange (e-service) in virtual environments (Giannoutakis and 
Petrou 2007; Debenham 2009; Ping, Durresi et al. 2011). The new paradigm of 
interaction of business entities in virtual environments is built not only on 
transactions, but on establishing, sustaining and improving relationships with 
existing or potential stakeholders (Jones, Wilikens et al. 2000; Ion, Danzi et al. 
2008). Stakeholders are comprised of participatory, enabling and supervisory 
members. Participatory stakeholders could be business partners, customers, 
individual/end customers, and suppliers. Technology is an enabling stakeholder that 
supports the means of communication, while a supervisory stakeholder is a third 
party agent who regulates transactions or provides advice in some way (Jones, 
Wilikens et al. 2000; Ion, Danzi et al. 2008). Hence, trust is always seen as 
something which strengthens a relationship. A successful relationship depends on the 
strength of the trust and commitment of the trusting agent and the trusted agent to 
deliver service according to the terms of a mutual agreement. 
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The establishment of an adequate level of trust in any interaction in virtual 
environments is neither simple nor quick, but is a lengthy and ongoing process. 
Therefore, once a sufficient level of trust has been established, it is a challenging 
effort to maintain it so that the relationship can be sustained. Both parties (trusting 
agent and trusted agent) need to take appropriate steps to ensure that a successful 
relationship that has already taken resources (such as time, effort etc) will be 
sustained over time if that relationship is valuable to both of them. If both parties do 
not take the steps necessary to maintain this trust level, then it may result in a 
diminished trust level, or even distrust. Once distrust exists in a relationship, it 
cannot be rebuilt in a short time (Currall and Epstein 2003; Babar, Verner et al. 
2007). Therefore, constant effort is required from both parties in order to maintain 
the trust level. This is a research issue yet to be addressed in the existing literature. 
Although the literature indicates that much work has been conducted on the issue of 
building trust (Hussain, Chang et al. 2007; Jøsang, Ismail et al. 2007), there is no 
methodological framework for maintaining trust. 
However, in the field of trust modelling, most of the research focus is on trust 
determination and trust prediction. By „trust modelling‟, we mean a process to assign 
the value of trust from trusting agent to trusted agent. A formal definition of trust 
modelling is presented in Chapter 3. Trust determination is concerned with 
determining the trust condition or trust level after an agent has carried out an 
interaction with another agent (Raza, Hussain et al. 2010). It can be with subjective 
or objective information (Sawamura, Aikebaier et al. 2010; Sawamura, Barolli et al. 
2010). On the other hand, trust prediction is the process of making use of the current 
trust value or trust condition or the previous trust values of an entity to reliably 
predict its trust value at a future point in time (Raza, Hussain et al. 2010). For 
example, the Service Level Agreement (SLA) between service provider and service 
requester is agreed upon and signed during the current time slot, but the service 
delivery will occur at a future point in time. Therefore, a service requester may need 
to predict the level of trust in this service provider for the future point in time when 
the service will be delivered. Additionally, those two key researches have been 
acknowledged as providing an important step in trust management; however, the 
next important step is how to maintain the existing or the current value after it has 
been determined. By „trust management‟ we mean a set of activities to manage the 
existence of trust in a relationship. A formal definition of trust management is 
presented in Chapter 3.  
Further, determination of trust value is neither a simple nor an easy task. An agent 
needs to assess all criteria and consider the service context before assigning a trust 
value to a trusted entity (Sawamura, Aikebaier et al. 2010). Therefore, once an agent 
holds or is assigned a trust value by another agent, it needs to maintain this trust, or 
preferably increase it after several further interactions, particularly if the relationship 
is beneficial to the agents.  
Moreover, it has also been widely argued that trust is dynamic rather than static 
(Chang, Dillon et al. 2006). By „dynamic‟ we mean that the value of the trust that is 
assigned to an agent may change dynamically due to a change in the performance or 
behaviour of the trusted agent. On the other hand, trust essentially has evolutionary 
phases in both physical and virtual environments (Currall and Epstein 2003; Xiao 
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and Wei 2008). For instance, (Currall and Epstein 2003) divide the trust evolution 
pattern into three phases: developing, maintaining and destroying. The manner in 
which trust develops and is maintained has been recognized as a critical factor in 
certain relationships (Hexmoor, Wilson et al. 2006). (Javernpaa, Knoll et al. 1998) 
also argue that a significant and critical issue when carrying out business in virtual 
environments is the development and maintenance of trust among parties. The first 
step in the initial business relationship is the development and establishment of trust. 
However, once trust has been developed and established, the next logical step is to 
maintain the trust level. This is particularly true if the relationship is valuable to 
either the trusting agent or trusted agent or both. The building of trust is difficult and 
costly; however, it can be destroyed quickly with a simple misbehaviour that disrupts 
the component of trust. Distrust or negative trust is a part of trust dynamism that 
should be avoided at all times in business relationships. One can start an initial 
relationship with distrust or negative trust. With the passage of time, both parties 
harbour the hope that distrust may lead to positive trust. Once positive trust has been 
established, it needs to be maintained. If, however, both trusting parties do not take 
the initiative to maintain trust, the trust level decreases to distrust or reaches a 
negative level. A concerted effort is then required to convert negative trust to 
positive trust. Hence, the maintaining of trust is a critical element in the trust 
management process (Xiao and Wei 2008). In order to maintain such relationships in 
virtual environments, a demanding and significant effort is required to avoid 
decreasing the level of trust to distrust. Therefore, the trust maintenance stage needs 
significant attention from scholars to foster the sustainability of a networked 
economy.  
Additionally, research in the trust field has been carried out by several researchers 
across a wide range of disciplines. Due to the unique nature of trust in the virtual 
environment, the important need to understand how it develops and is maintained 
provides an opportunity for researchers to discuss the mechanics of trust (i.e., how it 
is produced and maintained) in such a context (Connolly 2008; Aikebaier, Barolli et 
al. 2009). Connolly also states that research on the dynamic nature of trust, 
particularly in a virtual (technology-mediated) environment, is limited. However, the 
theory and application of trust in virtual environments is increasingly attracting 
interest from many disciplines. Some studies also suggest the need for research on 
how to maintain the trust level in virtual relationships (Javernpaa, Knoll et al. 1998; 
Chang, Dillon et al. 2006; Abuelmaatti and Rezgui 2008). Therefore, in this thesis, 
we aim to provide and validate a methodology for maintaining trust in virtual 
environments.  
1.3 The Pressing Issues of Research of Trust 
Maintenance in Virtual Environments  
As was discussed in the previous sections, in order to be successful in a long-term 
interaction in virtual environments, it is essential to maintain trust either vertically, 
laterally, internally or externally (Handy 1995; Ishaya and Mundy 2004; Nakayama, 
Binotto et al. 2006; Kenichi Watanabe, Enokido et al. 2009). This means that 
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business entities in virtual environments have to deal with the process of trust among 
the entities that are part of their virtual network. For example, members of a virtual 
team must maintain their trust level in their leaders, their peers, their subordinates 
(internally) as well as with their customers or suppliers or other teams which are their 
external business partners. Business entities need to examine ways to build trust with 
their internal and external parties, as well as maintain it. This is because „trust is not 
static and automatic; it involves risk calculation and requires a long time and high 
cost to build‟ (Ariss, Nykodym et al. 2002). Building trust is a challenging activity 
for every business relationship and it is therefore very fragile. Currall and Epstein 
(2003) suggest that business entities must think in a systematic way about what they 
can do to cultivate and maintain trust with the various entities in their industry and 
company.  
Hence, in order to support the establishment of a trusted environment in a Digital 
Economy, a proven and common framework or methodology would be of great 
assistance in maintaining a sufficient level of trust in the interaction between service 
provider and service requester. Such a methodology would guide the behaviour of 
both interacting parties, with a view to sustain if not increase the level of trust 
between them. The existing literature provides numerous discussions on how to build 
trust. However, there is scant research on trust maintenance in the existing body of 
literature.  In addition, the following pressing issues arise in the literature regarding 
trust maintenance: 
1. Most of the existing literature focuses on the trust building phase, with the 
vast majority of works presenting a single practice or policy for building 
trust. There is no component or architecture for maintaining trust. Some 
researchers noted that this is a pressing research issue that needs to be 
addressed (Jones, Wilikens et al. 2000; Chang, Dillon et al. 2006). Our 
research is concerned with trust maintenance. In this thesis, we present the 
design of a methodology for trust maintenance in virtual environments. The 
common goal of both parties (the trusting agent and the trusted agent) is 
therefore to sustain an adequate level of trust in their relationship.  
2. There are some good practices / principles and policies proposed in the 
literature that can be used to maintain trust. However, most of them consider 
only single factors or single activities to maintain trust. Whereas, there is no 
practical and complete solution to maintain trust which may rely on several 
important factors or events. Additionally, these proposed good 
practices/principles/policies to maintain trust lack empirical proof. 
3. There is a lot of confusion in the existing literature between the terms „trust 
building‟ and „trust maintenance‟. There is no clear distinction made between 
them. Additionally, there is no clear explanation of when the relationship can 
be categorized as being in the stage of building trust, maintaining trust or 
where trust starts to decline. 
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1.4 Objectives of the Thesis 
The previous sections outline the role of trust in virtual environments and the 
importance of trust maintenance once trust has been determined and established. This 
thesis attempts to address the pivotal need for trust maintenance by proposing a 
methodology to maintain trust. The objectives of this thesis are summarized as 
follows: 
1. To propose definitions of: trust evolution, trust building, trust maintenance 
and trust decline in the context of trust evolution pattern. 
2. To develop a comprehensive methodology by which a trusting agent can 
maintain the level of trust in a trusted agent. In order to address this second 
primary objective, it is broken down into the following sub-objectives: 
a. To develop a framework for third party agent selection 
b. To develop a framework by which the trusting agent and trusted agent 
can articulate and formalize their service requirements.  
c. To develop a framework whereby the third party agent can monitor 
the performance progress of both trusting agent and trusted agent. We 
also develop a resolution strategy in case the service is not delivered 
as planned.  
d. To develop a framework that can be used to motivate the agent to 
perform as much as possible according to the terms of the mutual 
agreement. 
e. To develop a framework in which both trusting agent and trusted 
agent re-calibrate the trust value by the end of the interaction. 
3. Validation of the proposed methodology for trust maintenance.  
Therefore this research does not focus on ways to determine trust value or to build 
trust in the new entities, but on how the trusted agent can preserve or even exceed the 
existing level of trust of the trusting agent beyond the minimum threshold of trust in 
order to successfully carry out a transaction in a virtual environment during the trust 
maintenance phase.  
We use the terms „trust maintenance methodology (TMM)‟ or „methodology for 
maintaining trust‟ synonymously to refer to the preservation of the existing trust 
level condition or to increasing it to a higher level. Throughout the text of this thesis 
we use the acronym TMM to represent Trust Maintenance Methodology and use it 
throughout consistently. In the following chapters, we consider trust between two 
independent actors in service environments, namely trusting agent and trusted agent. 
The trusting agent is a service provider offering a business service to another agent in 
a virtual environment and the trusted agent is either a business partner or an 
individual customer requesting access to the trusting agent‟s services, as represented 
by an identifiable agent in the network.  
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1.5 Scope of the Thesis 
This thesis presents a methodology that will enable a trusting agent to maintain its 
trust level in a trusted agent after trust has been determined and established. The 
scope of this thesis can be specified as follows: 
1. This thesis is concerned with the behaviour of trust which is „offer related‟ 
not „person related‟. (Coulter and Coulter 2002) argued that there are two 
areas that influence the relationship between trusted agent and trusting agent, 
„person related‟ (e.g. empathy, politeness and consumer/service 
representative similarity) and „offer related‟ (e.g. customization, competence, 
reliability and promptness). As this thesis deals with business relationships 
that transpire in virtual environments, „person related‟ is unobservable and 
hence is outside the scope of this thesis. Therefore, we are concerned with 
„offer related‟ only. (Coulter and Coulter 2002) also argued that the effect of 
„offer related‟ characteristics on trust became greater as the length of the 
relationship increased. In a mature relationship, the trusting agent becomes 
more and more aware of and tied to a particular service provider over time; 
therefore, the service provider (trusted agent) needs to be extremely 
competent in delivering service as mutually agreed.  
2. In this thesis, we are more concerned with the notion of „soft trust‟ rather than 
„hard trust‟. Hard trust factors represent information derived from security 
mechanisms such as identity keys, credentials and certificates, whereas „soft 
trust‟ encompasses information that is inferred from experience and 
observation of others. Therefore, the establishment of identity trust falls 
outside the scope of this thesis.  
3. This thesis focuses on maintaining trust in virtual e-business environments. 
Other environments such as physical settings etc do not fall within the scope 
of this thesis. 
4. This thesis is concerned with interactions which are medium to long-term 
relationships. The interaction between trusting agent and trusted agent is 
bounded by a contractual agreement. Therefore, the short-term transactional 
focus and non-contractual interaction is not within the scope of this thesis.  
1.6 Significance of the Thesis 
To the best of our knowledge, at the time of writing, this thesis is the first and only 
one of its kind to present a methodology for maintaining trust in virtual 
environments. Specifically, the significance of this thesis arises from the following: 
1. This thesis defines the concepts of trust evolution, trust building, trust 
maintenance and trust decline (in the context of trust evolution pattern) along 
with the specific characteristics and features of trust and relationships in each 
phase of the trust evolution. To the best of our knowledge, these concepts and 
the distinction between them for virtual environments have not previously 
been defined and presented. 
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2. This thesis proposes a methodology for maintaining trust in virtual 
environments. By proposing a methodology for maintaining trust between 
trusting agent and trusted agent, the significance of this thesis also arises from 
the following: 
a. This thesis proposes a framework for selecting a third party agent in 
virtual environments. The availability of a third party as a neutral agent is 
significant in the interaction between trusting agent and trusted agent. 
This third party agent will help both trusting agent and trusted agent to 
monitor the performance of „soft trust‟ in their interaction. To the best of 
our knowledge, the third party agent discussed in the literature is more 
concerned with the third party agent‟s ability to support the availability 
of „hard trust‟ rather than „soft trust‟.  
b. This thesis proposes a framework for the formalization and negotiation of 
service requirements. This framework will guide the trusting agent and 
trusted agent to construct a Service Level Agreement (SLA) for their 
interaction. To the best of our knowledge, the existing literature does not 
consider any pre-activities such as the formalization of service 
requirements prior to negotiating the service criteria. Moreover, in some 
cases, as the interaction will be carried out during the trust maintenance 
phase, the service criteria being formalized and negotiated may be 
derived from several previous transactions. There is no discussion in the 
existing literature on how to construct an SLA for interaction during the 
trust maintenance phase. 
c. This thesis proposes a framework for proactive continuous monitoring. 
With this framework, the trusting agent and trusted agent can keep track 
of their performance progress during their interaction in the trust 
maintenance stage. To the best of our knowledge, such a framework for 
proactive continuous monitoring has not been proposed in the literature. 
The literature tends to be more concerned with conducting a performance 
assessment at the end of the interaction, and nothing is done during the 
course of the interaction regarding the monitoring and performance 
assessment. Proactive continuous monitoring would provide a platform 
for timely resolution of discrepancies between agreed performance and 
actual performance, before they inflate to unmanageable levels. 
d. This thesis proposes a framework for providing an incentive during the 
course of the interaction. We designed a mechanism for giving an 
incentive that is done together with proactive continuous performance 
monitoring to further motivate the interacting parties to deliver according 
to the terms of the SLA. The existing literature review suggested and 
designed an incentive mechanism whereby the incentive is given by the 
end of the interaction. To the best of our knowledge, no framework to 
date has been proposed for an incentive mechanism that encourages the 
successful delivery of service during the trust maintenance phase. 
e. This thesis proposes a framework for trust re-calibration. The trust re-
calibration is, unlike in the existing literature, conducted during the trust 
maintenance phase. This re-calibration considers the value of 
intermediate trust which is an intermediate performance assessment as a 
result of proactive continuous monitoring. Hence, our framework for 
trust re-calibration is unique since it also takes into account the dynamic 
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behaviour of an agent during the interaction. To the best of our 
knowledge, such trust re-calibration or trust re-calculation which is 
specifically intended for activities in the trust maintenance phase has not 
been discussed in the literature. 
3. This thesis validates the proposed methodology for maintaining trust in 
virtual environments by conducting several experimental simulations. 
1.7 Plan of the Thesis 
In this thesis, we provide a complete methodology for trust maintenance in virtual 
environments. In order to achieve its objectives, this thesis is organised into eleven 
chapters. In this section, we give a brief summary of each chapter: 
Chapter 2: Chapter 2 provides an extensive review of the existing approaches to 
trust maintenance in the current literature. It broadly classifies these into approaches 
for trust maintenance in virtual environments and non-virtual environments. The 
problems arising from the current literature with regard to trust maintenance are 
identified in this chapter. Additionally, based on the comprehensive survey of 
literature, we identify the problems that we intend to address in this thesis. The aim 
of this chapter is to illustrate that the problems that we intend to address via this 
thesis have not been previously addressed and resolved in the literature. 
Chapter 3: Chapter 3 formally defines each of the problems that we intend to 
address in this thesis. Furthermore, here we present definitions of several 
terminologies that will be used to define the problems addressed in this thesis. 
Additionally, we discuss the research methodologies and research approaches used in 
this thesis.  
Chapter 4: Chapter 4 presents an overview of the solution to each of the issues 
identified in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 also provides pointers to the chapters containing 
the detailed solutions for the identified research issues. Moreover, this chapter 
presents the conceptual definitions of trust evolution, the phases of trust evolution 
(building trust, maintain trust and declining trust) and the associated trust and 
relationship characteristic of each phase.   
Chapter 5: Chapter 5 presents the framework for third party agent selection, 
whereby the trusting agent and trusted agent can select a third party agent for their 
interaction during the trust maintenance phase. This third party agent can be chosen 
in one of two ways: by using a mutual trusted friend or by hiring a paid professional 
third party agent. The detailed algorithmic framework and design of these 
approaches is presented in this chapter. 
Chapter 6: Chapter 6 presents the framework for the formalization and negotiation 
of service requirements. The proposed framework enables the trusting agent and 
trusted agent to articulate their service requirements, formalize them using a 
structured mechanism, and determine the prioritization of service criteria. This 
chapter also presents a framework that can be used by both trusting agent and trusted 
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agent to negotiate and address any conflict. Finally, in this chapter, we use a case 
study to illustrate how the service requirements being negotiated can translate into 
the construction of SLA. 
Chapter 7: Chapter 7 presents the framework for proactive continuous performance 
monitoring. The proposed framework enables a third party agent to carry out 
proactive continuous monitoring during a transaction between trusting agent and 
trusted agent. This chapter also presents mechanism by which lapses in performance 
during the course of the interaction can be addressed. Additionally, in this chapter we 
present the framework for an incentive mechanism which is an additional activity 
during the proactive continuous performance monitoring. This framework, coupled 
with the framework for proactive continuous monitoring, facilitates the success of 
service delivery in an interaction during the trust maintenance phase. We present 
three approaches to providing an incentive that can be used for different 
circumstances and interaction requirements.  The algorithmic framework and design 
of the framework are presented in this chapter. 
Chapter 8: Chapter 8 presents the framework for trust re-calibration. The proposed 
framework allows both parties to re-assign or re-calibrate their final trust level after 
an interaction. This chapter also presents three different approaches that can be used 
for final trust calculation. We illustrate how the final trust calculation model can be 
used for an interaction which employs our methodology.  
Chapter 9: Chapter 9 presents the prototypes that we engineered in order to validate 
the proposed methodology to maintain trust in virtual environments. The validation 
of the proposed methodology is carried out by measuring the effectiveness of our 
methodology in maintaining trust between trusting agent and trusted agent. We have 
7 (seven) broad objectives to measure the validity of our proposed methodology. We 
divided each objective into several sub-objectives. In this chapter 9, the 3 (three) 
broad objectives taken to validate the methodology are as follows: (a) a comparison 
transactions which use our methodology with those transactions which do not use our 
methodology, (b) a comparison between initial trust value and final trust value by the 
end of the interaction, and (c) a comparison of transactions which use our 
methodology with an incentive mechanism with those without the incentive 
mechanism. Additionally, we investigate and evaluate when the behaviour of an 
agent is dynamic or static. In chapter 9, we also present and discuss the results 
obtained from the engineered prototypes. 
Chapter 10: Chapter 10 also presents the prototypes similar to Chapter 9. In this 
chapter, the 4 (four) remaining objectives to validate our proposed methodology are 
presented. The primary measurement is of the effectiveness of having third party 
agents that supervise the interaction between members in the community and in 
terms of creating and maintaining the sustainability of communities in virtual 
environments. In this chapter, the 4 (four) broad objectives of validating the 
methodology are to ascertain: (a) the accuracy of third party agent‟s information, (b) 
the ability to identify all non-compliant agents in a community, (c) maximizing 
social welfare of the community and (d) measuring sustainability index. The results 
obtained from the prototypes are presented and discussed in this chapter. 
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Chapter 11: Chapter 11 concludes the thesis by giving a summary of the results of 
our work, along with the potential directions for future work. The structure of all 
chapters and the relationship between chapters is shown in Figure 1.1 below. 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction
Overview and background
Objectives of the thesis 
Scope of the thesis
Significance of the thesis
Plan of the thesis
Chapter 2: Literature Review
Existing work in the area of trust maintenance
Critical analysis of existing works
Chapter 3: Problem Definition
Key concepts
Problem overview and problem definition
Research methodology
Chapter 4: Solution Overview
Definition of key concepts
Overview of the solution for TMM
Chapter 5
Framework for Third 
Party Agent Selection
Chapter 6
Framework for Formalization
and Negotiation of 
Service Requirements
Chapter 7
Framework for Continuous 
Performance Monitoring and
Incentive Mechanism
Chapter 8
Framework for Trust 
Re-calibration
Chapter 9 and 10
Validation of the Proposed
Methodology
Chapter 11
Work Recapitulation
Future Work
 
Figure 1.1: Relationship between the chapters of this thesis 
1.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we provided an introduction to the importance of trust in a virtual 
environment and the importance of trust maintenance once trust has been determined 
and built. We then presented several research issues related to trust maintenance in a 
  
Page 38 of 319 
 
virtual environment. Specifically, it was pointed out that there is a pivotal need to 
make an effort to maintain trust; however, to the best of our knowledge, in the 
literature no complete methodology has been proposed for maintaining trust. The 
existing research focuses mainly on how to build trust between entities. In terms of 
trust modelling and trust management, the literature is mainly concerned with how to 
determine the value of trust or to make a trust decision regarding the trusted agent.  
Additionally, we discussed the dynamic nature and the fragility of trust in virtual 
environments and the need for any trust maintenance mechanism to consider these. 
The objectives of undertaking this study were subsequently stated and discussed, 
followed by a description of the scope and significance of this thesis in enabling a 
trusting agent to maintain the trust value toward the trusted agent. Finally, the plan of 
this thesis was presented. 
In the next chapter, we present an overview of the existing literature on trust 
evolution and trust maintenance for both the virtual environment and non-virtual 
environments. The objective is to ensure that the problems that we intend to address 
through this thesis have not been addressed previously. 
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we present an overview of approaches to trust and relationship 
evolution, and strategies presented in the literature to maintain trust relationships in 
both virtual and non-virtual environments. In Section 2.2, we examine the views on 
trust evolution in an interaction presented in the current literature. For discussion and 
evaluation purposes, we divided the existing literature into two broad classes based 
on the pattern of trust evolution. The two different views are: 
a. Continuous increasing: this view takes into account that trust level in a 
relationship between trusting agent and trusted agent will follow a certain 
phase of development or increase depending upon the level of knowledge 
about the trusting behaviour of the interacting agent. We present these 
arguments in Section 2.2.1. 
b. Non-linear increment: this view takes into consideration that trust level will 
follow a life cycle pattern similar to the biological pattern of life. It starts 
from birth, progresses to maturity and then to dissipation. We present these 
approaches in Section 2.2.2. 
In Section 2.3, we present a collection of strategic approaches to maintain trust as 
proposed in the existing literature. These approaches can be categorized into three 
different classes for discussion and evaluation purposes as follows: 
a. Variance-based / Factors-based Approach.  
The main characteristic feature of this approach is that it provides one or 
more factors that influence the preservation of trust in an interaction. 
Moreover, literature falls into this category if the authors provide an 
explanation for behaviour or social phenomena in terms of the relationship 
between dependent and independent variables that influence the movement of 
trust level condition from a certain level to a higher level. 
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b. Process-based / Stage-based Approach. 
The existing literature on models or methods to maintain trust falls into this 
category if the approach provides sequential events, activities and 
mechanisms in order to maintain trust over time. 
c. Hybrid Approach 
The existing literature on trust maintenance is grouped under this category if 
the approach takes into account the combination of variance-based and 
process-based approaches. Typically, such approaches identify variables in 
conjunction with processes that can impact on maintaining trust. 
In Section 2.6, we present a comprehensive review of all the existing approaches in 
the literature. Finally, Section 2.7 concludes the chapter. 
In the literature review presented in this chapter, we refer to the terms „building‟ 
'maintaining', 'developing' and 'nurturing' used by the respective researchers in 
presenting their proposal. Moreover, we use the terms, „interaction‟, „relationship‟ 
and „transaction‟ interchangeably as do the researchers in explaining their works. 
2.2 The Evolution of Trust and Relationship 
In this section, we present and subsequently discuss all the proposed views of trust 
evolution presented in the literature. The manner in which trust develops and is 
managed has been recognized as a critical factor in human relationships (Hexmoor, 
Wilson et al. 2006). In relationships, trust will evolve and change over time as 
knowledge and information about other parties‟ trustworthiness also evolves in those 
relationships (Chang, Dillon et al. 2006; Hussain 2006). Several studies have 
described this evolution pattern. Trust evolution is the process by which the trust 
level condition in such relationships may evolve or change depending upon several 
factors, either intrinsic or extrinsic (Chang, Dillon et al. 2006). The existing literature 
presents several different views on the pattern of this trust evolution. The discussion 
in this section is divided into two parts. Section 2.2.1 presents the existing views of 
trust evolution as a continuous increasing process and Section 2.2.2 presents the 
existing literature which view trust evolution in non-linear increment. 
2.2.1 Continuous Increasing 
The continuous increasing views of trust are closely intertwined with the relationship 
development processes (Lewicki, McAllister et al. 1998). It argues that the level of 
trust in such a relationship will develop with the passage of time. Hence, the trust 
level will increase with the increasing length of the relationship. The central tenet of 
this approach is that trust is an increasing function of time. As the time of the 
relationship increases, the level of trust also increases. 
Corritore et al. (Corritorea, Krachera et al. 2003) propose the developmental stages 
of trust level in a relationship. They divided the levels at which trust develops as 
follows: 
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a. Rudimentary level. 
The rudimentary level is the initial stage of a relationship where risk is 
relatively small because there is not much at stake (e.g. much money, very 
personal information) and in which there is a recognized system of rewards 
and punishments (e.g. Verisign trust seal) 
b. Intermediate level 
The intermediate level is a situation where knowledge can be used to predict 
behaviour and thus assign trust. It is usually reached after several satisfactory 
interactions between trusting agent and trusted agent. 
c. Most developed level 
This is the deepest level of trust. At this level, a trustor expects that his or her 
interest will be respected by the trustee and that he/she has no more need to 
calculate the level of risk. 
 
Clemmensemen et al. (Clemmensen, Khryashcheva et al. 2008) also argue that trust 
development in a virtual team is composed of three stages: predisposition to trust, 
trust formation and trust maintenance. Predisposition to trust exists in the initial 
relationship which is formed on the basis of cultural similarity (country, upbringing, 
etc.), and the personal and psychological characteristics of team members.  The 
second stage, trust formation, happens when trusting parties become formal members 
of a group. In an initial meeting of the group, they share resources in order to finish 
the task. The establishment of trust is dependent on the willingness of team members 
to share information and any other resources to achieve the team‟s task. Trusting 
agents will form or assign a trust value to the trusted agent based on the trusted 
agent‟s competence and ability to share resources and to finish tasks. The final stage 
of trust development in a virtual team is trust maintenance. The trust maintenance 
stage is entered when the importance of a task is increased. Hence, once trust has 
been firmly established in the second stage (trust formation), members of the virtual 
team start to maintain trust with attention given to the high quality of information 
about trust dimensions (willingness, competence and ability).  
Gwebu et al. (Gwebu, Wang et al. 2007) explained the continuous increasing stage of 
trust development in a virtual organization setting. The process of trust evolution in a 
relationship comprises three stages: calculative-based trust (CBT), knowledge-based 
trust (KBT) and institutional-based trust (IBT). Calculative-based trust is the trust 
that is initially established in the early stage of a relationship. In this stage, an agent 
decides to trust the other agent based on its calculation of the amount of punishment 
or reward that it might receive if s/he trusts the other party. Therefore, both trusting 
agent and trusted agent obtain information and calculate any potential gain or loss 
that may ensue from the relationship in order to make a trust decision. A clear reward 
system will guide behaviour and build the reputation of trusting parties, thereby 
enabling them to move to the second stage of trust, KBT. In the KBT stage, the 
trusting agent and trusted agent have sufficient knowledge about each other‟s 
reputation and trust level. In this phase, trusting parties carefully choose partners 
with whom to interact. It involves high levels of interactive communication to 
confirm the knowledge about the other party‟s trustworthiness. Both trusting agent 
and trusted agent tend to depend on the behavioural predictability of the parties 
involved in order to make rational judgments. Therefore, KBT is an extension of the 
trust building exercise (Gwebu, Wang et al. 2007). The last stage is institution-based 
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trust (IBT).  In this stage, both trusting agent and trusted agent have a mutual 
understanding and acknowledge each other‟s desires, needs and intentions. Other 
studies have also developed a similar approach to describe trust development based 
on CBT, KBT and IBT (Lewicki, McAllister et al. 1998; Hernandez 2010). 
McKnight and Chervany (McKnight and Chervany 2001) stated that there are two 
stages in the trust building process in e-commerce: the exploratory stage and the 
commitment stage. The exploratory stage occurs in the initial stage of a relationship 
when parties have limited knowledge of each other. In a typical e-commerce 
transaction, parties do not know each other from any previous interaction. It follows 
the form of an initial trust model. After several interactions between the involved 
parties, expectations are either met or unmet. If desired actions are reciprocated, trust 
can be expected to move to the commitment stage. In this stage, both parties have a 
high commitment to continue their relationship as the trust level is higher than in the 
exploratory stage. 
Zhang and Zhang (Zhang and Zhang 2005) also divided the trust relationship into 
two stages, initial stage and committed stage. The model also accommodates the 
dynamics of trust so that initial trust may turn into robust trust after long-term 
interaction. The experience during the robust trust or committed stage may result in 
either distrust or higher trust. The authors then present several factors that contribute 
to the initial trust and robust trust. The factors are derived from the characteristics of 
the online environment which considers the trusting agent, trusted agent, system trust 
belief, interaction factors and external environment factors. They concluded that 
different factors influence the assignment of initial trust and robust trust. A similar 
argument has also been proposed by Kim and Tadisina (Kim and Tadisina 2003) who 
present a model of trust development for E-businesses. They divided the 
development of trust into two stages: initial stage and committed stage. The initial 
stage is the stage of the initial relationship when the trusting agent has an initial trust 
that is determined by those factors impacting on initial trust. Once the initial trust has 
been established, then it moves into robust trust. Robust trust occurs in a committed 
relationship during the committed stage.  
Javernpaa et al. (Javernpaa and Leidner 1999) described the development of trust in 
global virtual teams. As members of virtual teams rarely meet face-to-face, the 
developed trust is known as „swift trust‟ (Meyerson, Weick et al. 1996; Javernpaa, 
Knoll et al. 1998; Javernpaa and Leidner 1999). However, in global virtual teams, 
trust develops in two steps: initial development and mature trust. Initial development 
corresponds to building an initial trust. Effective communication and the sharing of 
personal information help to build trust in initial task completion. It serves as an 
initial trust level between members in a virtual team. In order to show how trust 
levels can change during an interaction, they correlate this trust developmental view 
with the Group (Team) Life. They divided the group life into two stages, early stage 
and later stage. In the early stage, effective communication (such as social 
communication and communication of enthusiasm) will establish the initial trust and 
in the later stage, advanced communication behaviour (such as predictable 
communication, substantial and time responses) will help to maintain the trust level. 
If members of virtual teams successfully interact with technology-mediated 
communication, mature trust is formed. In their research, Javernpaa et al. (Javernpaa 
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and Leidner 1999) raised appropriate questions: from where is trust imported to the 
global virtual team and how is trust maintained in a relationship via electronic 
communication? Hence, this is a challenging research area that addresses the 
question of how to maintain trust in virtual environments. 
Jones and George (Jones and George 1998) see the development of trust in a 
relationship as a development path from conditional trust to unconditional trust (the 
development may also deteriorate backwards to distrust). In the first stage of a 
relationship, both parties develop their trust based on initial knowledge and 
information about each other. Conditional trust may be enough for an exchange 
relationship to function at a certain level, but it still needs to be monitored. In this 
stage, the relationship is characterised by distance, and trust is conditional during a 
testing period.  Even minor signals of distrust may freeze the interest and deter any 
attempt to develop the relationship. If trust deteriorates enough, a party will no 
longer accept the other‟s role and distrust emerges. If the parties are able to reach the 
level of unconditional trust, they may then be able to concentrate fully on the task at 
hand. Unconditional trust enables both parties that are involved in a business 
relationship to achieve the task. Furthermore, the best level for establishing a 
relationship is the unconditional trust level. It will create a positive effect and 
friendship, which results in a good performance outcome from the relationship.  
2.2.2 Non-linear Increment 
A non-linear increment pattern of trust evolution has been derived from the view of a 
biological evolution pattern. All the biological things in the world will follow a 
pattern of birth, growth, maturity and disappearance (Bateson 1988). The trust level 
condition in a relationship also follows this pattern and the longevity of a certain 
phase will depend upon the effort made by both trusting agent and trusted agent. 
Currall and Epstein (2003) divide the trust evolution pattern into three life cycle 
phases: developing, maintaining and destroying. In the early stage of the relationship, 
the trust level starts from a baseline of either trust or distrust. However, as the 
relationship progresses, if trust-building actions are taken, the level of trust grows 
until it begins to level off during the maintenance stage. It may either increase or 
decrease (relative to the initial trust level). The direction of the movement of trust 
value (increase / decrease) and the amount of increase / decrease during the 
maintenance stage depends on the capability and willingness of the other interacting 
party. Currall and Epstein (2003) argued that during the maintenance stage, the level 
of trust stays constant with some minor variations. If, however, the trust is negatively 
affected, then the level of trust drops quickly into the lower level or may turn to 
distrust. 
Deelmann and Loos (2002) present a pattern of trust cycle for SMEs in E-business. 
The trust cycle depends on the manner in which a customer establishes trust in SMEs 
when conducting E-business. It is argued that trust goes through three phases: trust 
building, transaction and evaluation. In an initial interaction, the trusting agent builds 
trust in the trusted agent. Once trust is established, it goes to the transaction phase. 
After n
th
 transaction or several repeated transactions, the trusting agent will evaluate 
the trustworthiness level. Once the trusting agent is satisfied with the trusted agent, it 
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will increase customer loyalty which leads to another transaction(s). After each 
transaction, the trusting agent will then evaluate its experience and satisfaction with 
the interacting party. If the situation is not satisfying, then it leads to less trust and 
decreased customer loyalty. On the contrary, if customers are satisfied with their 
experiences, their trust level in the SME increases. Thus, it follows a circle 
depending on the level of satisfaction experienced. 
Wagealla, Carbone et al. (2003) argued that trust follows the life cycle pattern in a 
relationship. The model of the life cycle starts with how trust is formed, how trust 
evolves over time due to available information and how trust can be exploited. 
Therefore, there are three aspects to the dynamic nature of trust during the trust life 
cycle: trust formation, evolution and exploitation. Trust formation involves collecting 
evidence about trust components that might be actively formed in initial trust in 
initial stage of interaction. Trust evolution refers to the process of changing one‟s 
estimation of trust based on gathered trust information from interactions. The last 
aspect, trust attraction or exploitation, represents the effect of a new piece of 
evidence on the current trust value. The new evidence (either from observations or 
recommendations) has some influence on the trusting agent‟s opinion, in the sense 
that it „attracts‟ his/her opinion towards it. It may result in the level of trust either 
decreasing or increasing. 
2.3 Integrative Review of Trust and 
Relationship’s Evolution 
This section builds on the critical evaluation of existing views of trust evolution 
carried out in the previous section. It works towards an integrative view to find out 
the main issues presented in the literature. As a general note, basically trust has a 
pattern of evolution whereby the level of trust may change over the time of the 
relationship. This also accommodates the view that trust is dynamic by nature 
(Kanawattanachai and Yoo 2002; Chang, Dillon et al. 2006; Winch and Joyce 2006; 
Kuo and Yu 2009). Based on discussion in the previous section, it can be concluded 
that in every trust-based interaction, trust has an evolution, characterized by a certain 
pattern and features at each stage. The movement from one phase to another phase 
depends on the efforts of both interacting partners. 
Moreover, a trust-based relationship always involves at least two interacting agents, 
the trusted agent and the trusting agent. From the relationship perspective, a long-
term strategic relationship is based on shared interests, mutual trust, ethics, 
cooperation, quality of alternatives, satisfaction, dependence, commitment, and other 
bonds that enable the relationship to continue (Giller and Matear 2001; Zineldin 
2002; Laaksonen, Pajunen et al. 2008; Aikebaier, Enokido et al. 2011 ). An adequate 
level of trust is an essential condition for all subsequent transactions to be successful 
(Das and Teng 1998; Chen and Lin 2004; Wilson, Straus et al. 2006). Therefore, it is 
imperative to follow the evolution of trust at every stage of the relationship‟s 
evolution in order to create, sustain and maintain an ongoing relationship. It has been 
argued that trust is dynamic rather than static (Kanawattanachai and Yoo 2002; Six 
2005; Chang, Dillon et al. 2006; Kuo and Yu 2009). Since most authors consider that 
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there are phases of trust such as building, stabilizing and declining, they tend to view 
trust as being dynamic but focus on specific phases when developing conceptual 
frameworks. Some are interested in trust at the beginning of a relationship (the trust 
formation), others at the end of the interaction (trust termination), but very few are 
concerned with examining trust in an ongoing and stable interaction. 
However, as trust is always integral to any relationship, the vast majority of the 
existing literature on trust evolution does not provide any characteristic features for 
each phase of trust evolution. Moreover, no clear definition of trust evolution itself 
has ever been provided. The main shortcomings of the above approaches relate to the 
modelling and defining of trust evolution. The literature on trust evolution is rarely 
focused on changes to the trust level within a business interaction. None of the 
existing literature focuses on trust evolution within the life-span of a trust-based 
relationship. Researchers have pointed out that the evolution of trust has three 
different broad phases: building, maintaining and declining. However, current 
literature does not present a formal definition and characteristics of the three broad 
phases of trust evolution.  
2.4 Strategic Approaches to Maintain Trust in 
Virtual Environments 
In this section, we present and subsequently discuss all the strategies presented in the 
existing body of literature to maintain trust for relationships in virtual environments. 
This thesis is concerned with the phase that follows the initial trust building in trust 
evolution, with a focus on existing work regarding trust maintenance or whenever 
trust has already been established in an interaction. The discussion in this section is 
divided into two parts. Section 2.4.1 presents and subsequently discusses the existing 
approaches to maintain trust with a variance-based approach and Section 2.4.2, 
presents and subsequently discusses the existing approaches to maintaining trust 
using a process-based approach, and Section 2.4.3 presents and subsequently 
discusses the existing approaches to maintaining trust with a hybrid approach. 
2.4.1 Variance-based (Factor-based) Approach 
We describe the variance-based (factor-based) approach as a research that explains 
phenomena in terms of the relationship among dependent and independent variables. 
A variance-based approach is characterized as follows: more of X and more of Y 
produces more of Z. Variance theories attempt to predict different levels of outcome 
variables as a function of some input variables (Markus and Robey 1988); (Mohr 
1982); (Sabherwal and Robey 1995). They attempt to explain the variance in 
outcomes often as a mathematical function.  
Variance theories typically use the standard box and line diagram to illustrate the 
relationship between variables. Most laboratory experiments are used to test variance 
theories because they are the most straightforward to operationalize and measure. 
The variance-based or factor-based approach is well suited to answering „what‟ 
questions, such as: what are the variables or factors that are considered best to 
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maintain trust in a relationship? In this section, we examine the existing literature 
that proposes several variables or factors to maintain trust relationships in virtual 
environments.  
Balasubramanian et al. (2003) argue that institutional safeguards such as trading 
regulations and formal statements about service criteria have a significant impact on 
trust formation. In virtual environments, a good repead experience will help the 
trusting agent to perceive service attributes in virtual environments such as reliability 
of information and efficiency of transaction execution. Reliability of information can 
be found in trading regulations or business contracts. Moreover, the efficient 
execution of a transaction can be seen as an actualization of its regulations statement. 
Hence, the agreed regulations that govern business interactions between trusting 
agent and trusted agent will help to maintain their trust level. Balasubramanian et al. 
(2003) suggested that customers rely strongly on the trust that leads to security 
provided by regulatory policies in online business transactions.  
However, this proposed model has the following shortcomings:  
a. This approach suggested the availability of agreed regulation to govern 
business interactions. With the agreed regulation, both parties will rely on this 
to execute the transaction. However, they do not explain in detail how both 
interacting parties access this agreed regulation. As they have suggested only 
one single factor or practice to influence the trust level, it is not a complete 
methodology.  
b. The authors used the terms „trust building‟ and „trust maintaining‟ 
synonymously, making no distinction between them It is also not clear 
whether the factors will work well in the initial relationship or mature 
relationship. Hence, it does not make clear whether they propose a factor for 
trust building or trust maintenance.  
c. Finally, they have not proven empirically the validity of their proposed factor 
for maintaining trust.  
Xiao and Wei (2008) offer several principles for trust construction and maintenance 
in a virtual team member relationship. The first principle is repeated communication. 
Communication of trustworthiness is acknowledged as an important element of 
restoring and maintaining trust in every relationship. It is described as „an interactive 
process that affects, monitors, and guides members‟ actions and attitudes in their 
interactions with one another‟. Via communication, trusting behaviour will be 
gathered as a means of assigning or deciding the trust level condition. The second 
principle focuses on the cognitive dimension of trust. In trust relationships in virtual 
environments, the cognitive dimension is easier to observe than the affective 
dimension. The third principle for maintaining the trust level is to keep promises 
regarding task delivery. Task-oriented information and delivery of service tasks 
should be managed in order to restore the trusting agent‟s confidence and in turn to 
maintain trust. Conversely, trust can be destroyed when the other party provides 
distorted information to mislead the other agent, or creates a discrepancy between 
promise and delivery.  
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In this work, Xiao and Wei (2008) propose three different factors that can be used to 
construct and maintain trust in the relationship between members in a virtual team. 
Intensive communication, concern with the cognitive dimension only rather than 
with the affective and timely delivery of the finished task, are the main factors in 
maintaining trust. However, the main drawback is that these three factors seem to be 
independent of each other. There is no link or sequential order in the process of 
achieving trust maintenance by applying these three factors. Therefore, it is not a 
complete methodology for maintaining trust. The second shortcoming is that the 
authors used the terms „construction‟ and „maintenance‟ without clearly defining 
these terms or making a clear distinction between them. It seems that construction is 
similar to forming an initial trust, while maintenance is the next phase. However, the 
authors do not differentiate between these terms. Additionally, the authors do not 
explain in which phase these two activities can be categorized in trust evolution. 
Moreover, they do not validate their proposed principles; hence, empirical research 
to show how the principles work is the next research challenge. 
Iacono and Weisband (1997) provide a theoretical and descriptive explanation of 
how to produce and maintain trust as a foundation for cooperative and 
interdependent work in virtual team. They suggested that the forming of good 
communication habits (e.g., checking and responding to email as demanded by task) 
is important in building active communication and consistent interaction in virtual 
environments. It becomes a foundation for cooperative and interdependent work in 
virtual teams. The ability to attend to requests from a distance while simultaneously 
handling local work demands is an effective way to produce and maintain trust.  
In their work, Iacono and Weisband (1997) are merely concerned with the 
importance of effective communication to produce and maintain trust in virtual 
collaboration. However, this is a single means of maintaining the communication 
between virtual agents which in turn maintains the availability of trust in an 
interaction. There should be other factors to maintain trust in virtual environments, 
which the authors do not address. Additionally, the authors do not provide details of 
how this communication should be conducted in order to maintain trust. Similar to 
(Balasubramanian, Konana et al. 2003; Xiao and Wei 2008), the authors also use the 
terms „produce‟ and „maintain‟ without differentiation. If we consider trust as an 
evolutionary process, the phase where trust is produced may be different from the 
phase where trust is maintained. As the authors propose only a single factor, they do 
not provide a complete methodology for maintaining trust. The last shortcoming is 
that their work lacks validation and implementation. They propose only a theoretical 
framework, so validation and empirical research is the next challenge which the 
authors need to address. 
Hung et al. (2004) propose an integrated model that can be used for trust formation 
and maintenance in both traditional organizational settings and temporary virtual 
teams. The model is based on the dual process theories of cognition, Elaboration 
Likelihood Model and the Heuristic-Systematic Model. They proposed that trust is 
formed through different routes at different stages. Moreover, their model 
incorporated the dynamic nature of trust and relationship in virtual teams. It proposed 
that to effectively manage trust, one needs to identify the stages of the relationship 
and emphasize their bases of trust formation. At the initial stages of a relationship or 
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within the short life span of virtual team collaboration, trust is mainly determined by 
peripheral and situational factors. To enhance presumptive trust, managerial 
emphasis should be placed on providing individuals with strong and clear peripheral 
cues such as well-defined roles, rules, increased reputational capital and illusion of 
control. In the middle stages of a relationship, the cognitive dimension of trust plays 
a critical role in determining one‟s level of trustworthiness in terms of trust. Thus, 
the interacting parties‟ ability, integrity, and benevolence should be emphasized. In 
the later stages of a work relationship, the emotional dimension of trust is critical for 
maintaining a trusting relationship. In this case, managers should strengthen the 
emotional bonds to support habit-enacted trust. Hence, their model integrates the 
different forms of trust and focuses on the dynamic shifts of trust over time. They 
offer managerial strategies for managing trust as follows: 
a. Pay attention to peripheral cues (third party information, dispositional 
trust, rule, category, and role) as individuals have limited prior 
interaction. 
b. Activate team support mechanisms such as team building exercises to 
reduce negative biases and stereotypical attributions by providing chances 
for individuals to build relationships and accumulate personal knowledge 
of each other. 
c. Create well-established rules and patterns of using various 
communications to increase the level of control. 
The shortcomings of their proposed work can be summarised as follows: 
a. The authors are concerned with the importance of well-established rules and 
patterns in conducting communication and collaboration in virtual 
environments. However, they do not provide a detailed explanation of the 
elements or criteria that should be communicated to achieve the agreed goal. 
b. Although the authors incorporate the dynamic nature of trust and recognize 
that different actions are needed for different stages of the relationship‟s life, 
the managerial strategies that they offer seem to be similar for both building 
and maintaining trust. They argue that the strategies can be implemented 
during both the initial relationship and the mature relationship stages. 
However, from the perspective of trust and relationship evolution, we need 
different strategies for each phase of the relationship. 
c. They use the terms „formation‟, „maintenance‟ and „enhance‟ synonymously. 
They do not provide clear definitions to differentiate between these terms. 
Hence, it is not clear with which phase they are actually concerned.  
d. The proposed approach for maintaining trust is applicable to virtual teams or 
virtual organizations, where the participants know each other on a face-to-
face basis. Their method cannot be used for maintaining trust in virtual 
business, where the transacting parties may not necessarily have met each 
other previously.  
e. The last shortcoming is they do not propose a complete methodology since 
they propose three different unrelated factors or variables to manage trust in a 
virtual environment.  
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Pavlou (2002) and Pavlou and Geven (2004) presented three IT-enabled institutional 
mechanisms to engender buyer trust in the B2C E-marketplace. The rules for 
implementing this mechanism are: providing feedback, third party escrow service 
and credit card guarantees. By conducting a survey-based online questionnaire in a 
community of online auction sellers, it shows that a feedback mechanism and third 
party escrow service influence the transaction behaviour of buyers. Pavlou (2002) 
described feedback as an opportunity to react quickly to signals that are sent out by 
others. It means that since the third party agent reveals that one of the trusting parties 
has misbehaved, they can quickly detect and determine what should be done next to 
reach a goal satisfactorily with a balanced solution between them. A content analysis 
and evaluation by an independent expert supports the existence of trust for business 
relationships in virtual environments. Therefore, the availability of this third party 
agent is significant in a trust maintenance effort. It also confirms that perceived 
monitoring by a third party agent as a part of institutional trust can engender trust 
between buyers and sellers in an online B2B relationship. Perceived monitoring is 
defined as „the extent to which buyer organizations believe that the third-party 
monitoring mechanism assures that all transactions in the marketplace are performed 
as expected‟ (Pavlou 2002). This research focuses primarily on the role of the third 
party agent in providing feedback and the importance of control and monitoring in a 
trust-based interaction. However, this research has several shortcomings as follows: 
a. They use the term „engender‟ without providing a clear definition of what 
engenders trust and the characteristic features of a relationship in which trust 
has to be engendered.  
b. The research focuses only on a single factor which is an IT-based institutional 
mechanism by discussing the role of third party assurance and feedback 
mechanism. Hence, it does not provide a complete methodology. 
c. Although this research regards the role of a third party and a feedback 
mechanism for control and monitoring, they do not discuss in detail the role 
of the third party agent in maintaining trust. 
d. The authors do not validate their proposed framework empirically. Hence, the 
validity of their proposed framework is unclear. 
Kong and Hung (2006) propose an integrated model for online trust, and identify the 
fundamental drivers of the online trust attitude formation process by adopting the 
dual cognitive processing notions of the Elaboration Likelihood Model of persuasion. 
They attempt to identify the fundamental drivers of information processes that lead 
to customers‟ trust decisions. They identified two fundamental drivers that aid 
customers in their trust decision-making process: motivation and ability to process 
relevant information. The model provides a basis for understanding the relationships 
between initial and repeat trust. Although their model separates initial and repeat 
trust, they do not propose any differentiating mechanism to distinguish between 
initial trust and repeat trust. They propose only fundamental drivers that lead to trust 
decisions. Therefore, it does not provide a methodology for maintaining trust in 
existing customers. 
Yee (2007) conducted a thorough literature survey on trust management for e-
commerce. Based on the analysis of his literature survey, he proposes seven methods 
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for building and maintaining trust in internet e-commerce. The seven methods which 
are known as approaches in one form or another are as follows: 
a. Branding.  
It proposed that the trustworthiness of the brand will be automatically 
transferred to the product or service in the eyes of the consumer. The 
consumer will also believe that the product or service is trustworthy. 
b. Seal of approval (including privacy seals) 
The appearance of a recognized and trusted party in an e-commerce Web 
site is to show that they are trustworthy. However, existing research 
provides some controversy as to whether consumers are aware of these 
seals and whether they really work as expected. Additional research is 
still needed to examine this factor. 
c. Trustable user interface 
One of the most important factors that influence the trust decisions in 
customer e-commerce is a well-designed visual interface which is 
determined by such factors as design, predictable performance, visual 
interpretation, fulfilling customer expectations and showing technical 
competence. 
d. Trustable sub-providers 
Sub-providers are the secondary providers that a primary provider uses to 
supply one or more components of its service such as payment for the 
service. 
e. Reputation 
The reputation of an e-commerce service provider directly determines 
whether a consumer will trust the provider‟s service. The higher the 
reputation of the provider, the higher the level of trust the consumer will 
have in the service. 
f. Insurance 
Providing insurance to build trust means that insurance policies are in 
place for the market space, to encourage buyer trust and seller trust. 
g. Economic incentives 
The use of economic incentives to build trust in e-commerce refers to 
incentives to purchase such as reduced pricing, more products for the 
same price, or offer of free delivery.  
These seven methods seem to provide a comprehensive approach to building and 
maintaining trust in e-commerce. It accommodates all factors that need to be 
understood and implemented to gain customer trust in carrying out transactions over 
the Internet. It ranges from the technological aspects to the social relationship itself 
and third party involvement. However, as each of the methods is separate from the 
others, we cannot regard it is a methodology. They also do not show in detail how 
each method can be implemented. Additionally, the authors mentioned that this 
method is for information purposes rather than for recommendation. Future research 
is still needed to explore and validate the methods. Similar to other authors in the 
literature (Hung, Dennis et al. 2004, Kong and Hung 2006), they use the terms „trust 
building‟ and „trust maintenance‟ synonymously to refer to the process of trust 
formation. Moreover, the authors do not validate their proposed method empirically. 
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Zhang and Wang (2006) propose a computational model on which the E-commerce 
system can be developed, whereby the trust level will be introduced and assessed 
based on users‟ attitudes, opinions and motivations. The model has two purposes: to 
assess the trust level of existing E-commerce systems and to suggest to the E-
retailers ways to improve the trust level. They proposed a new trust building model 
and e-commerce system which is based on the model. The model is based on the 
assumption that trust level in a relationship is influenced by several factors such as: 
a. Direct Experience which could be from customers, from current context 
and from another trust party. 
b. System Guarantees which includes hardware update, new technology 
introduced, software update and system upgrade. 
c. Digital Credentials from government, business partners or from 
community. 
d. Certificates from a third party agent or evaluation scale 
e. Evaluation/ Recommendation which could be from customer evaluations, 
recommendations, testimonials or complaints.  
The authors developed an ERC
2
G model based on the above factors. This model is a 
mathematical trust model that assigns different weights to each of the information 
sources according to their trustworthiness effect. The authors acknowledged that due 
to the dynamic nature of trust, the trust level is dynamically measured in this model. 
At the beginning, an initial trust level is generated by the model based on e-retailer's 
offline reputations, prior certificates, credentials and system guarantees. Based on the 
initial trust level, any positive support from the five major trust information sources 
will make the current trust level either increase or drop, depending on the value of 
this information. It suggests that the establishment of trust is of necessity a complex 
process that needs to involve more information sources in order to maintain trust 
levels. However, this model has several shortcomings as follows: 
a. They only provide several factors that can be used to maintain trust level 
without any detailed explanations of how to use those factors to maintain the 
trust level. Therefore, it does not provide a methodology for maintaining 
trust. 
b. They have not yet validated their model empirically. This validation should 
be on their next agenda. 
Gao and Wu (2010) proposes a cognitive model of trust in e-commerce based on 
consumer research and the trust literature. They argue that three cognitive 
perceptions which are perceived informativeness, perceived entertainment and 
perceived irritation of online shopping, coupled with trust propensity, contribute to a 
customer's general trust in e-commerce and intention to use e-commerce. Gao and 
Wu conducted a field study in China to validate their research model. It reveals that 
online marketers should pay more attention to those variables (perceived 
informativeness, perceived entertainment and perceived irritation of online shopping) 
in order to nurture consumer's trust in e-commerce. Perceived informativeness is 
defined as a customer's perception of web vendor's benevolence, integrity, 
competence and predictability. For example, complete contact information and a 
return policy add to credibility and also perceived integrity. FAQs and available 
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feedback mechanisms show that the online merchant is concerned about its 
customers‟ opinions and this enhances perceived benevolence.  
 
The second perception, perceived entertainment, is defined as an entertaining 
shopping experience that can enhance the trusting beliefs of a consumer in the 
trustworthiness of e-commerce. For example, a video or animation to demonstrate 
the product increases the perceived entertainment. It not only shows the vendor's 
goodwill in keeping its visitors entertained, but also demonstrates its confidence in 
its product design and delivery. The third perception, perceived irritation, is 
customers‟ perceptions that need to be considered so as to nurture customer trust. 
Online marketers need to control perceived irritation that has a negative impact on 
trust in e-commerce. For example, online vendors sometimes employ tactics such as 
pop-up ads and animated banners that annoy visitors. Visitors‟ feelings of confusion, 
distraction and messiness of online shopping sites may contribute to perceived 
irritation. Therefore, it needs to be controlled. Moreover, trust propensity is a 
personal trait that influences the formation of trust in e-commerce together with 
those three perceived factors. However, this approach has limitations as follows: 
 
a. This research delivers only several factors that influence consumers‟ trust. 
However, the authors have not identified factors that can be used to maintain 
trust. Therefore, it is not a complete methodology for maintaining trust. 
b. They use the terms „building‟ and „nurturing‟ synonymously when they 
actually mean „building trust‟.  
c. The authors do not describe a relationship or trust level condition that 
requires a nurturing of trust. 
d. The applicability of this model is limited to a particular country or 
geographical region. It cannot be generalized to be applicable to another 
country. 
Li et al. (2011) developed a holistic framework for trust which can be used to analyse 
the establishment and maintenance of trust in online transactions. The framework 
systematically illustrates the links between actors, transactional attributes and 
context, and the level of perceived trustworthiness by the actors in a transaction. It 
identifies the key attributes of a transaction and the context in which it is embedded, 
and maps out six types of trust antecedents that can be used to assess the 
trustworthiness of the transaction by different actors. The key attributes are:  
a. Third party certificates; it considers these as an attestation of the attributes of 
a seller from a third party 
b. Reputation systems; it describes these as aggregated feedback based on 
opinions of buyers  
c. Tips and recommendation; the availability of advice, suggestions, guidance to 
increase knowledge of buyers 
d. Dispute services: the availability of services provided by commercial 
organizations to facilitate resolution of disputes between partners 
e. Privacy policy: the availability of policy on providing sensitive personal data 
f. Security policy: the availability of policy on exchanging information and 
payments 
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g. Web site design: quality of graphical design, overall structure due to 
navigation, presentation of sellers, and products/service information. 
h. Communication with buyers; Communication through mail, telephone, and 
online forms 
i. Payment services: payment administration and escrow credits, money-back 
guarantees. 
They conclude that a party in an online transaction will perceive the other 
transactional party, the transactional attributes and its contexts to form trust 
antecedents in trust level calculation. If the trust level is sufficiently high enough, the 
transaction may go ahead. If not, one or both parties may abandon the transaction. 
Therefore, they argued that in order to establish and maintain trust in online 
transactions, the service provider needs to consider these key attributes. 
The main shortcomings of their proposed framework are: 
a. This framework gives an understanding to enable trust in general and in 
online transactions in particular. Although the authors argue that their 
framework can be used to maintain trust, they do not differentiate between 
establishing and maintaining trust. Additionally, they do not provide a 
specific relationship characteristic according to which the trust level has to be 
established and maintained. 
b. The framework is theoretical in nature and the authors provide three 
challenges to validate and refine the framework.  
c. The framework provides the key attributes of an online transaction and the 
embedded context. Since the framework only provides key factors, it is not a 
complete methodology to maintain trust.  
d. They use the terms „building trust‟ and „maintaining trust‟ synonymously 
when actually referring to „building trust‟. 
2.4.2 Process-based (Stage-based) Approach 
We define the process-based research approach as research that is concerned with 
understanding how things evolve over time and why they evolve over time in a 
particular way. Process data consists of anecdotal evidence: who did, what, and 
when. Hence, events, activities, and choices are ordered over time. This research 
approach provides explanations for phenomena in terms of the sequence of events 
leading to an outcome. Temporal ordering and probabilistic interaction between 
entities are important here. Understanding patterns in events is thus the key to 
developing a „process‟ theory. 
Process theories attempt to explain how a process operates and how different events 
induce variables to change states, and often include time-oriented explanations 
(Markus n Robey, 1988; Mohr, 1982; Sabherwal n Robey, 1995). At the extreme, 
process theories can be explained with process flow diagrams or state transition 
diagrams. In this section, we present several approaches in the existing literature that 
can be categorized under process-based research. 
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Javernpaa and Leidner (1999) propose a model of communication behaviour for 
facilitating and maintaining trust in global virtual teams. Facilitating trust occurs in 
the initial relationship stage and maintaining trust occurs later in the life of the 
relationship between members of a virtual team. The models of communication 
behaviours differ for building and maintaining trust. In trust building, the trusted 
agent needs to share social information (such as personal interest, email address, 
mobile number, country of origin, etc) and verbalize the desire to work 
collaboratively. On the other hand, the trusting agent needs to cope with technical 
uncertainty that may be faced in initial contact and present high initiatives (e.g., 
volunteering to complete tasks) to work in a trusted situation. Furthermore, in the 
trust maintenance phase, the trusted agent must be in predictable communication, 
which means guaranteed availability to reply to a task communication from the 
trusting agent. This is in order to provide a substantive and timely response to 
communication with the trusting agent.  Moreover, in the trust maintenance phase, 
this model suggests that the trusting agent and trusted agent should move from a 
procedural orientation to a task orientation. Procedural orientation may include 
frequency of checking e-mail, and how messages will be exchanged during the trust 
building stage. Once this rule has been well established, it will be possible to make a 
successful transition from social orientation to task orientation.  
Their process framework has several shortcomings as follows:  
a. Although this research has considered the evolution of trust by dividing the 
relationship into two stages, facilitating and maintaining, they do not provide 
a clear definition, defining characteristics, or the distinguishing parameters of 
certain relationship characteristics for both of these stages.  
b. The proposed framework at each phase of trust evolution contains only a 
single practice to manage trust, effective communication in virtual 
environment. Therefore, we cannot consider their framework as a complete 
methodology for maintaining trust.  
c. The other shortcoming is that the framework is theoretical in nature and thus 
subject to empirical challenge.  
d. The authors used the term „facilitating‟ and „maintaining‟ synonymously 
when actually referring to „building‟ trust. 
Greenberg et al. (2007) propose actions or steps to develop and sustain trust in virtual 
teams. The actions should be performed by both managers and team leaders. They 
argued that a virtual team has its own life cycle and each stage of the life cycle has 
different strategic requirements. Hence, both managers and team leaders have to 
perform different actions to help members develop and sustain trust through to the 
project‟s successful completion.  (Greenberg, Greenberg et al. 2007) divide the 
virtual team process into five stages: (a) establishing the team; (b) team inception; (c) 
task organizing; (d) transition; (e) accomplishing the service.  
During the first stage, members‟ recruitment, training and clear reward structure is 
needed to build dispositional trust. In the second stage, the introduction of team 
members and team building exercises are actions intended to swiftly build and 
sustain trust. In the third stage, evaluation of member participation and action to 
encourage participation of member to communicate in virtual environments is 
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needed to change the form of trust from ability- and integrity-based to benevolence- 
and integrity-based. Furthermore, in the fourth stage, transition, leaders and 
managers must always be available to support and guide members and shift their 
focus from procedures to task/service accomplishment. In the last stage, the type of 
trust is based more on benevolence and integrity. Team leaders and managers need to 
encourage supportive communication among members in order to successfully 
deliver the service.  
The main drawbacks of their proposed framework are as follows: 
a. This approach proposes a sequence of actions by which manager and team 
leader assist the development of trust during team life cycle. It will facilitate 
how team members accomplishing the service as requested. However, this 
approach has not yet been validated.  
b. The authors propose a conceptual framework for a leader and team member 
relationship but the applicability of their propose work to another domain 
remains questionable.  
c. They do not propose any measurement to show the involvement of trust in the 
degree of service accomplishment. 
d. They use the terms „develop trust‟ and „sustain trust‟ synonymously when 
actually referring to „building trust‟. 
Ishaya and Mundy (2004) propose a mechanism for trust development in a virtual 
community. The process mechanism includes calculative, competence, predictive, 
intentionality and transference. In the first process, virtual community members need 
to define and agree on the interaction rules such as reward and punishment. Once 
virtual members have a set of interaction rules, in the second step, they communicate 
extensively to obtain information about status, level of experience and others 
experience members. The objective of this step is to acquire information about other 
members‟ reputation. The third step, predictive, is the process of frequently 
interacting in regard to task-based issues. Once all members are aware of the 
expertise of others, they will initiate an interaction or transaction based on their 
expert interest. The next step is intentionality. In this step, virtual community 
members become more engaged and they get to know each other closely. It is 
characterised by a high amount of social dialogue, tenure relationship and sharing of 
team goals. The last process is transference where both parties have established basic 
communications and individual propensity, and have information about others. This 
mechanism shows that in trust building, there is a linear progression whereby the 
trusting agent moves from the first to the second process and so on. The trust level 
will increase from one step to the next. In this mechanism, by the end of the process, 
trust will be established between trusting agent and trusted agent. 
The shortcomings of their work can be summarised as follows: 
a. The authors present several different factors for each stage of trust 
evolution. They also state the need to pay attention to the movement of 
the trust level from one step to the next step during the course of the 
relationship. Hence, in each stage, there are different factors to manage 
the condition level of trust. However, their approach does not clearly 
  
Page 58 of 319 
 
provide a mechanism for maintaining the trust level once it moves from 
the lower level to the higher level. 
b. Even though the authors did acknowledge that a mechanism is required to 
maintain trust at every stage, they do not propose or discuss in detail the 
means by which such a mechanism can be implemented. For example, in 
the initial stage, interacting parties should have an agreement about the 
interaction rules. However, they do not explain how both trusting agent 
and trusted agent can reach this agreement. Therefore, it is not a complete 
methodology for maintaining trust in virtual environments. 
c. Finally, the framework is theoretical in nature. It has not been empirically 
validated. 
Kim and Tadisina (2003) present a model of trust development for E-businesses. 
They divided the development of trust into two stages: initial stage and committed 
stage. Initial stage is a stage that occurs during the initial relationship. In the initial 
relationship, the trusting agent will have an initial trust that will be impacted on by 
factors during that first encounter. Once the initial trust has been established, it 
moves into robust trust. Robust trust is present in a committed relationship during the 
committed stage. The factors that impact on robust trust are different from those of 
initial trust. Moreover, in 2005, the authors validated factors impacting on initial trust 
in e-business in their further empirical study (Kim and Tadisina 2005). The results 
provided evidence that the quality of a website has the largest effect on customers‟ 
beliefs that an e-business had competence and goodwill. Other predictors like 
company profile and supporting organizations, had less impact. The authors 
suggested that these results should be used with caution since they were based on 
data gathered under limited conditions. However, they have not yet discussed the 
second stage which is the committed stage. 
The shortcomings of their approach are as follows: 
a. Although this study has separated initial trust and robust trust, and also 
differentiated between initial relationship and committed relationship, the 
main concern of their research is develop a measurement of initial trust which 
can be classified as building trust.  
b. They do not present any mechanism or model for trust management in the 
committed stage. Therefore, it does not provide a complete methodology for 
maintaining trust. 
c. Since the authors acknowledged that the data that they used for validation 
were gathered under limited conditions, the generalization of their framework 
to another condition is limited. 
2.4.3 Hybrid Approach 
We define the hybrid research approach as research that is based on a combination of 
process-based and variance-based methods. To a certain extent, the work contains 
several factors which are structured as ordered actions to achieve certain goals 
(Fidock and Carroll 2009). In this section, we present several approaches in the 
existing literature that use the hybrid approach in their proposals. 
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Wang et al. (2011) built a formal model that considers probability and uncertainty as 
two dimensions of the dynamic nature of trust. It proposes a mechanism by which an 
agent can update the amount of trust it places in other agents on an ongoing basis. 
The authors view trust maintenance as the process of updating trust values. They 
posit that if an agent already has a certain trust value in the other agent, this trust 
value needs to be maintained by updating the information or current evidence about 
the trusted agent‟s behaviour. It could be done by asking referrals to provide the 
evidence on their past or current interaction. Therefore, they termed it as „trust in 
history‟.  
Their approach deals with how to incorporate new evidence in maintaining a trust 
rating. The simulation results show that their proposed approach: (a) provides 
accurate estimates of the trustworthiness of agents that change behaviour frequently 
due to the dynamic nature of trust; and (b) captures the dynamic behaviour of the 
agents. For example, agent A has a trust value toward agent B in a level of „5‟. In one 
point in time, B informs to A about B‟s trust value toward C as „4‟. In such time, A 
has an interaction with C and then A updates his trust value toward C. Based on this 
direct observation and referral information from B, A will update his trust value 
toward „B‟ based on this information and evidence. If referral information is equal to 
direct observation, the evidence is increased. However, if information from referrals 
does not equate to direct observation, conflict is increased. Trust would be 
maintained if evidence increased and conflict decreased.  
This approach concludes with a trust maintenance methodology since the authors 
propose a certain ordered action to update the trust value. They argue that once a 
trusting agent holds a trust value toward a trusted agent, this needs to be maintained 
by updating information. However, their use of the term „trust maintenance‟ is not 
expressed or derived from trust evolution but rather from the process of updating 
trust values from previous interaction or information. Moreover, the updated 
information needs to be gathered from the other agent. If no agent is able to provide 
new evidence or new information, then the trusting agent cannot update or maintain 
the trust value. 
Gwebu et al. (2007) propose a process-based framework that captures the manner in 
which trust develops in the virtual organization setting. The framework explains that 
the hierarchy of trust can be divided into three stages: calculative-based trust, 
knowledge-based trust and institutional-based trust. This conceptual framework 
contains events, activities and mechanisms for each stage. Calculative-based trust is a 
form of trust that is established in the initial relationship. Calculative-based trust is 
built by establishing a clear and effective reward system, establishing an effective 
reputation management system, ensuring a credible punishment and sanction system, 
and developing well-defined relational contracts. A clear reward system will guide 
behaviour and build the reputation of trusting parties. Based on this reputation 
information, the trusting agent will develop trust in the trusted agent. In the second 
stage, knowledge-based trust is the stage in which the trusting agent and trusted 
agent have a sufficient knowledge of each other‟s trust level and reputation. In this 
phase, trusting parties carefully choose partners with which to interact successfully. 
It involves high levels of interactive communication to confirm the knowledge about 
the other party‟s trustworthiness. Trusting agent and trusted agent tend to depend on 
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the behavioural predictability of the involved parties in order to make rational 
judgments. Therefore, knowledge-based trust is an extension of the trust building 
exercise. The last stage is institutional-based trust (IBT).  In this stage, both trusting 
agent and trusted agent have a mutual understanding and appreciate each other‟s 
desires, wants and intentions. The events that can encourage the existence of IBT are 
(a) mutual goal setting (b) creating joint activities to produce product/service, and (c) 
creating a shared value and ideology.  
The shortcomings of this work can be explained as follows: 
a.  They have divided trust into three hierarchy levels and provide several 
interaction characteristics for each level. However, they do not clearly 
distinguish between the building and maintaining stages. 
b. The authors also propose different events and actions at each stage. Those 
events and actions are continuous activities from one phase to the next phase. 
However, they do not propose a complete methodology for maintaining trust 
as they do not make a clear distinction between building trust and 
maintaining trust. 
c. Their framework is theoretical in nature and thus subject to empirical 
challenges.  
Zhang and Zhang (2005) propose an integrated model for the establishment of online 
trust that incorporates both the stage approach and factors approach. Their model is 
based on several theories: Social Exchange Theory, Expectation-Confirmation 
Theory, Theory of Reasoned Action, Theory of Planned Behaviour, and 
Technological Acceptance Management. The model is concerned with trust at 
different stages. The trust relationship is divided into two stages namely, initial stage 
and committed stage. The model also accommodates the dynamicity of trust, 
meaning that initial trust may turn into robust trust after long-term interactions. The 
experience during the robust trust or committed stage may result in either distrust or 
higher trust. The authors then present several factors that contribute to the initial trust 
and robust trust. The factors are derived from the characteristics of the online 
environment which include the trusting agent, trusted agent, system trust belief, 
interaction factors and external environment factors. They concluded that in order to 
gain initial trust and robust trust, different factors would be involved. Although this 
research recognized the different stages of trust and the contributing factors, they do 
not mention how to maintain robust trust. Additionally, as there is no mention of the 
way to implement the contributing factors, they do not provide a methodology for 
maintaining robust trust. Moreover, they do not validate their proposed model 
empirically.  
Winch and Joyce (2006) propose a model that incorporates the dynamic nature of 
trust, arguing the possibility that trust can be lost after being well established. This 
model is designed to prevent loss of customer trust in B2C E-commerce. Once the 
customer makes a decision to proceed with the transaction, this means that s/he has 
initial trust in the vendor. However, during the next stage of the transaction, 
customers may have experience regarding perceived risk in carrying out a virtual 
transaction. This level of trust could change – it may either increase or decrease 
depending on personal experience, extrapolation and hypothesized problems. The 
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company then needs strategic management actions to keep or maintain this customer 
trust based on the three risk determinants. Details of their proposed strategy are as 
follows: 
a. Personal experiences 
Personal experiences are a function of the number of experiences and 
perceived quality of outcome that customers feel they experienced. The 
accumulation of experience will create the quality of experiences in carrying 
out e-transactions. If the customer has been satisfied with past experiences, 
then trust may increase. Repeated positive experiences with online 
transactions will increase the trust level.  
b. Extrapolated problem  
A change in trust level from extrapolation is driven by the customer's 
understanding of technology and their development of a suitable knowledge 
level of technology. Thus, in order to reduce perceived risk based on this 
problem, the provider should provide an information infrastructure to 
increase the customer‟s knowledge about e-transactions. 
 
c. Hypothesized problem 
A hypothesised problem occurs if a customer perceives risk associated with 
the transactions and individual companies that they are dealing with. It will 
be moderated by the actual risks or quantifiable risks. Educational programs 
which aim to reduce perceived risk in e-transactions, perceived risks in 
company, quantifiable risks related to transaction and quantifiable risks 
related to company, are needed to overcome this problem.  
The authors inferred that with those strategies, the service provider should be able to 
change the customer‟s perception of risk. It can be considered as providing a policy 
for risk minimization. However, their work has the following limitations: 
a. Their proposed strategy is intended to provide complete actions for building 
and maintaining trust. However, this work proposes only a conceptual 
strategy without detailed explanation of how to educate customer to decrease 
the perceived risk in carrying out e-transactions. Therefore, it does not 
present a methodology for maintaining trust.  
b. The authors do not describe in detail the particular relationship characteristics 
at each stage of the trust relationship (building and maintaining stage).  
c. They do not validate their proposed conceptual strategy. 
d. The authors used the terms „building trust‟ and „maintaining trust‟ 
synonymously when actually referring to „building trust‟. 
2.5 Strategic Approaches to Maintain Trust in 
Non-Virtual Environments 
In this section, we present and subsequently discuss all the strategies for maintaining 
trust that have been discussed in the existing literature for relationships in non-virtual 
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environments. These relate to inter-organizational and intra-organization 
relationships.  
Babar, Verner et al. (2007) have identified variables that influence the establishment 
and maintenance of trust. By investigating the relationship between a client and 
vendor in the context of outsourcing global software development, they argue that 
initial trust is very important. However, they contend that what is most important is 
that a vendor needs to maintain the trust in ongoing relationships. Business entities 
should pay more attention to activities that maintain trust. Once distrust exists in a 
business relationship, it cannot be rebuilt in a short time. Therefore, constant effort is 
needed to maintain the trust level in any form of business relationship. They maintain 
that several factors play a vital role in maintaining a trust relationship. These factors 
are: effective communication, cultural understanding, provision of capabilities, 
contract conformance, quality and timely delivery, development processes, managing 
expectations, personal relationships and performance of staff. They note that contract 
conformance which includes quality and timely delivery plays a significant role in 
maintaining a trust relationship. With a contract conformance, both parties can 
confirm whether or not they will obey all clauses in the agreement. It will help to 
gain the trust of clients. Contract conformance is defined as an agreement between 
two parties about how they will create a virtual collaboration in software 
outsourcing. 
The main drawbacks of their work are:  
a. Although they have differentiated between establishment and maintenance, 
between initial trust and ongoing trust, they do not provide a clear definition 
of these two terms. Additionally, they do not describe the characteristics of 
each stage of the relationship.  
b. The factors that they proposed for maintaining trust seem to be independent 
of each other. There is no concurrent activity between these factors. 
Moreover, the authors do not clarify any dependencies between these factors. 
Therefore, it is not a complete methodology. 
c. Their proposed model is limited in application to global software 
development outsourcing; thus, it cannot be applied or generalized to virtual 
environments. Therefore, the generalization of their model to another 
relationship context has not been demonstrated. 
d. They use the terms „trust establishment‟ and „trust maintenance‟ 
synonymously when referring to „trust building‟. 
Sako (1998) proposed three sets of approaches to maintain trust in a bilateral 
relationship between supplier and customer. The three sets of approaches are as 
follows: 
a. Favourable and adversarial effects of legalistic remedies. 
Legal procedures such as formalizing contracts and rules are used to attempt 
to restore trust. These procedures may be used as substitutes for interpersonal 
trust which may not be available in organizations due to the absence of a 
history of face-to-face contact. 
b. History of long term trading and rational calculation 
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The availability of historical duration and experience of a relationship is a 
significant in building trustworthiness in business relationships. Furthermore, 
to those who place importance on a rational calculative basis for creating 
cooperation, what matters more than the record of long-term trading, is the 
expectation of long-term commitment into the future.  
c. Gift exchange and Credible Commitments.  
One mechanism for creating informal commitment is for the company to 
provide technical assistance to a customer. To the extent that the company 
demonstrates knowledge and skills by providing technical assistance, it 
enhances the customers‟ trust in the competence of the company. 
Finally, the author argues that trust between trading partners may vary not only with 
the attributes of bilateral transactions, but also with the trading environment in which 
they operate. This environment includes: 
a. Societal culture, politics, regulation, professionalization and national 
institutions.  
b. Industrial environment, the financial system, the national legal tradition and 
system, the systems of industrial relations and skill formation.  
The shortcomings of this work are: 
a. The author proposed best practices that can be implemented in an 
organization to enhance trust. However, she does not provide a detailed 
explanation or concrete mechanism for adhering to the legalities in a contract 
relationship. Moreover, she does not discuss a framework for how to 
calculate the value of trustworthiness based on the information from history 
of trading. Therefore, it is not a methodology for maintaining trust.  
b. Although the author presents empirical research evidence demonstrating how 
these three approaches can enhance trust, this applies only to suppliers of 
automotive parts in USA, Europe and Japan. Hence, we cannot make the 
generalization that this technique would be applicable to other countries and 
other types of business/firm relationships and to virtual environments.  
c. The author uses the term „creation and maintenance‟ of trust when proposing 
the three approaches. Then, in the discussion about survey findings, Sako 
(1998) says that this approach was found to „enhance‟ trust. She uses the 
terms „creation‟, „maintenance‟ and „enhance‟ synonymously. She has 
devised this approach to create, maintain and enhance trust between firms. 
However, each of these terms has a different meaning and activity associated 
with it.  
Ariño, de la Torre et al. (2001) discuss the dynamic nature of relationships from the 
perspective of economic exchange in inter-organizational relationships.  A long-term 
interaction can be seen as a relational exchange and therefore they argued that 
Relational Quality is one of the basic requirements for maintaining trust. The level of 
relational quality will affect the willingness of the parties to rely on trust in their 
everyday transactions.  
The authors then propose four elements to achieve high levels of relational quality or 
high levels of trust in long-term joint venture relationships: 
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a. Initial conditions 
The initial conditions surrounding the exchange determine the degree of 
trustworthiness granted the parties and derived from the partners; inherent 
characteristics, the institutional context within which the alliance exists, their 
respective reputations for fair dealing, and any direct prior experience they 
may have given to each other. 
b. Negotiation process 
Partners approach negotiation processes with a set of expectations for the 
standards of behaviour the other party will hold to, and hope that it will abide 
by those standards. These standards emerge from initial conditions that may 
not be anchored in the reality of any direct experience. The parties will turn 
sense-making processes into assessments of reputations and other person-
based trust. 
c. Partner interactions 
In the course of defining the terms of an alliance, managers are required to 
make decisions regarding the degree of vulnerability, uncertainty and risk 
they are willing to accept. Their willingness to rely on trust and their 
expectations regarding the partner‟s behaviour under diverse circumstances 
play a critical role in managing these issues, and these expectations will be 
subjected to continuous review following the negotiation process. It is the 
level of initial relational quality that will define how the partners interact and 
adjust their willingness to rely on trust as the alliance progresses. 
d. External events 
External events or behaviour outside the context of the alliance can also have 
an impact on the quality of the partners‟ relationship. These events can be 
considered as belonging to one of three types: (a) Systemic: environmental 
changes that affect all parties simultaneously and indiscriminately; (b) 
Corporate: wherein one of the partners is involved in matters that affects its 
reputation for fair dealing in other circumstances or with other partners, and 
(c) Individual: where one or more persons directly involved in partner-
interface participate in actions outside the partnership that influence either 
their own or their firm‟s reputation for fair dealing. 
However, their proposed work has several shortcomings as follows: 
1. This study considers only those elements necessary to maintain a high level 
of trust between organizations. These elements constitute a process to create a 
high quality of organizational relationship. Starting with discussion about 
how to observe initial conditions among parties, the negotiation process and 
then partner interaction. However, there is no detailed discussion of how to 
observe initial trust, how to negotiate and how to conduct the interaction in an 
appropriate manner. Therefore, it does not provide a methodology for 
maintaining the trust level condition. 
2. These four elements for creating a high level of relational quality apply only 
to the management of trust in corporate alliances. Therefore, these elements 
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or requirements cannot be applied to other types of interactions including 
those in virtual environments. 
3. This article is based on conceptualization only. The authors do not provide 
any empirical evidence to support their concept. Therefore, in order to prove 
that those elements are a basic requirement for high levels of relational 
quality, a validation of these proposed elements is needed. 
4. The authors use the terms „creating trust‟ and „building trust‟ synonymously 
without clearly defining each of these. They also do not provide the 
relationship characteristics of these two phases. 
Lamsa and Pucetaite (2006) argue that trust among employees is not inherent, but 
senior management can nurture it with the help of appropriate and context sensitive 
managerial practices. They take into account the procedural approach to explain why 
management should develop organizational trust especially where there is low work 
morale among employees. The procedural approach to trust development suggests 
that cognition-based as well as emerging affect-based organizational trust can be 
developed by managerial practices to initiate fellow partnership in a socio-cultural 
context where the general level of work morale is low. They define a „fellow 
partnership‟ as the relationship between management and employees. Fellow 
partners do not need to fight for their interests, or go to the barricades, but aim for 
consensual agreement through rational and empathetic dialogue. Fellow partners 
have both explicit and tacit knowledge about each other, can predict each other‟s 
actions in a certain situation and plan future activities relying on the congruence of 
the partner‟s value. 
The stages of the procedural approach to the development of organizational trust and 
the key managerial practices appropriate for advancing trust at each stage are the 
following: 
 Stages process Condition and Actions 
1. The relationship of opposing 
parties 
Employees know that they are continuously 
controlled and monitored, and punishment 
is inevitable if they do not obey  
organizational rules and norms 
 Key managerial practice to move to 2
nd
 stage  is making a strategic choice: 
consistent, fair and reliable rewards 
2. Calculators For the management, this means that there 
must be a knowledge about the employees‟ 
values and preferences so that adequate 
rewarding practices can be created and 
necessary practices for trust building can be 
constructed 
 To move to 3
rd
 stage: Enabling prediction through regular and open 
organizational communication 
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3. Acquaintances Management and employees learn to know 
each other and can predict one another‟s 
actions to a reasonable extent 
 To move to 4
th
 stage: Empowering employees‟ participation 
4. Moral acquaintances When standards for behaviour in a firm are 
clearly defined, reasoned and known to 
employees as well as influenced by them. 
 To move to 5
th
 stage; Enhancing organizational dialogue and searching for 
value congruence in organization 
5. Fellow partners Management proceed to build trust by 
showing care and consideration of the 
employees‟ interests 
In general, the authors argue that trust building is an ongoing process that must be 
initiated, maintained and continuously authenticated. However, this proposed work 
has several shortcomings as follows: 
a. Their approach is theoretical in nature. They do not validate their proposed 
framework. Therefore, their contribution and the developed model of a 
procedural approach require empirical investigation. 
b. Although they recognize the developmental stages of trust in an interaction 
between employees intra-organization, and suggest actions that should be 
taken by senior management to move the trust level from the previous stage 
to the next stage, they do not discuss in detail how to translate these elements 
into concurrent activities. Therefore, their work does not provide a complete 
methodology for maintaining trust. 
c. Their approach is applicable to a situation where both parties physically meet 
in a physical environment; hence, outward physical signs of trustworthiness 
information are easy to collect. Therefore, it is a challenge to apply their 
framework to virtual environment. 
d. They used the terms „building trust‟ and „maintaining trust‟ synonymously 
which on closer examination refers to „building trust‟. 
Pucetaite and Lamsa (2008) argue that the development of trust in organizations can 
be stimulated by raising the level of work ethic with organizational practice. They 
explain that work ethics are moral principles, norms and rules that guide a person‟s 
behaviour in the work place. Moreover, work ethics play a role as principles, 
particularly compliance with quality standards, self-discipline and commitment to 
professional norms and the job itself. Furthermore, they conclude that these features 
can be expected to contribute to workplace trustworthiness due to a lower risk of 
negative work attitude and deviant behaviour. Hence, Pucetaite and Lamsa (2008) 
assume that when the work ethic in a given society is low, organizational trust will 
also be lower, and in this case of high work ethic, organizational trust will also be 
higher. Accordingly, the idea of enhancing the work ethic and consequently 
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developing organizational trust through management practices is of particular interest 
to societies.  
An outcome from Lamsa and Pucetaite‟s work is based on Human Resource 
Management practices. This view is also held by Gillespie and Mann (2004). 
According to Gillespie and Mann (2004), transformational leadership and shared 
value may build trust in a leader. Common values are believed to guide behaviour. 
Sharing common values helps team members to predict how a leader will act in the 
future, and gives them the assurance that the leader is unlikely to act contrary to the 
shared values. Moreover, a common vision aligns leaders and team members‟ actions 
and focuses them on the achievement of shared goals. Goal-directed values motivate 
behaviour and help team members to predict the leaders‟ future behaviour. By 
engaging in these leadership practices, the leader is both placed in a position of 
vulnerability and demonstrates trust in team members. These practices require the 
leader to openly communicate his/her ideas, vision and values, and delegate power 
and responsibility to team members. The trust that the leader conveys to team 
members through these actions, encourages the reciprocation of trust by team 
members.  
Similar to Gillespie and Mann (2004), Connell, Ferres et al. (2003) also proved that 
managers can influence trust in their relationships with subordinates with the 
adoption of a transformational leadership orientation, by ensuring that procedural 
justice emerges and that employees are supported at every organizational level. The 
principle variables used in this study have repeatedly been established as having 
important consequences for organizational effectiveness. As such, these results 
reinforce the importance of creating and maintaining trust within manager-
subordinate relationships while holding significant implications for both managers 
and human resource professionals. Specifically, these results suggest that 
organizations should adopt approaches that engender perceived organizational 
support and procedural justice between the various constituents, policies and 
procedures of their organization in addition to focusing attention on relationships at 
various levels and leadership orientation.  
In addition, Six and Sorge (2008) explored the organizational policies which have 
been deliberately devised and are successful in encouraging trusting and trustworthy 
behaviour. Also, attention is paid especially to human resource management 
practices (selection, initiation, socialization, training, career management) and 
organizational policies (handling of interdependencies, attribution of roles, 
sanctioning of behaviour, organization of workflow and teams). Furthermore, they 
argue that interpersonal trust building is an interactive process in which individuals 
learn or unlearn to establish and maintain trustworthiness, under given organizational 
(contextual and structural) settings, and subject to policies directly or indirectly, 
positively or negatively sanctioning the building of interpersonal trust. Therefore, 
they argue that stable intentions for behaviour can be stimulated by durable policies, 
structures and contextual settings.  
However, the works by several authors (Connell, Ferres et al. 2003; Gillespie and 
Mann 2004; Lamsa and Pucetaite 2006; Pucetaite and Lamsa 2008; Six and Sorge 
2008) as discussed above offer only some organizational practices, policies and 
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procedures or conditions to create, build, engender and maintain leader-subordinate 
trusting relationships. They also use „create‟, „build‟, „engender‟ and „maintain‟ 
trustworthiness synonymously. Therefore, it does not provide a complete 
methodology for maintaining organizational trust. 
Moreover, similar to the shortcomings of other research, they use the terms 
„creating‟, „building‟ and „maintaining‟ synonymously and do not make a distinction 
between them. All of the above work identifies factors for building and some of them 
identify factors to maintain trust (Sako 1998; Ariño, de la Torre et al. 2001; Babar, 
Verner et al. 2007). None of them provides a methodology for maintaining trust. As 
mentioned previously, the primary thrust of the work presented above is on building 
or in some cases maintaining organizational trust (Sako 1998; Ariño, de la Torre et 
al. 2001; Babar, Verner et al. 2007). The applicability of this work to maintaining 
trust in virtual business environments has not been investigated by researchers. 
Velez, Sanchez et al. (2008) assert that MCSs (Management Control Systems) will 
be effective only in the early stage of relationships. However, by using a longitudinal 
case study, Velez, Sanchez et al. (2008) provide evidence that MCSs can build trust, 
even when trust is well-established. Action controls (e.g., electronic integration and 
norms) improved the amount and quality of information available. Result controls 
also enhanced members‟ mutual knowledge through the participation they 
developed. Therefore, MCSs create a frame where information about competence 
and ability is transferred, and in turn builds competence-based trust Sako (1992). 
Moreover, Sako (1992) states that MCSs presented the same information and 
evidence with a wider objectivity that knowledge transfer enhanced trustee abilities 
and competences. Some practices such as surveying the satisfaction level of the 
trusting agent and sustainable communication demonstrate the competence of the 
trusted agent in providing service. It also shows the ability to complement the needs 
of the trusting agent and indicates areas for improvement. 
Additionally, Das and Teng (1998) argue that the basic roles of trust, control, and 
confidence level are important in any type of business alliance based on trust. Das 
and Teng (1998) offer four key techniques for trust building in alliances which are: 
evaluation of risk taking, equity preservation, effective communication and inter-
firms adaptation. Moreover, similar with (Sako 1998; Velez, Sanchez et al. 2008), 
Das and Teng (1998) also argue that a control mechanism is important for trust 
building in strategic alliance. There are three specific control mechanisms that are 
relevant to strategic alliances: goal setting, structural specification and organizational 
blending. Goal setting improves control because business parties have agreed to this 
goal.  With this goal commitment, they will use a structural specification to perform 
and deliver a task. Hence, an organizational blending that involves the two business 
parties seems reliable. Trust and control have a similar effect on the success of 
business alliances. 
On the other hand, Long and Sitkin (2006) examine the ways to balance 
interpersonal trust-building and control-based efforts in order to maintain trust. They 
focus their explanations on task controls, which range from formal mechanisms 
(written contracts, monetary incentives and surveillance), to informal mechanisms 
(values, norms and beliefs) for building trust. The trusting agent can use those 
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mechanisms to direct the trusted agent toward the efficient and effective completion 
of tasks. There are various points in the production process where the trusting agent 
alters its control applications to direct the trusted agent task: firstly, input controls, 
which are material production resources. Secondly, process controls, by controlling 
trusted agent performance to ensure that they employ prescribed task production 
methods and thirdly, output controls by measuring the outputs of trusted agent 
produce against established metrics to ensure that prescribed performance standards 
are met. Therefore, based on these arguments, both trusting parties should combine 
trust building and task control activities that are appropriate for the task and 
relational contexts they encounter, thereby helping to ensure that goals are 
accomplished and that positive trust level in relationships are developed and 
maintained. This approach uses the control theory to build and maintain trust. In 
process controls and output controls, both parties will control each other‟s 
performance to ensure that they perform as prescribed in the task description.  
All the above works by (Das and Teng 1998; Long and Sitkin 2006; Velez, Sanchez 
et al. 2008) are mainly concerned with the factors of balancing trust and control 
mechanisms for building and maintaining trust. However, their works have several 
shortcomings as follows: 
a. They use the terms „building‟ and „maintaining‟ trust synonymously without 
provide a clear distinction between these terms. Moreover, on closer 
examination, both of these two terms actually refer to „building‟ trust. 
b. They present the main factor for building and maintaining trust which is 
control monitoring, without providing a detailed explanation of a mechanism 
for this control monitoring. Therefore, they do not provide a complete 
methodology for maintaining trust. 
c. Their work focuses on the relationship between organizations in non-virtual 
environments. Therefore, the applicability of their framework to the virtual 
environments is unclear. 
d. Most of their proposed model is based on theoretical concept. They do not 
empirically validate their proposed model. 
2.6 Integrative Review of Approaches to 
Maintain Trust in Virtual Environments 
and Non-Virtual Environments 
In this section, we establish a critical evaluation of existing approaches to trust 
maintenance which were discussed in the previous section. We carry out an 
integrative critical review to determine the main issues that need to be addressed in 
this thesis. As a general conclusion, no work to date has proposed a complete 
methodology for maintaining trust in virtual environments. The existing literature 
provides several factors, variables, practices, events and actions to maintain trust 
with little or no empirical proof that these can actually maintain trust. Some of the 
literature proposed similar factors or variables or even best organizational practices. 
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The most common factors or variables or practices that have been suggested in the 
literature to maintain trust are as follows: 
a. Effective communication between trusting agent and trusted agent to derive 
trustworthiness information  
b. Common business understanding 
c. Neutral party support 
d. Control and monitoring 
e. Service / Relationship Quality 
f. Website Quality 
g. Company Reputation 
h. Security, privacy and familiarity 
The meta-literature analysis in Table 2.1 below summarizes the existing literature on 
approaches for trust maintenance. Table 2.1 also presents whether the existing 
literature addresses the following questions: 
Q1: Do they make a distinction between the terms „building trust‟ and „maintaining 
trust‟? 
Q2: Do they propose a methodology to maintain trust? 
Q3: Do they validate their proposed model / framework? 
 
No References 
Critical Evaluations 
Factors/Variables/Practices Questions 
a b c d e f g h Q1 Q2 Q3 
1. (Balasubramanian, Konana et al. 2003)  v v      no no no 
2. (Xiao and Wei 2008) v    v    no no no 
3. (Iacono and Weisband 1997) v        no no no 
4. (Hung, Dennis et al. 2004)  v v      no no no 
5. (Pavlou 2002; Pavlou and Geven 2004)   v v     no no yes 
6. (Kong and Hung 2006)     v v   no no yes 
7. (Yee 2007)   v      no no no 
8.  (Zhang and ZhenWang 2006)   v      no no no 
9. (Gao and Wu 2010) v        no no yes 
10. Li et al. (2011) v  v   v v v no no no 
11. (Javernpaa and Leidner 1999) v  v      no no no 
12. (Greenberg, Greenberg et al. 2007) v v v  v    no no no 
13. (Ishaya and Mundy 2004) v v       no no no 
14.  (Kim and Tadisina 2003; Kim, Yum et 
al. 2005; Kim and Kim 2009) 
     v v  no no yes 
15. (Zhang and Zhang 2005)   v   v v v no no no 
16. (Gwebu, Wang et al. 2007) v v     v  no no no 
17. (Winch and Joyce 2006)     v v   no no no 
18. (Babar, Verner et al. 2007) v v   v    no no yes 
19. (Sako 1998) v   v     no no no 
20. (Ariño, de la Torre et al. 2001)     v    no no no 
21. (Lamsa and Pucetaite 2006)  v v   v    no no no 
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22. (Pucetaite and Lamsa 2008) v        no no no 
23. (Gillespie and Mann 2004) v v       no no no 
24. (Six and Sorge 2008) v        no no no 
25. (Long and Sitkin 2006)    v     no yes no 
26. (Das and Teng 1998)    v     no no no 
27. (Kusari, Cohen et al. 2005)    v     no no no 
28. (Kartseva, Gordijn et al. 2006)    v     no no no 
29. (Kabadayi and Ryu 2007)    v     no no no 
30. (Velez, Sanchez et al. 2008)    v     no no yes 
31. (Vlaar, Bosch et al. 2007)    v     no no no 
Total 
15 8 9 9 7 5 4 2    
a b c d e f g h    
 
Table 2.1: Critical review of the existing literature on trust maintenance 
Based on the summary of critical reviews in Table 2.1 above, we conclude that 
several authors have proposed a model or framework for trust maintenance by 
defining factors/variables/actions/mechanisms. However, the existing literature treats 
factors/variables/mechanisms in isolation and fails to present a methodology for 
maintaining trust. The methodology for maintaining trust should comprise 
factors/variables/mechanisms to maintain trust. In some cases, they provide a 
detailed clarification of events and actions, although most of them propose only a 
single event and action. Therefore, the major shortcomings of the existing literature 
can be summarised as follow: 
a. None of them proposes a complete methodology to maintain trust. 
b. Although they propose or identify a single important factor to maintain trust, 
they do not provide a detailed explanation of how to convert this factor into 
real action to maintain trust. 
c. They use the terms „building‟, „developing‟, „maintaining‟, „nurturing‟, 
„enhance‟, „foster‟ synonymously without any further effort to define these 
terms more precisely. They do not make any distinction between them. Based 
on the trust evolution theory, there should be several different factors for 
building and maintaining trust. Since they are different, a strategy or model to 
address this also should be different. 
d. Most of them are theoretical in nature and do not provide empirical evidence 
or validation. 
e. Some of them focus on a limited geographical setting and hence do not 
provide a generic method which can be applied broadly across domains and 
situations. 
In this thesis, we intend to provide a complete methodology comprising factors, 
variables, practices, events and actions to maintain trust. Our methodology comprises 
frameworks to maintain trust as follows: (a) the selection of a neutral agent; (b) the 
importance of a common business understanding; (c) the role of control and 
monitoring, (d) reward and incentive for successful of service delivery and (e) a 
mechanism for trust re-calibration. In the next section, we summarise and 
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subsequently discuss the associated problems in the existing literature related to each 
framework. 
2.6.1 The Involvement of Neutral Party as Independent Agent 
In the previous discussion, it has been argued by (Javernpaa and Leidner 1999; 
Papadopoulou 2001; Balasubramanian, Konana et al. 2003; Zhang and Zhang 2005; 
Zhang and ZhenWang 2006; Greenberg, Greenberg et al. 2007; Papadopoulou 2007) 
that the involvement of a third party agent as a neutral agent in such interaction can 
be used to preserve the existing level of trust. This is because the third party agent is 
a neutral and independent agent. As also suggested by Kasper-Fuehrer and 
Ashkanasy (2004), virtual environments are environments described as a network in 
which there is no formal and hierarchical authority between parties. Hence, it needs a 
network broker or third party agent to mediate between agents as the complexity of 
the relationship increases. In order to gain maximum benefit from the relationship, 
for trust maintenance purposes in virtual environments, both parties (trusting agent 
and trusted agent) need a third party agent as neutral party. This broker has a role as 
an independent and unbiased agent to monitor the trust relationship between virtual 
agents. The role of this agent is to advocate or mediate or judge and resolve conflicts 
or disagreements during the interaction. Moreover, in virtual worlds, rules of life are 
governed by contract. In virtual environments, the trusting agent designs a contract 
with each trusted agent. This contract or mutually agreed to behaviour establishes the 
rules of interaction between trusting agent and trusted agent. The role of the third 
party is to protect both parties if either intends to exploit the relationship. However, 
there is no literature that discusses in detail who the third party agent should be and 
how to select this third party agent from a virtual environment.  
As was discussed in the previous section, Balasubramanian, Konana et al. (2003) 
suggest that customers rely strongly on the availability of other institutions to 
generate trust and security in conducting business with online service providers. 
Their research on online investing suggests that investors feel secure if there is a 
third party institution such as the SEC (Security and Exchange Commission) that is 
involved in their business relationship with an online service provider. This SEC has 
a role as a safeguard institution that protects both parties from malicious practices 
between them. Customers‟ secure feeling leads to trust perceptions toward the 
service provider (trusted agent). However, this kind of third party is derived from 
hard trust perspective which represents information derived from security 
mechanisms such as identity keys, credentials and certificates. 
Javernpaa et al. (1999), Greenberg, Greenberg et al. (2007) also propose the role of a 
neutral party to develop and maintain the trusting relationship between trusting agent 
and trusted agent. An intermediary is an agent who acts as a link between trusting 
agent and trusted agent in order to try to bring about an agreement or reconciliation. 
Although business entities may never or rarely meet in person, they have an interest 
in relating to their partners virtually because it is beneficial to both of them. The 
main objective of this neutral agent is to establish trust for maintenance purposes in 
the relationship between two parties. This neutral agent is called „an arbitrator agent‟. 
The primary role of this agent is to act as an intermediary between the trusting 
parties. They are independent and provide their service either for free or for a fee 
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depending on the volume of business transaction, the duration of relationships and 
the level of trust that has been already established between both parties. This 
intermediary role involves conflict resolution and ensuring the satisfaction of both 
trusting agent and trusted agent.  
Basically, negotiation between both parties without the involvement of a third party 
is a better option when any conflict or disputes of contract arise during the 
relationship. However, even if the parties are willing to negotiate for purposes of 
conflict resolution, it may take a long time, even several days, to overcome their 
differences and arrive at a mutually satisfactory and practical solution. Moreover, it 
is a solution that is more likely to actually work because they reached it themselves. 
It may not be perfect, but it was not forced upon them by someone else who has not 
experienced the situation. However, due to the time limit to finish work in virtual 
environments and relationship constraints, mediation should be considered as an 
option. It may not be successful in every case; however, it is a real solution. The 
essence of mediation is compromise.  It also does not mean that both parties lack 
faith in their case. The purpose of this mediation is for the trusting parties to be 
willing to work in a more economical, successful or satisfying manner. It also means 
that the parties wishing to use mediation want to maintain control of the outcome.  
A successful mediation by the third party agent is one that resolves the conflict in a 
way that is acceptable to all the trusting parties.  This does not mean that one or the 
other of the parties gets everything that it wants.  On the contrary, the result is 
usually that neither party gets everything that it desires.  But, this third party agent 
makes a decision as to what it can accept and live with, and what the trusting agent 
and trusted agent can give up or do without.  Therefore, both parties decide how the 
matter will be resolved, and they should agree with the third party agent who will 
help them work with the other side to resolve it. 
However, the existing literature which proposes the involvement of a third party 
agent, primarily discusses the involvement of a third party agent from the perspective 
of hard trust such as that proposed by (Zhang and ZhenWang 2006; Yee 2007). In 
this thesis, we propose the involvement of a third party agent in an interaction 
between trusting agent and trusted agent to maintain their trust level. We also 
propose mechanisms for third party agent selection and for the resolution of any 
conflict that arises. In Chapter 4, we present an overview of the problem solutions. 
2.6.2 The Availability of Common Business Understanding 
As pointed out by several researchers (Babar, Verner et al. 2007; Gwebu, Wang et al. 
2007; Khalfan, McDermott et al. 2007), a well-defined relational contract is one of 
the most important factors in building and maintaining trust in virtual environments.  
Babar et al. (2007) noted that contract conformance which includes quality and 
timely delivery plays a significant role in maintaining trust relationships. With a 
contract conformance, both parties (trusting agent and trusted agent) can confirm 
whether or not they have abided by all clauses in the business agreement. A contract 
additionally serves the purpose of benchmarking the performance. Moreover, 
Khalfan, McDermott et al. (2007) also argue that contract and agreement are the 
foundation for a trusting business relationship. These contracts may be either formal 
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or informal. A formal contract may include some agreement between parties 
regarding mutually agreed behaviour, profit sharing, responsibilities and obligations.  
In addition, trust in virtual environments may increase as a result of repeated service 
experiences (experience base). It means that the trusting agent (e.g. customer) will 
have a high level of trust in the trusted agent (service providers) after a certain 
number of interactions. This is because the trusting agent does not have a set of pre-
consumption expectations of service quality in online environments (Zeithaml, 
Parasuraman et al. 2000). Perceptions of service providers‟ competence (operational 
competence) as a part of trust dimensions are mostly pertinent when trust is formed 
through repeated interactions (McKnight and Chervany 2006). In contrast, in 
traditional environments, a trusting agent usually engenders trust by observing a 
service provider‟s competence and ability to deliver a requested service (observation 
base). Therefore, Balasubramanian, Konana et al. (2003) argue that agreed 
regulations that govern business interactions between trusting agent and trusted agent 
will help to maintain their trust level. 
Moreover, Saphiro (1987) stated that the need to produce institutional structures that 
administer business activities is higher when there is a minimal personal relationship 
between trusting agent and trusted agent. In the trust field, situational normality and 
structural assurance are bases form of institution-based trust (McKnight and 
Chervany 2006). Situational normality is defined as the proper ordering of cognitive 
cues. Hence, we argue that a formal contract which contains cognitive signals 
between trusting agent and trusted agent is an expression of ordered activities that 
should be met in business activities. It is also a structural assurance that enhances 
trading security in virtual environments. Therefore, when security is perceived by 
trusting agents to be high, they may assign high levels of trust in the trusted agent, 
though they are in the limited number of personal relationship. It can be concluded 
that a formal agreement is an institutional structure that should be established in 
order to facilitate trust maintenance. Balasubramanian, Konana et al. (2003) suggest 
that customers rely strongly on the trust that leads to security provided by regulatory 
bodies in online business transactions.  
Therefore, by designing and agreeing to contracts, agreements and regulations, 
business parties may implicitly set their service standards for trust maintenance in a 
business relationship. There are some reasons why a legal common business 
understanding such as Service Level Agreement (SLA) is important in the online 
environments. First, the virtual nature of interactions can increase discrepancies in 
information. Hence, regulatory guidelines may help parties to maintain acceptable 
levels of performance during their relationship. Second, trusting agent and trusted 
agent may implement business procedures that protect both parties from any 
deleterious effects of the high volume of trade in business and high market 
instability. 
For this reason, a formal agreement is essential in an interaction as a foundation for 
trust maintenance. In order to establish an agreement regarding a business contract, 
negotiation between, and the participation of, both parties is an important step. Pruitt 
(1983) stated that negotiation is a process in which negotiator parties interact and 
communicate to discuss how to distribute and redistribute work resources and 
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commitment. Moreover, Bichler (2003) described negotiation as an iterative 
decision-making process between two or more agents (parties or their 
representatives). The parties exchange information, starting with detailed offers, 
counter offers and arguments, deal with interdependent tasks, and search for an 
agreement which is a decision resulting from cooperation and conciliation 
(Aikebaier, Enokido et al. 2009; Aikebaier, Barolli et al. 2011).  
As discussed in the previous section, several researchers argued that a common 
business understanding is important in the virtual context. In a virtual interaction, the 
specifications of common business understanding need to be communicated clearly 
between both parties to achieve a mutual agreement. The task specifications can be 
achieved by negotiating relational contracts that guide the formation, operation, and 
dissolution of the virtual business relationship. It is, therefore, conducive to 
maintaining the level of trust. However, none of the existing literature provides a 
detailed explanation of the means by which this negotiation in terms of a common 
business understanding can be carried out.  
Hence, it is incumbent upon the trusting agent and trusted agent to develop their own 
(formal or informal) guidelines for their relationship in virtual environments. Such 
agreements may include clarification of members‟ tasks and responsibilities, 
agreement on service criteria, deadline for service delivery, rewards and punishment. 
In this sense, clear guidelines, spelled out in an early stage of the partnership, serve 
to minimise misperceptions and to foster the establishment and maintenance of trust 
(Handy 1995; Kusari, Cohen et al. 2005). However, based on the thorough review 
conducted and documented in this thesis, none of these works proposes a mechanism 
by which both trusting agent and trusted agent can reach this agreement contract. 
Such a specification of the set of agreed business activities is extremely important in 
virtual environments (in particular), as it would:  
a. Enable both the interacting parties to determine or discover the business 
requirements of the interacting partner. 
b. Enable each interacting party to make a judgment about whether the service 
capabilities being offered by its interacting partner would be sufficient for its 
business requirements from the interaction. 
c. Provide clear criteria according to which the assessment process would be 
carried out. 
In addition, we have conducted a thorough survey of the existing literature on the 
negotiation process used to reach an SLA. For example, Da-Yin and Chung-Liang 
(2005) proposed an autonomous negotiation to reach SLA with guaranteed Quality of 
Services in Service Negotiation Protocols. The protocol of Service Negotiation is as 
follows: (a) a service provider formulates a constrained resource allocation for a 
service requester; (b) if the service provider can meet the requirements of the service 
consumer, contracting between both parties then follows; (c) if the service consumer 
is not satisfied with the requirements, the consumer can change his/her requirements 
and negotiate with the service provider for a further three times; and (d) after three 
attempts at re-negotiation, if there is still no solution to meet the requirements, a 
service consumers may seek alternatives. Although Da-Yin and Chung-Liang (2005) 
proposed a service negotiation process, the primary shortcoming is that there is no 
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framework for formulating the service requirements. Moreover, only one party 
(service provider) formulates a constrained resource allocation. In addition, the SLA 
that they reached is not for trust maintenance purposes and the iterative negotiation 
between service consumers and service provider is limited to three times only.  
Yan et al. (2007) proposed an autonomous negotiation process for service 
composition provision. This autonomous negotiation aims to reach an agreement on 
service quality between service requester and multiple providers who offer various 
services in the composition. The negotiation process which could be agent-based or 
Web-based is as follows: (a) both parties reserve their values; (b) request an initial 
call for a proposal; (c) conduct an iterated negotiation between both parties; (d) both 
parties may select the best overall deal; (e) return to best deal (f) check overall QoS 
(g) confirm / amended reserve values, and (h) accept / reject proposal. Once the 
proposal satisfies the overall QoS, then the parties reach an agreement. The 
negotiation process of this work considers a similarity value between the service 
provider and the service consumer. However, they do not propose a framework to 
articulate and formulate the value of service requirements that they will exchange. 
Moreover, the agreement that they reach is not for trust maintenance purposes.  
Huang et al. (2010) suggested a four-phase negotiation process between buyer and 
seller in e-commerce. They proposed a multiple-attributes negotiation model for B2C 
e-commerce which will facilitate automated negotiation of agreement in buying and 
selling. The four phases of negotiation are: (a) information collection, (b) search, (c) 
negotiate the requirements, and (d) evaluate the service requirements. The SLA 
negotiation process in this work includes information collection about service 
requirements and both parties are involved in the process to negotiate the 
requirements. However, the requirements are collected without any pre-defined 
service requirement formalization. In addition, the SLA between buyer and seller is 
not for trust maintenance purposes.  
On the other hand, Abedin, Kuo-Ming et al. (2009) also proposed a framework for 
agenda-based negotiation between service provider and service consumer to reach an 
SLA in such e-commerce transactions. The process of negotiation to reach the SLA 
is as follows: 
a. Both parties (service provider and service consumer) collect opinions about 
QoS  
b. Enter the process for ordering requirement preferences 
c. Provide individual priority order in different formats 
d. Uniform representation based on fuzzy preference relations 
a. Meet to determine preference ordering relations 
b. Rank the preference issue 
c. Start to negotiate based on agenda that is clearly stated in the previous step. 
d. Either accept or reject the SLA  
This negotiation process takes into account the collection of opinions about QoS 
from both parties so as to acquire a better knowledge about their respective service 
requirements. However, there is no framework for articulating and formalizing their 
service requirements. 
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Watanabe et al. (2010) proposed a requirement negotiation process for the design of 
cooperative service engineering. Firstly, both parties need to state their own service 
parameters. If there are any disparities regarding these parameters, the parties enter 
into a service requirement negotiation process. The process of service requirement 
negotiation is as follows: (a) specify contradicting requirement; (b) prioritize 
contradicting requirements to negotiate first; and (c) adjust the contradicting 
requirements. In this work, both parties have a chance to state their own service 
requirements. However, there is no framework for formalizing the service 
requirements. Moreover, the purpose of the negotiation is not to reach an SLA, but to 
engineer a cooperative service between both parties.  
Based on the survey above, we conclude that no literature proposes any mechanism 
for concluding the „specification of set of agreed business activities‟ for trust 
maintenance.  Apart from the importance of agreeing to an SLA, from the trust 
maintenance perspective, the following properties are unique: 
a. Since the level of trust between the interacting parties is high, one of the 
interacting parties (or possibly both) may be willing to negotiate, consider or 
agree to the business requirements of the interacting party. 
b. Given the special nature of relationship in trust maintenance, the parties may 
need to go through repeated or iterative negotiation on service criteria, before 
agreement is reached. 
c. Each interacting party would need to clearly determine and subsequently 
articulate what are its business requirements from the interacting party. 
In the existing literature, it is clear that there is no framework or methodology for 
agreeing on an SLA for trust maintenance, that takes into consideration the above 
requirements. Although the existing literature (Lau 2006; Yan, Kowalcyk et al. 2007; 
Zulkernine, Martin et al. 2009) provides many discussions on creating the SLA 
between service provider and service requester, none of them discusses any pre-
activities such as service formalization and service negotiation to reach an SLA. 
From the trust maintenance perspective, one may consider the SLA as a draft of the 
capability and willingness to meet standards requirements that both Easy Phones and 
Angela have agreed to. It also contains any strategies and tactics that they agree upon 
in order to conclude the service task. Therefore, service formalization and service 
negotiation are important steps in determining the SLA.  
However, in the existing literature, there is no framework with which an agent can 
formalize its service requirements. The formalization of service requirements would 
enable each interacting party to clearly determine and articulate its particular 
requirements. Furthermore, this would enable each interacting party to discover what 
the other interacting agent wants. We propose service formalization as a step or a 
process of articulating the business requirements of both the interacting parties. Once 
the service formalization has occurred, then the interacting parties can negotiate the 
service requirements between themselves. Each interacting party should know the 
service criteria that they want in their interaction.  In the existing literature, there is 
no mechanism by which either of the interacting parties can formalize their service 
requirements. Hence, the interacting parties are not in a position to discover the 
service requirements of their interacting partner. Therefore, there is the need for a 
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structured model and method whereby the service provider‟s and service requester‟s 
requirements can be ascertained.  
Moreover, in the existing body of works, there is only a limited discussion of a 
negotiation process by which both trusting parties can discuss their service 
requirements. Most of the literature considers negotiation as a process to satisfy or 
meet service requirements from the service requesters‟ perspective only. However, 
for trust maintenance purposes, an agreement on service requirements should 
consider the requirements of both parties and it may need to be negotiated iteratively 
on certain service criteria. However, the existing literature does not propose such a 
mechanism for service negotiation in trust maintenance. Therefore, in this research, 
we propose a framework by which an SLA between two interacting parties can be 
reached, based on service formalization and service negotiation. These two 
mechanisms, service formalization and service negotiation, will enable the trusting 
agent and trusted agent to reach an agreement. An agreement on service requirements 
from both parties is necessary in trust maintenance due to some basic assumptions. 
Firstly, both parties see a value, either monetary or non-monetary, in their 
relationship. Secondly, both parties are vulnerable in a reciprocal action to maintain 
or preserve this value. Thirdly, they engage in a joint effort to reach their common 
goal in such a business relationship. In Chapter 4, we present a solution overview for 
the formalization and negotiation of service requirements in a relationship for the 
purpose of trust maintenance. 
2.6.3 Performance Monitoring and Control Mechanism 
Performance monitoring is described as a set of activities undertaken to ensure and 
maximize the possibility of the actual behaviour of both trusting parties in a virtual 
transaction being in line with accepted agreements or contracts (Fachrunnisa and 
Hussain 2011).  
As was discussed in the previous section, one of the several factors that can be used 
for the trust maintenance effort is the role of a control and monitoring mechanism. In 
the existing body of literature, several authors such as (Jagers, Jansen et al. 1998; 
Langfield-Smith and Smith 2003; Kusari, Cohen et al. 2005; Sitkin and George 
2005; Kartseva, Gordijn et al. 2006; Long and Sitkin 2006; Kabadayi and Ryu 2007) 
propose the use of a control mechanism as an approach to maintain trust. This 
performance monitoring is intended to ensure that all transactions during the trust 
maintenance relationship are conducted according to the established standards for 
quality, delivery and performance. Pavlou (Pavlou 2002) suggested in his research 
that perceived monitoring by third party agents as a part of institutional trust can 
engender trust between buyers and sellers in an online B2B relationship. Perceived 
monitoring is defined as „the extent to which buyer organizations believe that the 
third-party monitoring mechanism ensures that all the transactions in the marketplace 
are performed as expected‟ (Pavlou 2002).  
Several researches such as the one carried out by (Gwebu, Wang et al. 2007), 
(Javernpaa, Knoll et al. 1998) proposed that proactive control, output-based control, 
process control, frequent and intensive communications will facilitate the 
development and maintenance of trust in virtual situations. Kartseva et al (Kartseva, 
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Gordijn et al. 2006; Vlaar, Bosch et al. 2007) argue that the use of control 
mechanisms is significant in successful business networks. However, they note that 
little work has been done on developing a control mechanism for virtual 
environments. Their research provides a methodology for designing control 
mechanisms in inter-organizational virtual networks. Vlaar (Vlaar, Bosch et al. 2007) 
also stated that the evolution of trust from the existence of trust to distrust can be 
avoided by the mechanism of formal coordination and control in a relationship. 
Hence, formalization of control action is a critical factor to assist trust maintenance 
in a virtual collaborative relationship. 
However, the existing literature does not provide a detailed explanation of how to 
conduct performance monitoring or provide a control mechanism in order to 
maintain trust. In Chapter 4, we provide an overview of a mechanism for conducting 
performance monitoring in interactions for trust maintenance purposes and in 
Chapter 7 we present the details of our performance monitoring framework. 
2.6.4  Reward and Incentive for Successful Service Delivery 
As was discussed in the previous section, several existing works suggest that the 
level of trust in such service relationships should always be monitored to ensure the 
success of interactions (Javernpaa, Knoll et al. 1998; Gwebu, Wang et al. 2007);  
Kartseva, Gordijn et al. 2006). Therefore, although trust has been established 
between the trusting agent and trusted agent in a transaction relationship, monitoring 
still plays an important role in ensuring that the partnership relationship continues to 
operate as intended (Sullivan 2007; Skopik, Schall et al. 2010). Therefore, even in 
situations where there is a sufficient level of trust between interacting parties, this 
trust needs to be underpinned by robust monitoring and, where necessary, reward and 
sanctioning processes could be utilized (Ferrin and Dicks 2003; Long and Sitkin 
2006).  
Burnett et al. (2011) consider three kinds of controls which can be used in those 
cases where trust is insufficient in such interactions: (a) Explicit incentives. These 
incentives are clearly stated in the contract and an agent will receive compensation 
(in terms of utility) depending upon the outcome; (b) Monitoring. The trustor 
expends additional effort/utility in order to observe the behavioural choices of the 
trustee, and (c) Reputational incentives. The trustor calculates the reputational gain 
(damage) that a trustee will experience as a result of good (or bad) feedback being 
communicated to the society and considers this as an additional incentive. In order to 
achieve this, rewards or penalties are incorporated in contracts. These kinds of 
incentive or penalties are intended to encourage interacting partners to behave 
according to the mutual agreement (contract). If the performance of the trusted agent 
approximates the specified behaviour stated in the contract, this trusted agent will be 
given rewards as stipulated in the contract. 
Hence, it can be concluded that rewards and incentives are widely acknowledged as 
motivators which can encourage agents to improve their performance. Badenfelt 
(2010) stated that trusting agents may use rewards to increase trust levels. 
Additionally, Jahn (2010) argues that in an Agent-Principal relationship, incentive is 
a single factor with several functions as follows:  
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a. Activation function as a stimulation of motivation and cognitive abilities. 
With an incentive, an agent will be motivated to perform better according to 
their cognitive abilities in order to obtain reward (in this case a higher trust 
value).  
b. Controlling function as an influence on the agent‟s behaviour. Incentive can 
be used as a control mechanism to influence the agent‟s behaviour. If an 
incentive is available, the agent will be motivated to obtain an incentive by 
performing well or better.  
c. Information function, whereby incentive agents receive a signal regarding 
desirable behaviour  
d. Selection function, where principals obtain information about an agent‟s 
performance 
e. Coordination function which coordinates the single actions of agents. Such 
continuous performance monitoring activities enable performance 
discrepancies to be identified and resolved early.  
Kumaran, Bishop et al. (2007) proposed a MDBT (Model Driven Business 
Transformation) for transaction monitoring between service provider, outsourcer and 
service requester. It provides a service delivery performance management platform 
which includes notification of any violation of SLAs. The performance is monitored 
by comparing actual performances against Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). The 
platform aims to model performance metrics for service delivery and describe how 
the monitoring and management of KPIs are supported as an integral part of the 
SDM (Service Delivery Management) platform. However, this platform does not 
provide any mechanism, using reward and incentive, to motivate the service provider 
to fully comply with SLAs. 
Additionally, Ferrin and Dirks (2003) carried out laboratory experiments to examine 
whether rewards have a direct effect on trust or whether they represent a catalyst that 
may set in motion other processes that influence trust. Their research concludes that 
rewards have a strong impact on the formation of trusting beliefs. However, as 
previously discussed, the existing literature does not propose any mechanism that 
provides an incentive at intermediate intervals during the delivery of service to 
facilitate or ensure trust maintenance. Additionally, it fails to investigate the 
combined use of rewards / penalties with intermediate performance monitoring to 
maintain trust. The incentive is given after the completion of tasks at the end of the 
interaction or it is given after the trusted agent has completely delivered the service.  
Hence, we conclude that a combination of a mechanism of proactive continuous 
monitoring and an incentive mechanism specifically designed to support successful 
service delivery would be valuable in the trust maintenance phase. In Chapter 4, we 
propose a solution overview of providing incentive mechanism for the successful 
interaction in the trust maintenance phase and in Chapter 7 we present detail 
mechanism of the framework 
2.6.5 Trust Re-calibration 
One basic assumption in trust maintenance is that a positive trust value has already 
been established in the previous phase (trust building phase) after some interactions 
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between two entities. If both parties do not make significant, concerted and 
concerned efforts to maintain this trust level, then it might decline. The main purpose 
of trust maintenance is, therefore, to preserve the current trust value so that this trust 
value will remain stable or possibly increase. In order to achieve this, we need to 
know the level of the trust values prior to, during, and after the interaction. As both 
parties have an initial trust at the beginning of their interaction, it can be argued that 
trust is maintained if the level of trust after the interaction (final trust) is equal to or 
greater than the initial trust level. Hence, in determining final trustworthiness, the 
initial trust that was established during the building phase is subject to re-calibration 
or re-assessment in the maintenance stage.   
The calibration or assessment of trustworthiness can be done by determining the 
correlation between actual behaviour and mutually agreed behaviour of the 
interaction (Hussain, Chang et al. 2004; Chang, Dillon et al. 2006). However, there 
are two streams of theorization or modelling of initial trust development. First, trust 
can be gained through direct observation or direct interaction with the trusting agent 
and secondly, trust can be gained through a reputation mechanism. In the existing 
literature, most work on trustworthiness assignment relates to reputation 
mechanisms. Existing works (Abdul-Rahman and Hailes 2000; Aberer and 
Despotovic 2001; Cornelli, Damiani et al. 2002; Yu and Singh 2002; Wang and 
Vassileva 2003; Xiong and Liu 2003; Wang and Vassileva 2005) propose a means 
for aggregating the reputation values from different recommendation peers who 
previously interacted with the trusted peers. Wang et al (Wang and Vassileva 2003; 
Wang and Vassileva 2003) propose a Bayesian network-based method for trust 
assessment. In order to determine whether Peer A can classify its interaction with 
Peer B as being satisfactory or otherwise, a weighted aggregate of the outcome of 
each of the criteria in the interaction is determined. Peer A can subsequently compute 
or determine the future probability of Peer B carrying out a satisfactory or an 
unsatisfactory interaction, in the given context or in any combination of the three 
contexts by making use of the Bayes rule. The primary shortcoming of their method 
is that the level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with a given peer in an interaction 
can be expressed at just two levels, namely 0 and 1, thereby preventing the trusting 
peer from expressing a finer gradation in the level of satisfaction with the behaviour 
of the trusted peer. Additionally, they do not propose any method for weighting the 
criteria in an interaction according to their importance.  Neither have they proposed 
any measure to account for scenarios where the criteria have not been mutually 
agreed upon by the interacting partners.  
Hussain et al. (Hussain, Chang et al. 2004; Chang, Dillon et al. 2006) proposed a 
CCCI metrics as a method of assigning trustworthiness of a trusted agent through or 
after an interaction with the trusted agent, and then automatically assigning an initial 
trustworthiness value to the trusted agent. With this metrics, trustworthiness can be 
rated as the concurrence between the expected behaviour vs. the actual behaviour as 
perceived by the trusting peer. However, CCCI compares actual with agreed 
behaviour for the whole interaction and this is done only at the end of the interaction.  
Schmidt, Steele et al. (2007) propose an enhancement to the CCCI metrics proposed 
by Hussain et al. (Hussain, Chang et al. 2004; Chang, Dillon et al. 2006). They 
propose a method for fuzzy trust evaluation in multi-agent systems. However, the 
proposed methodological framework for trust re-calibration by Hussain et al. 
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(Hussain, Chang et al. 2004), Wang et al. (Wang and Vassileva 2003; Wang and 
Vassileva 2005) and  Schmidt et al. (Schmidt, Steele et al. 2007) cannot be used in 
the trust maintenance phase. This is because during the trust maintenance phase, as 
pointed out by (Fachrunnisa, Hussain et al. 2009), the progress of an interaction is 
measured by periodic performance assessments at intermediate milestones (or 
checkpoints). This is in contrast to trust building, where performance assessment is 
carried out only at the end of the interaction. For trust maintenance purposes, we 
suggest having multiple intermediate performance assessments, resulting in multiple 
trust values from intermediate performance assessments.  
Moreover, none of the existing literature considers the need for trust re-calibration in 
a trust maintenance effort where the trust value would be a function of the 
intermediate trust values during the actual interaction. In Chapter 4, we present an 
overview of the solution in terms of trust re-calibration in the trust maintenance 
phase and in Chapter 8 we present the details of the trust re-calibration mechanism in 
our methodology. 
2.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we carried out an extensive survey of the existing literature. We 
grouped the existing literature of trust evolution under several categories based on 
views about how trust evolves in a relationship. Following this review of various 
perspectives on trust evolution, we then presented an extensive survey on trust 
maintenance approaches and categorised these according to the types of proposals. 
Finally, we evaluated the existing literature critically and found that no work in the 
literature proposes a complete trust maintenance methodology. We then provide a 
summary of the shortcomings of the reviewed works and the extant research 
challenges. In the next chapter, we define the problem that we intend to address in 
this thesis. 
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Chapter 3 - Problem Definition 
3.1 Introduction 
The first chapter highlighted the role and significance of maintaining trust in virtual 
environments. In the previous chapter, we presented a review of the existing 
literature. It was noted that a significant methodology to maintain trust in virtual 
environments is pivotal. Advances have been made by various researchers in the area 
of identifying important factors/variables/actions/mechanisms to maintain trust. 
However, it was noted in Chapter 2 that none of the existing literature offers a 
complete methodology for trust maintenance in virtual environments. Additionally, 
in the previous chapter, we identified seven main shortcomings within the existing 
literature that need to be addressed in order to propose a complete methodology for 
trust maintenance.  
In Section 3.3 of this chapter, we formally define and present the problem that we 
intend to address in this thesis. In Section 3.2, we propose a set of definitions of 
those terminologies that will be used when defining the problem in Section 3.3. We 
break the problem down into seven cohesive research issues and formally define 
each of these in Section 3.4. In Section 3.5, we outline the solution proposal and 
choice of research method for the solving of the identified research issues. Finally, 
Section 3.6 concludes the chapter. 
3.2 Key Concepts 
In this section, we present a formal definition of those terms and concepts which will 
be used to introduce, elucidate and formally define the problem addressed in this 
thesis. 
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3.2.1 The Evolution of Trust 
 
We define the evolution of trust as the process by which the level of trust in a 
relationship changes over time. Evolution is a theory in biology postulating that the 
various types of plants, animals, and other living things on the Earth have their origin 
in other pre-existing types and that the distinguishable differences are due to 
modifications in successive generations. The theory of evolution is one of the 
fundamental keystones of modern biological theory. The process of evolution may be 
interpreted as a biological term, but also as a cultural one or even as a process of 
learning in terms of trust and cooperation (Bateson 1988).  
 
In a community, interaction and reciprocation are common forms of behaviour. Trust 
plays a role as a social capital to create reciprocal cooperation. The entities 
communicate more than once, if the community is small, or if they collaborate in the 
same area. If trust were not present, reciprocation would not occur, and collective 
collaboration would be worse off. Agents in the community „will do better‟ if they 
trust others, than if they did not. Hence, in this case, trust, relationship and 
reciprocation have an evolutionary strength.  
3.2.2 Trust Modelling 
We define trust modelling as „the process of determining the trust value of an entity 
either quantitatively or qualitatively‟ (Raza, Hussain et al. 2010). 
3.2.3 Trust Management 
We define trust management as „the activity to determine how trust will be assigned, 
modified and revoked‟ (Ishaya, Mundy 2004). 
3.2.4 Trust Maintenance 
We define the trust maintenance phase as the period from the stage (point in time) at 
which positive trust has been established to the stage (point in time) at which 
trustworthiness values fall to a level corresponding to negative trust (Fachrunnisa and 
Hussain 2011). As pointed out in Chapter 2, in a trust-based relationship, the trust 
level follows an evolutionary pattern consisting of three phases: building, 
maintaining and declining. Once positive trust level is established in the trust 
building phase, the condition of the trust level may move to the trust maintenance 
phase. 
3.2.5 Hard Trust 
We define hard trust as trust that represents information derived from a security 
mechanism such as identity keys, credentials and certificates. 
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3.2.6 Soft Trust 
We define soft trust as trust information that is inferred from experience and 
observation of others. It is grounded in social factors that link behavior with 
evidence. This link is achieved through mapping observable behavioral evidence. 
3.2.7 Trust-Based Interaction or Relationship 
We define a trust-based interaction or relationship as dealing between two entities or 
two agents to achieve certain pre-defined objectives or goals based on their trust 
level (Chang, Dillon et al. 2006). This interaction has either a monetary or non-
monetary value attached to it. 
3.2.8 Time Space of Interaction or Relationship 
We define time space as the total duration of interaction time during which the 
behavior of the trusted agent will be analyzed and the trustworthiness assessment 
will be carried out (Chang, Dillon et al. 2006).  
3.2.9 Third Party Agent 
We define a third party agent as an agent who monitors the interaction of both 
interacting parties and provides real-time feedback in the case of „performance 
discrepancies‟ (Fachrunnisa and Hussain 2011). This agent is a neutral, independent 
and unbiased entity who monitors the trust-based interaction between both parties.  
3.2.10 Proactive Continuous Monitoring 
We define proactive continuous monitoring as a real-time performance monitoring of 
the way the trusted agent delivers service to the trusting agent as agreed and vice 
versa (Fachrunnisa and Hussain 2011).  
3.2.11 Trust Re-calibration 
We define trust re-calibration as the re-assessment or re-calculation of the condition 
of the trust level based on updated information (Fachrunnisa and Hussain 2011).  
3.2.12 Positive Trust Level 
We define positive trust level as the trust level condition in a well-established 
relationship. „It corresponds to an affirmative or sanguine belief that the trusting 
agent has about a given trusted entity‟ (Hussain 2006). 
3.2.13 Negative Trust Level 
We define negative trust level as the trust condition which „corresponds to a 
pessimistic, cynical, disparaging, adverse, unfavorable belief that the trusting agent 
has about a given trusted entity‟ (Hussain 2006). 
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3.2.14 Neutral Trust Level 
We define neutral trust level as the trust condition which „corresponds to a mediocre 
or average belief that the trusting agent has about a given trusted entity‟ (Hussain 
2006). 
3.2.15 Initial Trust 
We define initial trust as the trust level condition at the beginning of the interaction 
time space (Fachrunnisa and Hussain 2011). In this thesis, we use the terms „initial 
trust‟ and „initial trust value‟ synonymously. 
3.2.16 Intermediate Trust 
We define intermediate trust as the trust level condition in the intermediate time 
space of the interaction (Fachrunnisa and Hussain 2011). In this thesis, we use the 
terms „intermediate trust‟ and „intermediate trust value‟ synonymously. 
3.2.17 Final Trust 
We define final trust as the trust level condition at the end of the interaction time 
space (Fachrunnisa and Hussain 2011). In this thesis, we use the terms „final trust‟ 
and „final trust value‟ synonymously. 
3.3 Problem Overview and Problem Definition 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the trust maintenance phase is a critical point to which 
trusting parties in a trust-based relationship should pay more attention. The 
importance of trust maintenance can be evidenced from the previous research which 
concluded that trust has an evolutionary pattern and more attention must be paid to it 
after the trust level has been established. Additionally, in virtual environments, trust 
is recognized as being fragile (Meyerson, Weick et al. 1996; Javernpaa, Knoll et al. 
1998; Javernpaa and Leidner 1999); hence, a constant effort to maintain it is crucial. 
Additionally, the building of trust requires much effort and cost from both the 
involved parties; hence, once it is well established, both parties must follow a 
maintenance program; otherwise, the relationship falls into a state of disrepair 
(Currall and Epstein 2003).  
Several researchers have made a significant contribution to the issue of trust 
maintenance either in virtual environments or non-virtual environments. As we 
discussed in Chapter 2, in some parts of the literature, the notion of trust maintenance 
is used interchangeably or synonymously with the notion of trust building or trust 
development. This leads to a lot of confusion and distinction between trust building 
and trust maintenance and the methodologies / activities to achieve it. 
Moreover, the dynamic nature of trust has been viewed as an occurrence during the 
whole time space of the interaction. However, as was noted in Chapter 2, there is 
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little or no framework in the existing literature that illustrates how this trust level 
changes during one time space of interaction, especially in the trust maintenance 
phase. The condition of the trust level may be different at the beginning of the 
interaction (initial trust), middle or interaction (intermediate trust) and end of the 
interaction (final trust). The immediate shortcoming of this is that there is no 
definition of initial trust, intermediate trust and final trust to illustrate the dynamic 
nature of trust in one time space of the relationship. 
Furthermore, as was pointed out in Chapter 2, the literature on trust maintenance 
focuses largely on identifying factors or variables or a single action or single practice 
that needs to be undertaken if an agent intends to maintain the trust of another agent. 
It also suggests various practices or strategies to maintain trust. However, those 
factors or variables are not generic, but based on a certain domain and may produce 
different results if applied to another domain. To some extent, the studies presented 
in the literature have been limited to one country or geographical area. Moreover, the 
literature does not discuss the details of the mechanisms or procedures for 
implementing those variable factors. Hence, to the best of our knowledge, the 
existing literature does not provide a complete methodology for maintaining trust. 
Given the importance of maintaining trust, there is the need for a methodology for 
maintaining trust in virtual environments. The methodology comprises five 
frameworks that can be used to achieve the objective of trust maintenance. As we 
pointed out in Chapter 2, as trust has a dynamic nature, the change(s) in the trust 
value of an entity could occur at any time due to changes in its behaviour over time. 
As was also discussed in Chapter 2, one of the strategies that have been proposed to 
maintain trust includes the involvement of a neutral party in a relationship. However, 
most of the literature regards the third party agent as part of a hard trust or security 
platform that can be used to preserve the trust level. It does not investigate the use of 
third party agents to maintain soft trust. As argued by (Javernpaa and Leidner 1999; 
Greenberg, Greenberg et al. 2007), one way to ensure that trust is maintained is 
through an intermediary. An intermediary is an agent that acts as a link between 
trusting agent and trusted agent in order to achieve an agreement or reconciliation.  
In virtual environments, business entities might never or rarely meet in person, and 
they have an interest in doing business with their partners virtually because it is 
advantageous to both of them (Javernpaa, Knoll et al. 1998; Javernpaa and Leidner 
1999).   
However, the requirement of a third party agent in a relationship to maintain trust 
could be a significant problem in virtual environments. Since agents interact virtually 
and without restrictions, we need to have a framework for finding and selecting an 
appropriate third party agent. Nonetheless, the existing literature fails to provide a 
framework for third party agent selection. 
Other approaches in the literature suggested that contract conformance or a Service 
Level Agreement is needed in order to preserve the trust level in a relationship. They 
noted that contract conformance which includes quality and timely delivery plays a 
significant role in maintaining trust. With a contract conformance, both parties can 
confirm whether or not they have adhered to all the stipulations in the business 
agreement. It provides a baseline for trust evaluation at the end of the interaction. 
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Contract conformance is defined as an agreement between two parties on how they 
create a virtual collaboration in software outsourcing. Additionally, (Gwebu, Wang 
et al. 2007) also noted that a well-defined relational contract is one of the 
mechanisms used for building trust in virtual networks. However, in the existing 
literature, there is no framework for formalizing and negotiating the service 
requirements in order to reach this agreement. Additionally, to the best of our 
knowledge, there is no proposal in the literature that considers the creation of an SLA 
for trust maintenance purposes. The existing literature widely discusses the need to 
create an SLA during the trust building phase, but very few proposals provide a way 
to formalize the service requirements. 
The other most common factors or variables in the existing literature on trust 
maintenance are control and performance monitoring. It is suggested that the level of 
trust in such relationships should always be monitored to ensure the existence or 
maintenance of trust in a relationship (Das and Teng 1998; Jagers, Jansen et al. 1998; 
Kusari, Cohen et al. 2005). However, the literature does not provide any performance 
monitoring strategy for ensuring the maintenance or the continuity of trust in the 
relationship. Control and monitoring always take place at the end of the relationship 
to ascertain the level of completion of service delivery. Nonetheless, due to the 
dynamic nature of trust, trust levels can change(s) any time during the interaction 
time space. Hence, we need a monitoring or surveillance framework to ensure that 
the level of trust is maintained (and does not fall below a pre-defined threshold). This 
surveillance framework should be able to monitor or detect changes in the trust level 
in real time and respond to such changes. Such a mechanism for monitoring the 
progress of actual performance against agreed performance should be visible to all 
parties so that any early discrepancies can be resolved in real time. Moreover, in the 
existing literature, no effort has been made to develop a framework by which both 
parties can resolve the performance discrepancies without delaying the delivery time 
as agreed. 
Moreover, as was discussed in Chapter 2, the basic assumption underlying trust 
maintenance is that both parties already have a certain trust level condition based on 
several previous interactions that occurred during the trust building phase. The 
success of the trust maintenance process can be determined if the condition of trust at 
the end of time space of interaction is greater than or equal to the condition of trust at 
the beginning. Hence, both parties need to re-calibrate or re-assess their trust 
condition at the end of the time space of interaction. However, there is no approach 
in the existing literature that can be utilized to re-calibrate the trust level. Hence, we 
need a framework with which both parties can re-calibrate their trust level at the end 
of interaction. 
The problem described above leads to our proposal of a complete methodology for 
trust maintenance that takes into account the following frameworks: third party agent 
selection, formalization and negotiation of service requirements, proactive 
continuous performance monitoring, incentive mechanism and trust re-calibration. 
Hence, we formally define the problem that we intend to address in this thesis as 
follows: 
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In a virtual environment, how can a trusting agent and trusted agent maintain their 
positive trust level, taking into account the dynamic nature of trust, so that by end of 
the time space of interaction, the final trust is greater than or equal to the initial 
trust? 
The next section describes the research issues that need to be addressed in order to 
solve the above problem. 
3.4 Research Issues 
In this section, we present and discuss in detail the research issues that need to be 
addressed in order to solve the aforesaid problem of trust modelling in a service- 
oriented environment. The research issues that need to be addressed are as follows: 
1. In the context of trust evolution in virtual environments, define: the evolution 
of trust, trust building, trust maintenance and trust declining. 
2. Propose a framework for third party agent selection. In our TMM, we 
introduce a third party agent into the relationship between two parties. This 
third party agent is a neutral party that will help both the interacting parties to 
establish a successful relationship. The proposed framework provides a rule 
on how to select a third party agent to supervise relationships in virtual 
environments. 
3. Propose a framework for formalization and negotiation of service 
requirements. We need a framework by which two interacting parties may 
agree on an SLA during interaction in the trust maintenance phase. It involves 
activities such as both parties articulating the service requirements, 
negotiating on the service requirements, re-negotiating on certain service 
requirements, etc. 
4. Propose a framework for real time and proactive continuous monitoring for 
service deliverability. We need a framework to proactively monitor the 
performance of both parties during the time space of interaction and to 
maintain the level of trust between both parties. 
5. Propose a framework that provides an incentive mechanism to ensure 
successful service delivery. We need a framework that can be used to 
motivate interacting parties to perform as closely as possible to the terms of 
the mutual agreement.  
6. Propose a framework for trust re-calibration. We need a framework to re-
calibrate the condition of trust level from both interacting parties at the end of 
the interaction time space. 
7. Validate the proposed methodology for proof of concept.  
In the next section, we clearly define each of the aforesaid research issues that need 
to be addressed in order to solve the problem stated in Section 3.4. 
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3.4.1 Research Issue 1: Conceptual Definitions of Trust 
Evolution 
The first research issue is to define, in the context of virtual environments, the 
concept of trust evolution which consists of three phases: trust building, trust 
maintaining and trust declining. As was discussed in Chapter 2, trust evolution has 
been defined in various ways by different researchers. The way in which trust 
evolves in an interaction has also been discussed from various perspectives by 
various scholars. Two different views emerge, classified as: continuous increasing 
and non-linear increment. It should be noted here that the aforementioned different 
definitions and approaches for trust evolution and its associated phases cannot be 
regarded as incorrect as they tend to define trust in terms of the interaction domain. 
The main objective of developing a pattern in trust evolution is to show that trust has 
a dynamic nature in the context of any interaction. The progress or movement of the 
trust level condition from one phase to another phase depends upon the effort of both 
parties to manage trust level condition in their mutual relationship. 
In this thesis, we propose a definition of trust evolution in an interaction to which a 
monetary or financial value is attached. We classify the trust evolution process 
according to three phases. In Chapter 4, we propose a formal definition of trust 
evolution and its three associated phases namely: trust building, trust maintaining 
and trust declining. Additionally, we describe certain characteristics of the condition 
of trust level and relationship condition in each phase. 
3.4.2 Research Issue 2: Propose a Framework for Third Party 
Agent Selection 
As discussed in Chapter 2, several researchers acknowledge the role of a neutral 
party in a relationship. We argue that in order to gain the maximum benefit from a 
relationship for trust maintenance purposes in virtual environments, both parties 
(trusting agent and trusted agent) need a third party agent as a neutral party. This 
third party agent has a role as mediator/arbitrator/conciliator throughout the time 
space of the relationship. The role of this third party is „proactive-corrective‟ and 
focuses on task performance monitoring of both parties and helping to resolve any 
conflict arising during the relationship in order to maintain trust. 
However, there appears to be no service company that specializes in offering a 
professional third party agent for the purpose of maintaining trust. The common 
service business in this area is dispute resolution whereby a third party agent 
intervenes if there is some dispute or conflict in a business relationship. The role of 
this third party agent is corrective only. Both trusting parties seek this neutral service 
if any conflict occurs which they cannot resolve by negotiation.  Furthermore, the 
type of relationship that is supervised by an agent for online dispute resolution is not 
for purposes of trust maintenance, but rather for transaction purposes only.  
Therefore, there is a need for a new service that offers a third party agent to ensure 
that trust is maintained in a relationship.  
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The main difference between this Arbitration Service for Trust Maintenance (ASTM) 
and the existing arbitration service is the role of the third party agent and the purpose 
of arbitration. In ASTM, the third party agent‟s role is proactive-corrective, whereas 
in online dispute resolution, it is corrective only. Further, the role of the arbitrator in 
Online Dispute Resolution is to determine who is wrong and who is right. However, 
in ASTM, the role of the arbitrator is to ensure that both parties maintain their level 
of trust in the business relationship. This third party agent is involved in both parties‟ 
relationship from beginning to end of the time space of transaction or interaction. 
Both parties would report their task performance to a third party agent and if there is 
any discrepancy between the mutually agreed to behaviour and actual behaviour 
during the interaction, this third party agent helps both parties to arrive at another 
agreement so that the interaction task can be concluded in such a way that the trust 
level condition between the two parties is maintained.  
Moreover, the existing literature views the third party agent from a „hard trust‟ 
perspective which means creating a security technology or platform to maintain the 
trust level. However, in this thesis, we intend to introduce a third party agent from 
the perspective of „soft trust‟, where the agent is a human agent. Hence, this service 
could be provided by a professional service agency that comprises a large number of 
professional arbitration agents who specialize in trust maintenance in virtual business 
interactions. In Chapter 4, we propose a framework for selecting this third party 
agent. We explain the framework in detail in Chapter 5.  
3.4.3 Research Issue 3: Propose a Framework for Formalization 
and Negotiation of Service Requirements 
In this thesis, we take the viewpoint that the trusting agent needs to have a contract 
conformance with the trusting agent about the context of the interaction. This 
contract conformance or Service Level Agreement would be used to assist 
performance monitoring and assessment about the quality of service delivered by 
both parties. As was discussed in Chapter 2, contract conformance or business 
contract is acknowledged as a factor that can be used to maintain trust. However, the 
notion of creating an SLA as presented in the existing literature, is not mainly for 
trust maintenance purposes. Additionally, there is no framework by which both 
trusting parties can formalize their service requirements during the trust maintenance 
phase. 
As trust in virtual environments is more cognitive than affective, the maintenance of 
trust can best be done by measuring the degree to which a service task has been 
accomplished. Further, Sako (1998) suggests that competence to deliver a service 
task and task responsibility are central elements in the measurement of trust in a 
transaction setting. In order to maintain trust, both parties should have a benchmark 
or a basis by which to evaluate their performance when carrying out an interaction. 
This is because trust level can be calculated by correlating actual performance and 
agreed performance (Hussain, Chang et al. 2004). Specifically, in a services 
environment, actual performance can be seen as the actual service delivery, while 
agreed performance is the set of agreed service requirements from both parties. 
Therefore, a formal agreement such as Service Level Agreement (SLA), which 
specifies service requirements, is needed for trust maintenance. An SLA is defined as 
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a negotiated agreement between two parties where one is the service provider and the 
other is the service requester (Zulkernine, Martin et al. 2009).  
Unlike the trust building phase, in the trust maintenance phase, each of the 
interacting parties has to make a concerted attempt to maintain or sustain the level of 
trust in the relationship. In contrast to trust building, it may involve activities such as 
both parties articulating the service requirements, negotiating on the service 
requirements, re-negotiating on certain service requirements, etc. However, in the 
existing literature, there is no framework by which two interacting business parties 
may agree on an SLA for trust maintenance. Therefore, a method for reaching an 
agreement of service requirements between both parties is an important step in the 
process of trust maintenance. In Chapter 4, we present the design overview of a 
framework that involves service requirements formalization and negotiation to draw 
up an SLA for interaction in the trust maintenance phase. In Chapter 6, we present 
the details of the mechanism of this framework. 
3.4.4 Research Issue 4: Propose a Framework for Proactive 
Continuous Performance Monitoring 
As discussed in Chapter 2, control and monitoring are other factors that have been 
considered in the existing literature as means of maintaining trust in virtual 
environments. The existing literature provides several ways to control and monitor 
service deliverability. Several works suggest that the level of trust in an interaction 
should always be monitored to ensure the success of the interaction. Therefore, 
although trust has been established between the trusting agent and trusted agent in an 
interaction, monitoring still plays an important role in ensuring that the partnership 
relationship continues to operate as intended (Sullivan 2007; Skopik, Schall et al. 
2010). Therefore, even in situations where there is a sufficient level of trust between 
trusting agents, this trust needs to be underpinned by robust monitoring and, where 
necessary, reward and sanctioning processes could be utilized (Ferrin and Dicks 
2003; Long and Sitkin 2006).  
 
Unlike the existing works in the literature regarding control and monitoring of trust-
based interaction, in this thesis we propose a mechanism of proactive continuous 
monitoring during the interaction in order to maintain the trust level. The 
performance is monitored at intermediate checkpoints rather than at the end of the 
interaction. We do not intend to check the performance of interacting partners at the 
end of the interaction; instead, it is monitored during the course of the transaction to 
minimize the discrepancy between actual performances and mutually agreed to 
performance. In Chapter 4, we present an overview of the framework for proactive 
continuous monitoring in order to maintain trust. Details of this framework are 
presented in Chapter 7. 
3.4.5 Research Issue 5: Propose a Framework for Incentive 
Mechanisms for Successful Service Delivery 
As discussed in Chapter 2, reward and incentive are widely acknowledged as 
motivators which can encourage agents to improve their performance. Badenfelt 
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(Badenfelt 2010) stated that trusting agents could use rewards to change the trust 
levels in organizations. Although several researches have shown that the use of 
incentives can successfully increase the performance of agents in a non-virtual 
environment, Ferrin and Dirks (Ferrin and Dicks 2003) suggested that the effects of 
rewards in trust management in the context of virtual environments should be 
examined.  
The proactive continuous monitoring as described in research issue 4 is designed to 
monitor the service deliverability at every checkpoint. This continuous monitoring 
enables deviations in performance to be timely identified. Consequently, both parties 
will be able to quickly close the performance gap before it inflates into an 
unmanageable and undelivered service by the end of the transaction period. It is also 
suggested by (Ferrin and Dicks 2003; Long and Sitkin 2006) that, where necessary, 
reward and sanctioning processes could be utilized to maintain trust. Hence, reward 
and incentive can be used to encourage trusted agents to always comply at each 
checkpoint. It will guarantee successful delivery of that service.  
However, in contrast to the existing works in the literature regarding incentives for 
task completion, in this thesis we combine a mechanism for proactive continuous 
monitoring with an incentive mechanism specifically intended to support successful 
service delivery. The service delivery is monitored at intermediate checkpoints and 
incentives are given at intermediate checkpoints rather than at the end of the 
interaction. We do not intend to provide an incentive after task completion; instead, it 
is given during the course of the transaction to minimize the discrepancy between 
actual performances and mutually agreed to performance. In Chapter 4, we present 
the overview of framework of an incentive mechanism during proactive continuous 
performance monitoring in order to maintain trust by sustaining the service 
deliverability. Details of this framework are presented in Chapter 7. 
3.4.6 Research Issue 6: Propose a Framework for Trust Re-
calibration 
The next research issue that we need to address in this thesis in order to provide a 
complete methodology for trust maintenance is a framework for trust re-calibration. 
As the purpose of trust maintenance is to sustain the level of trust during the 
interaction, we need a framework for trust re-calibration. This trust re-calibration 
needs to take into account the proactive continuous monitoring and incentive 
mechanism that we proposed in the previous research issue. Moreover, since at the 
beginning of the interaction both interacting parties have a mutual agreement about 
service context and its service criteria, the trust re-calibration also needs to consider 
the mutual agreement which would serve as the basis for trust re-calibration. In 
Chapter 4, we present an overview of the framework for trust re-calibration in our 
TMM. Details of this framework is presented in Chapter 8. 
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3.4.7 Research Issue 7: Validate the Proposed Methodology by 
Simulation Experiments 
In order to verify the soundness of the proposed methodology, we need to validate 
the solution proposed for our research issues. By validation, we mean building an 
approximation or representation of a prototyping system that is based on the 
proposed TMM. This is in order to establish confidence that the methodology is 
suitable for trust maintenance efforts. In order to validate the methodology, we use a 
prototype approach. We present the solution overview for this research issue in 
Chapter 4, and in Chapters 9 - 10 we present the prototypes for validation of the 
proposed TMM. 
3.5 Research Methodology 
In addressing the stated problem, this thesis focuses on the development and 
subsequent testing and validation of a methodology for trust maintenance in virtual 
environments. In order to propose a solution for the seven research issues listed in 
the previous section, we need to follow a systematic scientific approach to ensure 
that the methodology development is scientifically-based. Therefore, in this section 
we give an overview of the existing scientifically-based research methods and justify 
our choice of a particular research approach. 
3.5.1 Research Approach 
Due to the nature of the research study, we identify that the science and engineering 
based research approach is the most appropriate for our purposes. Science and 
engineering research leads to the development of new techniques, architecture, 
methodologies, devices or a set of concepts, which can be combined to form a new 
theoretical framework. This research approach commonly identifies problems and 
proposes solutions to these problems. (Galliers 1992; Hevner, March et al. 2004) 
provide a concise conceptual framework for design science research and state that it 
deals with understanding the problem domain and designing a solution by building 
applications or design artefacts. This type of research is concerned with confirming 
theoretical predictions, and particularly in the engineering field, the spirit of „making 
something work‟ is essential (Galliers 1992).  
This thesis deals with the development of a new methodology for trust maintenance 
in virtual environments. We are not intending to build and evaluate a hypothesis; 
rather, we intend to create or design a methodology and validate it using 
experimental simulation. Therefore, our research falls into the science and 
engineering based approach with the type of research being design science. The 
Design Science Research follows three stages in the research life cycle (Jay F 
Nunamaker, Chen et al. 1991), namely: conceptual stage, development stage or 
perceptual stage and impact stage or validation stage. 
  
Page 105 of 319 
 
3.5.2 Conceptual Stage 
In the first stage, problems are identified and formally defined through a rigorous 
process of analysis. Furthermore, ideas, concepts and the construction of conceptual 
framework are also initially developed. The framework is elaborated on in the next 
stage. 
3.5.3 Development Stage or Perceptual Stage 
After problems have been formulated, a conceptual framework for the proposed 
methodology is constructed and a tool is developed. In this stage, implementations 
and prototyping are conducted. These instantiations are necessary to challenge or 
support the theory built on the previous stage.   
3.5.4 Impact Stage or Validation Stage 
In this last cycle, testing and validation through experimentation with real-world 
examples, using laboratory or field testing is carried out. The validation and 
assessment of the methodology are needed to recognize the benefits in both 
technological and social contexts and to identify future work which will improve on 
the proposed methodology. In this stage, the key aspects of the methodology would 
be related to fine-tuning. 
3.5.5 Choice of Design Science Research 
In this thesis, we apply a design science research approach, which originated from 
the work of Simon in 1969 (Simon 1996 ) in his study of the science of the artificial 
(as opposed to the natural). The design science research involves the development of 
an artefact to solve problems, and therefore emphasizes the utilitarian nature of the 
constructed artefact (March and Smith 1995; Hevner, March et al. 2004). It also 
encompasses behavioural science and engineering which deal with the development 
and justification of a theory as well as creating and evaluating artefacts features to 
the research, respectively. An overview of this research approach is depicted in 
Figure 3.1. 
Identification 
of Problem
Literature 
Review
Problem 
Formulation
Definition of 
Key Concepts
Conceptual 
Solution
Methodology 
Development
Development of 
Prototype Systems and 
Case Studies
Testing and 
Case Studies
Conceptual Stage
Developmental / 
Perceptual Stage
Impact / Validation 
Stage
 
Figure 3.1: Overview of design science research 
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We began by identifying the research problems. We collected and analysed extensive 
literature on topics related to maintaining trust. Based on this review, we formulated 
the problem that needs to be addressed. This problem was formally articulated in 
Section 3.3. Subsequently, we defined several key concepts (such as trust evolution, 
time space, time slot...etc) taking into account the dynamic nature of relationships or 
interactions. These definitions will be used when developing the conceptual solution. 
Then, we formulated the conceptual solution for the problem being addressed in this 
thesis. Our processes comprised the literature review, the problem formulation, 
defining the key concepts and proposing the conceptual solution framework. This 
process belongs to the conceptual stage.  
At the development stage, we developed the methodology for trust maintenance in 
virtual environments taking into account the type of interaction which involves a 
monetary value. During this stage, the detailed working of the methodology would 
be developed. The mathematical model and frameworks that underpin and drive the 
working of the methodology would be developed in detail in this stage. The 
techniques for choosing and selecting third party agent, techniques for service 
requirements formalization and iterative negotiation, techniques for proactive 
performance monitoring, techniques for providing incentive to ensure the service 
deliverability, and techniques for trust re-calibration will be developed in this phase.  
Subsequently, we engineered prototype systems to evaluate the frameworks in the 
methodology and developed several case studies to use later for the testing of our 
proposed methodology. We engineered a multi-agent system using the JADE Multi 
Agent-Based Framework. The engineered multi-agent system has an interface, 
wherein the user can specify the parameters prior to the execution. The processes of 
methodology development and development of prototype systems and case studies 
belong to the development stage.  
Once the prototype systems were engineered, we used them together with the 
developed case studies to validate our proposed methodology. At the impact stage or 
validation stage, based on the results obtained, we then evaluated and validated our 
proposed methodology. Based on the evaluation and validation, we then fine-tuned 
our proposed methodology. The process of evaluation and validation of the 
developed methodology occurs in the impact stage. 
3.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we presented a formal definition of the problem that we intend to 
address in this thesis. The identified problem was subsequently decomposed into a 
set of seven key cohesive research issues, which need to be solved in order to address 
the problem in which is the motivation for this thesis. Each of the seven identified 
research issues was explained in depth in relation to the existing literature and were 
subsequently defined formally. Furthermore, we outlined the different approaches to 
research and pointed out that we intend to implement a science and engineering 
research methodology in conjunction with the Design Science Research approach. 
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In the next chapter, we present an overview of the solution to the problem being 
addressed in this thesis. Additionally, we present an overview of the solutions for 
each of the seven research issues that encompass the problem being addressed in this 
thesis. The detailed framework of the trust maintaining methodology is then 
described in Chapters 5-8. 
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Chapter 4 - Solution Overview 
4.1 Introduction 
As explained in Chapter 2, several research works have presented 
factors/variables/mechanisms that may be used to maintain trust. However, as is 
evident from the discussion in Chapters 2 and 3, no literature provides a complete 
methodology for maintaining trust in virtual environments. In Chapter 3, we 
identified seven research issues that need to be addressed in order to solve this 
pivotal problem.  
In this chapter, we present an overview of the solutions to each of the seven research 
issues. We propose definitions for trust evolution and its three phases of evolution: 
building, maintaining and declining in the context of business in virtual 
environments in Section 4.2.1, Section 4.2.2 and Section 4.2.3 respectively. In 
Section 4.3, we present an overview of the solution for trust maintenance and we 
clarify the basic assumptions underlying our TMM. Subsequently, the solution for 
each of the research issues identified in the last chapter is presented from Sections 
4.4 – Section 4.9. Section 4.10 concludes the chapter. 
4.2 Overview of the Solution for Definition of 
Trust and Relationship Evolution  
As was discussed in Chapter 3, the existing literature does not propose a generic 
definition of trust evolution in a (long-term) relationship. Additionally, no literature 
provides the specific characteristics of the various phases during trust evolution 
process. However, if we correlate the trust evolution with the relationship evolution, 
we may find that different levels of trust exist at different stages of the relationship. 
In this section, we identify and present three phases of trust evolution which are: trust 
building, trust maintenance and trust decline. Subsequently, we also discuss the three 
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phases of relationship evolution which are: transaction/exchange/ ad hoc 
relationship, partnership/collaboration/cooperation relationship, and 
separation/termination/dissolution. The research outcome discussed in this section 
has been documented in a research article (Fachrunnisa and Hussain 2011). Figure 
4.1 illustrates the pattern of the trust evolution. 
Building Maintaining Declining
0
6
Trust Level
Time
 
Figure 4.1: Trust evolution pattern 
In this research, we use a trust scale (0 to 6) that was proposed by (Hussain, Chang et 
al. 2004). Each numerical value denotes a level of trust. Negative trust is denoted by 
„1‟ and „2‟, while „3‟ and „4‟ denote neutral trust, and „5‟ to „6‟ denote positive trust. 
The value of „0‟ is assigned to newcomers or unknown entities; thus, we term it 
„unknown trust‟. We defined positive trust, negative trust and neutral trust 
respectively in Chapter 3. 
Furthermore, we present the definition of each phase and describe the characteristics 
of a relationship at each phase of trust evolution, which are summarised in Table 4.1. 
In this discussion, we introduce a third party agent into a relationship. This third 
party agent is a neutral party that will help both the interacting parties to establish a 
successful relationship. 
No. Criterion Trust Building 
 
Trust Maintenance 
 
Trust Decline 
1. 
Phase of 
Relationship 
 Exchange/transaction 
only 
 High object related 
 Partnering/collaboration / 
   cooperation 
 High object and process related 
 Termination / 
Separation 
2. Trust Level 
Condition 
Low / negative 
Pre-condition (Trustinitial) 
= 0 
Trustfinal = positive levels 
High / positive 
Pre-condition (Trustinitial) = positive 
levels 
Trustfinal = positive levels 
Low / negative 
Pre-condition 
(Trustinitial) = 
positive levels 
Trustfinal = 
negative levels  
3. Value of 
Relationship 
Discover / Explore Established value Disappear / Nil 
4. Decision to 
manage trust 
level 
Unilateral or bilateral Bilateral Unilateral and or 
bilateral 
5. Involvement of 
third party 
agent in 
Nil High Nil or High 
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relationship 
6. The Nature of 
Business 
Activities 
Unplanned Planned Planned or 
Unplanned 
7. Relationship 
Experience 
Low or inexperience 
n < N *) 
High or mature 
n ≥ N *) 
Low or High 
n < N or n ≥ N *) 
8. Key Strategic 
Implications 
 Creating Interest 
 Analyzing Behavior 
 Collecting 
Trustworthiness 
Information 
 Increasing Trust Level 
 Sharing Interest 
 Bounded Rationality 
 Confirm Trustworthiness 
Information 
 High adaptation in Problem 
Solving 
 Sustaining Trust Level 
 Common 
Goals may not 
exist 
 Decreasing 
trust level 
*) 
n is the number of current interaction, N is the perceived number of being confidence to further engages in such relationship. 
Table 4.1: Characteristics of trust evolution phases 
Based on the evaluation presented in Table 4.1 above, viewing the whole span of the 
relationship from the trust perspective, during the trust building stage, both parties 
collect trustworthiness information about each other. During this phase, trust may be 
established between the parties. Once trust has been established, the relationship 
between the two parties becomes formalized. In other words, trust is a pre-requisite 
for the formation of a relationship. As the relationship progresses, with the 
subsequent conduct of interactions between both the interacting partners, it may 
reach a stage where both parties can see value in continuing the trust-based 
relationship.  
Typically, at this stage, both the interacting parties have interacted n times (n ≥ N), 
where „N‟ denotes the threshold corresponding to the number of interactions required 
by the trusting agent in order to determine whether the relationship with the trusted 
agent should be sustained, and „n‟ denotes the actual number of interactions that have 
occurred between trusting agent and trusted agent. It is important to note that „N‟ is a 
subjective variable determined by the trusting agent and may vary depending on the 
trusting agent, trusted agent, and context in question. This phase can be regarded as 
the „trust maintenance phase‟. In other words, a stable partnership is another outcome 
once trust has been built. In a partnership relationship, both parties acknowledge that 
a value or strategic advantage can be derived from their relationship. As we assume 
that trust has already been established, trust maintenance is a key issue in this phase. 
Both parties perceive that several current strategic advantages that they have gained 
as a result of numerous previous interactions need to be preserved. In order to retain 
these advantages, they make an arrangement to maintain trust that reflects their 
confidence in each other. If, however, both parties do not take the necessary steps to 
maintain trust, the relationship may terminate (or decline prematurely).  
In order to establish a valuable relationship (from business perspective), interacting 
agents may need to follow the different phases of the relationship and their 
correlation with trust evolution at every phase. It is a dynamic process that requires 
both parties to follow this evolutionary pattern. However, it always starts with the 
initial phase of building the relationship. The next phase of the relationship evolution 
depends on the effort that each party makes when dealing with the other. The 
relationship may move to the second stage or directly to the third phase. In the next 
sections, we present the trust and relationship condition at each phase of trust 
evolution. 
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4.2.1 The Trust Building Phase  
In this phase, the interacting parties are entering into a new relationship. They 
identify their needs and willingness to enter into or initiate an arrangement during 
this stage. As this is an initial relationship, the trust level may be at the base level. 
With the passage of time and with further subsequent interaction, each other‟s 
willingness and ability to interact productively is communicated, clarified and 
verified. Hence, during this phase, the perceived trustworthiness becomes either 
positively or negatively reinforced. The trust level may increase or decrease 
depending upon the way that an agent tries to build the level of trust in this 
relationship.  
Moreover, in the trust building phase, the decision to build trust may be unilateral or 
from one party only. For example, a service provider may try to build trust in the 
service requester, (e.g., by creating interest in product/service packages, deliver a 
diversity of product/service package options etc.). However, the service requester 
may not necessarily be aware that the trusting agent is trying to initiate a relationship. 
Conversely, the service requester may try to build trust in the service provider by 
demonstrating good paying performance and making a repeat purchase without the 
service provider being aware of this.  Hence, both parties are trying to discover value 
in their relationship. Their exchange is motivated by object-related or transactional 
purposes only and with unplanned behaviour.  
Therefore, one may say that the purpose of this level of the relationship is exchange 
or transaction only. Exchange means giving and receiving something of value 
without any deep meaning being attached to this value. Therefore, any uncertainties 
about the future of this relationship are greater in this phase. If both parties 
successfully discover some value in maintaining the relationship, then the 
relationship and the trust level enters the second phase. It can be characterized by the 
establishment of a mutual positive trust level and a certain number of successful 
interactions being experienced.  
Hence, we define building trust as “the phase which spans the period from the stage 
(point in time) corresponding to the initiation of the relationship at the stage (point in 
time) at which positive level of trust has been established”. The focus of both parties 
(trusting agent and trusted agent) in this phase is to construct the trust level and 
relationship value. 
4.2.2 The Trust Maintaining Phase 
Relationship experience and value discovery in the previous phase (trust building 
phase) create a certain degree of confidence for both parties to advance to the next 
level of their relationship. In this phase, both parties recognize the importance of 
establishing and preserving some of the strategic advantages of their relationship. 
This established relationship value needs to be preserved as both parties will gain 
additional advantages by continuing their business relationship. Further, the trust 
level has been established at a positive level and needs to be maintained; it may even 
increase to a higher level. At this stage, both of the interacting entities have shared 
value. 
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As for the relationship evolution, this moves forward from an exchange relationship 
to a partnership relationship. In a partnership relationship, both parties consider 
successful cooperation, rather than exchange only, as a means of preserving value. 
The partners are able and willing to cooperate with each other on the basis of mutual 
trust. Therefore, trust needs to be maintained in this phase in order to sustain a long-
term relationship. However, the decision to sustain or maintain trust should come 
from both parties. If one party does not agree to maintain this relationship, the trust 
maintenance effort is pointless. For example, in a stable relationship between buyer 
and seller, the seller continues to invest heavily in the relationship, while the buyer 
may be seeking a replacement vendor. Without initial planning or explanation given 
in advance to the seller, the seller may face considerable losses. Therefore, in 
contrast to building trust, a bilateral decision to maintain trust in a relationship is 
important.  
Further, with trust maintenance efforts, both parties try to maintain the stability of the 
partnership. If an unplanned event occurs, both parties will negotiate solutions 
without undermining the stability of the relationship. In order to ensure the stability 
of a partnership, a third party agent is involved in the relationship. This third party 
takes the role of an independent and unbiased agent to monitor the trust relationship 
between two interacting agents.  
Hence, we define trust maintenance as “the phase which spans the period from the 
stage (point in time) at which positive trust has been established to the stage (point in 
time) at which trustworthiness values fall to a level corresponding to negative trust”.  
The common goal of both parties (the trusting agent and the trusted agent) is 
therefore to sustain an adequate level of trust in their relationship. 
4.2.3 The Trust Declining Phase 
The trust declining phase may occur as a result of dissatisfaction on the part of either 
one or both parties, resulting in the termination of their relationship. For example, if 
a customer‟s demand increases sharply and cannot be met by the seller, the 
relationship may be threatened. From the trust perspective, the level of trust may 
decline, going from a positive level to a negative level, or may move from trust to 
distrust. In this phase, neither party perceives any value in persisting with the 
relationship. Further, the decision to terminate such a relationship could come from 
either one or both parties. It could be either unplanned or under negotiation with the 
help of a third party agent trying to obtain a win-win solution for both parties. In this 
phase, common goals may no longer exist, in contrast to the trust building phase.  
Hence, we define declining trust as “the phase starting from the stage (point in time) 
corresponding to when negative trust has been established to the stage (point in time) 
at which the trust relationship does not exist”.  
However, the vast majority of existing literature on trust focuses on „building‟ or 
„developing‟ trust. Very few works explore the notion of trust maintenance 
(Fachrunnisa, Hussain et al. 2009). In this chapter, we clearly differentiate the 
various phases and review the characteristics of each. Additionally, in this research 
we focus on the maintenance phase as the aspects of this phase have not been studied 
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in detail. In the next section, we present an overview of the methodology for 
maintaining trust, which to date and to the best of our knowledge, is the only one of 
its kind.  
4.3 Overview of the Solution for TMM 
As was pointed out in the previous chapters, the existing research does not propose a 
complete methodology for trust maintenance in virtual environments. In this section, 
we provide a detailed overview of the proposed methodology for maintaining trust in 
order to address the issues discussed in the previous chapter. The focus of this 
methodology is not on building trust between the new interacting parties, but on the 
ways by which interacting entities can preserve the existing level of trust in their 
relationships or exceed their minimum threshold of trust in order to successfully 
carry out an interaction in virtual environments.  
Before we introduce the details of the methodology, the basic assumptions 
underlying the methodology need to be stated as follows: 
a. Both parties (trusting agent and trusted agent) have previously been involved 
in a certain number of relationships involving the same criteria or relationship 
context. The trust level in this context has reached a positive level of 5 or 6. 
b. Both parties need to be sincere in their efforts to maintain trust. In other 
words, both the interacting parties need to be honest in their intention to 
maintain trust. This methodology provides a systematic framework by which 
two interacting parties can maintain the existing level of trust. 
c. In order for trust to be maintained, we propose the use of a third party agent. 
The role of the third party agent is „active corrective‟. The third party agent 
uses both mutually agreed to behaviour and actual behaviour on a real-time 
basis to identify when performance discrepancies occur and provide real-time 
feedback to the non-complying party. This third party agent could be a 
mutual friend or an agent from a professional service. 
The conceptual framework of the methodology for maintaining trust is depicted in 
Figure 4.2 below. 
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Figure 4.2: Conceptual framework of the proposed methodology for 
maintaining trust in virtual environments 
The whole workflow of the TMM is as follows: 
1. First of all, before both parties start to interact for the purpose of maintaining 
the trust level, they select a third party agent that will be involved for the 
entire duration of the relationship. This is a pre-interaction activity. 
2. The second step is formalization and negotiation of Service Requirements. In 
the formalization of service requirements, both parties start to formalize their 
service requirements. These service requirements are an input for the next 
sub-step, negotiation of service requirements. After both parties have 
determined their service requirements, they iteratively negotiate those 
requirements to reach a Service Level Agreement (SLA). This SLA is used as 
the basis for measuring the trust performance at the end of time space 
relationship.  
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3. Once both parties have an SLA for mutually agreed performance, they 
conduct their service requirements as stated in the SLA. At the same time, 
they are monitoring and evaluating the performance progress of service 
deliverability. The third party agent‟s role here is to monitor the interaction 
performance and help both parties to resolve any conflict or performance 
discrepancies that may occur.  
4. Incentive mechanisms, in conjunction with proactive continuous monitoring 
are employed to ensure the success of service deliverability. 
5. Finally, the trust level is re-calibrated at the end of the relationship.  
As discussed in the previous chapter and the above section, our methodology is 
comprised of five frameworks which are: third party agent selection, formalization 
and negotiation of service requirements, proactive continuous performance 
monitoring, incentive mechanisms, and trust re-calibration. These are research issues 
2 – 6 as discussed in Chapter 3. In Sections 4.4 – 4.9, we present an overview of the 
solution for these research issues and in Section 4.10 we present an overview of the 
solution for research issue 7 which is validation of the methodology. 
4.4 Solution Overview of Framework for Third 
Party Agent Selection 
In this section, we present an overview of the framework for third party agent 
selection. As mentioned previously, the selection of a third party agent is the first 
step in our TMM. In this step, both parties (trusting agent and trusted agent) choose 
and select a third party agent. Before the parties start their relationship, their first task 
is to discuss and choose this third party agent. Both parties will choose an agent that 
they agree will be involved in their relationship for trust maintenance purposes.  This 
third party agent is independent and provides its service either gratis or for a fee. The 
intermediary role of third party agent involves performance monitoring, conflict 
resolution and ensuring the interacting parties‟ satisfaction during the trust 
maintenance phase.  
There are two options when choosing this third party agent. Firstly, this third party 
agent may be selected from mutual trusted friends. This option is chosen if the 
volume of business transactions is not too high. The service provided by this friend is 
gratis. Secondly, the third party agent may be a paid professional agent who is hired 
to provide a service as an arbitrator for trust maintenance purposes. The mechanism 
to find a mutual friend or professional agent is as follows: 
4.4.1 Mutual Trusted Friend as Third Party Agent 
One simple way to find this third party agent in virtual environments is by benefiting 
from a mutual trusted friend. If both parties have a mutual friend in whom they both 
have a sufficient level of trust as their arbitrator, then the trusting agent and trusted 
agent will arrive at some agreement about this third party agent.  
  
Page 118 of 319 
 
However, this third party should be an agent that also is mutually trusted by the 
interacting parties. Therefore, both trusting parties will agree to and select an agent to 
monitor their relationship, especially in activities related to maintaining trust. This 
step comprises two options: (a) find a mutual friend from a list of friends; or (b) find 
a mutual friend from a list of friends of a friend (FoAF). 
a. List of Friends (Basic Approach) 
In our proposed framework, firstly both trusting parties (trusting agent and 
trusted agent) create a list of their friends. Both parties should consider the 
rank of trust level in their friend. The friend with the highest level of trust 
would be placed first on the list and so on. This is in order to create a list of 
trusted friends. Then both parties try to establish a list of mutual friends. If 
they find one mutual trusted friend, they solicit this friend to agree to arbitrate 
in their relationship in order to maintain trust. If this person is able and ready 
to be the third party agent for the duration of the relationship, then this person 
becomes a third party agent. 
However, if both parties have more than one mutual friend, both parties 
would establish some criteria for selecting one of their mutual friends to 
become a third party agent. The criteria to select this third party agent is 
defined and agreed by both parties. 
This is the first stage of the process of finding a mutual friend to act as a third 
party agent. If in this first stage, both parties cannot find a mutual trusted 
friend, they proceed to the next stage of the process by creating a list of 
friends of a friend (FoAF). 
b. Friends of a Friend List (FoAF-based Approach) 
There is a possibility that both parties cannot not find a mutual trusted friend 
in the first stage (from their direct mutual list of friends). If this occurs, they 
go to the second stage in which both parties ask their first ranked trusted 
friend to make a list of friends. Therefore, now both parties have a first 
friends of friend list. Then, the process to obtain a mutual trusted friend is 
repeated as in the first stage. If, however, there is no mutual friend from this 
first list friend of friend, they should ask the following rank of trusted friend 
to create list of friends. The mechanism repeats until end of list of friends.  
There is also a chance that both parties could not find a mutual trusted friend in the 
FoAF-based approach. If this is the case, both parties ask the friends of the first 
friend to make a list of friends. Therefore, both parties have a second friends of 
friend list. The process of selecting a mutual trusted friend is the same as for the first 
and second stages, until both parties obtain a mutual trusted friend from the friends 
of friend list to be an arbitrator. However, the task of compiling a friends of friend 
list is limited to the sixth friends of friend list. This is based on „six degrees of 
separation‟. Six degrees of separation (also referred to as the “Human Web”) is the 
notion that, if a person is one step away from each person they know and two steps 
away from each person who is known by one of the people they know, then everyone 
is, at most, six steps away from any other person on Earth. In the next chapter, we 
present the detailed mechanism of this framework. 
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4.4.2 Professional Service as Third Party Agent 
The second option is to select a third party agent by hiring a professional service. 
This option can be utilized if both parties cannot find a mutual friend by using the 
Basic approach and the FoAF-based approach. Moreover, if both parties have a high 
volume of business transactions, the task that needs to be finished by both parties is 
highly important, and the initial level of trust is also at a positive high, then the 
trusting parties may need a professional third party agent. A professional third party 
agent is one who has specific knowledge about a particular field of business, conflict 
management, and business law that suits both parties‟ business context. Furthermore, 
this third party agent might have experience as an arbitrator in dispute resolution.  
However, as was pointed out in the previous chapter, there is little or no service 
company that specializes in offering a professional third party agent for the purposes 
of maintaining trust. Therefore a new service company is needed that specializes in 
offering a third party agent to ensure trust maintenance in a relationship. We term 
such a company „Arbitration Service for Trust Maintenance‟ (ASTM). This service 
company may take the form of a collective business system or collective business 
model. A collective business model is a business organization or association 
typically composed of relatively large numbers of businesses, tradespersons or 
professionals in the same or related fields of endeavour, which pools resources, 
shares information or provides other benefits for their members (Teece 2010). Hence, 
the company that provides a third party agent for trust maintenance purposes could 
be a professional service company comprised of a large number of professional 
arbitration agents who specialize in trust maintenance in virtual business 
relationships.  
Therefore, to build an ASTM as a „new service company‟, we propose a service 
business model that supports its interoperability. Details of this service business 
model are presented in Chapter 5. 
4.5 Solution Overview of Framework for 
Formalization and Negotiation of Service 
Requirements 
Step 2 of the methodology focuses on the formalization and negotiation of service 
requirements by both parties. In this section, we present an overview of the 
framework for formalization and negotiation of service requirements. This 
framework comprises three steps as follows: 
4.5.1 Step 1: Formalization of Service Requirements 
In this stage, both parties formalize and express the service requirements in a formal 
manner. The activities comprise three steps:  
a. Determination of service requirement 
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Determination of service requirements is the process of discovering the needs 
of interacting partners in this relationship. 
b. Articulation of service requirements  
Service requirement articulation is the process of expressing the service 
requirements in terms of service criteria and their quality descriptors. 
c. Prioritization of service requirements.  
Prioritization of service requirements is the process of determining the level 
of importance of each service criterion.  
Therefore, the outcome of this reciprocal action is a clear statement about the service 
requirements of both parties. It contains service criteria, service quality descriptors 
and level of importance. Once both parties have each other‟s service requirements, 
they will use this statement to negotiate in step 2. Both trusting agent and trusted 
agent are expressing the service that they want and expect from the interaction. 
Based on these three activities (determining service requirement, articulating service 
requirements and prioritizing service requirements), both parties will have an initial 
proposal of service requirements which contains service criteria, quality descriptors 
and the level of importance of each service criterion. The number of service criteria 
might be different for each party („n‟ from trusting agent and „m‟ from trusted agent).  
From their initial proposal, both parties can classify or identify any of their 
conflicting service requirements which need to be negotiated in the next step, the 
negotiation phase.  
4.5.2 Step 2: Negotiation of Service Requirements 
The next step of this framework focuses on negotiation of service requirements. 
Once both parties have established a set of service requirements, they make an 
iterative negotiation about those requirements. Both parties either agree or disagree 
to the service criteria and their corresponding quality descriptors. Repeated 
negotiation is needed until an agreement on a specific service from both parties is 
achieved. The outcome of this negotiation is a service commitment that must be 
achieved. Once both parties agree on specific service requirements, they make an 
iterative negotiation again to reach a mutually agreed behaviour that contains finite 
services in time slots, the number of checkpoints per time slot, how they will 
evaluate each other‟s performance, how they will give a report to the third party etc. 
All the results of this negotiation are documented in a contract.  
Hence, the outcome of this step is an agreement contract and a mutually agreed 
behaviour that will guide each party‟s behaviour to achieve a common goal. The 
third party agent comes into action to help both trusting parties define the number of 
checkpoints in each time slot. Additionally, during this step, both parties negotiate 
iteratively on each conflicting service requirement. Once they reach an agreement 
about all the service requirements to be carried out during the interaction, they will 
have an SLA which is an agreement about a set of service requirements. In Chapter 
6, we present the details of the mechanism for formalizing and negotiating service 
requirements. 
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4.5.3 Step 3: SLA Construction 
Once both parties reach an agreement about all the service requirements to be carried 
out during the interaction, the third party agent will translate the formalization and 
negotiation result into an SLA. This is the phase of SLA construction. The SLA is an 
agreement about a set of service requirements. Additionally, during SLA 
construction, the third party agent comes into action to help both trusting parties 
define the number of checkpoints in each time slot. In Chapter 6, we present the 
details of the mechanism for formalizing and negotiating service requirements. 
4.6 Solution Overview of Framework for 
Proactive Continuous Performance 
Monitoring 
The third phase of our methodology is performance monitoring. In this section, we 
present an overview of proactive continuous performance monitoring. Once both 
trusting agent and trusted agent have a mutual agreement or SLA, they start to 
deliver their agreed service. In order to ensure the service deliverability and to 
maintain the level of trust between two parties, we develop an intelligence 
mechanism to automatically detect and intelligently respond to the differences 
between mutually agreed behaviour (MAB) and actual behaviour. This intelligence 
mechanism is designed to detect events and automatically respond by adjusting 
performance thresholds and maintaining a service performance history. It will help 
both interacting parties and the third party agent to ensure continuity of performance, 
make accurate decisions based on the most up-to-date information, and meet 
compliance and control regulations. Therefore, changes in behaviour and events are 
promptly detected, well documented and reacted to appropriately. It allows trusting 
parties to remain alert to behaviour changes and respond quickly if there occur any 
unmet performance events that will impact significantly on the relationship. 
This mechanism also ensures that both parties preserve the deliverability of service 
and proactively respond if some service failure occurs. Without such continuity, 
performance monitoring solutions are of little or no value, given the dynamic nature 
of trust. Moreover, this platform will also provide a system of configuration 
management database (CMDB) to the third party agent. It maintains accurate and up-
to-date information, together with any behaviour changes of either party. By 
automatically applying these behaviour updates, the third party can continue to rely 
on its CMDB as a single, accurate „source of truth‟, guaranteeing service levels, 
avoiding risky changes, and reducing incident response times, especially in the face 
of execution of task service.  
Another key purpose of performance monitoring is to identify service deliverability 
and/or its problems as early as possible so that corrective actions may be taken to 
prevent/minimize performance discrepancies that will result in a decrease of trust. 
Moreover, monitoring helps provide qualitative observations and data on how well 
services are being delivered based on the mutually agreed behaviour or an SLA.  
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The framework for proactive continuous performance monitoring comprises several 
steps as follows: 
a. In order to ensure the deliverability of service, the third party agent creates a 
time window which consists of time space, time slots, and number of 
checkpoints. Time space is defined as „the total duration of time over which the 
behaviour of the trusted agent will be analysed and the trustworthiness measure 
and prediction will be carried out‟ (Chang, Dillon et al. 2006). 
b. At each time space of interactions, the task service is decomposed into several 
time slot(s). Time slot(s) is defined as a finite number of non-overlapping, 
mutually exclusive and equally spaced sectors of time. It is the number of 
intermediate sections of task that should be delivered at those intermediate 
times for the duration of the time space (Chang, Dillon et al. 2006). 
c. Each time slot is then divided into several checkpoints. We define checkpoints 
as the number of points used to check the performance in each time slot (s) 
(Fachrunnisa and Hussain 2011). A checkpoint is designed to ensure the 
continuity of service delivery. At each checkpoint, the agreed intermediate 
performance of service delivery is expressed. This checkpoint system is 
intended to facilitate proactive continuous performance monitoring during the 
transaction. With the designed time slot, the trusting agent can observe or track 
changes in the performance of the trusted agent over a time space. The agreed 
performance for each time space is divided into several checkpoints which are 
the points within a time space where the trusting agent evaluates the 
performance of the trusted agent in delivering the service. 
d. The number of checkpoints or intermediate performances is determined by the 
third party agent using a pre-defined measure. In this step, the third party agent 
acts as an active-corrective agent by monitoring task performance and helping 
to resolve any conflict during the relationship in order to maintain trust. The 
third party agent has the responsibility to monitor the performance and 
administer the SLA between service requester and service provider. 
Performance monitoring always takes place within the set time space and 
occurs on an ongoing basis throughout the term of the SLA. The proactive 
continuous monitoring and progress of the interaction between the interacting 
parties would produce real-time performance information. It would 
additionally allow „proactive performance monitoring‟ whereby each 
interacting agent would be able to proactively determine when its Mutual 
Agreed Behaviour (MAB) is not in line with the Actual Behaviour, and take 
appropriate remedial action(s). 
In Chapter 7, we present the details of the mechanism of this proactive continuous 
monitoring. Several case studies involving various scenarios are also presented for 
elucidation purposes. 
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4.7 Solution Overview of Framework for 
Incentive Mechanisms for Successful 
Service Delivery 
In the previous step, an overview of the mechanism for proactive continuous 
performance monitoring as a kind of control was presented. In order to support the 
continuity of service delivery, an incentive mechanism to encourage both parties to 
comply as closely as possible with the terms of the mutual agreement is needed.  In 
this section, we present an overview of the framework for an incentive mechanism 
for service deliverability.  
Unlike the existing works in the literature regarding incentives for task completion, 
in this research, we combine a mechanism of proactive continuous monitoring and 
incentive mechanism specifically to support successful service delivery. The service 
delivery is monitored at intermediate checkpoints and incentives are given at these 
checkpoints rather than at the end of the interaction. The framework is not intended 
to provide an incentive after task completion; instead, incentive is given during the 
course of the transaction to minimize any discrepancy between actual performances 
and mutually agreed to performance. We propose three different mechanisms for 
providing incentive to facilitate successful service deliverability as follows: 
a. Performance-driven-based Incentive 
Incentive is given if the performance at the current checkpoint is greater than or 
equal to that at the previous checkpoints and the parties show an improved 
performance level in response to receiving an incentive. 
b. Error-tolerance-based Incentive 
Incentive is given if the performance at any checkpoint is greater than or equal 
to a specific threshold agreed to by both parties. 
c. Occurrence-based Incentive 
Incentive is given if the performance in current checkpoint is greater than or 
equal to that at the previous checkpoints. The increasing performance occurs by 
means of chance. 
Details of the mechanism for each approach and various benchmarks to measure the 
effectiveness of each approach are presented in Chapter 7. 
4.8 Solution Overview of Framework for Trust 
Re-calibration 
In order to have a complete methodology for trust maintenance, we need to have a 
framework for trust re-calibration by the end of the interaction time space. This 
methodology facilitates a system for periodic assessment of trust level in each time 
slot(s) and for a one-time assessment of final trust at the end of the interaction. 
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Additionally, this methodology facilitates the maintenance of a trust relationship by 
using historical data from both their trust level records and performance records. 
In this step, both parties re-calibrate the final trust. The calibration or calculation of 
trust after an interaction during the trust maintenance phase is determined by the 
correlation between actual behaviour and mutually agreed behaviour during the 
interaction. We employed CCCI metrics (Chang, Dillon et al. 2006) to measure this 
final trust. We propose three different approaches for trust re-calibration in TMM as 
follows (Fachrunnisa and Hussain 2011): 
a. Outcome-based Approach 
The trust re-calibration for this approach is computed based on the correlation 
of actual outcome performance with the agreed performance in the 
interaction. The actual outcome performance is determined by the final 
outcome at the end of the interaction. In the outcome-based approach, the 
trusting agent does not consider how the trusted agent performs at each 
intermediate checkpoint. This approach considers only the final service 
delivered by the trusted agent to the trusting agent. In other words, this metric 
measures or captures whether or not the service in question has been 
successfully delivered at the end, without considering whether the 
intermediate SLA requirements were successfully met. In contrast, as 
mentioned above, the outcome-based approach would capture and reflect the 
conformance to the SLA by a given agent at the end of the interaction only. 
 
b. Checkpoint-based Approach 
In this approach, a final trust value is computed by measuring accumulated 
evidence of intermediate trust during the entire time of the relationship. The 
evidence of trust experienced is collected / accumulated at each checkpoint. 
With this approach, a fine-grained view of an agent‟s performance over the 
whole interaction is aggregated to find the final trust value.  The checkpoint-
based approach captures and reflects the trust value of a given agent as a 
function of compliance between the mutually agreed behaviour and actual 
behaviour at all the intermediate checkpoints. 
 
c. Weighted-based Approach 
As discussed above, we have proposed the outcome-based approach 
(measured by SLA compliance only at the end of interaction) and checkpoint-
based approach (measured by compliance at all the checkpoints throughout 
the interaction) for computing the final trust value. However, for objective 
trust assessments, it would be optimal to determine the final trust value using 
a weighted approach between the outcome-based trust and checkpoint-based 
trust values. Such a metric would take into account the successful delivery of 
the service at both the end of the interaction and at the intermediate 
checkpoints. 
A weighted-based approach is an approach for calculating final trust as a 
function of real-time trust value (checkpoint-based approach) and outcome-
based approach. This approach is proposed to give some weight to the 
different types of compliant agents. As in the TMM, there is a proactive 
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continuous monitoring of performance. The agent who always complies at 
every checkpoint might be different from the agent who does not comply at 
every checkpoint but delivers the full service by the end of the interaction. 
In Chapter 8, we present the details of the mechanism of the trust re-calibration 
framework. We also present several scenarios and case studies to show the utilization 
of the framework. 
4.9 Solution Overview for Validation of 
Methodology  
In this thesis, we make use of simulation experiments in order to validate the 
methodology for trust maintenance in virtual environments.  In order to determine 
the effectiveness of our methodology, we engineered a multi-agent system using 
JADE Multi Agent-Based Framework. The engineered multi-agent system has an 
interface with which the user can specify the parameters prior to the execution. The 
user could specify the total number of interactions (or transactions) that need to be 
simulated. Additionally, the user specifies the total number of agents in the multi-
agent system that need to be grouped into six classes, with each class corresponding 
to one particular trustworthiness value.  
During the bootstrapping phase, the agents are created and each of them is assigned a 
given behaviour to represent their level or degree of compliance. Each compliant 
behaviour corresponds to one trustworthiness value. For example, the behaviour 
belonging to agents with trustworthiness value „1‟ (TV1) would contain a behaviour 
that would spell out the action or the way that agents carry out a transaction.  
Hussain (2006) defines the behaviour of an agent as „the way in which it conducts 
itself in a given situation or circumstance‟. The behaviour of an agent in turn depends 
directly on the trustworthiness value assigned to it by the multi-agent system. In this 
research, we propose that the behaviour of an agent is the degree to which an agent 
complies with the terms of a formal contract or mutually agreed performance. Davies 
et al. (Davies, Lassar et al. 2011) define compliance as „an outcome of commitment, 
motivation and cognitive process that jointly drive decisions of one party to do what 
the other party desires‟. From the perspective of performance behaviour, an agent‟s 
compliance is a reflection of the degree of conformance to a contractual agreement. 
Since there are six different trustworthiness values, there are six different compliance 
behaviours.  
In the experiment simulation, we propose a correctness of agent‟s compliance level 
using four counts: Crisp Compliance Level, Fuzzy Triangular Compliance Level, 
Fuzzy Trapezoidal Compliance Level, and Fuzzy Hybrid Compliance Level. We 
have 7 (seven) broad objectives of the simulation which we divided into several sub 
objectives. The first three objectives (objective 1, objective 2, and objective 3) focus 
on performance testing of TMM under three conditions as following: 
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a. Performance testing of TMM assuming static behaviour of agents (objective 
1) 
b. Performance testing of TMM assuming dynamic behaviour of agents 
(objective 2) 
c. Performance testing of TMM assuming that incentives are awarded (objective 
3) 
The subsequent four objectives (objective 4, objective 5, objective 6, and objective 7) 
are concerned with the validation of the finer elements of the methodology as 
follows: 
a. Determining the accuracy of recommendations by a third party agent 
(objective 4) 
b. Ability to identify all the non-complying agents (objective 5) 
c. Ability of the methodology to maximize community social welfare (objective 
6) 
d. Modelling the impact of our methodology for improving community 
sustainability (objective 7) 
The first 3 (three) broad objectives of the validation measurement are presented in 
Chapter 9 and the 4 (four) broad objectives are presented in Chapter 10, along with 
the results obtained. 
4.10 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we presented a generic formal definition of trust evolution and 
described the three phases of trust evolution namely, trust building, trust maintenance 
and trust decline. In addition, we present the characteristic feature of interaction at 
each phase. Furthermore, we proposed the solution overview for each of the seven 
cohesive research issues that we had identified in Chapter 3. Finally, we presented 
the solution overview to the problem that is being addressed in this thesis. In the next 
chapter, we propose the framework for third party agent selection, which was 
identified in this chapter as being the first step of our methodology to maintain trust.  
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Chapter 5 - Framework for Third 
Party Agent Selection 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we present a framework for third party agent selection. The third 
party agent is a neutral agent that will be used to supervise the interaction between 
the trusting agent and the trusted agent during the course of the interaction at any 
point in time during the trust maintenance phase. Hence, the purpose of this 
interaction is to maintain the existing level of trust. The process of selecting this third 
party agent is the first step in our proposed methodology to maintain trust. Before 
both trusting agent and trusted agent start their transaction, their first activity 
according to our proposed methodology for trust maintenance is to discuss and 
choose who would be the third party agent in their transaction. Both parties will 
choose an agent that they agree will be involved during the course of the interaction 
in the trust maintenance phase. 
Section 5.2 presents a framework for third party agent selection by means of taking 
advantage of the availability of a mutual trusted friend. A case study is presented in 
this section to illustrate the operability of the framework. Section 5.3 presents a 
framework whereby the trusting agent and trusted agent could hire a professional 
third party agent to supervise their interaction. We also present a service business 
model proposal for a professional third party agent service company. Details of the 
Arbitration Service for Trust Maintenance (ASTM) company are presented in this 
section. Section 5.4 concludes the chapter. 
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5.2 Mutual Trusted Friend as Third Party 
Agent  
As was discussed in the previous chapter, there are two options for choosing and 
selecting the third party agent. Both parties have to agree on the choice of the 
selected third party agent in their interaction for trust maintenance purposes. The first 
option is to select a third party agent from mutual trusted friends. This option is 
viable if the volume of business transactions is not too high. Moreover, the service 
provided by this friend could be gratis. The second option is that the third party agent 
might be a paid professional agent who could be hired from a service company to act 
as an arbitrator in an interaction for trust maintenance purposes. In this section, we 
present a detailed framework for agent selection from mutual trusted friend (basic 
approach) and mutual friend of a friend (FoAF based approach). 
As was explained in the previous chapter, one simple way to find this third party 
agent in virtual environments is by benefiting from a mutual trusted friend. We 
define a mutual trusted friend as an agent who is a friend of both trusting agent and 
trusted agent. If both parties have a mutual trusted friend, then the trusting agent and 
trusted agent will arrive at an agreement with this mutual friend to be the third party 
agent in their interaction. However, the chosen third party agent should also be an 
agent that is mutually trusted by the interacting parties. We present the details of 
these two mechanisms in the next sections. 
5.2.1 Mutual Friend from List of Friends (Basic Approach) 
The first stage in finding a mutual trusted friend is from the list of the friends of both 
the trusting agent and the trusted agent. This section explains how to find a mutual 
trusted friend from a list of friends. Firstly, both trusting agent and trusted agent 
create a list of their friends. They have to create a list of friends based on the rank of 
trust value that they have toward their friends. The friends list of both the trusting 
agent and the trusted agent is sorted by the trust value of the trusting agent and the 
trusted agent toward them. Once both parties have their own list of friends, they try 
to establish a list of mutual friends. If they find one mutual trusted friend, they ask 
this friend to agree to be a third party agent in their interaction in the trust 
maintenance phase. If this mutual friend is able and ready to be an arbitrator for the 
duration of the relationship, then this mutual friend becomes a third party agent. 
However, if both parties have more than one mutual friend in the list of mutual 
friends, they would make use of pre-defined criteria when selecting one of their 
mutual trusted friends to become their third party agent. Hence, the steps involved in 
this first stage are as follows: 
a. Step 1: Trusting agent and trusted agent draw up a list of their friends 
b. Step 2: The order of friends on the list is based on the level of trust both 
parties have in a friend. Friend with highest trust value is placed first on the 
list and so on. 
c. Step 3: Identify mutual friends from both friends‟ lists 
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d. Step 4: If there is one mutual friend, this mutual friend would be selected as a 
third party agent 
e. Step 5: If there is more than one mutual friend, several criteria should be used 
to select the one who will be chosen as a third party agent. The criteria that 
can be considered by both interacting parties but not limited to the following: 
 
i. The level of trust in their mutual friend(s)  
Both parties agree on a certain threshold of trust level in a friend who 
will be the third party agent in their transaction. If the level of trust in 
a particular mutual friend is greater than the specified threshold, this 
friend would be selected as the third party agent. 
ii. The reputation of the friend 
The reputation of being fair and unbiased is another criterion that 
needs to be considered. It may be helpful to choose a neutral agent or 
third party agent who is familiar with the service criteria in the 
interaction so that any performance gap that might appear during the 
interaction can be resolved in a real-time manner. 
In the algorithmic design, we use the function C1 (mutual friend 1) to Cn 
(mutual friend n
th
) to refer to user defined function for selecting one mutual 
friend if the search returns multiple potential mutual friend. In this case C1 
could refer to the level of trust and C2 could refer to the reputation value. 
f. Step 6: The friend with the highest trust and/or reputation value would be 
contacted and selected as the third party agent. It is important to note here 
that the critical point is that both parties agreed to select this particular friend. 
On the other hand, the selected friend should agree to and be able to act as the 
third party agent for both trusting agent and trusted agent in the transaction 
for trust maintenance purposes.  
The mathematical expression and algorithm framework for this approach is depicted 
in Table 5.1. 
Input:  T =  trusting agent 
 D = trusted agent 
 FT = Set of friends of T 
 FD = Set of friends of D 
 Mutual Friend = set of mutual friends = null 
 Selected mutual friend = null 
Cn (mutual friend) = user defined criteria for selecting the mutual friend from 
amongst the mutual friend list 
 
Begin Procedure 
 Sort FT in descending order of trust value of T  
 Sort FD in descending order of trust value of D 
 Mutual Friend = FT ∩ FD 
 if (size (mutual friend) = 1), then  
 Selected mutual friend = mutual friend [1] 
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 else 
 Selected mutual friend =  
 C1 (mutual friend) and  
 C2 (mutual friend) and 
 ……. 
 Cn (mutual friend) 
 End if 
 
End Procedure 
Table 5.1: Algorithm framework for third party agent selection  
(basic approach) 
This is the first stage of the process of finding a mutual friend to act as a third party 
agent. If in this first stage, the parties cannot find a mutual trusted friend, they 
proceed to the next stage of the process by creating a list of friends of a friend. The 
next section presents a framework for finding mutual friend from friends of a friend 
list. 
5.2.2 Mutual Friend from List of Friends of a Friend (FoAF-
based Approach) 
There is a possibility that both parties may not be able to find a mutual trusted friend 
in the first stage (from their direct mutual list of friends) as explained above. If this is 
the case, they go to the second stage in which both parties ask their trusted friend to 
make a list of friends. Therefore, now both parties have a first friend of friends list.  
The steps involved in this stage are as follows: 
a. Step 1: Both parties ask their respective trusted friend with the highest 
degree/level of trust. Therefore, both parties have a first list of friends of a 
friend (FoAF list). From this list, the process of finding a mutual friend is the 
same as that for the basic approach. 
b. Step 2: If no mutual friend can be found from the list of FoAF, ask trusted 
friend with the next highest degree/level of trust to make a list of friends and 
apply the mechanism as above (steps 5 and 6 from basic approach) as 
explained in Section 5.2.1. 
c. Step 3: Repeat this mechanism until the end of the friends list has been 
reached. 
d. Step 4: If there is no mutual friend from the first list of FoAF, both parties ask 
their first friends of friend list to make a list of their friends. Therefore, now 
both parties have a second list of FoAF and the process specified above in steps 
1, 2, and 3 are recursively identified until a mutual friend is found. 
e. Step 6: The creation of a friends of friend list is limited to six separations or 
sixth FoAF list. 
The mathematical expression and algorithm framework for this approach is depicted 
in Table 5.2 below: 
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Input:  T =  trusting agent 
 D = trusted agent 
 Fx is a function that returns friends of agent x 
 FT = Set of friends of T 
 FD = Set of friends of D 
 Mutual Friend = set of mutual friends = null 
 Selected mutual friend = null 
Cn (mutual friend) = user defined criteria for selecting the mutual friend from amongst the mutual 
friend list 
M = degree of separation = 1 
            n = 1 
            n is a variable to index friends of agent x  
 
Begin Procedure 
 Sort FT and FD in descending order of trust value of T  and D respectively 
 Mutual Friend = FT ∩ FD 
 if size (mutual friend = = 0) 
 then  
 Repeat (while (size(mutual friend = = 0))) 
                      Sort FT and FD in descending order based on trust value of T & D           respectively. 
Mutual Friend = FT ∩ FD 
Repeat (while (size(mutual friend = = 0))) 
  n = 1 
Repeat ( while(m ≤ 6)) 
     Compute FFT [n] and FFD [n] 
      Sort FFT [n] and FFD [n] in descending order of trust value  of FT and FD 
      Mutual Friend = FFT [n] ∩ FFD [n] 
End Repeat      
if (size mutual friend = = null), then 
FT [n] = FT [n + 1] 
FD [n] = FD [n + 1] 
End if 
  End Repeat 
 End Repeat 
 
 if size ((mutual friend = = null)) 
 Mutual friends cannot be located in 6 degrees of separation use ASTM 
 else 
  if (size (mutual friend) = = 1) 
  then selected mutual friend = mutual friend [1] 
  else 
  Selected mutual friends =  
   C1 (mutual friend) and 
   … 
   Cn (mutual friend) 
                           End if 
 End if 
End Procedure 
Table 5.2: Algorithm framework for third party agent selection  
(FoAF-based approach) 
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5.2.3 Illustrative Example of Finding Mutual Trusted Friend 
from List of Friends (Basic Approach)  
In this section, we illustrate the process of finding a mutual trusted friend in a virtual 
environment to act as a third party agent by using basic approach. 
a. First Scenario of Basic Approach 
The first scenario is where both trusting agent and trusted agent find a mutual trusted 
friend in the first stage. Consider for example, that there is a trusting and trusted 
agent each with a list of their friends. From these lists, there is a mutual friend, 
Charlie. Both parties might request that Charlie be the third party agent in a 
transaction during the trust maintenance phase.  
Trusting Agent Trusted Agent
Alice Bob
Charlie Daniel
Edward Charlie
Farah Ghani
 
Figure 5.1: First scenario of basic approach 
Figure 5.1 above illustrates that each party provides a list of trusted friends. As we 
can see from the list, there is one mutual friend: Charlie. Hence, Charlie qualifies as 
the third party agent in a transaction between trusting agent and trusted agent. The 
workflow of this process of identifying the mutual friend is as follows: 
a. Both parties provide their list of friends 
b. There is one mutual friend: Charlie 
c. Charlie is selected as a proposed third party agent 
d. If Charlie is willing and able to be their third party agent, then Charlie 
becomes the third party agent. 
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b. Second Scenario of Basic Approach 
In the second scenario, there is more than one mutual trusted friend. For example, 
both Alice and Charlie are the mutual trusted friends of both trusting agent and 
trusted agent. Let us assume that both Alice and Charlie are able to be third party 
agents. In this case, both parties have to decide on who will be their third party agent 
- Alice or Charlie.  This scenario is depicted in Figure 5.2 below. 
Trusting 
Agent
Trusted 
Agent
Alice Alice
Charlie Daniel
Edward Charlie
Farah Ghani
 
Figure 5.2: Second scenario basic approach 
a. Both parties have a list of friends 
b. There are two mutual friends: Alice and Charlie 
c. Assign pre-defined criteria in order to select one of them: trust and 
reputation value 
d. The friend with the highest trust and/or reputation value would be 
contacted and requested as the third party agent. In this case, let us 
assume that Alice is the first option. 
e. If Alice is available and agrees, then Alice becomes the third party 
agent.  
f. If Alice is not available, then both parties contact Charlie. 
 
 
c. Third Scenario of Basic Approach 
The third scenario is where the parties do not find a mutual friend in the first stage. 
As a result, they enter the second stage which involves finding a mutual friend from 
a list of friends of a friend. Let us consider the following example in Figure 5.3.  
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Trusting 
Agent
Trusted 
Agent
Alice Bob
Erick Daniel
Edward Charlie
Farah Ghani
 
Figure 5.3: Third scenario of basic approach 
a. Both parties have a list of friends 
b. They do not have a mutual friend 
c. They ask Alice and Bob, as the most trusted friends of both parties, to 
list their friends.  
In this case, the framework for third party agent selection uses the FoAF-based 
approach. In the next section, we present a case study to illustrate the finding of a 
mutual friend using the FoA-based approach.  
5.2.4 Illustrative Example of Finding Mutual Trusted Friend 
from List of FoAF (FoAF Based Approach) 
In this section, we illustrate the process of finding a mutual trusted friend in a virtual 
environment to act as a third party agent by using the FoAF-based approach.  
a. First Scenario of FoAF-based approach 
The first scenario for the FoA-based approach is when both parties have a mutual 
friend from the first degree of friend of a friend. If this occurs, the mutual friend 
from first list of FoAF is chosen and selected as a candidate for the third party agent. 
If this agent agrees and is available, then s/he becomes a third party agent. Figure 5.4 
below illustrates the first scenario for the FoAF-based approach. 
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Trusting Agent Trusted Agent
Alice Bob
Erick Daniel
Edward Charlie
Farah Ghani
Sarah
Nadia
Deddy
Sarah
Lita
George
 
Figure 5.4: First scenario of FoAF-based approach 
a. Both parties have a friends of first friend list 
b. There is one mutual friend: Sarah 
c. Sarah is proposed as a third party agent 
d. If there is more than one mutual friend, use the procedure to find mutual 
friend by assigning the pre-defined criteria (the mechanism as for the second 
criteria) 
e. If there is no mutual friend, ask the second highest trusted friends of both 
parties (Erick and Daniel) to list their friends and follow the same procedure 
as above  
f. Repeat the same procedure until the end of the friends list: Farah and Ghani 
 
b. Second Scenario of FoAF-based Approach 
The second scenario of FoAF based approach is where both parties do not find a 
mutual friend from the first list of FoAF. If this occurs, both parties may ask friends 
in the first list of FoAF to create their friends and find a mutual friend from the list.  
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Trusting 
Agent
Trusted 
Agent
Alice Bob
Erick Daniel
Edward Charlie
Farah Ghani
Budi
Linda
Malik
Sarah
Lita
George
Merry
Christian
Henny
Jihan
Lilly
David
 
Figure 5.5: Second scenario of FoAF-based approach 
a. There is no mutual friend from the list of friends of friend until the end of 
the friend list (Farah and Ghani) 
b. Ask Budi and Sarah to make a list of their friends. Both parties now have a 
second list of friends of a friend. If there is still no mutual friend, ask Linda 
and Lita to list their friends  
c. Continue this procedure until the end of the list of friends of Farah and 
Ghani (Henny and David) 
d. Repeat the same procedure until both parties find a mutual friend from the 
friends of a friend list 
If the search process (using algorithm for basic approach and FoAF basic approach) 
does not return a successful result, then a professional third party agent could be 
used. We explain the professional third party agent in the next section. 
5.3 Professional Third Party Agent 
The second option for finding a third party agent could be to hire a professional third 
party agent. This option may be chosen if the business transaction volume of both 
parties is high, the task that needs to be finished by both parties is of high 
importance, and the initial level of trust is also positive and high. This option can 
also be used if both trusting agent and trusted agent cannot find a mutual friend from 
basic approach and FoAF based approach. A professional third party agent is one 
that would have a great deal of knowledge about business, conflict management, and 
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business law and would therefore be able to provide advice for both parties‟ business 
activities to achieve a successful outcome. Furthermore, this third party agent might 
have had prior experience as a judge or arbitrator in dispute resolution.  
However, currently there is little or no service company that specializes in offering a 
professional third party agent for the purposes of maintaining trust. More commonly, 
the type of business service being offered is dispute resolution where the third party 
agent acts only if some dispute or conflict occurs in the business relationship. The 
role of this third party agent is corrective only. Both trusting parties access this 
service if a conflict occurs which they are unable to resolve or negotiate. 
Furthermore, the type of relationship is not for the purpose of trust maintenance. 
Therefore, we need a new service company that specializes in offering a third party 
agent to help maintain a trust relationship. We shall call this new service company 
„Arbitration Service for Trust Maintenance‟ (ASTM). Arbitration Service for Trust 
Maintenance (ASTM) company is a service company that offers a complete service 
to help business entities improve their performance, primarily by maintaining 
companies‟ trust relationship with their clients, partners and customers in virtual 
environments. In this chapter, we present a business model proposal for this ASTM 
company which specializes in providing professional agents. Both trusting agent and 
trusted agent can hire one of these professionals as a third party agent if required. 
5.3.1 Business Model Proposal for ASTM company 
A business model, put simply, describes how a business makes (or intends to make) 
money.  It is central to the business plan.  The construction of a business model is the 
first step in planning when starting a business (Keskinen, Maenpaa, and Saaristo 
2007; Osterwalder, Parent, and Pigneur 2004).  The purpose of a business model is to 
ensure that all the factors needed to operate a successful business are considered and 
analysed to ensure that they are reasonable and achievable.  Business models 
describe the products and services offered for sale, the business infrastructure 
required to produce and sell these products and services, the target customers that the 
business expects will buy these products and services, and the financial results and 
profit the business expects to achieve. In short, a business model defines how the 
enterprise creates and delivers value to customers, and then converts payments 
received to profits (Teece 2009). 
The main difference between this ASTM company and the existing arbitration 
service company is the role of the third party agent and the purpose of arbitration. 
The role of the third party agent in the ASTM company is proactive-corrective; 
whereas, in online dispute resolution, it is corrective only. Further, the purpose of the 
arbitrator in Online Dispute Resolution is to decide who is wrong and who is right. 
However, with the ASTM company, the purpose of the arbitrator is to ensure that 
both parties maintain their trust level in the business relationship. This third party 
agent is involved in the parties‟ interaction from beginning to end. It is important to 
note here that the interactions between the parties are carried out during the trust 
maintenance phase or in the phase where the relationship is mature. The third party 
agent monitors both parties‟ performances and if there is any discrepancy between 
the mutually agreed behaviour and the actual behaviour during the time of the 
relationship, this third party agent helps both parties to reach an alternative 
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agreement regarding the delivery of service. Table 5.3 presents the differences 
between the role of third party agent in an existing arbitration service company and 
the ASTM company. 
Indicators Corrective 
(Existing Arbitration Company) 
Proactive – Corrective 
(ASTM company) 
 
Involvement of 
third party agent 
Is not involved during the whole 
time space of interaction, only if 
the parties need help to address 
conflict or performance gaps 
Is involved from the beginning 
until the end of interaction 
between two parties 
Purpose of 
arbitration 
Decides who is wrong and who is 
right if performance gaps occurs 
Helps both parties by suggesting 
or recommending alternative(s) to 
close the performance gaps 
Trust Objective Does not pay attention to existing 
level of trust between both 
interacting parties 
To maintain (or increase) the 
existing level of trust between 
both interacting parties 
Monitoring action Provides no monitoring action 
during the interaction time space 
The third party agent monitors the 
performance progress of both 
parties during the interaction time 
space 
Table 5.3: The differences between corrective and proactive–corrective roles 
Moreover, the structure of this service company could be that of a collective business 
system or collective business model. The latter is a business organization or 
association typically composed of relatively large numbers of businesses, 
tradespersons or professionals in the same or related fields of endeavour, which pools 
resources, shares information or provides other benefits for their members (Teece 
2009). Hence, the company that provides a third party agent for trust maintenance 
purposes could be a professional service company that comprises a large number of 
professional arbitration agents who specialize in trust maintenance in virtual business 
relationships.  
Therefore, in order to establish an ASTM as a „new service company‟, in this thesis, 
we propose a service business model that supports its interoperability. The literature 
provides various definitions of a business model, such as (Teece 2009; Hamel 2002; 
Osterwalder 2004; Keskinen, Maenpaa, and Saaristo 2007). In the most basic 
scenario, a business model is the method of doing business by which a company can 
sustain itself, by means of generating revenue. The business model spells out how a 
company makes money by specifying where it is positioned in the value chain. The 
modelling approach proposed by (Osterwalder 2004) is suitable for the ASTM 
context that we propose, as the detailed model structure comprises the basic 
principles for the establishment of a new company. These basic principles are 
important to offer the product/service, the infrastructure needed, the target customer 
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and how to reach customers, and the financial set-up by which a new company 
ascertains its costs and generates revenue from its activities The details of the four 
components of our proposed business model for the ASTM company are as follows: 
1. The business offering (value proposition) 
The first component is the business offering which contains a value 
proposition. Value proposition is a description of the products and services 
the business offers and the reasons that customers will be compelled to buy 
them.  The value proposition describes the problem the customers are 
experiencing and how the products and services being offered will help solve 
that problem.  It describes how the features and characteristics of the products 
and services will contribute to resolving the customers‟ problem. 
The ASTM company will provide a professional, neutral and independent 
third party agent to monitor interacting parties‟ activities involved in a trust 
maintenance relationship. The third party agent will remain with both trusting 
agent and trusted agent throughout the entire transaction for trust 
maintenance purposes (from start to end of service delivery) and apply a 
dedicated conflict management style to resolve any conflict that might arise 
during the relationship. 
Additionally, this ASTM company relies on the assumption that since 
business in virtual environments relies mainly on trust value, it is very 
important for the trusting agent and trusted agent to maintain their trust level. 
With the intention of maintaining trust, some tasks with certain milestones 
should be finished so that the trust level can be re-calibrated and maintained 
at the current level, if not improved. In the relationship for trust maintenance 
purposes, trusting parties need a neutral and independent third party who will 
monitor the progress of task performance and also act as a mediator if there is 
any lapse in performance during the transaction relationship.  
Business entities who buy or hire this service will gain the benefits of (a) 
neutral supervision of their interactions, (b) recommendation to other 
potential agents in the business community, and (c) proactive-corrective 
recommendations for the progress of the interaction. Additionally, they will 
receive external (and presumably objective) advice, access to the consultant‟s 
specialized expertise, or simply as extra temporary help during a one-time 
project (trust maintenance), where the hiring of a more permanent arbitrator 
is not required. The main advantage of using this third party agent is that it 
encourages the trust level between two parties to remain stable or increase as 
a result of the delivery of service as agreed. Moreover, the other benefit is 
that the third party agent will provide a recommendation for any other party 
that wants to establish a relationship for trust maintenance purposes with both 
parties. 
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2. The infrastructure 
This is the part of the business that incurs expenses and includes basic 
facilities, skills, manpower, partnerships, and production process needed to 
exploit the business opportunity. It includes: 
a. Core capabilities 
Core capabilities are the capabilities and core competencies necessary to 
operate the business.  These include land, facilities, equipment, personnel and 
their required skills needed to create and provide the products or services 
described in the value proposition. 
 
This ASTM company will require persons with specialized knowledge about 
a particular business field. In particular, professional agents in this service 
company are professional arbitrators with solid experience in mediation and 
arbitration services in some field of business. The ASTM company has a 
panel of skilled, experienced and neutral third party agents covering many 
commercial areas and professional disciplines. These agents will assist 
customers with matters regarding the most appropriate procedures or the re-
scheduling of the whole process to meet time demands. The business 
equipment required consists primarily of computer and communication tools 
for the purpose of communicating with customers.  
    
b. Partner network 
Partner network refers to the business alliances needed to operate the 
business.  Most businesses need alliances, agreements, licenses, or other 
types of third party assistance (legal, accounting, insurance, security, etc.) 
which are usually purchased from specialized service providers. 
 
Complementary capabilities are required on a larger scale for the ASTM 
company. These include the cooperation with partners such as government 
agencies, business associations and professional corporations. A government 
agency is a public agent that provides arbitrators who are employed directly 
as civil servants. Moreover, a business association is a union of business 
entities whose members are involved in a particular business or trade, such as 
retail and wholesale, fabrics, food stuff, transportation, etc.  A professional 
corporation is a registered or incorporated entity that provides professional 
services (which generally require a license from a professional body) such as 
accounting, legal advice, medical care, etc. Collaboration with those partner 
networks will help the ASTM company to build a reputation as a professional 
service company, to select members as employees and to acquire customers 
that need a third party agent for trust maintenance purposes. 
 
c. Value configuration 
Value configuration is the process by which the products or services are 
produced and presented to the customer.  The value configuration describes 
how the materials, supplies, and other required resources will be obtained and 
transformed into usable products or services and how they will be made 
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available to buyers.  It describes the process that will be used to create the 
products and services described in the value proposition. 
 
An ASTM company would help to ensure the long-term relationship of both 
trusting agent and trusted agent by maintaining their trust value. It is 
committed to promoting, encouraging and maintaining a positive relationship. 
The aim of an ASTM company is to serve entities in the business community, 
commerce and industry by providing a neutral third party to monitor and 
solve problems in task performance relationships for trust maintenance 
purposes. 
 
In terms of task performance monitoring and unmet performance in a trust 
maintenance relationship, there are at least five capabilities that ASTM can 
offer to customers. These capabilities are derived from the intelligence of our 
proposed TMM: 
a. Preventative 
This is used to anticipate the low performance level of both parties in 
delivering service as agreed. The third party agent would help to predict it 
in advance using our proposed TMM. For example, our proposed TMM 
design includes proactive continuous monitoring to address any lapse in 
service delivery performance in real time manner. This also provides a 
guideline for the construction of an SLA using a defined number of time 
slot(s) and checkpoints. 
b. Collaborative 
The third party agent encourages both parties to collaborate and cooperate 
in resolving any problems or difficulties that arise. 
c. Facilitating 
The third party agent intervenes to assist the parties if there is any 
disagreement during an interaction. 
d. Fact Finding/Advisory 
The third party agent takes a role as case appraiser/non-binding 
arbitration/expert appraisal. In this case, the professional third party agent 
will assist the process of conciliation/mediation/arbitration. 
e. Mandatory 
In this option, a third party agent makes a decision that is binding on both 
parties.  
 
3. Customers – this is the part of the business that generates revenue 
We describe several ways whereby the ASTM company can generate revenue 
from providing service as professional third party agent as follows: 
 
a. Target customer: the process of targeting customers should consider the 
demographics, purchasing patterns, and location of the potential buyers of 
the products or services described in the value proposition.   
 
The customers of this ASTM company will be a big company which 
wants to maintain its relationship with customers, clients and partners in 
virtual environments. The customers will be drawn from a range of 
companies and institutions including government, manufacturing, service, 
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and public companies. The type of relationship could be Business-to-
Business (B2B) or Business-to-Customers (B2C). The role of this third 
party agent can be extended to include resources and to meet the 
requirements of other user communities interested in maintaining their 
trust level; these may include industry, government, hospitals, etc. 
 
b. Distribution channel: The means by which the business delivers products 
and services to customers. This includes the business's marketing and 
distribution strategy. 
 
The ASTM company can use a partner network to publicize its service or 
advertise independently in the open market. Parties are able to select their 
third party agent from a panel of professionals, or the ASTM company 
will nominate a suitable agent on request. The process begins with an 
agreement between the parties to use this third party agent. The third 
party agent activities are constituted and conducted in accordance with 
that agreement, and the third party agent is involved only with matters 
within the scope of the agreement.  
c. Customer relationships: the process of interacting with the business‟s 
customers.  It includes communicating, selling, supporting, and assisting 
customers to purchase and use the business‟s products or services. 
The ASTM company can use its past or existing customers to help in 
finding new customers. In this case, parties who have used the ASTM 
company‟s services may spread a positive word of mouth to promote the 
benefit and advantage by buying service at ASTM company. In another 
way, the ASTM company can create a customer relationship management 
service through which existing customers can share their experiences and 
information with future customers who wish to use the ASTM company. 
4. Finances - this is the part of the business that determines its financial 
performance and profit. We define several structures that might be included 
in an ASTM Company as follows: 
 
a. Cost structure: the monetary representation of the means employed in the 
business model 
Administrative costs relating to the operation of this company include 
operation, maintenance, and advertising. This administrative cost can be 
covered by a nominee fee that generates a revenue stream.  
Initially in terms of costs, the president or chief operating owner can use 
his own money to operate this company. Alternatively, the company 
charge a certain amount to professional agents if they want to be members 
or employees. This fee is an initial once-off payment. On payment of a 
joining fee, they are registered as professional arbitrators and acquire the 
right to be nominees as third party agents for trust maintenance purposes. 
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The company will promote them and help them to acquire clients or 
customers in virtual environments.  
b. Revenue streams: the way to runs business, makes money through a 
variety of revenue flows 
The ASTM company can generate revenue by charging some fees to 
customers or parties through a nomination fee, list and searching fees, and 
usage service meter.  
i. Nomination fee 
Full search and nomination fees set by the president or chairman of a 
suitable third party agent company can be categorized based on size of 
matter or volume of business transaction between two parties. Table 
5.1 below presents a simple example for classification of charged 
nomination fees. 
Transactions Size (volume of transaction 
between two parties) 
Fee 
Transactions  over $ 1,000,000 
*** 
Transactions  between $100,000 and $999,999 
*** 
Transactions under $100,000 
*** 
Etc... 
 
Table 5.4: Nomination fee at ASTM company 
i. Listing and search fee 
This fee is charged to customers if they want to select a third part 
agent by themselves. The ASTM company will provide a brief resume 
of each nominator. Table 5.2 below provides a simple example on 
how listing and search fee may be charged to the customer. 
Search Type Fee 
Simple - customers want 3 - 5 candidates of third 
party agents and they will choose one of them. A 
brief resume of each will be provided 
 
*** 
Complex – to find up to 3 suitable third party 
agents, check availability, reputation, conflict of 
interest and provide a detailed resume 
 
*** 
Etc... 
 
Table 5.5: Listing and search fee at ASTM company 
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ii. The utility model 
The utility or „on-demand‟ model is based on metering the usage or a 
„pay as you go‟ approach. Unlike subscriber services, metered 
services are based on actual usage rates. Therefore, this fee is charged 
based on the duration of third party agent involvement (relationship 
duration). For example, if the duration is less than 3 months, 6 months 
or 1 year, the charge would be different for each period.  
c. Profit streams:  
Profit can be generated by a nominee fee (revenue sharing). In this case, 
the fee paid by customers including nomination fee, listing and searching 
fee and usage meter goes to the third party agent who accepts formal 
nominations from the company. However, in order to generate revenue 
that will be used to cover administration costs, the company will retain a 
percentage of the nominee‟s fee. For example, 10%-20% of professionals‟ 
fee applies to third party agents who accept formal nominations and fulfil 
their task as mediator/arbitrator in business trust maintenance.  
In this section, we present our proposal of service business model for an ASTM 
company to demonstrate its practicability and viability. The second option requires 
the hiring of a professional third party agent for trust maintenance purposes. 
However, currently there are few if any arbitration service companies that specialize 
in hiring out agents for trust maintenance purposes. If such a company were 
established, parties needing to hire a professional agent to supervise their relationship 
in the trust maintenance phase could contact this ASTM company. Moreover, this 
ASTM company would enrich the business network in virtual environments by 
providing a third party agent who is dedicated to maintaining the relationship 
between business entities in the network. 
5.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we presented our framework for third party agent selection. The 
selection of a third party agent is the first step of our TMM. There are two options 
when choosing a third party agent in an interaction between trusting agent and 
trusted agent in a trust maintenance interaction. The first is by taking advantage of 
the availability of a mutual trusted friend. In order to find this mutual friend, we 
present a framework for selecting the mutual friend from a list of friends and a list of 
friends of a friend. We present algorithmic frameworks of the different third party 
selection approaches. The second option is to hire a paid professional third party 
agent who specializes in mediating for trust maintenance purposes. However, few, if 
any companies currently offer this service. Therefore, in this chapter we present a 
service business model proposal for an ASTM company. The validation of this 
framework is presented in Chapter 10. In the next chapter, we present the second step 
of our proposed TMM which is a framework for the formalization and negotiation of 
service requirements. 
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Chapter 6 - Framework for 
Formalization and Negotiation of 
Service Requirements 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we present a framework for the formalization and negotiation of 
service requirements. Formalization and negotiation of service requirements are the 
second step of our methodology to maintain trust. In this step, both parties formalize, 
express and prioritize the service requirements. Once they have formalized the 
service requirements, they carry this on to the negotiation phase. The negotiation 
process may take iteratively until an agreement is reached. Formalization of service 
requirements is a way of gathering information about the other party‟s requirements. 
Negotiation of service requirements is a process by which an agreement can be 
reached if there are any conflicting requirements. The outcome of this activity is a 
Service Level Agreement (SLA) for the time space of an interaction. The research 
outcome of the proposed framework has been documented in an article for 
publication (Fachrunnisa and Hussain 2011). 
In the next section, we present a case study involving an interaction between a 
trusting agent and trusted agent in formalizing and negotiating their service 
requirements. In Section 6.3, we present our proposed framework, including the step-
by-step procedure whereby the trusting agent and trusted agent carry out the 
formalization and negotiation process to reach an SLA. Section 6.4 concludes the 
chapter.  
6.2 Case Study 
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, service formalization would enable each 
interacting party to ascertain and document its service requirements. This would 
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additionally enable each party to get an idea of its interacting party‟s requirements. 
Subsequently, during the negotiation process, each interacting party can negotiate the 
service requirements, keeping in view its service capabilities. Therefore, a 
framework of formalization and negotiation to create an SLA that requires effective 
communication between trusting agent and trusted agent is pivotal in TMM.  
 
In this section, using a case study we will explain the process of formalization and 
negotiation of service requirements. Let us consider the following example of the 
relationship between a mobile phone manufacturer as service provider (trusting 
agent) and a retail mobile phones dealer as service requester (trusted agent). The case 
study is as follows: 
Easy Phones is a large mobile phone manufacturer. In order to distribute their 
products, Easy Phones engages with several wholesalers or retailers. Let us consider 
that Easy Phones has three retailers: Angela, Budi and Cherry. Of these retailers, 
Easy Phones has found that, over time, Angela is a trustworthy retailer. This is 
because Angela always reaches the highest sales volume and has been prompt in 
payment. Additionally, let us consider that as a retailer, Angela also has many 
suppliers, one of which is Easy Phones. From Angela‟s point of view, Easy Phones is 
also a trustworthy supplier since they always deliver their service on time and meet 
Angela‟s requirements. In this case, both Easy Phones and Angela see that their 
relationship, which has been established over time, is highly valuable. Let us assume 
that the trust level in the relationship has been positive for a pre-defined duration of 
time. To continue a healthy relationship, both parties need to maintain their 
relationship value. Easy Phones and Angela agree that they would like to maintain 
trust in order to provide the best possible outcome to each other. In other words, 
both the interacting parties (Easy Phones and Angela) would like to get a clear idea 
of their interacting parties‟ requirements from the interaction, so that (a) they can 
make a decision on whether they can deliver on the other parties‟ requirements, and 
(b) know clearly what is expected of them from the interaction.  
Since Angela and Easy Phones have decided to maintain their trust relationship, they 
need to clearly determine and articulate their business requirements for the duration 
of their relationship. Once the business requirements have been articulated, 
subsequent negotiations between them can occur. In order to obtain information on 
what interacting parties want from a relationship, a service requirement statement / 
formalization is needed. Service formalization is a method of determining what they 
require and need from each other during the phase of trust maintenance. This 
formalization framework will allow Easy Phones and Angela to formalize their 
requirements and standards in the interactions conducted during the trust 
maintenance phase. A negotiation framework is required to establish an agreement 
on service requirements. This is due to the fact that Angela‟s service requirements 
may differ from Easy Phones‟ service requirements. Therefore, there is a need for a 
negotiation process by which both parties can discuss any conflicting requirements 
and reach an agreement. A process for deriving an SLA-based on formalization and 
negotiation is needed. The SLA would serve as the assessment platform for their 
trust relationship in trust maintenance. With this SLA, Easy Phones and Angela can 
check their performance positions which in turn measure their trust level. In the next 
section, we present the proposed framework and the steps involved. 
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6.3 The Proposed Framework 
In this section, we present our proposed framework for formalization and negotiation 
of service requirements. The framework consists of three steps: (a) formalization of 
service requirements, (b) negotiation of service requirements, and (c) SLA 
construction. Details of the framework are depicted in Figure 6.1 below: 
 
a. Step 1: Formalization of Service Requirements 
 
Trusting 
Agent
Trusted 
Agent
4.. Initial Proposal with 
„n‟ service criteria
4. Initial Proposal with 
„m‟ service criteria
1. Determine Service 
Requirement
5.  Classify / Identify 
conflicting requirements and 
categorize them
5. Classify / Identify 
conflicting requirements and 
categorize them
2. Articulate  Service 
Requirement
3. Prioritize  Service 
Requirement
 
 
 
 
 
 
b. Step 2: Negotiation for each conflicting requirement 
 S1 Negotiation / Negotiation for Conflicting Service Criteria 1 (one) 
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 S2 negotiation / Negotiation for Conflicting Service Criteria 2 (two)   
 ...... 
 Sn negotiation /  Negotiation for Conflicting Service Criteria n   
 
Discuss / Negotiate
Discuss / 
Negotiate
Accept/Refuse
Accept/Refuse
Accept/Refuse
Trusting 
Agent
Trusted 
Agent
 
 
accepted / agreed 
 
c. Step 3: SLA Construction 
 
Trusting 
Agent
Common 
mutually agreed 
with ‘q’ service 
criteria  *)
Trusted Agent
 
 
*) q ≥ m ≥ n 
 
 
The above framework in Figure 6.1 shows that initially, both trusting agent and 
trusted agent are starting to re-formalize their service requirements. Both trusting 
agent and trusted agent are expressing the service that they want and expect from 
other interacting party in the interaction. It includes the following three steps or 
activities: (a) determining service requirements, (b) articulating service requirements, 
and (c) prioritizing service requirements. Based on these three activities, both parties 
will have an initial proposal of service requirements which contains service criteria, 
quality descriptors and the importance level of its service criteria. The number of 
service criteria might be different for each party („n‟ from trusting agent and „m‟ 
from trusted agent).  From their initial proposal, both parties can classify or identify 
any of their conflicting service requirements which need to be negotiated during the 
negotiation phase. 
Figure 6.1: The proposed framework for formalization and 
negotiation of service requirements 
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In the negotiation phase, both parties negotiate iteratively on each conflicting service 
requirement. Once they reach an agreement about all the service requirements to be 
carried out during the interaction, they will have an SLA which contains an 
agreement about a set of service requirements. As mentioned previously, the number 
of service criteria of the trusting agent is denoted as „n‟ and the number of service 
requirements from the trusted agent is denoted as „m‟. Therefore, in an SLA, the 
number of agreed service requirements (denoted as „q‟) could be the same as „n‟, „m‟ 
or the accumulation/combination of „n‟ and „m‟. We present the details of this 
framework in the next section. 
6.3.1 Step 1: Formalization of Service Requirements (Pre-
negotiation) 
We define formalization of service requirements as „the process of deciding and 
articulating the service requirements with a quantitative, qualitative or hybrid 
expression‟. Hence, the service requirements can be stated as a numerical value, text 
value or a combination of numeric and non-numeric measures. Service requirement 
formalization is an extremely important step that contributes to the successful 
delivery of service requirements. Before the interaction, if the service requirements 
or criteria are not carefully constructed or thought out by the interacting parties and 
articulated in unambiguous terms, it will not be possible for the interacting partner to 
know what is expected of it. In order to address this, we propose the step of service 
formalization that leads to service negotiation. Understanding or coming to know the 
interacting parties‟ needs about the service is an extremely important step in 
eventually delivering on the requirements. Service formalization would additionally 
serve the purpose of the other interacting party knowing what is required or expected 
of it.  
 
Additionally, trust maintenance can be viewed as providing service (possibly 
customized service) to a special, valued partner. In order to do so, each interacting 
party needs to ascertain (a) its service requirements, and (b) the service requirements 
of its interacting partner. The provision and delivery of service based on customized 
requirements makes the trusting agent feel that the trusted agent values its needs. 
This is an important element of maintaining trust. In a relationship with trust 
maintenance purposes, a close connection between service requester (trusting agent) 
and service provider (trusted agent) must be facilitated in order to obtain a quick 
response on what both parties want. Trust can be maintained only by consistently 
delivering on the agreed service requirements. The significance of this step arises 
from the fact that the trusted agent will be better able to deliver on the service 
requirements if it has a clearly articulated idea of the corresponding requirements. 
The steps involved in the service formalization phase are as follows: 
Step 1 – Service Requirements Determination 
Step 2 – Service Requirements Articulation 
Step 3 – Service Requirement Prioritization 
These are depicted in Figure 6.2 below. 
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a. Step 1: Service Requirements Determination 
We define service requirements determination as „the process of ascertaining 
service requirements or needs‟. In other words, it can be construed as the 
process of ascertaining the needs that the interacting party wants to fulfil with 
the interaction. 
Let us continue with the above example involving Easy Phones and Angela. 
The first phase of this framework is formalization of service requirements. 
Without the formalization phase, neither party will know exactly what is 
required of it in the business relationship. It is also a kind of mutual self- 
learning for both parties by which service provider and service requester can 
learn about their own potential needs in the interaction. This phase allows the 
service provider and service requester to determine their business 
requirements from the interaction.  
 
In this phase, both trusting agent and trusted agent start to determine their 
service requirements. Both service requester and service provider state the 
service that they want and expect from the interaction. As the purpose of this 
activity is to maintain trust, both parties try to provide a high-end service to 
their interacting party. For trust maintenance purposes, both parties are aware 
of their service context. However, the subsequent context details and 
requirements of the service delivery need to be expressed clearly in order to 
increase the trust level during the trust maintenance phase. 
 
b. Step 2: Service Requirements Articulation 
We define service requirements articulation as „the process of expressing the 
service requirements in terms of service criteria and their associated quality 
descriptors‟. Moreover, in order to provide a mechanism to articulate service 
requirements, we propose a template of service formalization that is suitable 
for structured information. By designing a service formalization template, 
Service Requirements 
Determination 
Service Requirements 
Articulation 
Service Requirements 
Prioritization 
Figure 6.2: Formalization of service requirements 
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business parties may implicitly declare or articulate their service requirements 
clearly in a manner that is easily understood by the interacting parties. This 
template varies depending on the type of service and parties‟ interaction. It 
contains service criteria, quality descriptors and preference or level of 
importance. As this SLA creation is for trust maintenance (the phase 
subsequent to trust building as pointed out in Chapter 3), the interaction 
context and service criteria already established during the trust building phase 
would serve as the basis for choosing and determining the context and criteria 
of trust maintenance. The service criteria in this phase may be derived from 
several previous interactions or may be augmented versions of the previous 
criteria.  
c. Step 3: Service Requirements Prioritization 
We define „service requirements prioritization‟ as the process of evaluating 
the importance of each service criterion. This can take two values as follows: 
 
 0 – Unimportant, which refers to supplementary criteria 
 1 – Important, which refers to mandatory criteria 
   
In order for both parties to express their service requirements and associated 
metrics, we propose a service formalization template as depicted in Table 6.1. 
With this template, both parties can state their service requirements. This 
template is used by both trusting agent and trusted agent. Therefore, the 
outcome of service formalization is a statement of service requirements from 
the trusting agent and a statement of service requirements from the trusted 
agent. Table 6.1 below shows the template for the formalization of service 
requirements. It contains service criteria, quality descriptors and level of 
importance. We define service criteria as a „decisive factor or requirements 
of the service being requested or provisioned‟. For example, if the service is 
about providing logistics transportation, one service criterion would be „time‟ 
to deliver goods from city A to city B.  
We define quality descriptor as „a statement expressing the quality 
requirements for those criteria‟. The quality requirements could be either 
quantitative, qualitative or hybrid. Let us use the above example of „time‟ as a 
service criterion in logistics transportation. In order to state the description of 
service criterion „time‟, „5 days‟ or „a month‟ is a service descriptor or quality 
descriptor for „time‟.  
a. Service Requester (Trusting Agent) Requirements‟ Statement 
 
Service Criteria Quality 
Descriptors 
Level of Importance 
S1 
C11 
... 
C1n 
Imp1 
... 
... ... 
Sn 
Sn1 
...... 
SnN 
Impn 
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b. Service Provider (Trusted Agent) Requirements‟ Statement 
 
Service Criteria Quality Descriptors Level of Importance 
S1 
C11 
... 
C1m 
Imp1 
... 
... ... 
Sm 
Sm1 
...... 
Smn 
Impm 
Table 6.1: Service formalization template 
Let us explain the process of determining, articulating and prioritizing service 
requirements by continuing with the previous example and illustrating how Easy 
Phones and Angela formalize their service requirements. 
Service Criteria 
Quality Descriptors Level of 
Importance 
S1= Quantity of order C11 =  2500 units 1 
S2 = Price C21 = 500 $ 1 
S3= Delivery time C3= Once in three months 1 
S4=Order and purchase 
method 
C41 = Fax 
C42 = Email 
C43= Online ordering form 
1 
S5= Payment method 
C51 = Credit Card 
C52= 30% before shipping and 70% 
after shipping 
1 
S6= Additional services 
C61 = Two years spare part 
warranty 
C62 =  Product advertisement 
network 
C63 = Product upgrade information 
0 
S7 = Bonus 
C71 = Holiday voucher 
C72 = Cash back 
C73= Workshop decoration 
0 
Table 6.2: Trusting agent’s (Angela) requirement statement 
 
Table 6.2 describes the service requirements statement from Angela‟s perspective. In 
this case, Angela proposes seven (7) service criteria for the service that she requires 
and expects from Easy Phones. For each service criterion, quality descriptors explain 
the quality requirements for that particular service criterion from Angela‟s 
perspective. For example, for service criterion 4 (S4) which is order and purchase 
method, Angela wants ordering and purchasing to be done through fax, email or 
online ordering form.  
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On the other hand, let us assume that, based on numerous previous interactions, Easy 
Phones also have service criteria that they want and need from Angela. The number 
of service criteria from the Easy Phones‟ perspective is only five (5) as shown in 
Table 6.3. They do not offer the additional services and bonus that Angela wants. 
Table 6.3 below represents Easy Phones‟ requirements statement.  
 
Service Criteria Quality Descriptors Level of 
Importance 
S1 = Quantity of order C11 =  3000 units 1 
S2 = Price C21 = 550 $ 1 
S3 = Delivery time C3 = Monthly 1 
S4 = Order and purchase 
method 
C41 = Online ordering 
form 
1 
S5 = Payment method C51 = Cheque 
C52 = 100% before 
shipping 
1 
Table 6.3: Trusted Agent’s (Easy phone) requirement statement 
Once both parties have each other‟s service requirements, they start to negotiate on 
any conflicting requirements. In the next section, we discuss how both parties 
negotiate their conflicting service requirements. 
6.3.2 Step 2: Negotiation of Service Requirements 
In order to enable the trusting agent and trusted agent to carry out negotiations in a 
structured manner, we propose a service description map (SDM). SDM is a template 
which can be used by both parties to compare their desired or required service 
requirements and associated factors against those offered by the interacting party for 
each service criterion. After both parties (trusting agent and trusted agent) formalize 
their service requirements, they translate these requirements into an SDM which 
represents a comparison of service requirements from the perspectives of the trusting 
agent and the trusted agent. The structure of the SDM is shown in Table 6.4 below: 
Transaction ID:  
Time Frame: 
Time Slot (s): 
Number of Checkpoint(s): 
Trusting Agent ID: 
Trusted Agent ID: 
Service 
Criteria 
Trusting Agent’s Offer Trusted Agent’s Offer 
C1 .. Cn Imp C1 … Cn Imp 
         
         
         
Table 6.4: Service description map template 
In this step, both parties review and discuss their service requirements. If the service 
requirement from the trusting agent‟s perspective is difficult or cannot be delivered 
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by the trusted agents or vice versa, an adjustment to the requirements should be 
performed to accommodate the interests of both parties. 
Continuing with the above example of Easy Phones and Angela‟s service 
formalization, there are some differences in the requirements of both parties. In order 
to reconcile these two different views during the negotiation process, both parties 
would translate their service formalization to a service description map. Table 6.5 is 
an expression of both parties‟ service requirements via the Service Description Map.  
Transaction ID: xxx 
Time Frame: 1 January 2011 – 31 December 2011 
Time Slot(s): 4 (Four) 
Number of initial checkpoints at each time slot: 4 (Four) 
Trusting agent ID: Angela 
Trusted agent ID: Easy Phones 
Service 
Descriptors 
Angela’s Offer Easy Phones’  Offer 
C1 C2 C3 Imp C1 C2 C3 Imp 
S1 = Quantity  2500   1 3000   1 
S2 = Price 500$   1 550$   1 
S3 = Delivery time 1 * 3 
months 
  1 1 * 3 
month 
  1 
S4 = Order and 
purchase method 
Fax Email Online 
Form 
1 Online 
Form 
  0 
S5 = Payment 
method 
Credit 
Card 
30% 
before 
and 70% 
after 
shipping 
 1 Cheque 100% 
before 
shipping 
 1 
S6 = Additional 
services 
Two years 
warranty 
Advertise-
ment 
network 
Product 
upgrade 
information 
0 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
S7 = Bonus Holiday 
voucher 
Cash 
back 
Workshop 
decoration 
 0 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Table 6.5: Service description map (SDM) between Angela and Easy Phones 
The SDM compares the trusting agent‟s offer with the trusted agent‟s offer for each 
service criterion. By checking this service description map, both parties can identify 
criteria or quality descriptors for which they have conflicting service requirements. 
The sets of the conflicting requirements would be the ones that require negotiation 
between the interacting parties. We propose the following steps in the negotiation 
phase: 
  
 Step 1: Identify contradicting requirements 
Based on the service description map, both parties can identify the service 
requirements to which they have not yet agreed. These contradicting or 
conflicting requirements would be the main issues to negotiate. 
  
 Step 2: Prioritize the contradicting requirements 
The objective of this phase is to prioritize the set of all conflicting 
requirements. Once both parties have identified these requirements, they 
should prioritize them in order to make a deal through negotiation. Each 
contradicting requirement has a certain importance level value. The negotiating 
parties (trusting agent and trusted agent) can determine a comparative 
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preference value in their service description map. If there is more than one 
conflicting requirement, the service criteria with the highest importance level 
would be the first to be considered for negotiation in step 3 below. 
  
 Step 3: Negotiate contradicting requirements 
Any information about contradicting requirements and their level of 
importance is available from the second step. During the negotiation process, 
both parties should be able to adjust their conflicting requirements until an 
agreement is reached. 
 
Based on the above SDM from the interaction between Easy Phones and Angela, 
there are several conflicting requirements (italicized) and several same value (in 
bold) requirements from both parties. The negotiation process starts with the highest 
level of importance of conflicting requirements. In this case, it starts from service 
criteria 1 (S1), S2, S5, S4, S6 and S7. The T1, T2, T3....Tn is the number of iterations 
over the negotiation time. Once both parties have agreed on each of the service 
requirements, the negotiation is concluded and both parties reach an agreement on 
service criteria, quality descriptors, and level of importance.  
 
S2: Quantity 
Trusting Agent‟s level of importance: 1 
Trusted Agent‟s level of importance: 1 
 Trusting Agents’ 
Offer 
Trusted Agents’ 
Offer 
Time C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3 
T1 2500 0 0 3000 0 0 
T2 2700 0 0 2800 0 0 
T3 2725 0 0 2725 0 0 
T4 Agreed 
Table 6.6: Process of negotiation for S1 
 
S2: Price 
Trusting Agent‟s level of importance: 1 
Trusted Agent‟s level of importance: 1 
 Trusting Agent’s 
Offer 
Trusted Agent’s 
Offer 
Time C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3 
T1 500$ 0 0 550$ 0 0 
T2 510$ 0 0 550$ 0 0 
T3 525$ 0 0 525$ 0 0 
T4 Agreed 
Table 6.7: Process of negotiation for S2 
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S5 : Payment Method 
Trusting Agent‟s level of importance: 1 
Trusted Agent‟s level of importance: 1 
 Trusting Agents’ Offer Trusted Agent’s Offer 
Time C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3 
 T1 Credit 
card 
30% before 
shipping and 
70% after 
shipping 
-- Cheque 100% 
before 
shipping 
0 
T2 Cheque 30% before 
shipping and 
70% after 
shipping 
-- Credit 
Card 
100% 
before 
shipping 
0 
T3 Cheque 100% before 
shipping 
-- Cheque 100% 
before 
shipping 
0 
T4 Agreed 
Table 6.8: Process of negotiation for S5 
 
S4: Order and Purchase Method 
Trusting Agent‟s level of importance: 1 
Trusted Agent‟s level of importance: 0 
 Trusting Agent’s Offer Trusted Agent’s Offer 
Time C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3 
T1 Fax Email Online 
Form 
Online 
Form 
-- -- 
T2 Online 
Form 
-- -- Online 
Form 
  
T3 Agreed 
Table 6.9: Process of negotiation for S4  
 
S6: Additional Services 
Trusting Agent‟s level of importance : 0 
Trusted Agent‟s level of importance: n/a 
 Trusting Agent’s Offer Trusted Agent’s 
Offer 
Time C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3 
T1 2 years 
warranty 
Advertisement 
network 
Product 
upgrade 
information 
-- -- -- 
T2 -- Advertisement 
network 
-- -- -- -- 
T3 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
T4 Agreed 
Table 6.10: Process of negotiation for S6 
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S7: Bonus 
Trusting Agent‟s level of importance: 0 
Trusted Agent‟s level of importance: 0 
 Trusting Agent’s Offer Trusted Agent’s Offer 
Time C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3 
T1 Holiday 
voucher 
Cash back Workshop 
decoration 
-- -- -- 
T2 -- Cash back -- 10% 
discount 
-- -- 
T3 -- -- Workshop 
decoration 
-- -- Workshop 
decoration 
T4 Agreed 
Table 6.11: Process of negotiation for S7 
 
As we can see from Table 6.6 – Table 6.11 (above), in S1, S2, S5, S4, S6, S7 Easy 
Phones and Angela could reach an agreement on the service requirements using the 
negotiation process. The number of iterations required for an agreement to be 
reached on a given each conflicting service requirement varies. For example, in S1 
(Quantity of delivery) both parties reached an agreement after four iterations. During 
the negotiation process, the quality service descriptor value of a given criteria could 
be a value proposed by one agent and agreed to by the other agent; or it could be a 
new negotiated value. There is a possibility that both parties may not reach an 
agreement value for certain service criteria. In this case, if the importance level of 
this service criterion is „0‟ which means that it is unimportant or a supplementary 
criterion, the service criterion would be excluded from the final agreement contract. 
However, if the importance level of the criterion is „1‟ meaning that the service 
criterion is an obligatory criterion, the SLA cannot be constructed and therefore the 
transaction cannot proceed. In this case, the parties would be required to re-negotiate 
to reach an agreement as shown in Figure 6.4. Once the negotiation phase is 
completed, both the interacting parties examine the set of requirements, which have 
been mutually agreed to. If, based on the negotiated and agreed requirements, both 
the interacting parties agree to proceed with the interaction, it goes ahead.  This 
process is depicted in Figure 6.3 below.  
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Formalization
Negotiation
Service Parameters 
Agreed?
Has the number of 
interaction reached the 
treshold?
This interaction 
cannot take place
SLA
Yes
No
No
Yes
 
Figure 6.3: Negotiation process 
In order to illustrate this, let us consider the negotiation process between Easy 
Phones and Angela on Service Criteria 6 (S6: Additional Services). Angela demands 
three options of additional service; however, none of them is being agreed to by Easy 
Phones. After some iterative negotiation interaction threshold, both parties agree to 
remove this service criterion from the relationship agreement. Once both parties 
finish bargaining on each conflicting service requirement, they send this agreement 
to the third party agent. The third party agent creates a service level agreement for 
both parties. In the next section, we illustrate how this agreement can be translated 
into an SLA.  
6.3.3 Step 3: SLA Construction (Post Negotiation) 
Once all service criteria and their quality descriptors have been agreed upon by both 
parties during the negotiation phase, the agreement documented in a service 
description map would be sent to the third party agent whose role is to monitor the 
interaction. The third party agent will translate the SDM to an SLA. The outcome of 
this is an SLA or a mutually binding contract for both parties. An SLA is a 
documented written agreement between service provider and service requester about 
the required levels of service. SLAs should state the performance and satisfaction 
metrics that will be used by both parties to measure the success level of interaction. 
Additionally, based on this SLA, third party agent will determine the time window 
which consists of time space, number of time slots and number of initial checkpoints 
per time slot for the interaction. Details of how the third party agent determines this 
time window are presented in the next chapter.  
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The following important points should be included during the drafting of SLAs: 
 The contact information of each agent 
 The context or description of service relationship 
 The criteria of service 
 The agreed quality descriptor for each criteria 
 The level of importance of each criterion 
 The time window of SLA 
 Measurement of the success of the interaction 
This SLA would be used as a basis for both parties to monitor their interaction. The 
trust level would be calculated based on the correlation of agreed requirements as 
stated in the Service Level Agreement and the actual value that is delivered by the 
trusting agent and trusted agent (Hussain, Chang et al. 2004). With this SLA, both 
parties will have a clear idea of the interacting parties‟ requirements and 
subsequently the third party agent will take the role of judge or arbitrator to monitor 
the performance progress of both parties during trust maintenance. We argue that if 
both parties‟ requirements are formalized and negotiated, they will be able to deliver 
service based on their needs and wants. It will ensure that the trust level remains 
significantly positive and should even increase by the end of the relationship. The 
details of the SLA based on the SDM in the interaction between Angela and Easy 
Phones is provided in Table 6.12.  
Transaction ID: Xxx  
Time Frame:  1 January 2011 – 31 December 2011 
Time Slot (s): 4 (Four) 
Number of Initial Checkpoints 4 (Four) 
Trusting agent ID:  Angela  
Trusted agent ID: Easy Phone  
Service Context Mobile Phones Trading  
 
Service Criterions Quality Descriptors Level of Importance 
Trusting 
Agent 
Trusted 
Agent 
S1: Quantity C11: 2725 unit 1 1 
S2: Price C21: 525 $ 1 1 
S3: Delivery Time C31: Once in three months 1 1 
S4: Order and Purchase Method C41: Online Form 0 1 
S5: Payment Method C51: Cheque 
C52: 100% before 
shipping 
1 0 
S6: Bonus C61: Workshop 
Decoration 
1 0 
Table 6.12: Service level agreement between Angela and Easy Phone 
Our proposed framework of formalization and negotiation of service requirements is 
designed to create an SLA with the purpose of trust maintenance in a relationship. It 
contains three activities: (a) formalization of requirements, (b) negotiation of 
requirements and (c) SLA construction. The outcome of these three activities is an 
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SLA which contains a set of service criteria, along with their quality descriptors and 
importance level, as agreed to by the trusting agent and the trusted agent.  
For trust maintenance purposes, given that the parties have already been involved in 
a previous trust-based relationship which occurs during the trust building phase, the 
service requirement negotiation and formalization needs to take into account the 
previous service criteria, their level of importance and other factors based on which 
the refined SLA for trust maintenance would be constructed. This SLA provides a 
benchmark or a basis for evaluating the performance of both parties when carrying 
out a business interaction. It is also a guide to how both parties should carry out the 
interaction. For trust maintenance purposes, both trusting agent and trusted agent will 
monitor each other‟s performance in service delivery to ensure that they perform as 
prescribed by the SLA. There are various points of the monitoring process (which we 
term as checkpoints. This is presented in Chapter 7), at which each of the parties can 
recalibrate their actual performance with the agreed performance.  Firstly, there are 
input controls, which are the formalization of service requirements. Secondly, 
process controls, by controlling the trusted agent‟s performance, ensure that they 
employ prescribed service requirements, and thirdly, output controls measure the 
outputs of the trusted agent and trusting agent against established metrics that have 
been pre-defined in the SLA. This ensures that prescribed performance standards are 
met. We present the details regarding evaluation of the performance of both parties 
in the next chapter (Chapter 7). 
6.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we present our proposed framework for the formalization and 
negotiation of service requirements. This is the second step of our methodology for 
maintaining trust. The output of the service formalization phase is the service 
requirements document, which is translated to the SDM. From the SDM, both parties 
can identify any conflicting requirements and start to negotiate about each conflicting 
quality descriptor, service criterion and its level of importance (importance value). 
Hence, the main purpose of negotiation is to discuss any conflicting requirements. 
The negotiation is an iterative process until agreement is reached. If all service 
requirements are agreed to, then this agreement is sent to the third party agent. The 
third party agent will then translate this to an SLA. In the next chapter, we discuss 
how a third party agent determines the time window of interaction which is the basis 
for proactively conducting continuous performance monitoring. 
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Chapter 7 - Framework for Proactive 
Continuous Performance 
Monitoring and Incentive 
Mechanism 
7.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 6, we presented a framework for formalization and negotiation of service 
requirements. As was discussed, the outcome of this formalization and negotiation of 
service requirements is a Service Level Agreement (SLA). Based on this SLA, a 
third party agent will monitor the performance of both trusting agent and trusted 
agent during the delivery of service. Moreover, the third party agent will take action 
if there are any discrepancies between the actual performance and the mutually 
agreed to performance during the interaction. 
 
In this chapter, we propose frameworks for proactive continuous performance 
monitoring that would enable the third party agent to (a) continuously monitor  
service delivery and compare it against the agreed plan for service delivery, (b) 
suggest / carry out corrective measures when the delivery deviates from the agreed-
upon delivery according to a pre-defined threshold. In order to ensure that the actual 
service delivery is as close as possible to the agreed service delivery, we propose the 
use of incentive mechanisms. In this research, we propose three different incentive 
frameworks as measure to incentivise actual service delivery. This is the third step of 
our methodology for maintaining trust in a virtual environment. Section 7.2 and 
Section 7.3 present the details of the framework including mathematical formulae to 
express the requirements of this framework. In Section 7.4, we present a framework 
for an incentive mechanism to support the success of service delivery. In this chapter, 
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we also present a simple case study to illustrate our framework. Section 7.5 
concludes the chapter.   
7.2 Framework for Proactive Continuous 
Performance Monitoring 
In this section, we present our framework for proactive continuous performance 
monitoring. This framework consists of six steps, the details of which are presented 
in Section 7.3. We propose that proactive continuous performance monitoring of 
trust in a relationship is founded on an underlying philosophy of trust maintenance 
which is to „build and examine often‟ (Currall and Epstein 2003). This clearly 
expresses that once trust has been well-established, it needs to be examined often if it 
is to survive. We propose the following mechanism for conducting proactive 
continuous performance monitoring and assessment: 
 
a. Design a predefined number of time slots to divide the delivery time of 
agreed service requirements. 
b. Determine the number of checkpoints needed to review the intermediate 
performance during the interaction. 
c. Proactively monitor the performance of the trusted agent‟s actual 
performance against the agreed performance. 
d. Take remedial action or corrective measures in case of discrepancy between 
actual intermediate performance and agreed intermediate performance. 
As was discussed in Chapter 4, the proactive continuous monitoring enables 
performance deviations to be timely identified. Consequently, the trusting agent and 
trusted agent, with the help of the third party agent, will be able to quickly address 
performance discrepancies before they inflate into an unmanageable and final 
undelivered service outcome. In order to illustrate how our proactive continuous 
performance monitoring framework works, let us consider an example of an 
interaction between an international audit service company as service provider and a 
manufacturing company that requires audit service as service requester. Let us 
assume that „Loyalty Company‟ is a goods manufacturer and „ABS White‟ is an 
international company that provides an auditing service.  Loyalty Company has had a 
business relationship with ABS White for a certain number of years. Their 
relationship is now in the cooperative and collaborative stage and they agree to 
maintain their business value and their current trust level over a specified longer 
duration of time. As a simple example, Loyalty Company requests that ABS White 
audit its 240 files of financial accounts within one month. Let us assume that both 
parties have been involved in steps 1 – 2 of our TMM. As a result, in their Service 
Level Agreement (SLA), ABS White agreed to audit and delivers 240 files of audited 
financial accounts over the next one month.  
During the business interaction, with the passage of time, the number of accounts 
that have been audited should increase as specified in the SLA. For instance, by the 
end of Week One, 60 accounts should have been audited and verified. By the end of 
the month, 240 accounts should have been audited and the service should have been 
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delivered as per the agreement with the customer. If however, there is no 
performance monitoring every week, it might be that the actual performance falls 
outside the parameters specified by the service agreement. The weakness of the one-
off performance evaluation which is done at the end of the interaction is that Week 
One‟s performance discrepancies are compounded by Week Two‟s and so on, until a 
month passes by and in the end, the service is not fully delivered as mutually agreed 
upon by the two parties. With the passing of time, the small performance 
discrepancies that occurred initially may become a massive problem that no-one was 
concerned to fix earlier. And with every passing week, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to fix everything, thereby decreasing performance. Hence, there is a need for 
proactive performance monitoring rather than reactive performance monitoring. 
Consequently, the final delivered service falls outside the performance agreed to in, 
for example, the Service Level Agreement (SLA). This situation is depicted in Figure 
7.1 below: 
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Figure 7.1: One-off performance evaluation 
The proactive continuous performance monitoring model, however, can be used to 
eliminate this compounding effect because performance is tested and checked at 
every designated checkpoint. Hence, the performance discrepancies can be detected 
early and resolved quickly. Procedural steps may be required in order to solve the 
performance discrepancies. Given that an appropriate mechanism is employed to 
detect performance discrepancies and to ensure that these discrepancies are 
addressed, the proactive continuous performance monitoring approach delivers 
greater benefits resulting in better service delivery at the end. It reduces the risk of 
service failure because it ensures that a service will be delivered on time as promised 
(see Figure 7.2). In Figure 7.1, the dotted line indicates that the checkpoint is not 
actually present in the interaction process (since performance assessment is done 
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only at the end of the interaction). We have shown this checkpoint during the 
interaction (in Figure 7.2) to illustrate that if proper checkpoints were in place, there 
would have been opportunities in Time Slot 1, Time Slot 2, Time Slot 3, and Time 
Slot 4 to formulate strategies to minimize the performance discrepancies.  
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Figure 7.2: Proactive continuous performance monitoring 
From the trust relationship perspective, trust can be seen as the execution of contracts 
or mutually agreed behaviour (Chang, Dillon et al. 2006; Debenham and Sierra 
2008). We propose the use of time slots and checkpoints to help that trust to be 
maintained. In the case of unmet performance or a contract not being fulfilled, the 
discrepancy can be identified and addressed at the next checkpoint. In this case, the 
number of checkpoints in each time slot is designed to review the progress of service 
delivery. In the next section, we present the details of the proposed framework. 
7.3 Details of Framework for Proactive 
Continuous Performance Monitoring 
In this section, we present the step-by-step process of conducting proactively 
continuous performance monitoring. This framework consists of six steps that need 
to be carried out by the third party agent. Subsequently, both interacting parties have 
to agree with the entity who will act as third party agent and the role of this third 
party agent as proactive corrective recommender system.  
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7.3.1 Step 1: Determining the Time Window of Interaction 
The first step of this framework includes an activity to determine the time 
window of interaction. As was discussed in Chapter 4, time window is a set of 
time statements which represent when the context of interaction is in question. 
The time window consists of time space, time slots, and number of 
checkpoints. As was discussed in the previous chapter (Chapter 6), each SLA 
would be used for one interaction within a time window.  
7.3.2 Step 2: Determining the Time Space of Interaction 
Time space is defined as „the total duration of time over which the behaviour of 
the trusted agent will be analysed and the trustworthiness measure and 
prediction will be carried out‟ (Chang, Dillon et al. 2006). This time space 
clearly states when the interaction starts and when the interaction finishes. This 
time space is mutually agreed to by both parties. It is also clearly stated in the 
SLA as discussed in Chapter 6. 
7.3.3 Step 3: Determining the Time Slot(s) of Interaction 
Time slot is defined as a „finite number of non-overlapping, mutually exclusive 
and equally spaced sectors of time‟ (Chang, Dillon et al. 2006). It is the 
number of intermediate sections of a task that should be delivered at those 
intermediate times for the duration of the time space. 
7.3.4 Step 4: Determining the Initial Number of Checkpoint(s) at 
Each Time Slot 
We define checkpoints as the number of points used to check the performance 
in each time slot(s) (Fachrunnisa, Hussain et al. 2011). The number of 
checkpoints is determined by the third party agent based on pre-defined 
formulae in Equations 7.1. However, both parties have to determine the 
number of initial checkpoints that they want to have during the interaction 
using Equations 7.4 and 7.5. The third party agent then determines the agreed 
number of checkpoints used to review performance in each time slot. The 
initial number of checkpoints is the maximum number or average number of 
checkpoints being proposed from trusting agent to trusted agent and the 
number of checkpoints being proposed from trusted agent to trusting agent. As 
a simple example, let us consider agent A as trusting agent and agent B as 
trusted agent. We denote the number of checkpoints being perceived from 
agent A to agent B as ( )CN A B  and the number of checkpoints being perceived 
from agent B to agent A as ( )CN B A .  
The initial number of checkpoints can be formalized as a mathematical 
expression as follows: 
                                  
( ( ), ( ))CN f CN A B CN B A              Equation 7.1 
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Where, 
The function „ƒ‟ represents the maximum or average function corresponding to 
the checkpoints between A  B and B A. If the third party agent is using the 
„maximum function‟, the mathematical expression is follows: 
max( ( ), ( ))CN CN A B CN B A  Equation 7.2 
On the other hand, if the third party agent is using the „average function‟, the 
mathematical expression is follows: 
( ( ), ( ))CN avg CN A B CN B A
     Equation 7.3 
Both parties initially determine the number of checkpoints that they want to be 
used to review the progress of performance of their interacting parties using 
equations 7.4 or 7.5. This formula is established based on their actual initial 
trust level and the current business value of the interaction and the maximum 
business value have been carried out between both parties. The mathematical 
expression of this calculation is as follows: 
(A B)
initial max
6 m
CN  = *  
T (A B) M
  Equation 7.4 
(B )
initial max
6 m
CN  = *
T (B ) M
A
A
  Equation 7.5
      
Where; 
 CN denotes the number of initial checkpoints per time slot in an 
interaction. 
 CN (A B)  denotes the number of checkpoints from agent A to agent 
B 
 CN (B A)  denotes the number of checkpoints from agent B to agent 
A 
 6 denotes the highest possible level of trust level in a relationship 
 Tinitial (A  B) denotes the initial trust level from agent A to agent B 
and Tinitial (B  A) denotes initial trust level from agent B to agent A 
 m represents the monetary value of the interaction (current business 
interaction) 
 Mmax represents the value of the maximum worth of interaction 
carried out thus far between agent „A‟ and agent „B‟.  
 
7.3.5 Step 5: Solution for Performance Discrepancies 
In this step, we present an approach for resolving the problem of performance 
discrepancies should these occurs during the interaction. The key purpose of 
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proactive continuous performance monitoring is to identify the continuity of 
service deliverability and/or its problems as early as possible so that corrective 
actions may be taken to prevent/minimize performance discrepancies that will 
result in a decrease of trust. Moreover, monitoring helps provide quantitative 
observations and data on how well services are being delivered based on the 
mutually agreed to behaviour or an SLA.  
In the SLA that has evolved from the previous step, it (the SLA) is 
decomposed into several intermediate time slots and checkpoints in order to 
provide a mechanism by which both interacting parties can incrementally 
monitor the progress of each other‟s activities. The number of checkpoints, or 
intermediate performance, is determined by the third party agent in the first 
step of our proposed TMM. In the proactive continuous performance 
monitoring step, the third party agent acts as a proactive-corrective agent. A 
proactive-corrective role means taking the lead by monitoring task 
performance and helping to resolve any conflict during the relationship in order 
to maintain trust. The third party agent has a responsibility to monitor the 
performance and administer the SLA between service requester and service 
provider. Performance monitoring always takes place within the set time space 
and occurs on an ongoing basis throughout the term of the SLA. The proactive 
continuous monitoring and progress of the interaction between the interacting 
parties would result in real-time performance information. It would 
additionally allow „proactive performance monitoring‟ whereby each 
interacting agent would be able to proactively determine when its Mutual 
Agreed Behaviour (MAB) is not in line with the Actual Behaviour and take 
appropriate remedial actions. 
Real-time monitoring of service deliverability can then be regarded as a 
sequence of thresholds trust testing. Service performance is monitored by both 
parties and the third party agent at every time interval or every checkpoint. 
This will lead to the measurement of intermediate trust levels by correlating 
real-time actual behaviour with agreed behaviour. The third party agent will 
obtain a performance report for both the trusting agent and trusted agent. By 
reviewing this performance monitoring report, each interacting party and the 
third party agent can review their performance status.  
This proactive continuous performance monitoring may produce two possible 
outcomes. First, the actual behaviour at every checkpoint is equal to the 
expected behaviour. Second, the actual behaviour at each checkpoint is 
different from the expected behaviour. We discuss each of these two scenarios 
below: 
Scenario 1. The actual behaviour is equal to the mutually agreed to behaviour 
for each of the checkpoints in the interaction. Assuming n1, n2, …nn represent 
the checkpoints in the interaction, this may be formally expressed as follows 
    i iAB MAB i N  Equation 7.6              
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Where, N = {n1, n2,….nn}, ABi  corresponds to actual behaviour at checkpoint i 
and MABi represents Mutually agreed behaviour at checkpoint i                                                                                                        
Scenario 2. The actual behaviour is not equal to the mutually agreed to 
behaviour for at least one of the checkpoints in the interaction. 
    i iAB MAB i N      Equation 7.7 
Where N = {n1, n2,….nn}, ABi  corresponds to Actual behaviour at checkpoint i 
and MABi represents Mutually agreed behaviour at checkpoint i 
In the first scenario, both parties are complying with the SLA. In this case, the 
third party agent takes no action as there is no problem and no performance 
discrepancies. The third party agent retains the information of both parties‟ 
performances in their databases. The third party agent can use one of two 
strategies to manage the continuity of service performance and trust 
relationship if the second scenario occurs. These are: 
a. Reassign tasks within the time slot  
This option is chosen if there is more than one checkpoint remaining in the 
current time slot. There are two options to reassign tasks within the time 
slot. Firstly, if the error tolerance or unmet performance in the previous 
checkpoint is below error tolerance, the number of checkpoints within the 
time slot is not be changed; rather, the unmet performance in the current 
checkpoint is handed over to the next checkpoint within the time slot.  
 
Let us continue with the above example. In time slot 1 (TS1), it is agreed 
that 60 files have to be audited. Let us assume that in TS1, it has been agreed 
that there are three checkpoints. Hence, at checkpoint 1 (CP1), checkpoint 2 
(CP2), and checkpoint 3 (CP3), 20 files have to be finished audited. The 
error tolerance that has been agreed to in the SLA is 0.05 (3 files). Let us 
further consider that at CP1, the trusted agent delivered only 19 files which 
is acceptable (as the discrepancy is 0.04); hence, the remaining unaudited 
work which is 1 file is carried over to the next checkpoint (CP2). In this case, 
the agreed performance in CP2 changed to be 21 files instead of 20.  
 
If however, at CP1 the trusted agent delivers only 15 files which are above 
the error tolerance, the remaining number of checkpoints within TS1 needs 
to be revised. The revised number of checkpoints is calculated using 
formula 7.8. The main point of this strategy is that agreed performance at 
each time slot has to be close within the time slot (equal to or less than the 
pre-defined performance threshold). 
 
b. Restructures the number of checkpoints in the next time slot, so that the 
number of checkpoints in the next time slot is changed. This option is used 
if the performance discrepancy occurs at the end of a time slot.  In this case, 
the level of performance against the error tolerance does not need to be 
considered. The number of revised checkpoints is based on the following 
formula:  
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int
6
*  *  '
remaining
plannedcompliant noncompliant
m
CN CN
T m
         Equation 7.8 
Where, 
 CN '  denotes the revised number of checkpoints per time slot 
 6     represents the highest agreed level of trust  
 int compliant noncompliantT denotes the intermediary trust level from compliant 
agent to non-compliant agent. 
 m remaining  denotes value of business interaction remaining within time 
slot or for the next time slot 
 m planned  denotes value of business interaction planned within time slot or 
for the next time slot 
 CN represents the original/initial number of checkpoints per time slot. 
int compliant noncompliant
T is measured by employing CCCI metrics.  CCCI metrics 
are a suite of metrics proposed by Hussain et al. (Chang, Dillon et al. 2006) 
(Hussain, Chang et al. 2004), that can be used to measure the Quality of 
Service (QoS) of the service provider, subsequent to the interaction. The QoS 
value is expressed as „the degree consonant or parallelism between the actual 
behaviour of a trusted agent and the mutually agreed behaviour of the trusted 
agent, as perceived by a trusting agent‟ (Chang, Dillon et al. 2006) (Hussain, 
Chang et al. 2004). However, in this case, the intermediate trust is calculated at 
every checkpoint; hence, we term it „intermediate trust‟. This can be expressed 
mathematically as follows (based on the adaptation of CCCI metrics): 
1
1
int
  * * Imp
 * * Imp
6*
N
criterionc criterionc criterionc
C
N
criterionc criterionc criterionc
C
In Agreed Perf Clear
In MAP Clear
T                        Equation 7.9 
Where, 
 intT  denotes intermediate trust value 
 6 represents the highest level of trust value 
   criterioncIn Agreed Perf denotes the agreed criterion representing the fulfilment of 
each criterion of the trusted agent at an intermediate checkpoint. 
 criterioncClear represents the clarity of each criterion in the service agreement 
(contract) and whether it is understood in the same way by both parties. For 
a given criterion, 
criterionc
Clear can have two levels (a) „0‟ – This criterion or its 
output or both have not been mutually agreed to by both parties and (b) „1‟ – 
This criterion along with its output has been mutually agreed to by both 
parties 
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 Impcriterionc denotes the importance of each criterion that affects the 
determination of trustworthiness. For a given criterion, Impcriterionc can have 
two levels: (a) „0‟ – not important (b) „1‟ – important.  
 criterioncInMAP  denotes mutually agreed performance of the trusted agent 
according to the given criterion at the intermediate checkpoint. 
In the next section, we present a framework of incentive mechanisms to support 
successful service delivery by the end of the interaction. The incentive is used to 
encourage trusted agents to always comply at each checkpoint. 
7.4 Framework for Incentive Mechanisms for 
Successful Service Delivery 
As was noted in the previous section, a key research challenge relating to the 
formation of a successful transaction is product/service guarantee and its 
deliverability. By „service deliverability‟, we mean a guarantee of continued delivery 
of service as mutually agreed to by both of the parties involved. Further, 
(Fachrunnisa, Hussain et al. 2011) argue that the capability of the trusted agent to 
deliver service as promised and agreed to by the trusting agent will increase the level 
of trust that the trusting agent has in the trusted agent. Trust is the degree of belief or 
faith that an interacting party has in another party (Chang, Dillon et al. 2006) that 
forms the basis of QoS and the subsequent establishment of a business relationship 
(Ruppel, Underwood-Queen et al. 2003).  
In this section, we present our generic framework for an incentive to be provided in 
our proactive continuous monitoring. As was discussed in the previous sections, we 
divided the time space of interaction into several time slot(s). At each time slot(s) we 
designed a predefined number of checkpoint(s) whereby both parties have to track 
the performance of their interacting parties in delivering service requirements based 
on the SLA. This proactive continuous monitoring is carried out by a third party 
agent. In addition to proactive performance monitoring, we propose the use of 
rewards and incentives that can be used to motivate the trusted agent to behave or 
perform as closely as possible to the terms of the SLA. A reward or incentive is 
given during the course of transaction instead of at the end of the interaction. We 
propose three different approaches for giving incentive: (a) Performance-driven-
based-incentive, (b) Error-tolerance-based incentive, and (c) Occurrence-based 
incentive. We present the details of each approach in the next sections. A research 
outcome regarding this framework has been documented in a published article 
(Fachrunnisa 2011).  
7.4.1 Performance-driven-based Incentive 
In this approach, an incentive is given if the performance of the trusted agent at the 
current checkpoint is greater than or equal to the performance at the previous 
checkpoint and the trusted agent shown an increased performance as a response of 
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receiving incentive. In other words, in this approach, incentive is awarded only if 
parties show a minimum improved performance level in response to receiving an 
incentive.  
The objective of this approach is to motivate trusted agents to increase their 
performance in delivering service to the trusting agent as closely as possible to the 
mutual agreement. The steps included in this approach are as follows:  
a. Step 1: Defining Incentive Requirements in SLA 
For each transaction, both parties have agreed on a mutually agreed 
performance or SLA. This incentive and its requirement for providing 
incentive have to be clearly spelt out in the SLA. As was discussed in Chapter 
6, the SLA would clearly state each service criterion and its associated level 
of importance. If both parties agreed to use reward and incentive as part of 
their interaction, the kind of incentive and details of requirements must be 
stated in the SLA. 
 
b. Step 2: Evaluating the intermediate performance or intermediate trust level 
at each checkpoint 
Once both parties have agreed on the SLA including the details of the 
incentive, at every checkpoint, both parties need to evaluate the intermediate 
performance of their interacting partners. As a result, both parties would have 
an intermediate performance level at each checkpoint. Hence, the 
performance of the trusted agent in terms of delivering the service is 
monitored at each checkpoint. It is reflected in the correlation between actual 
performance and mutually agreed performance upon service requirements at 
each checkpoint. Hence, at each checkpoint, the trusting agent will allocate a 
value to intermediate performance. The performance of the trusted agent can 
be measured by correlating actual performance with mutually agreed to 
performance at each checkpoint(s). The intermediate performance is 
calculated using the following formula: 
1
1
CPnint
  * * Imp
 * * Imp
6 *   
N
criterionc criterionc criterionc
C
N
criterionc criterionc criterionc
C
In Actual Perf Clear
In MAP Clear
P                    Equation 7.10 
Where, 
 intP CPn  denotes intermediate performance at checkpoint n 
 6 represents the highest level of performance 
   criterioncIn Actual Perf denotes the actual / delivered criterion representing the 
fulfillment of each criterion of the trusted agent at an intermediate 
checkpoint. 
 criterioncInMAP  denotes mutually agreed performance of the trusted agent 
according to the given criterion at the intermediate checkpoint. 
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 criterioncClear represents the clarity of each criterion in the service agreement 
(contract) and whether it is understood in the same way by both parties. 
For a given criterion, 
criterionc
Clear can have two levels (a) „0‟ – This criterion 
or its output or both have not been mutually agreed to by both parties and 
(b) „1‟ – This criterion along with its output has been mutually agreed to 
by both parties. 
 Impcriterionc denotes the importance of each criterion that affects the 
determination of trustworthiness. For a given criterion, Impcriterionc can have 
two levels: (a) „0‟ – unimportant and (b) „1‟ – important.  
 
c. Step 3: Determining an Incentive Checkpoint(s) (Incentive CP).  
After the trusting the agent has evaluated the performance of the trusted agent 
at checkpoints, the trusted agent then can determine whether a checkpoint 
will be categorized as incentive checkpoint or not. In this approach, the 
incentive at each checkpoint will be issued if the performance of a trusted 
agent at the current checkpoint is higher than for the previous checkpoint. 
Hence, if PintCPn > PintCPn-1, where n > 1, the trusting agent will give an 
incentive to the trusted agent, while PintCPn is intermediate performance at 
current checkpoint and PintCPn-1 is the intermediate performance at the 
previous checkpoint.  We term the checkpoint which receives the incentive as 
the „incentive CP‟. During one transaction, there would be several 
checkpoints. It is important to note that the incentive is given only if the agent 
has shown an increase in performance at a certain level which is determined 
by equation 7.11.  
 
3. Step 4: Calculating Incentive value.  
As was discussed in Chapter 4, the trusting agent will give an incentive value 
as a kind of „trust value‟. In this research, the highest accumulated value as an 
incentive during a transaction is „1‟. Hence, the value of incentive for each 
„incentive CP‟ is calculated as follows: 
 
1
=  
total number of CP
Incentive CP                                    Equation 7.11 
4. Step 5: Increasing performance as a response of incentive.  
Once an agent has received an incentive at a certain checkpoint, an agent will 
receive an incentive if he increases his performance to a certain level at the 
next checkpoint. The level of increased performance can be calculated as 
follows:  
 
IPL = CLCPn * initial performance level * brake      Equation 7.12 
 
Equation 7.12 
Where IPL denotes increasing performance level, CLCPn denotes the 
compliance level at checkpoint n. This CLCPn is chosen randomly by the 
system at each initial checkpoint.  Initial performance is randomly assigned 
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early in the simulation. Brake option is a value of 0 – 0.9, which represents 
the degree of performance increase after receiving an incentive. 
5. Step 6: The condition of incentive by end of the interaction 
This approach is intended to motivate the trusted agent to deliver service as 
closely as possible with the agreed performance. However, in this approach, 
we employ an incentive deduction as a kind of punishment if the agreed 
service is not fully delivered by the end of the transaction. At the end of the 
interaction, the total incentive will be calculated based on the ratio of 
incentive CP by total number of CP in the course of interaction. It can be 
mathematically expressed as follows: 
 
 
         Equation 7.13 
Equation 7.13 
Where,  
 Incentive TV denotes incentive trust value as total incentive that the 
trusted agent receives during the interaction. 
 
 Total incentive CP denotes total checkpoints in interaction 
categorized as incentive CP 
 
 Total number of CP denotes total number of checkpoints during the 
interaction.                              
If, however, by the end of the interaction, the agreed service is not fully 
delivered, the incentive deduction can be calculated by comparing the ratio 
between remaining units and total agreed units. Hence, the net incentive trust 
value can be calculated using the following formulae: 
 
Equation 7.14                                                                                         Equation 7.14                        
Equation 7.14                                                        Equation 7.14 
Where, 
 
                                                                                    Equation 7.15 
The mathematical formulation and algorithm of this approach is depicted in Table 
7.1. As mentioned in Table 7.1, an incentive is awarded at a given checkpoint (say 
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CPn) if either Condition 1 or Condition 2 is satisfied. Additionally, as mentioned in 
the table below, an incentive is not awarded at CPn   if Condition 3 is true. 
  
Condition 1: , if ( ) - ( )) ≥   
 < 1)) 
Condition 2: ) 
Condition 3:  -  
Table 7.1:  Mathematical formulation of conditions for performance-driven-
based approach 
Let us consider an example from the previous case study in the interaction between 
„Loyalty Company‟ and „ABS White‟ for elucidation purposes of performance-
driven-based incentive. At each checkpoint in TS1, it is agreed that ABS White will 
deliver 20 audited files. Let us consider that at the first checkpoint (CP1), ABS White 
delivers only 19 units. At this first checkpoint, by using formulae in equation 7.10, 
the intermediate performance for this CP1 is 5.7. In the framework of proactive 
continuous performance monitoring, we propose a mechanism by which the 
performance gap at the previous checkpoint is carried over to the next checkpoint if 
it is below the error tolerance. As described in the previous section, the agreed error 
tolerance is 0.05. Hence, in this case, the agreed performance for the second 
checkpoint is 21 units instead of 20 unit files. If at the CP2, the performance level is 
greater than CP1, this checkpoint is characterized as an incentive checkpoint. For 
example, if the agent delivers 21 units, using equation 7.10 the PintCP2 is 6. As 
PintCP2 is greater than PintCP1, this CP2 is marked as incentive CP. As a result of 
receiving the incentive, this agent will increase his performance level at CP3. The 
increasing performance level is calculated by using equation 7.12. This mechanism 
continues until the end of the transaction time space. At the end of the interaction, the 
third party agent will calculate the total number of incentives. Let us further assume 
that during the interaction, the trusted agent received an incentive at three 
checkpoints. By using the formula in equation 7.13, at each incentive CP, the value 
of the incentive is 0.083. Let us consider that there is no further change to the 
number of checkpoints during the interaction and finally the agent receives an 
incentive at three checkpoints as explained. At the end of the interaction, by using 
equation 7.13, the value of the incentive for this interaction is 0.25.  
In this approach, if by end of the interaction, the trusted agent is not able to deliver 
all 240 audited files, the value of the incentive is deducted. Let us assume that by the 
end of the agreed time space, the trusted agent has delivered only 220 audited files. 
Hence, the incentive deduction is 0.091 as calculated using equation 7.15 and by 
using equation 7.14, the net incentive value for this interaction is 0.159.   
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7.4.2 Error-tolerance-based Incentive 
In this approach, a trusted agent will receive an incentive if the performance at any 
checkpoint is greater than or equal to a specific threshold value agreed to by both 
parties.The objective of this approach is to motivate trusted agents to maintain their 
performance in delivering service to the trusting agent at least higher than error 
tolerance as determined and agreed to by both parties. Let us consider an example 
from the previous section between Loyalty Company and ABS White. Both parties 
have agreed that the level of error tolerance is 0.05. In order to encourage the trusted 
agent to perform higher than the error tolerance margin, we design an error-tolerance 
based incentive approach. Let us further assume that, both parties agree on a 
threshold value of 0.02 in this approach. It means that once the trusted agent 
complies on 0.02 higher than error tolerance, this trusted agent will receive an 
incentive. Unlike the previous approach, the trusted agent does not need to show an 
improvement of performance level after receiving the incentive. However, as long as 
the performance discrepancy is within the specified threshold, the agent will get an 
incentive. The steps included in this approach are as follows:  
a. Step 1: Defining Incentive Requirements in SLA 
This step is exactly that same as that of the previous approach. In order to 
employ this approach, both parties have to agree on a certain threshold of 
requirements in order to give incentive. In this case, they agree on a certain 
value which determines when the trusted agent can receive incentive. 
 
b. Step 2: Evaluating the intermediate performance or intermediate trust level 
at each checkpoint 
This step is also exactly the same as that of the previous approach. Once both 
parties have the mutual agreement which specifies the time slots, checkpoints 
and agreed performance, they can assess an intermediate performance at each 
checkpoint using equation 7.8. Based on the result of this intermediate 
performance, the trusting agent can then determine whether in that particular 
checkpoint(s), a trusted agent is eligible to receive incentive. 
 
c. Step 3: Determining an Incentive Checkpoint(s) (Incentive CP) 
After the trusting agent evaluates the performance of the trusted agent at the 
specified checkpoints, the trusted agent can then determine whether or not a 
checkpoint will be categorized as an incentive checkpoint. In this approach, 
the incentive at each checkpoint will be issued if the performance of a trusted 
agent at any checkpoint is higher than a certain threshold which has been pre-
determined.  
 
Hence, if PintCPn ≥ agreed threshold value, the trusting agent will give an 
incentive to the trusted agent, while PintCPn is the intermediate performance at 
the current checkpoint and agreed threshold value is a value that is agreed by 
both parties to determine the minimum level for receiving an incentive. We 
term the checkpoint which receives the incentive the „incentive CP‟. During 
one transaction, there would be several checkpoints. It is important to note 
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that the incentive is given only if the agent has performed better than or equal 
to the agreed certain threshold value.  
 
d. Step 4: Calculating Incentive Value.  
Similar to the previous step, the trusting agent will give an incentive value as 
a kind of „trust value‟. In this research we fix the highest accumulated value 
as an incentive during a transaction is „1‟. Hence, the value of incentive for 
each „incentive CP‟ is calculated using formula 7.11. 
The mathematical expression and algorithm of this approach is depicted at Table 7.2. 
As can be seen from the table below in the error-tolerance-based incentive approach, 
an incentive is awarded at a given checkpoint (say CPn) if condition 1 is true and is 
not awarded is condition 1 is false and condition 2 is true. 
 
Condition 1:  
  
Condition 2:  
 
Where n > 1, and threshold denotes the additional service delivery effort required beyond 
the error tolerance for an incentive to be awarded. 
Table 7.2: Mathematical formulation of conditions for error-tolerance-based 
incentive 
We continue with the example above concerning the interaction between „Loyalty 
Company‟ and „ABS White‟. They have agreed that the error tolerance level is 0.05. 
Let us assume that they agreed on 0.02 as a threshold value for obtaining incentive. 
Hence, if the trusted agent delivers services equal to or greater than 0.97, this agent 
will receive an incentive. In this case, if the intermediate performance at any 
checkpoint is equal to or greater than 5.87, the checkpoint will be known as incentive 
CP. 
Let us further assume that at the first checkpoint (CP1), „ABS White‟ delivers 18 
units. At this first checkpoint, by using formula 7.10, the intermediate performance 
for this CP1 is 5.4. As the intermediate performance in this CP1 is lower than 5.87, 
this agent will not receive incentive; in other words, we cannot categorize this 
checkpoint as incentive CP. This mechanism continues until the end of the 
transaction time space. The formula for calculating the incentive CP and total 
incentive by the end of the interaction is exactly the same as that for the previous 
approach. However, there is no incentive deduction if, by the end of the interaction, 
the trusted agent does not deliver all the agreed performance. 
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7.4.3 Occurrence-based Incentive 
In this approach, an incentive is given if the performance of the trusted agent at the 
current checkpoint is greater than or equal to the performance at the previous 
checkpoint. However, unlike the first approach (performance-driven-based), an agent 
does not need to increase his performance in response to receiving an incentive. The 
increased performance is a chance occurrence. The steps involved in this approach 
are as follows: 
a. Step 1: Defining Incentive Requirements in SLA 
This step is similar to that in the previous two approaches. It has to be 
mutually agreed upon that whenever both parties show an increasing 
performance compared to that at the previous checkpoint, the agent will 
receive incentive. In the case that the agent fully performs (deliver service in 
100%) at a particular checkpoint, an agent will receive an incentive if he 
performs at 100% at the next checkpoint. 
 
b. Step 2: Evaluating the intermediate performance or intermediate trust level 
at each checkpoint 
This step is also exactly the same as that of the previous approach. Once both 
parties have the mutual agreement which specifies the time slots, checkpoints 
and agreed performance, they can assess intermediate performance at each 
checkpoint using equation 7.10. Based on the result of this intermediate 
performance assessment, the trusting agent can then determine whether at that 
particular checkpoint(s), a trusted agent has shown an increased performance. 
 
c. Step 3: Determining an Incentive Checkpoint (Incentive CP) 
After the trusting agent has evaluated the performance of the trusted agent at 
checkpoints, the trusted agent can then determine whether or not a checkpoint 
will be categorized as an incentive checkpoint. In this approach, the incentive 
at each checkpoint will be issued if the performance of a trusted agent at the 
current checkpoint is higher than that at the previous checkpoint.  
 
Hence, if PintCPn > PintCPn-1, the trusting agent will give an incentive to the 
trusted agent, while PintCPn is the intermediate performance at current 
checkpoint and PintCPn-1 is the intermediate performance at the previous 
checkpoint. The „incentive CP‟ is that checkpoint which receives the 
incentive.  During one transaction, there would be several checkpoints. It is 
important to note that the incentive is given only if the agent has shown an 
increase in performance.  
 
e. Step 4: Calculating the Incentive Value.  
Similar to the previous step, the trusting agent will give an incentive value as 
a kind of „trust value‟. In this research, the highest trust value as an incentive 
during a transaction is „1‟. The value of incentive for each checkpoint can be 
calculated using formula 7.11 above. 
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The mathematical expression and algorithm framework for this approach is depicted 
in Table 7.3. As can be seen from the table below an incentive is awarded at a given 
checkpoint (say CPn) if either Condition 1 or Condition 2 is satisfied. Additionally, 
an incentive is not awarded at CPn   if Condition 3 is true. 
 
Condition 1:  
 
 
Condition 2:  
 
Condition 3:  
 
Table 7.3: Mathematical formulation of conditions for occurrence-based 
incentive 
Continuing with the example above from the interaction between „Loyalty Company‟ 
and „ABS White‟, in this approach, if the intermediate performance at any 
checkpoint is equal to or greater than that at the previous checkpoint, the checkpoint 
can be categorized as incentive CP. The increasing performance level occurs by 
chance only. Hence, the requirement to obtain incentive is very simple, once the 
agent has shown an increasing performance compared to that at the previous 
checkpoint, this particular checkpoint will marked as incentive CP. By the end of the 
interaction, the total incentive is calculated in the same way as that of the two 
previous approaches. 
7.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we present a framework for proactive continuous performance 
monitoring and an incentive mechanism for the successful delivery of service. 
Proactive continuous performance monitoring is designed to proactively monitor the 
performance of interacting parties. The aim of this framework is to identify the 
performance gap as early as possible and to provide a strategy to address any 
performance gap as soon as possible before it spirals out of control. Moreover, in 
order to ensure successful service delivery, we present a framework for the provision 
of an incentive. We present the use of reward and incentive to motivate both parties 
to comply as closely as possible with the terms of the SLA. There are three 
approaches that can be utilized to provide an incentive for successful service 
delivery. The main purpose of these frameworks (proactive continuous monitoring 
and incentive mechanism) is to facilitate successful service delivery. Hence, by the 
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end of the interaction, the trust level has reached a positive level as the trusted agent 
has delivered service as agreed to by the trusting agent. We demonstrate the 
effectiveness of this framework in Chapter 9. In the next chapter, we present a 
framework for trust re-calibration at the end of the time space of interaction. 
7.6 References 
Chang, E., T. S. Dillon, et al. (2006). Trust and reputation for service-oriented 
environments: technologies for building business intelligence and consumer 
confidence. Chichester, England, John Wiley & Sons Inc. 
Currall, S. C. and M. J. Epstein (2003). "The Fragility of Organizational Trust: 
Lessons From the Rise and Fall of Enron." Organizational Dynamics 32(2): 
193-206. 
Debenham, J. and C. Sierra (2008). A Map of Trust between Trading Partners. 
TrustBus 2008. S. M. Furnell, S. K. Katsikas and A. Lioy. Verlag Berlin 
Heidelderg, Springer: 8-17. 
Fachrunnisa, O. (2011). "A Performance-Driven Incentive-Based Approach for 
Successful Service Delivery". 5
th
 IEEE International Conference on Digital 
Ecosystems and Technologies (IEEE DEST 2011), Daejeon, Korea, 31 May -
3 June 2011: 324-329. 
Fachrunnisa, O. and F. K. Hussain. 2011. "A Methodology for Maintaining Trust in 
Industrial Digital Ecosystems". IEEE Transactions in Industrial Electronics. 
DOI: 10.1109/TIE.2011.2173890 
Hussain, F. K., E. Chang, et al. (2004). "Trustworthiness and CCCI Metrics in P2P 
communication". International Journal of Computer Systems Science & 
Engineering 3: 173-190. 
Ruppel, C., L. Underwood-Queen, et al. (2003). "e-Commerce: The Roles of Trust, 
Security, and Type of e-Commerce Involvement". e-Service Journal 2(2): 25-
45. 
 
 Every reasonable effort has been made to acknowledge the owners of copyright 
material. I would be pleased to hear from any copyright owner who has been omitted 
or incorrectly acknowledged. 
  
  
Page 183 of 319 
 
 
Chapter 8 - Framework for Trust Re-
calibration 
8.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 7, we presented details of a framework for proactive continuous 
performance monitoring and incentive mechanisms. These mechanisms are carried 
out during the course of the interaction. Hence, our methodology facilitates 
maintaining trust by using historical data of both the trust level records and 
performance records. This is to ensure that by the end of the interaction, both parties 
will deliver service as closely as possible to that specified in the mutual agreement. 
As mentioned previously, our methodology is intended for trust maintenance in 
virtual environments. The basic assumption is that trust has already been established 
in an interaction and needs to be maintained by consistently monitoring and 
examining the interaction. Hence, by the end of the interaction, both parties need to 
re-calibrate or re-examine their trust level.  It is the last step of our methodology for 
maintaining trust whereby both parties can obtain the final trust level at the end of 
the interaction time space. In this chapter, we present our generic framework for trust 
re-calibration by the end of the interaction in the trust maintenance phase both for 
interaction with incentive and without incentive.  
Section 8.2 describes the details of the framework. Section 8.3 explains several 
metrics that will be used to develop the approaches for final trust calculation. Section 
8.4 presents three different approaches for calculation of trust final in an interaction 
without an incentive mechanism agreement. In order to illustrate the operability of 
our framework, we present a case study in Section 8.5 which continues from that in 
the previous chapter. Section 8.6 presents three approaches for calculation of final 
trust for the interaction with incentive, and Section 8.7 concludes the chapter.  
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8.2 Detailed Framework of Trust Re-
calibration 
As was explained in Chapter 4, the main purpose of trust maintenance is to preserve 
the current trust value so that it will remain stable or possibly increase. In order to 
achieve this, we need to know the level of the trust values prior to, during, and after 
the interaction. As both parties have an initial trust at the beginning of their 
interaction, we argue that trust is maintained if the level of trust after the interaction 
(final trust value) is equal to, or greater than, the initial trust level. Hence, in 
determining final trustworthiness, the initial trust value that was established during 
the building phase is subject to recalibration or re-assessment at the end of each 
interaction in the maintenance stage.  Therefore, the methodological framework for 
computing the final trust value of an interaction during the trust maintenance phase 
would be different from that used during the trust building phase. This would be due 
to the different focus in these phases in terms of trust value calculation. In the trust 
building phase, the actual behaviour during the interaction is measured only at the 
end of the interaction whereas in trust maintenance phase, the trust value is re-
calibrated. Since the trust level has already been established during the trust building 
phase, in the trust maintenance phase, trust is subject to re-calibration. In order to 
ensure that trust is maintained, we propose a model for formally testing trust levels 
during the relationship. This formal testing takes into account the dynamic nature of 
trust in a relationship. This model is based on a proactive continuous performance 
monitoring approach for trust maintenance that was presented in Chapter 7.  
In the previous chapter, we proposed the use of time slots coupled with checkpoints 
to assist in the maintenance of trust. In the case of unmet performance or unfulfilled 
contract occurring, the discrepancy can be identified and addressed at the checkpoint 
bases. In this case, the number of checkpoints in each time slot is designed to review 
the progress of service delivery. Since at every checkpoint there is a review process 
of intermediate actual performance against intermediate agreed performance (for that 
checkpoint), the trusting agent can assign an intermediate trust value (reflecting the 
degree of compliance of the trusted agent at that checkpoint at the interaction). 
Therefore, given a finite number of checkpoints during the interaction, the trusting 
agent may have multiple intermediate trust values, each of which corresponds to the 
intermediate checkpoint. Debenham et al. (Debenham and Sierra 2008) state that this 
can be considered as the experience of trust during an interaction. Trust experience 
can be based on experience during the history of the transaction. Trust that is 
experienced throughout this relationship (checked and reviewed at every checkpoint) 
will determine or contribute towards the final trust value at the end of the interaction. 
The trust intermediate calculation at each checkpoint designed to represent the trust 
experienced during a transaction. In the next section, we propose three different 
approaches for final trust calculation as a result of proactive continuous performance 
monitoring. 
Based on proactive continuous performance monitoring as explained in the previous 
chapter, by the end of the relationship, the trusting agent will have the following 
information: 
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a. Agreed Performance Information 
Agreed performance information is a statement of performance or behaviour 
that is agreed to by both parties. This statement can be found in the mutually 
agreed behaviour or business contract or Service Level Agreement (SLA). 
Continuing with the case study that we presented in Chapter 7 of a 
relationship between service auditor („ABS White‟) and a business company 
(„Loyalty Company‟), the finished auditing of 240 financial accounts within 
one month is the agreed performance. The outcome of the negotiation phase, 
which is a contract between the interacting parties denotes or manifests the 
agreed performance between the two interacting parties. In the contract, the 
agreed performance information would be specific using the following 
parameters for the service: 
 The criteria that comprise the service 
 A quantitative representation of each agreed criterion that comprises 
the service 
b. Actual Outcome Performance Information 
We define the actual performance information as the actual delivery of 
service by the trusted agent at the end of the interaction. The outcome-based 
performance can be specified using the following parameters: 
 Actual criteria delivered by the trusted agent at the end of the 
interaction 
 Quantitative representation describing the actual number of units 
delivered for each criterion 
c. Intermediate Agreed Performance Information 
We define the intermediate agreed performance as the agreed delivery of 
service between both the parties at the intermediate checkpoint. This delivery 
of service is agreed to by both parties. For instance, based on the previous 
example, 60 files of financial accounts is the intermediate agreed 
performance information (for Time Slot 1 (TS1), TS2, TS3 and TS4). The 
intermediate agreed performance can be specified using the following 
parameters. Moreover, the performance is checked at each checkpoint and it 
has been agreed that the intermediate agreed performance at each checkpoint 
is 20 files. Hence, initially, at C1, C2,....C12, the agreed performance is 20 files 
per checkpoint (C1 – C12). However, as we use a proactive continuous 
performance monitoring mechanism with the purpose of capturing the 
dynamically changing performance, the agreed performance at each 
checkpoint may also change based on the occurrence of performance gaps 
and policies or behaviours to close the gaps. We explain this situation in point 
e below (adjusted agreed performance information). The intermediate agreed 
performance can be specified using the following parameters: 
 The criteria that comprise the intermediate service. 
 Quantitative representation of each agreed criterion at intermediate 
checkpoints. 
d. Intermediate Actual Performance Information 
We define the intermediate actual performance as the actual delivery of 
service by the trusted agent at the intermediate checkpoints. The intermediate 
actual performance can be defined using the following parameters: 
 Actual criteria delivered by the trusted agent at each checkpoint 
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 Quantitative representation describing the actual number of units 
delivered for each criterion 
e. Adjusted Agreed Performance Information 
We define the adjusted agreed performance as the adjusted agreed delivery of 
service by the trusted agent at the intermediate checkpoint. This adjustment 
results from the mechanism of proactive continuous performance monitoring. 
The adjusted agreed performance information can be described using the 
following parameters: 
 The adjusted criteria that comprise the intermediate service 
 Quantitative representation describing each adjusted agreed criterion 
at intermediate checkpoints.  
Let us continue with the above example, where the initial intermediate agreed 
performance at C1 is 20 files. If, for instance, in C1, the trusted agent delivers 
only 18 files, and let us further assumes that based on the policy for closing 
this performance gap, the 2 remaining files are adjusted in the next 
checkpoints, then the intermediate agreed performance in C2 is adjusted 
upwards to 22 files. 
Based on the above data that the trusting agent has obtained during the interaction, 
we propose three approaches to calculate the final trust value. The suite of metrics 
that we propose in this thesis are based on the CCCI metrics proposed by Hussain et 
al. (Chang, Dillon et al. 2006), (Hussain, Chang et al. 2004). CCCI metrics is a set of 
QoS, as a means of measuring the trusting agent‟s trust in the trusted agent after the 
interaction. The trustworthiness value is expressed as „the degree consonant or 
parallelism between the actual behaviour of a trusted agent and the mutually agreed 
behaviour of the trusted agent, as perceived by a trusting agent‟ (Chang, Dillon et al. 
2006) (Hussain, Chang et al. 2004). Hence, the trustworthiness value of an 
interaction can be expressed mathematically as shown below: 
 Equation 8.1 
                                      
  Equation 8.2  
 
As defined by Hussain et al. (Hussain, Chang et al. 2004; Chang, Dillon et al. 2006), 
the Actual Performance ( is a metric that „qualifies and expresses 
the actual performance of the trusted agent in the given criterion‟. 
Mutually Agreed Performance ( is a metric that „qualifies and 
expresses the mutually agreed performance of the trusted agent in the given 
criterion‟.  
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Clarity of Criterion ( is a metric that qualifies the extent to which a 
criterion is mutually agreed upon by the trusting agent and trusted agent. For a given 
criterion,  can have two levels: 
 0 – This criterion or its output or both have not been mutually agreed 
to by both parties 
 1 – This criterion along with its output has been mutually agreed to by 
both parties 
Impcriterion c or Importance is a metric that qualifies the extent of importance of a 
criterion for the trusting agent in the interaction. For a given criterion, Impcriterion c can 
have two levels: 
 0 – Unimportant, which refers to supplementary criteria 
 1 – Important, which refers to mandatory criteria 
The actual performance and mutually agreed to performance metric will be adjusted 
based on a defined approach that will be used to calculate Final Trust Value. 
8.3 Approaches for Final Trust Calculation 
In this section, we present three approaches that can be utilized to measure final trust 
at the end of the interaction during the trust maintenance phase. These approaches 
are based on several benchmarking metrics gathered during proactive continuous 
performance monitoring for the duration of the transaction. 
8.3.1 Outcome-based Final Trust Value (OFTV) 
We define outcome-based final trust value as „performance assessment done using 
outcome-based performance information and agreed performance information at the 
end of interaction‟. At a conceptual level, this may be expressed as follows: 
 
                                                                                             Equation 8.3Equation 8.3 
The trust re-calibration in this approach is based on the correlation of agreed 
performance with the actual outcome performance at the end of the interaction. The 
actual performance outcome is determined by the final outcome at the end of the 
interaction and by using the CCCI metrics proposed by Hussain et al. (Hussain, 
Chang et al. 2004; Chang, Dillon et al. 2006). In the outcome-based approach, the 
compliance or non-compliance of the mutually agreed performance at the 
intermediate checkpoints is not taken into consideration; rather the compliance or 
non-compliance (or degree of compliance) of all the mutually agreed goals at the end 
of the interaction determines the outcome-based trust value. This approach considers 
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only the final service delivery by the trusted agent to the trusting agent. In this 
approach, we calculate the final trust value as follows: 
  
     Equation 8.4                                                                                                        
                                 
8.3.2 Checkpoint-based Final Trust Value (CFTV) 
We define the checkpoint-based final trust value as „performance assessment done 
using intermediate performance information and agreed intermediate performance 
information‟. At a conceptual level, this may be expressed as follows: 
 
 
         Equation 8.5  
In this approach, a final trust value is determined by aggregating the intermediate 
trust values during the entire time of the interaction. The evidence of trust 
experienced is collected / accumulated at each checkpoint. The intermediate 
checkpoint-based trust value is measured by the correlation between intermediate 
actual performance and intermediate agreed performance. With this approach, a fine-
grained view of an agent‟s performance is aggregated to determine the final trust 
value. In contrast to the outcome-based approach, during the transaction, the trusting 
agent confirms the intermediate performance of the trusted agent at every 
checkpoint. Therefore, by the end of the interaction, the final trust value can be 
determined by calculating the average of the intermediate trust levels. 
  Equation 8.6  
                                                                                                      
where 
  is intermediate Trust and η denotes the total number of checkpoints in an 
interaction.   Value can be calculated as follows: 
  
 Equation 8.7 
Where;  
 is the actual service delivered by the trusted 
agent at each checkpoint  
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 is the intermediate service delivery that is agreed to by 
both parties at each checkpoint. It is important to note here that, whenever this 
mutually agreed to intermediate performance is adjusted, we use the adjusted 
information to calculate intermediate trust. 
8.3.3 Weighted-based Final Trust Value (WFTV) 
We define weighted-based final trust value as „performance assessment done using 
combination between outcome based final trust value (OFTV) and checkpoint-based 
final trust value (CFTV)‟. At a conceptual level, this may be expressed as follows: 
  Equation 8.8 
This approach is proposed to give some weight to the two different types of final 
trust value calculation presented in Sections 8.3.1 and 8.3.2. As in the TMM, there is 
a proactive continuous monitoring of performance, the agent who always complies at 
every checkpoint might be different from the agent who does not comply at every 
checkpoint but delivers the full service by the end of the interaction. This approach 
can be mathematically expressed with the following equation: 
 
Trust Final = (α * OFTV) + (β * CFTV)  Equation 8.9 
 
Where,  are weighted for weighting outcome-based final trust and 
checkpoint-based trust value. In this case, the policy for determining α and β depends 
on how the trusting agent assigns an important value to both parameters. However, 
the aggregate number of α and β is 1. For example, some agents may place more 
importance on real-time trust value as incorporated in intermediate trust than on 
outcome-based trust. Thus, the trusting agent will give more weight to β than α. 
However, if the trusting agent places more emphasis on the final outcome of the 
interaction rather than on how the trusted agent performs during the interaction, then 
this trusting agent will assign more value to α than β.  
In order to illustrate the operability of these three approaches, we explain their 
workings using a case study which is presented in the next section. In this chapter, 
we make use of the case study scenario described in Chapter 7 (transaction between 
„Loyalty Company‟ and „ABS White‟). 
8.4 Case Study 
In this section, we develop a simple case study to elucidate the workings of the 
framework for trust recalibration and how final trust can be calculated using the 
approaches that we have proposed in the previous section. 
Let us continue using a simple example from the previous chapter which involves a 
business relationship between „Loyalty Company‟ and „ABS White‟. „Loyalty 
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Company‟ requests that „ABS White‟ audit its 240 files of financial accounts within 
one month. As a result, in their Service Level Agreement (SLA), „ABS White‟ 
agreed to audit and deliver 240 files of audited financial account over the next one 
month and „Loyalty Company‟ agreed to pay $100 for each file audited. For 
simplicity, we include only one service criterion in this interaction. The details of the 
SLA for this interaction are as follows: 
 
Transaction ID: Xxx 
Time Space: 1 November 2010 – 30 November 2010 
Trusting agent ID: Loyalty Company 
Trusted agent ID: ABS White 
Service Context: Auditing Service 
Time Slot: 4 (Four) 
Number of initial CP: 3 (Three) per Time Slot 
Level of Error tolerance: 0.05 
Service Descriptions Service Criteria 
Level of Importance 
Trusting Agent 
(Loyalty 
Company) 
Trusted 
Agent 
(ABS White) 
S1: Quantity C11: 240 files of 
financial account 
1 1 
S2: Price C21: $24000 1 1 
Table 8.1: Service level agreement 
 
As we can see from Table 8.1 above, the time frame of the relationship is for one 
year and there are four time slots in the relationship. The details of the Time Window 
are as follows: 
a. Time frame is the duration of the relationship to finish or to deliver service 
which is one month (1 November 2010 – 30 November 2010). 
b. Time slot is the number of intermediate tasks that should be fulfilled or 
delivered. Based on the above SLA, both parties agreed that time slot 
would be 4 (four) during interaction. Therefore, the number of time slots is 
four with the duration details as follows: 
 Time Slot 1 (TS1) : 1 November 2010 – 7 November 2010 
 Time Slot 2 (TS2) : 8 November 2010 – 15 November 2010 
 Time Slot 3 (TS3) : 16 November 2010 – 22 November 2010 
 Time Slot 4 (TS4) : 23 November 2010 – 30 November 2010 
c. Checkpoints are the number of points used to review the performance of 
service deliverability in each time slot. In this case, a third party agent 
determines this number of checkpoints by using equation 7.1. Let us 
further consider that the number of checkpoints in every time slot is 3 
(three). Since the number of time slots is 4 (four), the total number of 
checkpoints for the whole interaction is 12 (twelve). Let us assume that the 
statement of intermediate agreed performance for „Loyalty Company‟ and 
„ABS White‟ at each checkpoint is as follows: 
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Time Slot  
(TS) 
Date Checkpoints ABS 
White 
Loyalty 
Company 
TS1 
3 November 2010 C1 20 files $ 2000 
5 November 2010 C2 20 files $ 2000 
7 November 2010 C3 20 files $ 2000 
 
    
TS2 
10 November 2010 C4 20 files $ 2000 
12 November 2010 C5 20 files $ 2000 
15 November 2010 C6 20 files $ 2000 
 
    
TS3 
17 November 2010 C7 20 files $ 2000 
19 November 2010 C8 20 files $ 2000 
22 November 2010 C9 20 files $ 2000 
 
    
TS4 
25 November 2010 C10 20 files $ 2000 
27 November 2010 C11 20 files $ 2000 
30 November 2010 C12 20 files $ 2000 
 
    
Total 
 12 
Checkpoints 
240 files $  24000 
Table 8.2: Intermediate agreed performance 
After both parties have the details of the above service delivery for each checkpoint, 
they follow the third step of the methodology which is performance monitoring and 
an incentive mechanism as discussed in Chapter 7. In the performance monitoring 
step, both parties execute their tasks and monitor the progress of performance. This 
means that for every checkpoint, both parties monitor whether their interacting party 
performs as agreed. For example, at checkpoint 1 (C1), „Loyalty Company‟ reviews 
whether or not „ABS White‟ delivers 20 files of audited financial accounts. 
Therefore, „Loyalty Company‟ has information about „ABS White‟s intermediate 
actual performance. „Loyalty Company‟ needs to assign a trust value to ABS White‟s 
performance at this checkpoint (C1). On the other hand, „ABS White‟ also assigns a 
trust value to „Loyalty Company‟ based on Loyalty Company‟s intermediate actual 
service delivery at this checkpoint.  
Let us continue with the following data set of agreed performance and actual 
performance at each checkpoint for the whole interaction as depicted in Table 8.3. 
For simple illustration purposes, we provide the data set for ABS White‟s 
performance only. Therefore, „Loyalty Company‟ will re-calibrate their trust value 
toward „ABS White‟ at the end of the interaction based on the data set given in Table 
8.3. 
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Time Check 
points 
Intermediate 
Agreed 
performance 
Adjusted 
Agreed 
performance 
Actual 
performance 
3 November 2010 C1 20 20 19 
5 November 2010 C2 20 21 18 
7 November 2010 C3 20 23 21 
10 November 2010 C4 20 22 22 
12 November 2010 C5 20 20 17 
15 November 2010 C6 20 23 22 
17 November 2010 C7 20 21 19 
19 November 2010 C8 20 22 22 
22 November 2010 C9 20 20 18 
25 November 2010 C10 20 22 21 
27 November 2010 C11 20 21 20 
30 November 2010 C12 20 21 21 
     
Total 12 240  240 
Table 8.3: Interaction performance data 
At Checkpoint 1 (C1), the agreed performance is that „ABS White‟ should deliver 20 
units of audited file. However, „ABS White‟ delivers only 19 files. Let us further 
assume, that third party agent take an action to employ policy to close this 
performance gap. Based on our TMM, 1 files (20 - 19) are forwarded to the 
checkpoint 2 (C2) agreed performance; therefore, the agreed performance in C2 is 
adjusted to be 21 service units. In C2, again „ABS White‟ could not fully meet the 
adjusted agreed performance. As shown in Table 8.3, it only delivers 18 files. It is 
agreed that the 3 remaining files will be covered at checkpoint 3 (C3). Hence, the 
agreed performance in C3 is adjusted to be 23 units (20 + 3) and so on. Based on 
these performance data, Table 8.4 below provides intermediate trust calculation from 
„Loyalty Company‟ to „ABS‟ White using Equation 8.7. 
Check 
points 
Intermediate 
Agreed 
performance 
Intermediate 
Adjusted Agreed 
performance 
Intermediate 
Actual 
performance 
Intermediate 
Trust Value 
C1 20 20 19 5.7 
C2 20 21 18 5.14 
C3 20 23 21 5.47 
C4 20 22 22 6 
C5 20 20 17 5.1 
C6 20 23 22 5.74 
C7 20 21 19 5.43 
C8 20 22 22 6 
C9 20 20 18 5.4 
C10 20 22 21 5.73 
C11 20 21 20 5.71 
C12 20 21 21 6 
Table 8.4: Intermediate trust values 
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Hence, at the end of the interaction, „Loyalty Company‟ has a series of performance-
related data that contain intermediate agreed performance, intermediate adjusted 
agreed performance, intermediate actual performance and intermediate trust value. In 
order to determine the final trust value, the three approaches as proposed in the 
previous section are used. Details of the final trust calculation are given in the 
following sections. 
8.4.1 Outcome Based Final Trust Value (OFTV) 
The trust recalibration for this approach is based on the correlation of actual outcome 
performance with agreed performance in the interaction. The actual outcome 
performance is the total amount of actual performance. The final trust value for this 
approach is calculated using Equation 8.4: 
 
The criterion of this interaction is only 1 which is a service unit. The criterion is very 
clear (1) as both parties formalize and negotiate this criterion in the second phase of 
our methodology and the importance level (Imp criterion) is 1 (important). Hence, 
the final trust calculation is:  
 
 
Hence, this final trust value corresponds to the above scenario wherein all the 240 
files were delivered by „ABS White‟ to „Loyalty Company‟ at the end of the 
interaction. 
8.4.2 Checkpoint-based Final Trust Value (CFTV) 
Based on Table 8.4 above, „Loyalty Company‟ has a data set for its calculation of 
intermediate level of trust in „ABS White‟. The Final Trust Calculation using 
Equations 8.6 and 8.7 is as follows: 
 
Where, Tin = Intermediate Trust and n denotes the total number of checkpoints 
during the interaction. 
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8.4.3 Weighted Final Trust Value (WFTV) 
As mentioned in Section 8.3.3; the weighted final trust value is determined as a 
function of checkpoint-based final trust value and outcome-based final trust value. It 
gives a predefined weight for each checkpoint-based and final trust. Let us consider 
that „Loyalty Company‟ takes α as 0.6 and β is 0.4. Hence, in this approach, the 
calculation of final trust using Equation 8.9 is as follows: 
 
 
 
 
Based on the case study above, by using the three different approaches to calculate 
Final Trust value, „Loyalty Company‟ will have a different final trust value after 
their interaction with „ABS White‟. The summary of the final trust values based on 
the three approaches is as follows: 
No. Approach Correlation or Formula Direction Final Trust Value 
1. Outcome-based Final Trust 
Value (OFTV)  
agreed performance vs. actual 
outcome performance 
6 
2. Checkpoint-based Final 
Trust Value (CFTV) 
average of  adjusted intermediate 
agreed performance vs. 
intermediate actual performance 
5.62 
4. Weighted-based Final Trust 
Value (WFTV) 
weighted combination of 
outcome-based and checkpoint-
based  
5.89 
Table 8.5: Summary of final trust values 
It can be seen from the above case study and simulation results that each of the above 
approaches result in a different final trust value. The highest final trust value is 
derived from the outcome-based approach which is a correlation between agreed 
performance and actual outcome performance at the end of the interaction, while the 
lowest final trust value is produced by the checkpoint-based approach. However, the 
checkpoint-based approach takes into account and models the dynamic nature of 
trust. In checkpoint-based trust, the final trust value is calculated as an average of the 
intermediate trust value which reflects the trust condition in an interaction due to the 
dynamic nature of trust. Hence, at any given point in time, real-time data regarding 
trust levels can be found in intermediate trust value calculation. Updated information 
on trust value makes it necessary to re-calibrate trust. 
The outcome-based final trust value approach is based on the final outcome of an 
interaction. In this case, this approach produces the highest trust value. However, we 
argue that this final trust value does not fully represent the mutually agreed upon 
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performance as stated in the SLA. Although by the end of the interaction the trusted 
agent delivers the service as agreed, this approach does not consider the way in 
which the trusted agent delivers the service units. The sole focus of these metrics is 
to compute the degree of conformance to the agreed behaviour and the actual 
behaviour as measured at the end of the interaction. 
The third approach, the weighted-based approach, integrates both of the previous 
approaches. It combines both the checkpoint-based and the outcome-based 
approaches. We may consider this weighted approach to be the best and fairest way 
of calculating final trust value in trust maintenance activities. This is because the 
trusting agent considers giving a better reward to the trusted agent who always 
complies with every agreed performance at each checkpoint. However, the 
importance of actual service delivery as an outcome of interaction is also considered 
in this approach.  Therefore, a weighted-based approach incorporates the final 
outcome of an interaction with real-time data to update trust status during an 
interaction. 
8.5 Trust Re-calibration for Interaction with 
Incentive Trust Value 
In Chapter 7, we presented the framework for incentive mechanisms in proactive 
continuous performance monitoring. As was discussed in Chapter 7, there is 
incentive provided for complying behaviour value during the interaction. As a result, 
the final trust calculation for interaction with incentive and without incentive would 
be different. In the previous section, we presented and illustrated an interaction 
without the inclusion of an incentive mechanism in the calculation of the trust levels. 
In this section, we present the mechanism for trust re-calibration if in the interaction, 
both parties have agreed to an incentive requirement. We propose three different 
approaches for final trust calculation of the interactions which are derived from 
metrics developed in the technique for trust re-calibration for interaction without 
incentive trust value. 
8.5.1 Outcome-based Incentive 
In this approach, final trust value is calculated based on the total number of service 
units delivered at the end of an interaction. As the interaction utilized an incentive 
mechanism, the net incentive is added to this approach. It can be mathematically 
expressed as follows: 
 
 
   Equation 8.108.10 
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Where, net incentive is the total incentive value that the trusted agent receives from 
an interaction after incentive deduction, if any. The formula for and discussion of this 
net incentive, can be found in Chapter 7.  
8.5.2 Checkpoint-based Incentive 
In this approach, similar to the mechanism for interaction without an incentive 
mechanism, final trust value is the sum of the average of the intermediate trust value 
plus net incentive. The mathematical expression for this approach is as follows: 
  Equation 8.11 
8.5.3 Weighted-based Incentive 
Similar to the weighted-based approach for this approach to the interaction without 
incentive mechanism, the final trust value is calculated by adding the net incentive. 
Mathematically it is expressed as follows: 
Trust Final = {(α * OFTV) + (β * CFTV)} + Net Incentive  
 Equation 8.12
 Equaon 8.12 
In any case of final trust calculation, if the trust final resulting from the proposed 
calculation technique is greater than „6‟, we round off this value to „6‟. This is 
because we use the scale of trust value from „0‟ to „6‟ as we discussed in Chapter 4. 
8.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we present the framework for trust re-calibration as the last step in 
our TMM. As TMM means that both parties have various data that can be used to 
determine the final trust value, we propose three different approaches to calculate the 
final trust value. These three techniques, namely, outcome-based approach, 
checkpoint-based approach and weighted-based approach, will help trusting agents to 
re-calibrate their initial trust value in the trusted agent at the conclusion of the 
interaction. We also present three different techniques for final trust calculation if, 
during the interaction, both parties have agreed to utilize an incentive to facilitate 
service delivery. In the next chapter, we present the validation of our methodology 
according to various benchmarks. 
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Chapter 9 - Experimental Simulation 
and Validation of TMM 
9.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters, we presented the five frameworks as the foundation of our 
methodology for maintaining trust. In order to determine the effectiveness of our 
proposed methodology for maintaining trust, we engineered a multi-agent system.  
The system was engineered as a graphical user interface by making use of the 
following tools: 
1. Java Version 1.5.0_03: Java 2 Platform Software Edition is a complete 
development environment which was used to code the multi-agent simulation 
and was later integrated with NetBeans to build the GUI for this simulation. 
Java was the chosen platform for the engineering the protoype because of its 
Object Oriented (OO) paradigm that lends itself to / allows for representation 
of agents and their behaviours. 
2. NetBeans IDE 4.0: NetBeans is an integrated Development Environment for 
developers of Java applications. NetBeans was used to engineer the multi-
agent simulation because of the ease with which Graphical User Interfaces 
(GUIs) can be built using NetBeans. 
In this thesis, we propose 7 (seven) broad objectives of simulation, each of which we 
divide into sub-objectives. In this chapter, we present the multi-agent system that we 
engineered to validate our proposed methodology for maintaining trust from 3 (three) 
broad objectives of validity measurement. The remaining 4 (four) objectives are 
presented in Chapter 10. In Section 9.2, we discuss the aims and objectives of 
engineering this system. In Section 9.3, we give an abstract overview of each of the 
phases involved in running the multi-agent system. In Section 9.4, we present the 
parameters used in the multi-agent system. In Sections 9.5 – Section 9.7, we illustrate 
the workflow and the results of the simulation (which we engineered in order to 
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determine the effectiveness of the TMM). Section 9.8 concludes the chapter. We use 
the terms „simulation‟ and „system‟ interchangeably in this chapter.  
9.2 Objectives of Engineering the Prototype 
Systems 
The aim of engineering a multi-agent system was to simulate the working of the 
TMM. The engineered multi-agent system is meant to reflect the transactions 
between entities in virtual environments and subsequently determine the 
effectiveness of our TMM. The interactions between the software agents in the multi-
agent system are meant to reflect the transaction between entities in the virtual 
environments. The (software) agents in the multi-agent system carry out a finite 
number of transactions (specified by the end user) with other software agents. At the 
end of the transactions, statistics are obtained and the effectiveness of our 
methodology is expressed and quantified numerically using the metrics that we 
propose for each associated objective. The prototype simulation is available online at 
http://blade1.debii.curtin.edu.au:8080/trustMaintain/. 
In order to enable a detailed analysis and detailed validation of the proposed 
methodology, in this chapter, we present its validation from three perspectives as 
follows: 
1. Objective 1: The effectiveness of our methodology for maintaining trust 
when the behaviour of agents in each transaction is static. By this we mean 
that the behaviour of agents in the transactions does not change. Here, we 
make use of the engineered prototype and define additional benchmarks to 
measure the effectiveness of our TMM. We divide this objective into two 
sub-objectives: 
1.1 Objective 1.1: Compare transactions with TMM and transactions without 
TMM. In order to achieve this objective, we quantify the benefits of 
using our methodology in such transactions over transactions which do 
not use our methodology. In this objective, we assume the static 
behaviour of agents during the transactions. 
1.2 Objective 1.2: Determine the correlation between final trust (at 
completion of interaction) and initial trust (at initiation of interaction). In 
order to achieve this objective, we compare the level of initial trust with 
the final trust at each transaction. In this case, we assume the static 
behaviour of agents during the transactions. 
2. Objective 2: We further investigate and present the effectiveness of our 
methodology for trust maintenance when the behaviour of agents / parties 
involved in the transactions changes dynamically during the interactions. In 
order to address this issue, objective 2 proposes dynamic (non-static) 
behaviour of agents in interactions (in contrast to objective 1). We model the 
behaviour changes of an agent during the transaction by proposing three 
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different fuzzy logic based approaches. Similar to objective 1, we divide this 
second objective into two sub-objectives:  
2.1. Objective 2.1: Compare transactions with TMM and without TMM. In 
order to achieve this objective, we quantify the benefits of using our 
methodology in such transactions over transactions which do not use our 
methodology. In this objective, we assume the dynamic behaviour of 
agents during the transactions.  
2.2. Objective 2.2: Determine the correlation between final trust (at 
completion of interaction) and initial trust (at initiation of interaction).  
Similar to the objective of simulation 1.2, in order to achieve this 
objective, we compare the level of initial trust with the final trust at each 
transaction. However, in this case, we assume that the behaviour of 
agents during the transactions is dynamic.  
 
3. Objective 3: Ascertain the effectiveness of having an incentive mechanism in 
our TMM. Our objective here is to measure the effectiveness of our TMM 
using an incentive-based approach. We divide this third objective into two 
sub-objectives: 
3.1 Objective 3.1: Compare transactions with incentive-based TMM with 
those transactions without incentive-based TMM. In order to achieve 
this, we quantify the benefits of having an incentive-based TMM 
compared with a non-incentive TMM. 
3.2 Objective 3.2: Investigate the best approach for providing an incentive to 
facilitate successful service delivery. As we propose three different 
approaches for an incentive mechanism, we will compare the 
performance of those three approaches to determine which approach 
performs best in facilitating the success of service delivery. 
In the next section, we present the various phases involved in the simulation. 
9.3 Phases in the Multi-agent System 
The multi-agent system comprises four different phases as listed below: 
1. Initialization Phase: In this phase, the user specifies the parameters needed 
for the multi-agent system such as the total number of agents needed for the 
multi-agent simulation, number of interactions, percentage of agent in the 
community with each of the trustworthiness values of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6...etc.  
2. Bootstrapping Phase: In this phase, the (software) agents are actually created. 
Subsequently, each agent is then assigned a trustworthiness value by the 
multi-agent system. Each trustworthiness value is associated with a unique 
behaviour which specifies how that agent would behave in a given 
circumstance. The behaviour of the agents depends upon the chosen aim of 
the engineered systems. 
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3. Interaction Phase: This phase is meant to simulate the process of an agent 
carrying out an interaction with another agent by making use of our TMM. 
4. Results Phase:  During this phase, the statistical results of simulation are 
gathered and presented to the user. The aim of this phase is to determine and 
quantify numerically the extent to which our TMM is effective in terms of 
maintaining the trust values between interacting parties.  
In this section, we provided a snapshot of the phases involved in the simulation. In 
the next section, we explain the parameters used in the Multi-agent Systems.  
9.4 Parameters used in the Multi-agent System 
In this section, we present the parameters that have to be specified by the user prior 
to the simulation. We present the parameters for each objective presented as 
explained in Section 9.2. The first objective of our engineered system can be divided 
into two sub-objectives. Firstly, we evaluate the effectiveness of our methodology by 
comparing the transactions which employ our TMM with the transactions which do 
not employ our TMM. In this case, the behaviour of the agent is assumed to be static 
throughout the interaction. Table 9.1 presents the input parameters that we use for 
this simulation. 
 
Parameter Description Valid Domain Values 
Agent No. The user can specify the total 
number of agents in the 
simulation.  
0 < x 
Where „x‟ is the 
maximum number of 
agents that can be 
specified by the user.  
Transaction No. The user can specify the 
number of transactions that 
will be carried out by agents. 
0 < x 
Where „x‟ is the 
maximum number of 
transactions that can be 
specified by user. 
Alpha (α) The user can specify the value 
of weighted for weighting 
outcome-based final trust. 
0 ≤ α ≤ 1*) 
Beta (β) The user can specify the value 
of weighted for weighting 
checkpoint-based final trust. 
0 ≤ β ≤ 1*) 
 
The total value of 
 α + β = 1 
Error of Tolerance The user can specify the level 
of tolerance for the acceptable 
delivery of service unit. 
0 ≤  e 
Where „e‟ is the 
maximum error 
tolerance that can be 
specified by the user. 
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Algorithms The user can specify a crisp 
algorithm that would be used 
to implement static 
compliance behaviour of 
agent. 
Crisp 
Percentage of TV1 – 
TV6  
The user can specify the 
percentage of agents in the 
community who would 
behave as specified by TV1 - 
TV6. 
The total value of 
percentage of TV1 + 
TV2 + TV3 + TV4 + TV5 
+ TV6 = 1 
Running Type The user can specify whether 
the interaction would be 
utilizing the TMM or not 
utilizing the TMM. 
Select one option only: 
- With monitoring 
or 
- Without monitoring 
Table 9.1: Parameters used in simulation to compare transactions with TMM 
and those without TMM in static behaviour of agents 
The second sub-objective (objective 1.2) is to analyse the correlation between initial 
trust value and final trust value if the behaviours of the agents are static. Table 9.2 
presents the parameters used in the simulation to achieve objective 1.2. 
 
Parameter Description Valid Domain Values 
Agent No. The user can specify the total 
number of agents in the 
simulation.  
0 < x 
Where „x‟ is the 
maximum number of 
agents that can be 
specified by the user. 
Transaction No. The user can specify the 
number of transactions that 
will be carried out by agents. 
0 < x 
Where „x‟ is the 
maximum number of 
transactions that can 
be specified by the 
user. 
Alpha (α) The user can specify the value 
of weighted for weighting 
outcome-based final trust. 
0 ≤ α ≤ 1*) 
Beta (β) The user can specify the value 
of weighted for weighting 
checkpoint-based final trust. 
0 ≤  β  ≤ 1*) 
 
*)  
the total value of 
 α + β = 1 
Error of Tolerance The user can specify the level 
of tolerance for the acceptable 
delivery of service unit. 
0 ≤  e 
Where „e‟ is the 
maximum error 
tolerance that can be 
specifies by users 
Algorithms The user can specify a crisp Crisp 
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algorithm that would be used 
to implement static 
compliance behaviour of 
agent. 
Percentage of TV1 – 
TV6  
The user can specify the 
percentage of agents in the 
community who would 
behave as specified by TV1 - 
TV6. 
 
The total value of 
percentage of TV1 + 
TV2 + TV3 + TV4 + 
TV5 + TV6 = 1 
Table 9.2: Parameters used in simulation to compare final trust value with 
initial trust value in static behaviour of agents 
The second objective of the simulation is to further analyse the effectiveness of our 
methodology as in objective 1. However, in order to relax the static behaviour of the 
agent, we propose dynamic behaviour of the agent during the interaction. It is 
assumed that the behaviour of the trusted agent will dynamically change throughout 
the interaction. This is also intended to capture the changing behaviour of agents in a 
transaction. Similar to objective 1, we analyse the effectiveness of our methodology 
from two different perspectives, therefore the objective of this simulation is divided 
into sub-objectives 2.1 and 2.2. Tables 9.3 and 9.4 show the parameters used for the 
simulation to achieve this second objective. 
 
Parameter Description Valid Domain Values 
Agent No. The user can specify the total 
number of agents in the 
simulation.  
0 < x 
Where „x‟ is the 
maximum number of 
agents that can be 
specifies by users. 
Transaction No. The user can specify the 
number of transactions that 
will be carried out by agents. 
0 < x 
Where „x‟ is the 
maximum number of 
transactions that can be 
specifies by users. 
Alpha (α) The user can specify the value 
of weighted for weighting 
outcome-based final trust. 
0 ≤ α ≤ 1*) 
Beta (β) The user can specify the value 
of weighted for weighting 
checkpoint-based final trust. 
0 ≤ β ≤ 1*) 
*)  
the total value of 
 α + β = 1 
Error of Tolerance The user can specify the level 
of tolerance for the acceptable 
delivery of service unit. 
0 ≤  e 
Where „e‟ is the 
maximum error 
tolerance that can be 
specifies by users 
Algorithms The user can specify an 
algorithm that would be used 
There are three options: 
FL Triangular, FL 
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to implement dynamic 
compliance behaviour of 
agent. 
Trapezoidal and FL 
Hybrid 
Percentage of TV1 – 
TV6  
The user can specify the 
percentage of agents in the 
community who would 
behave as specified by TV1 - 
TV6. 
 T
he total value of 
percentage of TV1 + 
TV2 + TV3 + TV4 + TV5 
+ TV6 = 1 
Running Type The user can specify whether 
the interaction would be 
utilizing the TMM or not 
utilizing the TMM. 
Select one option only: 
- With monitoring 
or 
- Without monitoring 
Table 9.3: Parameters used in simulation to compare transactions with TMM 
with those without TMM in dynamic behaviour of agents 
 
Parameter Description Valid Domain Values 
Agent No. The user can specify the total 
number of agents in the 
simulation.  
0 < x 
Where „x‟ is the 
maximum number of 
agents that can be 
specified by user. 
Transaction No. The user can specify the 
number of transactions that 
will be carried out by agents. 
0 < x 
Where „x‟ is the 
maximum number of 
transactions that can be 
specified by the user. 
Alpha (α) The user can specify the value 
of weighted for weighting 
outcome-based final trust. 
0 ≤ α ≤ 1*) 
Beta (β) The user can specify the value 
of weighted for weighting 
checkpoint-based final trust. 
0 ≤ β ≤ 1*) 
*)  
the total value of 
 α + β = 1 
Error of Tolerance The user can specify the 
percentage level of tolerance 
for the acceptable delivery of 
service unit. 
0 ≤  e 
Where „e‟ is the 
maximum error tolerance 
that can be specified by 
the user. 
Algorithms The user can specify an 
algorithm that would be used 
to implement the dynamic 
compliance behaviour of 
agent. 
There are three options: 
FL Triangular FL FL 
Trapezoidal and FL 
Hybrid. 
Percentage of TV1 – 
TV6  
The user can specify the 
percentage of agents in the 
community who would 
The total value of 
percentage of TV1 + TV2 
+ TV3 + TV4 + TV5 + TV6 
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behave as specified by TV1 - 
TV6. 
= 1. 
Table 9.4: Parameters used in simulation to compare final trust value with 
initial trust value in dynamic behaviour of agents.  
 
The third objective of the simulation is to analyse the results of the comparison of 
transactions which use the TMM incentive-based mechanism with those transactions 
which do not use an incentive mechanism (TMM non-incentive-based). The 
parameters used for TMM non-incentive based interactions are exactly the same as 
those used for the TMM simulation in Table 9.1. Moreover, as we have three 
different types of trust mechanism, we compare them in order to determine which is 
the most effective. Tables 9.5 – 9.7 show the parameters used for the simulation to 
achieve this third objective.  
 
 
Parameter Description Valid Domain Values 
Agent No. The user can specify the total 
number of agents in the 
simulation. 
0 < x 
Where „x‟ is the 
maximum number of 
agents that can be 
specified by the user 
Transaction No. The user can specify the 
number of transactions that 
will be carried out by agents. 
0 < x 
Where „x‟ is the 
maximum number of 
transactions that can be 
specified by the user 
Alpha (α) The user can specify the value 
of weighted for weighting 
outcome-based final trust. 
0 ≤ α ≤ 1*) 
 
Beta (β) The user can specify the value 
of weighted for weighting 
checkpoint-based final trust 
0 ≤ β ≤ 1*) 
*)  
the total value of 
 α + β = 1 
Error of Tolerance The user can specify the 
percentage level of tolerance 
for the acceptable delivery of 
service unit. 
0 ≤  e 
Where „e‟ is the 
maximum error tolerance 
that can be specified by 
the user 
Algorithms The user can specify an 
algorithm that would be used 
to implement compliance 
behaviour of agent. 
There are four options: 
Crisp, FL Triangular, FL 
Trapezoidal and FL 
Hybrid. 
Bonus Bias The user can specify the value 
of bonus bias. This is the 
value to determine the level of 
performance increment as a 
response to receiving an 
incentive. 
0 < x < 1 
Where „x‟ is the number 
value that can be 
specified by users. 
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Percentage of TV1 – 
TV6  
The user can specify the 
percentage of agents in the 
community who would 
behave as specified by TV1 - 
TV6. 
The total value of 
percentage of TV1 + TV2 
+ TV3 + TV4 + TV5 + TV6 
= 1 
Table 9.5: Parameters used in performance-driven-based incentive simulation 
 
Parameter Description Valid Domain Values 
Agent No. The user can specify the total 
number of agents in the 
simulation.  
0 < x 
Where „x‟ is the 
maximum number of 
agents that can be 
specified by the user. 
Transaction No. The user can specify the 
number of transactions that 
will be carried out by agents. 
0 < x 
Where „x‟ is the 
maximum number of 
transactions that can be 
specified by the user. 
Alpha (α) The user can specify the value 
of weighted for weighting 
outcome-based final trust. 
0 ≤ α ≤ 1*) 
 
Beta (β) The user can specify the value 
of weighted for weighting 
checkpoint-based final trust. 
0 ≤ β ≤ 1*) 
*)  
the total value of 
 α + β = 1 
Error of Tolerance The user can specify the 
percentage level of tolerance 
for the acceptable delivery of 
service unit. 
0 ≤  e 
Where „e‟ is the 
maximum error tolerance 
that can be specified by 
the user. 
Algorithms The user can specify an 
algorithm that would be used 
to implement compliance 
behaviour of agent. 
There are four options: 
Crisp, FL Triangular, FL 
Trapezoidal and FL 
Hybrid 
Incentive Ratio The user can specify the 
incentive ratio over the error 
tolerance. This is the value to 
determine threshold level for 
receiving an incentive. 
0 < x < 1 
Where „x‟ is the value 
that can be specified by 
the user 
Percentage of TV1 – 
TV6  
The user can specify the 
percentage of agents in the 
community who would 
behave as specified by TV1 - 
TV6 
The total value of 
percentage of TV1 + TV2 
+ TV3 + TV4 + TV5 + TV6 
= 1 
Table 9.6: Parameters used in error–tolerance based incentive simulation 
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Parameter Description Valid Domain Values 
Agent No. The user can specify the total 
number of agents in the 
simulation.  
0 < x 
Where „x‟ is the 
maximum number of 
agents that can be 
specified by the user. 
Transaction No. The user can specify the 
number of transactions that 
will be carried out by agents. 
0 < x 
Where „x‟ is the 
maximum number of 
transactions that can be 
specified by the user. 
Alpha (α) The user can specify the value 
of weighted for weighting 
outcome-based final trust. 
0 ≤ α ≤ 1*) 
 
Beta (β) The user can specify the value 
of weighted for weighting 
checkpoint-based final trust. 
0 ≤ β ≤ 1*) 
*)  
the total value of 
 α + β = 1 
Error of Tolerance The user can specify the 
percentage level of tolerance 
for the acceptable delivery of 
service unit. 
0 ≤  e 
Where „e‟ is the 
maximum value of error 
tolerance that can be 
specified by the user. 
Algorithms The user can specify an 
algorithm that would be used 
to implement compliance 
behaviour of agent. 
There are four options: 
Crisp, FL Triangular, FL 
Trapezoidal and FL 
Hybrid. 
Max Bonus To Give The user can specify the 
maximum bonus to give to the 
agent. By default, this value is 
1. 
0 < x < 1 
Where „x‟ is the value to 
give incentive that can be 
specified by the user. 
Percentage of TV1 – 
TV6  
The user can specify the 
percentage of agents in the 
community who would 
behave as specified by TV1 - 
TV6 
The total value of 
percentage of TV1 + TV2 
+ TV3 + TV4 + TV5 + TV6 
= 1 
Table 9.7: Parameters used in occurrence-based incentive simulation 
9.5 Simulation for Objective 1: The 
Effectiveness of TMM with Static 
Behaviour of Agent 
In this section, we present the results of simulation to achieve objective 1 of the 
System. We also present the workflow of this simulation including the screenshot to 
input the parameters prior to simulation. Subsequently, we discuss the results. 
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9.5.1 Workflow of the Simulation for Objective 1 
The steps involved in this simulation are as follows: 
a. Step 1. The user specifies all the parameter values that need to be determined 
as specified in Tables 9.1 – 9.2.  
b. Step 2. During the bootstrapping phase, the agents are created and each of 
them is assigned a given behaviour to represent their level or degree of 
compliance. Each compliant behaviour corresponds to one trustworthiness 
value as presented in equations 9.1 – 9.6 below. We determine the level of 
compliance of agents with different trustworthiness values by dividing the 
compliance spectrum space into six equal parts (corresponding to the number 
of trustworthiness values of agents). For example, agents with trustworthiness 
value „1‟ (TV1) would have a behaviour that would spell out the action or the 
way that agents have carried out a transaction. In this simulation, we assume 
that the behaviour of an agent is static during the interaction. We use a „crisp 
compliance‟ approach by which each agent has a crisp level of compliance. 
The level of compliance also depends on the approach taken by the user to 
calculate the compliance level. The compliance level of agents corresponding 
to TV1, TV2, TV3, TV4, TV5 and TV6 is shown below: 
TV1 = level of compliance = 16.67% Equation 9.1 
TV2 = level of compliance = 33.33% Equation 9.2 
TV3 = level of compliance = 50% Equation 9.3 
TV4 = level of compliance = 66.67% Equation 9.4 
TV5 = level of compliance = 83.33% Equation 9.5 
TV6 = level of compliance = 100% Equation 9.6 
The values above indicate that agents will comply with the mutual agreement 
according to the trust level that is assigned to them. For example, an agent 
which has TV1 when carrying out an interaction will deliver service only at 
16.67%.  The reasons for this characterization are: 
a. It assumes a static compliance level 
b. It assumes discrete and constant increments in compliance level by 
16.67% between two consecutive trust values. The reason for this 
constant increase is that we have divided the compliance space (between 
0 – 100%) into six equal units with each unit corresponding to the 
compliance level of one trust value.  
Therefore, an agent with TV1 is characterized as complying at 16.67%, agent 
with TV2 will always comply at 33.33%, and so on. The compliance level of 
an agent will determine the extent to which it will deliver on the agreed 
SLAs. For example, an agent with TV4 which has a 66.67% compliance level, 
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when carrying out a transaction, will perform only at 66.67% for the mutually 
agreed performance. This is represented pictorially in Figure 9.1. 
TV1 TV2 TV3 TV4 TV5 TV6
16.67% 33.33% 50% 66.67% 83.33% 100%
Compliance Level
 
Figure 9.1: Trustworthiness values and levels of compliance 
Based on this crisp approach, an agent will have a certain degree of 
compliance level as a crisp value.  
c. Step 3. During each transaction, a trusting agent and a trusted agent are 
randomly chosen. The trusting agent is chosen such that it is always a 
compliant agent which means this trusting agent has a 100% level of 
compliance level. However, the compliance level of the randomly chosen 
trusted agent could be any trust value between TV1 to TV6. The agents carry 
out an interaction as described in our TMM. 
d. Step 4. The statistical outcome regarding this simulation is gathered and 
presented to the user. We then analyse the results corresponding to the 
objective. 
9.5.2 Simulation Results: Comparison of Transactions with 
TMM and without TMM (Static Behaviour) 
This simulation is designed to achieve objective 1.1 which is to analyse the 
effectiveness of our TMM. The analysis is conducted by comparing the transactions 
which employ our TMM with those transactions which do not employ our TMM. 
Figure 9.2 below shows the trust maintenance tool benchmark software prompting 
the user to input the parameters prior running the simulation.  
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Figure 9.2: Screenshot of testing tool to compare transactions with TMM and 
without TMM in static behaviour of agents.  
a. The simulation result with the input parameters is shown in Table 9.8 below: 
 
Number of agents 1000 
Number of transactions 1000 
Error tolerance level 0.05 
Α 0.3 
Β 0.7 
Algorithms Crisp 
Percentage of agents with TV1 – TV6 TV1 = 0.1, TV2 = 0.1, TV3 = 0.1, 
TV4 = 0.2, TV5 = 0.25, TV6 = 
0.25 
Table 9.8. Input parameters for simulation to compare transactions with TMM 
and those without TMM in static behaviour of agents  
(2000 agents, 1000 transactions)   
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Figure 9.3: Result of simulation to compare transactions with TMM and 
without TMM in static behaviour of agents (1000 agents, 1000 transactions)   
Figure 9.3 shows the result of the simulation and presents a comparison of the 
percentage of successful transactions which use our TMM with those transactions 
which do not employ our TMM. The input parameter for this simulation is as 
described at Table 9.8. As mentioned previously, in this case, the behaviour of agents 
is static throughout the interaction. The percentage of successful transactions is 
measured by comparing the final trust value with the initial trust value. If by the end 
of the interaction, the final trust value is greater than the initial trust, the transaction 
is considered to be successful. For further detailed analysis, the final trust calculation 
is compared using three approaches which are outcome-based, checkpoint-based, and 
weighted-based. The left side of the graph shows the results for transaction which 
use our TMM, while the bar on the right side of the graph shows the result for 
transactions which do not use our TMM.  
In the outcome-based and weighted-based approaches, the percentage of successful 
transactions is the same. However, if we calculate the final trust value using the 
checkpoint-based approach, the percentage of successful transactions is „0‟. This is 
because, with the checkpoint-based approach, the final trust value is calculated by 
computing the average of intermediate trust values at each checkpoint which 
produces a lower trust value compared to the outcome-based and weighted-based 
approaches. As was explained in Chapter 8, the outcome-based final trust calculation 
does not emphasize the way that a trusted agent performs during the interaction. 
Moreover, the weighted-based approach for final trust calculation is a hybrid 
measure giving weights to both the checkpoint-based approach and outcome-based 
approach. 
Moreover, as we can see from the graph in Figure 9.4, when comparing transactions 
which use our TMM with transactions which do not use our TMM, none of the 
transactions without TMM can be considered to be successful transactions in terms 
of the trust level being maintained (final trust greater than initial trust). Conversely, 
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the percentage of successful transactions which employ our TMM is more than 90% 
on average. It can be inferred that for every 100 transactions, an average of 90% of 
them have successfully maintained their trust level. For further evaluation, we run 
several simulations using different parameters in the next section. 
b. Simulation result with the parameters as shown in Table 9.9 below: 
 
Number of agents 2000 
Number of transactions 1000 
Error tolerance level 0.05 
Α 0.3 
Β 0.7 
Algorithms Crisp 
Percentage of agents with TV1 – TV6 TV1 = 0.1, TV2 = 0.1, TV3 = 0.1, 
TV4 = 0.2, TV5 = 0.25, TV6 = 
0.25 
Table 9.9: Input parameters for simulation to compare transactions with TMM 
and those without TMM in static behaviour of agents (2000 agents, 1000 
transactions)   
 
Figure 9.4: Result of simulation to compare transactions with TMM and 
without TMM in static behaviour of agents (2000 agents, 1000 transactions)  
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c. Simulation result with the parameters as shown in Table 9.10 below: 
 
Number of agents 3000 
Number of transactions 1000 
Error tolerance level 0.05 
α 0.3 
β 0.7 
Algorithms Crisp 
Percentage of agents with TV1 – TV6 TV1 = 0.1, TV2 = 0.1, TV3 = 0.1, 
TV4 = 0.2, TV5 = 0.25, TV6 = 
0.25 
Table 9.10: Input parameters to compare transactions with TMM and those 
without TMM in static behaviour of agents (3000 agents, 1000 transactions)  
 
 
Figure 9.5: Result of simulation to compare transactions with TMM and those 
without TMM in static behaviour of agents (3000 agents, 1000 transactions)  
We further analyse the result from point (a) by utilizing different input parameters. 
Figures 9.4 and 9.5 above present the comparison of simulation results from 
transactions which use our TMM and transactions those which do not use our TMM. 
As we can observe, although we increase the number of agents in the population, the 
results show a similar pattern. The percentage of successful transactions with TMM 
is far better than transactions which do not employ our TMM. There is no successful 
transaction from the transactions which do not use the TMM. The percentage level of 
transactions with TMM is more than 85%, whereas the percentage of successful 
transactions which do not employ the TMM is 0%. Hence, we can conclude that our 
TMM is effective enough to maintain the trust level between trusting agent and 
trusted agent. In Section 9.6.2, we further analyse this simulation by using the 
dynamic behaviour of agents throughout the transactions. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
50
0
60
0
70
0
80
0
90
0
10
00 10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
50
0
60
0
70
0
80
0
90
0
10
00
P
e
r
c
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f 
S
u
c
c
e
sf
u
l 
T
r
a
n
sa
c
ti
o
n
s
Transactions with TMM Transactions without TMM
Outcome 
Based
Checkpoi
nt Based
Weighted 
Based
  
Page 214 of 319 
 
9.5.3 Simulation Results: Comparison between Final Trust and 
Initial Trust (Static Behaviour) 
This simulation system is designed to determine the percentage of transactions in 
which trust has successfully been maintained.  We conduct a relative comparison of 
the initial trust value (prior to the interaction) with the final trust value (after the 
interaction) to determine the effectiveness of our methodology as explained in the 
previous chapters. If the final trust value is greater than or equal to the initial trust 
value, one can conclude that our methodology has enabled trust to be maintained. 
Conversely, if the final trust value is lower than the initial trust value, then one can 
conclude that trust has not been maintained in the interaction. We propose a metric to 
measure the percentage of successful transactions. A successful transaction can be 
measured by computing the correlation between initial trust and final trust. For 
example, in 100 transactions, if 80 are considered successful, this is because for 
those 80 transactions, the final trust is greater than the initial trust. So the percentage 
of successful transactions is 80%. Therefore, the mathematical expression for it is: 
Percentage of successful transactions = (transactions in which 
the trusting agent successfully maintains the trust level / total 
transactions)*100.                                                                       
Equation 9.7 Equation 9.7 
In this thesis, we consider two benchmarks for classifying successful transactions. 
Firstly, the final trust value is greater than the initial trust value (T final > Tinitial). We 
refer to this benchmark as the G-Benchmark. Secondly, the final trust value is greater 
than or equal to the initial trust value (Tfinal ≥ Tinitial). Subsequently, we refer to this 
benchmark as the GE-Benchmark. Figure 9.6 below shows the trust maintaining tool 
benchmark software prompting the user to input the parameters prior to running the 
simulation. 
 
Figure 9.6: Screenshot of testing tool to compare final trust value with initial 
trust value in static behaviour of agents  
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a. Simulation results with input parameters as shown in Table 9.11 
Number of agents 1000 
Number of transactions 1000 
Error tolerance level 0.05 
α 0.3 
β 0.7 
Algorithm Crisp 
Percentage of agents with TV1 – TV6 TV1 = 0.1, TV2 = 0.1, TV3 = 0.1, 
TV4 = 0.2, TV5 = 0.25, TV6 = 
0.25 
Table 9.11: Input parameters for simulation to compare final trust value and 
initial trust value in static behaviour of agents (1000 agents, 1000 transactions) 
 
 
Figure 9.7: Results of simulation to compare final trust value with initial trust 
value in static behaviour of agents (1000 agents, 1000 transactions) (G-
Benchmark) 
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Figure 9.8: Results of simulation to compare final trust value with initial trust 
value in static behaviour of agents (1000 agents, 1000 transactions) (GE-
Benchmark) 
At the crisp compliance level, the degree of compliance of the chosen agent is 
constant throughout the interaction. Figure 9.7 above shows that, based on outcome-
based and weighted-based approaches for trust recalibration, if we use the G-
Benchmark, for every 100 transactions, more than 90% of them are successful. 
However, if we compute the final trust value using the checkpoint-based approach, 
no transaction appears to be successful. This is because, as the compliance level is 
constant throughout the interaction, at every checkpoint an agent will always comply 
at that compliance level. Therefore, the initial trust will always be the same as the 
final trust. Further, if the metrics for measuring successful transactions is the G-
Benchmark, then no transactions can be considered to be successful. However, if we 
use the second benchmark scenario which is the GE-Benchmark, the number of 
successful interactions using the checkpoint-based approach to calculate final trust is 
100% as shown in Figure 9.8. Similar results are obtained for final trust calculation 
based on the outcome-based approach and the weighted-based approach. By using 
those approaches, the percentage of successful interactions is 100%. This is because 
the trusted agent demonstrates the same degree of trustworthiness throughout the 
interaction. This results in the final trust being equal to the initial trust. Table 9.12 
below shows the analysis of the differences between the success ratios of the G-
Benchmark and GE-Benchmark for each trust value. 
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 G-Benchmark 
 Successful 
Transactions 
TV1 TV2 TV3 TV4 TV5 TV6 
OB 910 103 174 236 302 90 0 
CP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
WB 910 103 174 236 302 90 0 
 GE-Benchmark 
 Successful 
Transactions 
TV1 TV2 TV3 TV4 TV5 TV6 
OB 1000 103 174 236 302 95 90 
CP 1000 103 174 236 302 95 90 
WB 1000 103 174 236 302 95 90 
 
Table 9.12: Differences in success ratios in simulation to compare final trust 
value with initial trust value in static behaviour of agents  
As clearly evident from Table 9.12, the difference in the success ratios using the G-
Benchmark and GE-Benchmark measurements comes from an agent that has an 
initial trust value of „6‟. Since the possible highest trust value is 6, in G-Benchmark 
there will no successful transactions for the agent with an initial trust value of „6‟. 
However, if we determine a successful transaction by using the GE-Benchmark, a 
given agent with an initial trust value of „6‟ would be counted as a successful 
transaction if the final trust value calculation is „6‟. 
b. Simulation results with parameters as shown in Table 9.13 
Number of agents 5000 
Number of transactions 3000 
Error tolerance level 0.04 
α 0.3 
β 0.7 
Algorithm Crisp 
Percentage of agent with TV1 – TV6 TV1 = 0.1, TV2 = 0.1, TV3 = 0.1, 
TV4 = 0.2, TV5 = 0.25, TV6 = 
0.25 
Table 9.13: Input parameters for simulation to compare final trust value with 
initial trust value in static behaviour of agents (5000 agents, 3000 transactions) 
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Figure 9.9: Result of simulation to compare final trust value with initial trust 
value in static behaviour of agents (5000 agents, 3000 transactions) (GE-
Benchmark) 
 
Figure 9.10: Result of simulation to compare final trust value with initial trust 
value in static behaviour of agents (5000 agents, 3000 transactions) (GE-
Benchmark) 
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c. Simulation results with the parameters as shown in Table 9.14 below: 
Number of agents 10000 
Number of transactions 10000 
Error tolerance level 0.05 
Α 0.3 
Β 0.7 
Algorithm Crisp 
Percentage of agents with TV1 – TV6 TV1 = 0.1, TV2 = 0.1, TV3 = 0.1, 
TV4 = 0.2, TV5 = 0.25, TV6 = 
0.25 
Table 9.14: Input parameters for simulation to compare final trust value with 
initial trust value in static behaviour of agents (10000 agents, 10000 
transactions)  
 
 
Figure 9.11: Result of simulation to compare final trust value with initial trust 
value in static behaviour of agents (10000 agents, 10000 transactions) with G -
Benchmark 
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Figure 9.12: Result of simulation to compare final trust value with initial trust 
value in static behaviour of agents (10000 agents, 10000 transactions) with GE-
Benchmark 
Figures 9.9 – 9.12 present the result of simulation conducted to compare final trust 
value with initial trust value using various input parameters. In this case, the 
behaviour of agents throughout the interaction is static. As observed, the percentage 
of successful transactions where the final trust value is higher than the initial trust 
value is more than 90 % if we use G-Benchmark and 100 % if we use GE-
Benchmark. Moreover, with the G-Benchmark no transactions are considered to be 
successful if we calculate the final trust value using the checkpoint-based approach. 
We found this similar condition in the other simulation results. The main reason is 
because in the checkpoint-based approach, the trust final is calculated by computing 
the average of intermediate checkpoints, while in the outcome-based approach, the 
final trust value is calculated based on the actual delivery of service at the end of the 
interaction (or for the entire interactions). Further discussion regarding results of 
simulation for objective 1 is presented in the next section. 
9.5.4 Discussion of Results Obtained for Objective 1 
Based on simulation results with various input parameters as presented in several 
figures in the previous section, we can infer the following: 
a. Objective 1.1: Transaction with TMM and without TMM in static behaviour 
of agents 
As indicated by Figures 9.3 – 9.5, the average successful ratio of interactions 
with TMM is higher than for transactions without TMM. Our investigation 
was done from the perspective of the various parameters and it can be 
concluded that for agents with static behaviour, the successful transactions 
using TMM is approximately 91.3%, whereas in transactions without TMM, 
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it is around 0%. For elucidation purposes, Table 9.15 below presents the 
summary of average simulation results. 
 
 
Trust Final 
Calculation 
G - Benchmark 
Transaction with 
TMM 
Transactions without- 
TMM 
Outcome Based 91.3% 0% 
Checkpoint Based 0% 0% 
Weighted Based 91.3% 0% 
Table 9.15: Summary of simulation result to compare the transactions 
with TMM and without TMM 
b. Objective 1.2: Trust final and trust initial for agents with static behaviour  
As explained in Section 9.5.3, the successful ratio of transactions (using the 
TMM) determined by comparing final trust with initial trust using both the G 
and GE-Benchmark, is acceptably high. If we use the G-Benchmark, the 
successful ratio is 81%; whereas if we use the GE-Benchmark, it is 100%. It 
can be inferred that for any number of transactions using our TMM, the 
number of successful transactions deduced by comparing final trust with 
initial trust is greater than 80%. By using our TMM, the level of trust at the 
end of the transaction is higher than initial trust at the initial transaction. 
Hence, we can conclude that our TMM very significantly assists the trusted 
agent to maintain the trust of the trusting agent. Table 9.16 presents the 
summary of simulation results on average. 
 
          Benchmark 
Trust Final 
Calculation 
G–Benchmark 
GE–Benchmark 
Outcome Based 81.25% 100% 
Checkpoint Based 0  100% 
Weighted Based 84% 100% 
Table 9.16: Summary of simulation result to compare final trust value with 
initial trust value in static behaviour of agents 
 
  
Page 222 of 319 
 
9.6 Simulation for Objective 2: The 
Effectiveness of TMM with Dynamic 
Behaviour of Agent 
The objective of this simulation is to further analyse the effectiveness of our TMM 
similar to objective 1. However, in this case, the behaviour of agents is not static 
because it is not always possible for the compliance level of an agent to be static 
during the interaction. The compliance level of an agent could be dynamic. In order 
to model this scenario, we discuss modelling the behaviour of agents using a fuzzy 
logic approach membership function, and in the next section we examine the results. 
In this section, we present the workflow of the simulation which accommodates the 
three different approaches to modelling the dynamic behaviour; we also present and 
discuss the simulation result. 
9.6.1  Workflow of the Simulation for Objective 2 
The steps involved in this simulation are: 
a. Step 1. The user specifies all the parameters‟ values that need to be 
determined by the user prior to initiating the simulation as specified in Table 
9.3 and Table 9.4.  
b. Step 2. During the bootstrapping phase, the agents are created and each of 
them is assigned a given behaviour to represent their level of compliance. In 
this approach, the behaviour of each agent corresponding to a trustworthiness 
value is represented using a membership function as shown in Table 9.17. 
The degree of compliant behaviour of an agent for each trust value is 
determined with the help of a statistical graph which corresponds 
proportionally to the measurement of 100 scale intervals. The number „0%‟ 
denotes the lowest level of compliance, meaning that the agent is totally non-
compliant, and „100%‟ denotes the perfect performance or full compliance. A 
fuzzy trust grade set will be defined as the fuzzy measurement result, which 
is denoted by Trust Value (TV) = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. These six grades TV1, 
TV2, TV3, TV4, TV5, and TV6 denote the gradational measurement results 
ranging from the fully compliant to fully non-compliant as depicted in Figure 
9.13 below.  
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Figure 9.13: Triangular membership degree and compliance values 
corresponding to various trust levels. 
The graph above shows the degree of membership and value of compliance 
for every agent for each trust value. It can be seen that the nature of 
membership functions is primarily triangular; hence, we term this type of 
compliance „fuzzy triangular compliance‟. An agent with a certain level of 
compliance will have a certain trust value. Membership degree (y) which 
ranges from 0 to 1 is a mapping called the membership function of the fuzzy 
set TV, and level of compliance (x) indicates the degree of belongingness or 
membership value of „x‟ in any Trust Value. Therefore, a certain compliance 
level acquires two trustworthiness (membership) characteristics.  
During simulation, the user randomly selects an agent with the probability of 
having a compliance value ranging from 0% to 100%. There are six grades of 
TV1, TV2, TV3, TV4, TV5, and TV6. Each compliance value will correspond 
to a certain degree of trust value membership. For example, if a user chooses 
an agent with a 28%, level of compliance, their behaviour will exhibit some 
degree similarity to the TV1 and TV2 characteristics as this point has a certain 
degree of membership in TV1 and TV2. However, the total degree of 
membership is always 1. The equations representing fuzzy triangular 
compliance corresponding to TV1, TV2, TV3, TV4, TV5, and TV6 are shown 
below: 
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TV Membership Degree  
TV1 
0  
 
16.68<  < 33.33 
1 0  
TV2 
0  
 
 
 
 
1  
TV3 
0  
 
 
 
 
1  
TV4 
0  
 
 
 
 
1  
TV5 
0  
 
 
 
 
1  
TV6 
0  
 
 
1  
Table 9.17: Fuzzy triangular compliance rules  
In this approach, consider for example that we have an agent with a 
compliance level of 85%. This agent will exhibit behaviour to some degree of 
TV5 and to some extent of TV6. Therefore, the calculation of compliance 
behaviour is as follows: 
 
 
 Equation 9.8 
Membership degree is the level of membership based on calculation using the 
fuzzy rule above, whereas TVn char is a characteristic of trust value as derived 
from the crisp compliance level. Based on the above rule, the compliance 
level of this agent is 87.5% as a result of the following calculation shown in 
Table 9.18. 
  
Page 225 of 319 
 
TV   Membership Degree Compliance 
Behaviour 
TV5 
83.33 <  < 90 
 
 
TV6 
 
 
  
Total  
   
Table 9.18: Triangular compliance behaviour calculation 
The second approach that we propose for modelling the dynamic behaviour of an 
agent is to use a fuzzy trapezoidal compliance level. This approach is an extension 
of the fuzzy triangular approach. However, the membership functions 
corresponding to TV2 to TV5 are trapezoidal; hence, we call this type of compliance 
„fuzzy trapezoidal compliance‟. This is depicted in Figure 9.14 below. 
28.33 38.33 45 55 78.33 90 10016.67 61.6
TV1 TV2 TV3 TV4 TV5 TV6
71.67
Compliance Value
88.33
0
100
 
Figure 9.14: Trapezoidal membership degree and compliance values 
The membership functions are shown below in Table 9.19. 
TV Membership Degree  
TV1 
0  
 
16.67 <  < 28.33 
1 0  
TV2 
0  
 
 
1  
 
 
TV3 0  
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1  
 
 
TV4 
0  
 
 
1  
 
 
TV5 
0  
 
 
1 78.33  
 
 
TV6 
0  
 
 
1  
Table 9.19: Fuzzy trapezoidal compliance rules 
In order to show the difference between compliance level calculation by using this 
approach and the previous approach, consider for example, that we have an agent 
with a compliance level of 85%. This compliance value has a full degree of 
membership in TV5. Therefore, this agent will categorize in characteristic of TV5 
with compliance behaviour 83.33%. Consider another example where we randomly 
have an agent with a compliance value of 89%. This compliance behaviour will 
categorize to some extent the degree of TV5 and TV6. The compliance behaviour of 
this agent is 90.16 as a result of the calculation of compliance behaviour as illustrated 
in Table 9.20 below:  
 
TV   Membership Degree Compliance 
Behaviour 
TV5 
 
 
 
TV6 
 
 
 
Total  
   
Table 9.20: Trapezoidal compliance calculation 
The third method that we propose for modeling the dynamic behaviour of an agent is 
by determining the behaviour of agents with the help of a graph which combines the 
triangular approach and trapezoidal approach. Hence, we term this approach „fuzzy 
hybrid compliance‟. This is represented pictorially in Figure 9.15 below. 
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Figure 9.15: Hybrid membership degree and compliance values 
The membership functions are shown below in Table 9.21 
TV Membership Degree  
TV1 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
16.68<  < 33.33 
 
1 
0  
TV2 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
1  
TV3 
 
0 
 
 
 
1  
 
 
 
TV4 
0  
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1  
TV5 
0  
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
TV6 
0  
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Table 9.21: Fuzzy hybrid compliance rules  
In order to show how to calculate the compliance behaviour of an agent with a 
certain trust value using this approach, let us consider for example that we have an 
agent with a compliance level of 70%. According to the fuzzy hybrid compliance 
rules in Table 9.21, this compliance level exhibits elements of compliance of both 
agents with TV4 and TV5. The compliance behaviour of this agent is 71.16 as a result 
of the calculation of compliance behaviour as illustrated in Table 9.22 below:  
TV 
  Membership Degree Compliance Behaviour 
TV4 
 
 
  
TV5 
 
 
 
Total  
  
 
Table 9.22: Hybrid compliance behaviour calculation  
c. Step 3. During each transaction, a trusting agent and a trusted agent are 
randomly chosen. The trusting agent is chosen so that it is always a compliant 
agent which means this trusting agent has a 100% level of compliance. 
However, the compliance level of the randomly chosen trusted agent could be 
any trust value between TV1 to TV6. Both agents then carry out the 
interaction guided by our trust maintenance methodology.  
d. Step 4. The statistical outcome corresponding to the results produced by the 
simulation. 
Once we retrieve all these statistical results, we then analyse them in order to 
determine the effectiveness of our methodology.  
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9.6.2 Simulation Results: Comparison of Transactions with 
TMM and without TMM (Dynamic Behaviour) 
This simulation is designed to achieve objective 2.1 which is to analyse the 
effectiveness of our TMM in terms of the dynamic behaviours of agents. The 
analysis is conducted in order to compare transactions which employ our TMM with 
those which do not employ our TMM. Figure 9.16 below shows the trust maintaining 
tool benchmark software prompting the user to input the parameters as described in 
Table 9.3. 
 
Figure 9.16: Screenshot of testing tool to compare transactions with TMM and 
without TMM in dynamic behaviour of agents 
a. Simulation result with the input parameters as shown in Table 9.23 below: 
Number of agents 1000 
Number of transactions 1000 
Error tolerance level 0.05 
α 0.7 
β 0.3 
Algorithms FL Triangular 
Percentage of agents with TV1 – TV6 TV1 = 0.1, TV2 = 0.1, TV3 = 0.1, 
TV4 = 0.2, TV5 = 0.25, TV6 = 
0.25 
Table 9.23: Input parameters for simulation to compare transactions with 
TMM and without TMM in dynamic behaviour of agents (FL Triangular)  
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Figure 9.17: Result of simulation to compare transactions with TMM and 
without TMM in dynamic behaviour of agents (FL Triangular) 
Figure 9.17 presents results of simulations using the parameters given in Table 
9.23. In this case, the dynamic behaviour of agents is represented with the help of 
FL Triangle. As we can observe from the figure, for agents who use our TMM in 
their transactions, by the end of transactions, the trust level between trusting 
agent and trusted agent has been successfully maintained. If we calculate final 
trust using outcome-based, after 200 transactions, 100% of them have 
successfully maintained their trust level. Conversely, if we investigate those 
transactions which do not use our TMM, the percentage of successful 
transactions is lower than 70% on average. Additionally, if we calculate the trust 
final using checkpoint-based and weighted-based, the percentage of successful 
transactions is 0%. This is because, without having our TMM in the transactions, 
there will be no intermediate checkpoint by which trusting agent can assign an 
intermediate value of trust. Checkpoint-based final trust is the average value of 
intermediate trust values during interaction. This situation also occurs if we 
calculate final trust using weighted-based. Weighted-based final trust value is 
calculated by giving a weight alpha for outcome-based and checkpoint-based. As 
in the transactions without TMM there is no checkpoint value, hence the final 
trust value based on weighted based is „0‟. Thus, we can infer from the 
comparison, by using outcome-based, the transaction which used our TMM give 
a better result in terms of maintaining trust compare with the transactions which 
do not use our TMM. In contrast, in the simulation using the static behaviour of 
agent, in comparison with the dynamic behaviour of agent, the successful 
transactions are slightly lower in transactions with TMM. This is because with 
dynamic behaviour, the performance of the agent throughout the interaction is 
dynamically changing. In the next section, we further investigate the simulation 
using other approaches for dynamic behaviour modelling. 
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b. Simulation result with the parameters as shown in Table 9.24 below: 
Number of Agents 1000 
Number of transactions 1000 
Error tolerance level 0.05 
α 0.3 
β 0.7 
Algorithms FL Trapezoidal 
Percentage of agents with TV1 – TV6 TV1 = 0.1, TV2 = 0.1, TV3 = 0.1, 
TV4 = 0.2, TV5 = 0.25, TV6 = 
0.25 
Table 9.24: Input parameters to compare transactions with TMM and without 
TMM in dynamic behaviour of agents (FL Trapezoidal)  
 
Figure 9.18: Result of simulation to compare transactions with TMM and 
without TMM in dynamic behaviour of agents (FL Trapezoidal) 
Figure 9.18 gives a similar result as that depicted in Figure 9.17. However, 
the modelling of dynamic behaviour of agents in this simulation is 
represented by using the FL trapezoidal. It can be clearly seen that across the 
board, irrespective of the approach used to model the dynamic behaviour of 
agents, by using our TMM, the percentage of successful transactions with 
TMM is always higher than for the transactions without TMM. Similar to the 
previous cases in simulation without TMM, there is no value for final trust 
calculation using checkpoint-based and weighted-based. In transactions 
without TMM, there is no performance continuous monitoring. Hence, there 
is no intermediate trust value based on the intermediate monitoring. 
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c. Simulation result with the parameters as shown in Table 9.25 below: 
Number of agents 125000 
Number of transactions 100000 
Error tolerance level 0.03 
α 0.4 
β 0.6 
Algorithms FL Hybrid 
Percentage of agents with TV1 – TV6 TV1 = 0.1, TV2 = 0.1, TV3 = 0.1, 
TV4 = 0.2, TV5 = 0.25, TV6 = 
0.25 
Table 9.25: Input parameters for simulation to compare transactions with 
TMM and without TMM in dynamic behaviour of agents (FL Hybrid) 
 
Figure 9.19: Result of simulation to compare transactions with TMM and 
without TMM in dynamic behaviour of agents (FL Hybrid) 
Figure 9.19 presents results for simulation with the input parameters as 
described in Table 9.25. The modeling of agent behaviour in this simulation 
is determined with the help of FL Hybrid. As can be seen from the figure 
9.20, the percentage of successful transactions with TMM is higher than 
transactions without TMM. Hence, it can be concluded that even though the 
behaviour of agent is dynamic throughout the transactions, based on all the 
three modeling approaches, our TMM is effective in helping the trusting 
agent to maintain its trust value in the trusted agent. Further analysis and 
discussion can be found in Section 9.6.4. 
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9.6.3 Simulation Results: Comparison between Final Trust and 
Initial Trust (Dynamic Behaviour) 
Figure 9.20 below shows the screenshot of the trust maintenance tool benchmark 
software prompting the user to input the parameters for simulation with the objective 
to analyse the effectiveness of our TMM by making a comparison between final trust 
value and initial trust value.  
 
Figure 9.20: Screenshot of testing tool to compare final trust value with initial 
trust value in dynamic behaviour of agents 
a. Simulation results using the input parameters as shown in Table 9.26 below: 
Number of Agents 5000 
Number of Transactions 1000 
Α 0.3 
Β 0.7 
Error Tolerance 0.05 
Algorithm FL Triangular 
Percentage of TV1 – TV6 TV1= 0.1; TV2= 0.1; TV3= 0.1; 
TV4=0.2; TV5=0.25; TV6=0.25 
Table 9.26: Input parameters for simulation to compare final trust value and 
initial trust value in dynamic behaviour (FL Triangular) 
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Figure 9.21: Result of simulation to compare final trust value with initial trust 
value in dynamic behaviour of agents (FL Triangular) (G-Benchmark) 
 
 
 
Figure 9.22: Result of simulation to compare final trust value with initial trust 
value in dynamic behaviour of agents (FL Triangular) (GE-Benchmark) 
Figures 9.21 and 9.22 above depict the results of the simulation using the 
input parameters shown in Table 9.26. The number of agents in this 
simulation is 5000 and they carried out 1000 transactions. Figure 9.21 
describes the results when the effectiveness of methodology is measured by 
using the G Benchmark (final trust greater than initial trust), while Figure 
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9.22 depicts the results when the effectiveness of methodology is measured 
by using the GE Benchmark (final trust greater than or equal to initial trust). 
The final trust calculation is measured using three approaches which are: 
outcome-based, checkpoint-based and weighted-based.  
As we can observe from Figures 9.21 and 9.22, in every 100 transactions, by 
using outcome-based and weighted-based approaches for final trust 
calculation and the G-Benchmark, on average, the number of successful 
interactions is around 90%. This is because, with the outcome-based 
approach, final trust is determined by the final outcome of the interaction 
without considering how this agent behaves at every checkpoint. Based on 
the methodology of proactive continuous performance monitoring, once a 
performance discrepancy occurs, it needs to be resolved in a timely manner. 
Hence, by the end of the interaction, the actual performance will correspond 
as closely as possible to the mutually agreed performance (assuming that both 
parties intend to maintain trust). With the large weight given to outcome-
based trust (70%) relative to checkpoint-based trust (30%) when computing 
the final trust value using the weighted-based approach, we can observe a 
pattern of success similar to that of the outcome-based approach. However, if 
we employ the GE-Benchmark, then we can see that all the transactions (by 
using the outcome-based approach and weighted-based approach) can be 
regarded as successful. In order to understand the difference in the success 
ratio, using these benchmarks, we carried out an analysis of the percentage of 
successful transactions as a function of the trustworthiness value of the 
trusted entity. The analysis is presented in Table 9.27 below: 
 G-Benchmark 
 Successful 
Transactions 
TV1 TV2 TV3 TV4 TV
5 
TV6 
OB 903 90 137 258 324 94 0 
CP 357 90 0 123 142 2 0 
WB 903 90 137 258 324 94 0 
 GE-Benchmark 
 Successful 
Transactions 
TV1 TV2 TV3 TV4 TV
5 
TV6 
OB 1000 90 137 258 324 94 97 
CP 490 90 0 138 161 4 97 
WB 1000 90 137 258 324 94 97 
Table 9.27: The differences in success ratios when comparing final trust value 
with initial trust value in dynamic behaviour of agents (FL Triangular)  
As we can clearly observe from Table 9.27, the difference in the success ratio 
using both the G- and GE-Benchmarks occurs when the trust initial value of 
the trusted entity is „6‟. Since the trust initial value of the trusted entity is „6‟, 
the final trust value at best could be 6. In this case, by using the G-
benchmark, this transaction would be considered unsuccessful. However, by 
using the GE-Benchmark, this transaction would be regarded as successful. 
On the other hand, if we computed final trust using the checkpoint-based 
approach, the number of successful interactions is around 36% on average for 
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the G-Benchmark and around 49% for the GE-Benchmark scenario. This 
difference occurs because we use different scenarios to determine successful 
transactions. The lower number of successful interactions using the 
checkpoint-based approach compared with the outcome-based and weighted-
based approaches occurs due to the manner in which the final trust value in 
the checkpoint-based approach is computed using average of intermediate 
behaviour. The methodology helps the trusted agent to close the performance 
gap at every checkpoint; however, the checkpoint-based approach does not 
consider the final outcome. In contrast to the outcome-based approach, the 
checkpoint-based approach calculates the final trust value by averaging all 
the trust values for the checkpoints in the interaction. The final calculated 
trust value does not particularly focus on whether the final service delivery 
(in the final checkpoint correspond with agreed service delivery, but rather 
the degree of compliance at all checkpoints in the interaction). 
b.  Simulation results using the input parameters are shown in Table 9.28 below: 
Number of Agents 1000 
Number of Transactions 100000 
α 0.3 
β 0.7 
Error Tolerance 0.05 
Algorithm FL Hybrid 
Percentage of TV1 – TV6 TV1= 0.1; TV2= 0.1; TV3= 0.1; 
TV4=0.2; TV5=0.25; TV6=0.25 
Table 9.28: Input parameters to compare final trust value with initial trust 
value in dynamic behaviour of agents (FL Hybrid) 
 
 
Figure 9.23: Result of simulation to compare final trust value with initial trust 
value in dynamic behaviour of agents (FL Hybrid) (G-Benchmark) 
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Figure 9.24: Result of simulation to compare final trust value with initial trust 
value in dynamic behaviour of agents (FL Hybrid) (GE-Benchmark) 
Figure 9.23 and Figure 9.24 above present the analytical results for the 
effectiveness of our TMM after comparing final trust with initial trust. The 
input parameters are those described in Table 9.28. It is evident that by using 
the GE-Benchmark, the average number of successful transactions, that is, 
those where final trust is greater than initial trust, is about 70%, if we 
calculate final trust using outcome-based and weighted-based approaches. 
However, if final trust is calculated using the checkpoint-based (CP based) 
method, the percentage of successful transactions is around 40% on average. 
This is because the trust final calculation in checkpoint based approach 
considers only the performance of service delivery during the intermediate 
performance. It does not pay any particular significance or importance the 
final delivery outcome by end of the interaction.  
Nonetheless, if we use the GE-Benchmark, the percentage of successful 
transactions is greater than for those where the G-Benchmark was used. As 
our analysis with the triangular FL dynamic behaviour in section (a) above 
shows, the difference in the success ratio using both the G and GE-
Benchmarks occurs when the trust initial value of the trusted entity is „6‟. 
Since the initial trust value of the trusted entity is „6‟, the final trust value at 
best could be 6. In this case, by using the G-benchmark, this transaction 
would be considered unsuccessful. However, by using the GE-Benchmark, 
this transaction would be regarded as successful. 
c. Simulation results using the input parameters as shown in Table 9.29 below: 
Number of Agents 5000 
Number of Transactions 1000 
α 0.3 
β 0.7 
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Error Tolerance 0.05 
Algorithm FL Trapezoidal 
Percentage of TV1 – TV6 TV1= 0.1; TV2= 0.1; TV3= 0.1; 
TV4=0.2; TV5=0.25; TV6=0.25 
Table 9.29: Input parameters for simulation to compare final trust value with 
initial trust value in dynamic behaviour of agents (FL Trapezoidal) 
 
Figure 9.25: Result of simulation to compare final trust value with initial trust 
value in dynamic behaviour of agents (FL Trapezoidal) (G-Benchmark) 
 
Figure 9.26: Result of simulation to compare final trust value with initial trust 
value in dynamic behaviour of agents (FL Trapezoidal) (GE-Benchmark) 
As we can see from Figures 9.26 and 9.27, in every 100 transactions, by using 
outcome-based and weighted-based trust recalibration, the number of successful 
interactions is around 85% for the G-Benchmark and 99% for the GE-Benchmark. 
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This result is quite different from the result of triangular compliance level. This is 
because we employed the trapezoidal compliance level so that the behaviour of the 
chosen trusted agent is different from that of the chosen agent at the triangular 
compliance level. An in-depth analysis of the difference between the success ratio 
using both G and GE-Benchmarks is provided in Table 9.30 below: 
 
 G-Benchmark 
Successful 
Transactions 
TV1 TV2 TV3 TV4 TV5 TV6 
OB 886 109 132 275 274 96 0 
CP 440 109 48 141 141 1 0 
WB 885 109 132 275 274 95 0 
 GE-Benchmark 
 Successful 
Transactions 
TV1 TV2 TV3 TV4 TV5 TV6 
OB 996 109 132 275 274 96 110 
CP 590 109 69 150 151 1 0 
WB 995 109 132 275 274 95 110 
Table 9.30: The difference in success ratios when comparing final trust value 
with initial trust value in dynamic behaviour of agents (FL Trapezoidal) 
Table 9.30 above shows that the differences between the G and GE- Benchmarks 
occur in the agent with an initial trust value of „6‟. Moreover, if we compute the final 
trust using the checkpoint-based approach, the number of successful interactions by 
using G-Benchmark is 44% and 59% if we utilize the GE-Benchmark. As mentioned 
previously, this is due to the manner in which the checkpoint-based approach arrives 
at an aggregate value from intermediate trust values during the transaction. It may be 
the case that the number of low performances is greater than the number of high 
performances for the whole checkpoint. Even though the trusted agent delivers 
service fully by the end of the transaction, this checkpoint-based approach does not 
give a weighting to the service delivery at a particular checkpoint; instead, it 
considers only how the trusted agent complies at every checkpoint. In order to 
elucidate this further, let us consider a simple example where the trusted agent does 
not comply at several checkpoints, but this agent delivers a service in total by the end 
of the transaction. This would result in a lower number of intermediate trust values 
which influences the final trust calculation. Therefore, it produces a lower number of 
successful interactions than do the outcome-based and weighted-based approaches.  
9.6.4 Discussion of Results Obtained for Objective 2 
Based on results from various input parameters as presented in several figures in the 
previous section, we can draw the following conclusions: 
a. Objective 2.1: Comparison between transaction with TMM and without 
TMM in dynamic behaviour of agents 
We have three different approaches to modeling the dynamic behaviour of 
agents in carrying out an interaction. Hence, the discussion will be based on 
the three different dynamic behaviours of agents. As we can see from Figures 
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9.17 – 9.18, the average successful ratio of interaction with TMM is higher 
than for transactions without TMM. We carried out our investigation from the 
perspective of the various parameters and it can be concluded that where an 
agent displays dynamic behaviour, the percentage of successful transactions 
with TMM is more than 85%; whereas, in transactions without TMM the 
success rate is lower than 50%. For elucidation purposes, Table 9.31 below 
presents the summary of the average of simulation results both with and 
without TMM.  
 
 Transaction with TMM Transaction without TMM 
FL 
Triangular 
FL 
Trapezoidal 
FL 
Hybrid 
FL 
Triangular 
FL 
Trapezoidal 
FL 
Hybrid 
OFTV 94% 89% 85% 49% 0% 46% 
CFTV 47% 37% 51% 0% 0% 0% 
WFTV 50% 34% 52% 0% 0% 0% 
Table 9.31: Summary of simulation result to compare transactions with 
TMM and without TMM in dynamic behaviour of agents  
 
b. Objective 2.2: Comparison between final trust value and initial trust value in 
dynamic behavior of agents  
As explained in Section 9.6.3, the ratio of successful transactions ascertained 
by comparing final trust and initial trust using both G and GE-Benchmark is 
satisfactorily high. In modeling agent behaviours using fuzzy logic triangular, 
the successful ratio is 90.3% if we calculate this using the outcome-based and 
weighted-based approaches (G-Benchmark). However, if we use the GE-
Benchmark, the success ratio is 100%. The checkpoint-based approach 
resulted in a lower number of successful transactions because in this case, the 
final trust calculation considers only the intermediate performance without 
paying attention to final delivery. With the help of the fuzzy logic trapezoidal 
to model the dynamic behaviour of the agent, the number of successful 
transactions is much lower than when using the triangular approach for both, 
using the G and GE-Benchmarks. However, the number of successful 
transactions is greater than 88% when using the G-Benchmark and 99.5% for 
the GE-Benchmark.  
The last approach for modelling the dynamic behaviour of an agent is by 
using a hybrid fuzzy logic compliance level. With this approach, the 
percentage of successful transactions using our TMM is greater than 90% 
based on both the G and GE-Benchmarks. Hence, it can be inferred from this 
discussion that using our TMM, for any number of transactions and any 
number of agents, with the hybrid fuzzy logic of dynamic behaviour of 
agents, the number of successful transactions when the final trust is greater 
than the trust initial, is close to 100%. Moreover, the successful ratio using 
the GE-Benchmark using weighted-based calculation is 100%. Table 9.32 
below presents the summary of average results of this particular simulation.  
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        Benchmark 
FTC             
G-Benchmark GE–Benchmark 
OFTV CFTV WFTV OFTV CFTV WFTV 
FL Triangular 90.3% 35% 90.3% 100% 49% 100% 
FL Trapezoid 88.6% 44% 88.5% 99.6% 59% 99.5% 
FL Hybrid 92% 50% 87% 98% 58% 100% 
N.B.: FTC = Final Trust Calculation, OFTV = Outcome-based Final 
Trust Value, CFTV = Checkpoint-based Final Trust Value, WFTV = 
Weighted-based Final Trust Value. 
Table 9.32: Summary of simulation result for comparison between final 
trust value and initial trust value in dynamic behaviour of agents 
We can also additionally infer from Table 9.32 above that by using FL 
triangular, the successful ratio is the highest compared with other approaches 
of dynamic behaviour model, based on the GE-Benchmark. A similar pattern 
of results can be found if we examine them from the G-Benchmark 
perspective.  
Finally, we can conclude that for transactions in a virtual environment which 
employ our TMM, the level of trust at the end of the transaction is higher than 
the initial trust at the initial transaction. The success ratio is higher than 88%. 
In this case, we may ignore the final trust calculation from the checkpoint-
based approach. As was discussed by (Fachrunnisa and Hussain 2011), the 
weighted-based approach to calculate final trust at the end of the interaction 
using the TMM is the most effective and reasonable method. The weighted 
approach takes into account the dynamic nature of trust information during the 
interaction and the final outcome that has been delivered by the trusted agent at 
the end of the interaction which the checkpoint based approach and outcome 
based approach do not. Hence, we can conclude that our TMM is effective in 
helping the trusted agent to maintain trust in the trusting agent. 
9.7 Simulation for Objective 3: The 
Effectiveness of Incentive-based TMM 
The objectives of the simulation are to analyse the effectiveness of using/employing 
incentive mechanisms in our TMM. In this simulation, we employ three different 
incentive mechanisms in our TMM. We carried out an analysis to evaluate the 
performance of a TMM with an incentive mechanism compared with a TMM 
without an incentive mechanism. Moreover, as we have three different approaches to 
providing an incentive in such transactions, we also investigate which of these 
approaches best facilitates the trust maintenance effort and service deliverability. In 
the next section, we explain the workflow and simulation results, discuss each 
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incentive mechanism approach in detail, and compare the performance of these three 
mechanisms (with each other) to maintain trust and without any incentive-based 
approach in TMM.  
9.7.1 Workflow of Simulation for Objective 3.1 
In order to achieve this objective, we run simulations for TMM non-incentive-based 
approaches similar to the simulation for objective 1. Using the same input 
parameters, we also run simulation for TMM incentive-based. The steps involved in 
the TMM incentive-based simulation are as follows: 
a. Step 1. The user specifies all the parameter values that need to be determined 
as stated in Table 9.5 – Table 9.7.  
 
b. Step 2. During the bootstrapping phase, the agents are created and each of 
them is assigned a given behaviour, to represent their level of compliance. 
c. Step 3. During each transaction, a trusting agent and a trusted agent are 
randomly chosen. The trusting agent is chosen such that it is always a 
compliant agent which means this trusting agent has a 100% level of 
compliance. However, the compliance level of the randomly chosen trusted 
agent could be any trust value between TV1 to TV6. Both agents then carry 
out the interaction following all the framework steps that we proposed in our 
trust maintenance incentive-based methodology. 
d. Step 4. The outcome statistics are gathered and presented.  
In this case, we compare the results of transactions which utilize our TMM incentive-
based approach with the results from transactions which did not utilize our TMM 
incentive-based approach.  
9.7.2 Simulation Results: Comparison of TMM with Incentive 
and TMM without Incentive. 
This simulation is designed to compare TMM without incentive and TMM with 
incentive. We propose three different approaches for the incentive mechanisms: (a) 
TMM performance-driven-based incentive, (b) TMM occurrence-based incentive, 
and (c) TMM error-tolerance-based incentive. Figure 9.27 below shows the 
screenshot of trust maintaining tool benchmark software for a performance-driven 
incentive-based mechanism prompting the user to input the parameters.  
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Figure 9.27: Screenshot of testing tool for performance-driven-based incentive 
mechanism 
 
Figure 9.28: Screenshot of testing tool for occurrence-based incentive 
mechanism 
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Figure 9.29: Screenshot of testing tool for error-tolerance-based incentive 
mechanism  
a. Simulation results using the input parameters shown in Table 9.33. 
Number of Agents 1000 
Number of Transactions 1000 
α 0.3 
β 0.7 
Error Tolerance 0.05 
Algorithm FL Triangular 
Brake option (performance-driven) 0.1 
Incentive ratio (error-tolerance-based) 0.02 
Max bonus (occurrence-based) 1 
Percentage of TV1 – TV6 TV1= 0.1; TV2= 0.1; TV3= 0.1; 
TV4=0.2; TV5=0.25; TV6=0.25 
Table 9.33: Input parameters for testing incentive mechanism (FL Triangular) 
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Figure 9.30: Result of testing the effectiveness of incentive based TMM with FL 
Triangular (Outcome-based: G-Benchmark) 
 
 
 
Figure 9.31: Result of testing the the effectiveness of incentive based TMM with 
FL Triangular (Outcome-based: GE-Benchmark) 
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Figure 9.32: Result of testing the effectiveness of incentive based TMM with FL 
Triangular (Checkpoint-based G-Benchmark) 
 
 
 
Figure 9.33:  Result of testing the effectiveness of incentive based TMM with FL 
Triangular (Checkpoint-based GE-Benchmark) 
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Figure 9.34:  Result of testing the effectiveness of incentive based TMM with FL 
Triangular (Weighted-based G-Benchmark) 
 
 
 
Figure 9.35: Result of testing the effectiveness of incentive based TMM with FL 
Triangular (Weighted-based GE-Benchmark) 
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Figures 9.30 to 9.35 above show a comparison of the numbers of successful 
transactions using the TMM incentive-based approach and the TMM without 
incentive-based in which the dynamic behaviour of agents is determined with 
the help of the FL Triangular. We measure the success of transactions by 
comparing initial trust value (prior to the transaction) with final trust value (at 
the end of the transaction). Moreover, the final trust value is calculated using 
three different approaches: outcome-based, checkpoint-based and weighted-
based. We present the details of each of these using both G and GE-
Benchmark. If the final trust value is greater than or equal to the initial trust, 
this indicates that the trusted agent in that particular transaction has maintained 
its level of trust in the trusting agent. It does not mean that the service has been 
delivered at a full compliance level (100%); rather, this depends on the initial 
compliance level as a representation of the trustworthiness value of the agent 
and the level of error tolerance taken into account. 
As observed from the figures above, in interactions with our incentive-based 
TMM, using the outcome-based GE-Benchmark, the successful service 
delivery remains at 100% throughout the interaction. If we calculate the final 
trust using the checkpoint-based approach GE-Benchmark, the TMM error-
tolerance-based incentive shows the highest ratio of success. It means that all 
agents have shown either an increase or the same initial trust as a result of the 
incentive. In contrast, for interactions without incentive, the performance of 
TMM without incentive is considered as good only if we calculate the final 
trust using the weighed-based GE-Benchmark. For the other approaches of 
final trust calculation for the successful service delivery for interactions 
without incentive TMM, the performance of successful transactions is less than 
80% on average. This means that during transactions, only 80% of agents have 
shown an improved trust level by the end of the interaction.  In the next sub-
section, we present the results of simulations conducted using various 
parameters. Further discussion of this result is provided in Section 9.7.5. 
b. Simulation results using the input parameters shown in Table 9.34 below. 
 
Number of Agents 1000 
Number of Transactions 1000 
α 0.6 
β 0.4 
Error Tolerance 0.01 
Algorithm FL Trapezoidal 
Brake option (performance-driven) 0.9 
Incentive ratio (error tolerance-based) 0.02 
Max bonus (occurrence-based) 1 
Percentage of TV1 – TV6 TV1= 0.2; TV2= 0.2; TV3= 0.2; 
TV4=0.1; TV5=0.15; TV6=0.15 
Table 9.34: Input parameters for testing incentive mechanism (FL Trapezoidal) 
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Figure 9.36: Result of testing the effectiveness of incentive based TMM with FL 
Trapezoidal (Outcome-based G-Benchmark) 
 
 
 
Figure 9.37 Result of testing the effectiveness of incentive based TMM with FL 
Trapezoidal (Outcome-based GE-Benchmark) 
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Figure 9.38 Result of testing the effectiveness of incentive based TMM with FL 
Trapezoidal (Checkpoint-based G-Benchmark) 
 
 
Figure 9.39 Result of testing the effectiveness of incentive based TMM with FL 
Trapezoidal (Checkpoint-based GE-Benchmark) 
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Figure 9.40 Result of testing the effectiveness of incentive based TMM with FL 
Trapezoidal (Weighted-based G-Benchmark) 
 
 
Figure 9.41 Result of testing the effectiveness of incentive based TMM with FL 
Trapezoidal (Weighted-based GE-Benchmark) 
Figures 9.36 to 9.41 above present the simulation results for the parameters 
shown in Table 9.34. This is done in order to make a comparison between TMM 
without incentive and TMM with incentive based on the three incentive 
mechanisms. In this case, the dynamic behaviour of agents is determined with the 
help of the FL trapezoid. As we can observe from the graphs, by using the 
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outcome-based G-Benchmark, only in three cases out of ten cases is the 
performance of TMM without incentive better than the TMM with incentive. In 
the outcome-based GE-Benchmark, the performance of TMM without incentive 
is the same as that for TMM with incentive in error-tolerance-based incentive and 
performance-driven incentive-based. Moreover, in the checkpoint-based 
approach, by using G – Benchmark, the performance of TMM non-incentive 
based is lower than TMM incentive based. A similar result is produced if we use 
the GE-Benchmark in the checkpoint-based final trust value-based approach. In 
the other case, if we calculate the final trust value using the weighted-based 
approach, the performance of TMM non-incentive based is higher in five out of 
ten blocks of transactions. However, if we use the GE-Benchmark, the 
performance of TMM non-incentive based is the same for the TMM Error-
tolerance-based incentive mechanism which performs the best of the three 
mechanisms.  
 
c. Simulation results using the input parameters shown in Table 9.35 below. 
 
999 1000 
Number of Transactions 1000 
α 0.6 
β 0.4 
Error Tolerance 0.01 
Algorithm FL Hybrid 
Brake option (performance-driven) 0.9 
Incentive ratio (error tolerance-based) 0.02 
Maximum bonus (occurrence-based) 1 
Percentage of TV1 – TV6 TV1= 0.2; TV2= 0.2; TV3= 0.2; 
TV4=0.1; TV5=0.15; TV6=0.15 
Table 9.35: Input parameters for testing the incentive mechanism (FL Hybrid) 
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Figure 9.42: Result of testing the effectiveness of incentive based TMM with FL 
Hybrid (Outcome-based G-Benchmark) 
 
 
 
Figure 9.43: Result of testing the effectiveness of incentive based TMM 
mechanism with FL Hybrid (Outcome-based GE-Benchmark) 
 
Figure 9.44: Result of testing the effectiveness of incentive based TMM 
mechanism with FL Hybrid (Checkpoint-based G-Benchmark) 
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Figure 9.45: Result of testing the performance-driven-based incentive 
mechanism with FL Hybrid (Checkpoint-based GE-Benchmark) 
 
Figure 9.46: Result of testing the effectiveness of incentive based TMM 
mechanism with FL Hybrid (Weighted-based G-Benchmark) 
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Figure 9.47: Result of testing the effectiveness of incentive based TMM 
mechanism with FL Hybrid (Weighted-based GE-Benchmark) 
Figures 9.42 – 9.47 present results from simulation with the objective to 
make a comparison between TMM non-incentive-based with TMM 
incentive-based on three approaches. In this case, the dynamic behaviour of 
agents throughout the interaction is determined with the help of FL Hybrid. 
The percentage of successful transactions is measured by comparing final 
trust values with initial trust values. For simulations using other approaches 
in the dynamic modelling of agents‟ behaviour, we use two benchmarks, G-
Benchmark and GE-Benchmark, in order to compare final trust with initial 
trust. Additionally, the trust final is calculated using three different 
approaches: outcome-based, checkpoint-based and weighted-based. Figures 
9.42 and 9.43 are the result of simulation when the trust final is calculated 
using outcome-based. As we can observe in G-Benchmark (Figure 9.42), the 
performance of TMM non-incentive-based is the same as that of the TMM 
error-tolerance-based-incentive. However, if we use the GE-Benchmark, the 
performance of TMM non-incentive-based is lower than the TMM 
performance-driven-based incentive and TMM occurrence-based incentive. 
The performance of TMM non-incentive-based is always the same as the 
TMM error-tolerance-based. In the checkpoint-based approach to calculate 
the trust final, both using G and GE-Benchmark, the performance of TMM 
non-incentive-based is lower than TMM incentive-based. In addition, by 
using a weighted-based approach in final trust calculation, for both the G- and 
GE-Benchmarks, the performance of TMM non-incentive is always the same 
as that of TMM error-tolerance-based. However, it is always lower than 
TMM performance-driven-based and TMM occurrence-based incentive. 
Further evaluation is discussed in Section 9.7.5. 
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9.7.3 Workflow of Simulation for Objective 3.2: Comparison 
between Three Approaches of Incentive Mechanisms 
This simulation is designed to evaluate the performance of three types of incentive 
mechanism for successful delivery of service. We compare three of them and 
determine which one has the best performance in facilitating successful delivery of 
service. The workflow of this simulation is as follows: 
a. Step 1. The user specifies all the parameter values that need to be determined 
as presented in Tables 9.5 – Table 9.7. 
b. Step 2. During the bootstrapping phase, the agents are created and each of 
them is assigned a given behaviour, to represent their level of compliance. 
c. Step 3. During each transaction, a trusting agent and a trusted agent are 
randomly chosen. The trusting agent is chosen such that it is always a 
compliant agent which means this trusting agent has a 100% level of 
compliance level. However, the compliance level of the randomly chosen 
trusted agent could be any trust value between TV1 to TV6. Both agents then 
carry out the interaction following all the framework steps that we proposed 
in our TMM with the chosen incentive–based approach. 
d. Step 4. The statistical outcome is gathered and presented to the user.  
9.7.4 Simulation Results for Objective 3.2: Investigate the Best 
Incentive Mechanism Approach. 
a. Comparison between TMM performance-driven-based and TMM occurrence-
based. The simulation was carried out using the input parameters shown in 
Table 9.36 below: 
Number of Agents 1000 
Number of Transactions 1000 
α 0.7 
β 0.3 
Error Tolerance 0.02 
Algorithm FL Triangle 
Brake option (performance-driven-based) 0.9 
Maximum bonus (occurrence based) 1 
Percentage of TV1 – TV6 TV1= 0.1; TV2= 0.1; 
TV3= 0.1; TV4=0.2; 
TV5=0.25; TV6=0.25 
Table 9.36: Input parameters for simulation to compare TMM performance-
driven-based and TMM occurrence-based (1000 agents, 1000 transactions) 
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Figure 9.48: Result of simulation to compare TMM performance-driven-based 
with TMM occurrence-based in 1000 agents carrying out 1000 transactions 
(Outcome-based G-Benchmark) 
 
Figure 9.49: Result of simulation to compare TMM performance-driven-based 
with TMM occurrence-based in 1000 agents carrying out 1000 transactions 
(Outcome-based GE-Benchmark) 
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Figure 9.50: Result of simulation to compare TMM performance-driven-based 
with TMM occurrence-based in 1000 agents carrying out 1000 transactions 
(Checkpoint-based G-Benchmark) 
 
Figure 9.51: Result of simulation to compare TMM performance-driven-based 
with TMM occurrence-based in 1000 agents carrying out 1000 transactions 
(Checkpoint-based GE-Benchmark) 
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Figure 9.52: Result of simulation to compare TMM performance-driven-based 
with TMM occurrence-based in 1000 agents carrying out 1000 transactions 
(Weighted-based G-Benchmark) 
 
Figure 9.53: Result of simulation to compare TMM performance-driven-based 
with TMM occurrence-based in 1000 agents carrying out 1000 transactions 
(Weighted-based GE-Benchmark) 
Figures 9.48 – 9.53 present the results of simulation to achieve objective 3.2 
which are the comparison between the performances of TMM performance-
driven incentive-based with TMM occurrence-based incentive by which the 
dynamic behaviour of an agent is determined with the help of the FL trapezoidal. 
By „performance of TMM‟ we mean the ratio of successful transactions for 
which trust has been maintained. As explained in the previous section, we use 
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two benchmarks, the G and GE-benchmark to indicate whether trust has been 
maintained during the interaction. Moreover, we calculated the trust final using 
three different approaches, outcome-based, checkpoint-based and weighted-
based. We present each of the results of these three approaches. For example, 
Figure 9.48 presents the results of a simulation which compares the TMM 
performance-driven-based incentive with the TMM occurrence-based incentive. 
In this case, we calculate the final trust using the weighted-based approach, and 
we compare final trust with initial trust using the GE-Benchmark. It can be 
observed from the graph that in an agent population of 1000 who carry out 1000 
transactions, for each continuing 100 transactions, the performance of TMM 
occurrence-based is slightly higher than TMM performance-driven- incentive-
based approach. As we can observe, the performance of the TMM occurrence-
based incentive is higher in seven out of ten blocks of transactions.  
Let us consider another result from Figure 9.49. In this case, the trust final 
calculation is done by using the outcome-based approach and the GE-
Benchmark. We simulate 1000 agents who have carried out 1000 transactions 
and present the result at every 100 transactions consecutively. As we can observe 
from Figure 9.49, the TMM performance-driven-based incentive has a higher 
success rate than does the TMM occurrence-based incentive. This result is 
different if we use the weighted-based approach to calculate the final trust. 
Further discussion of this variation of results is presented in Section 9.7.5. 
b. Comparison between TMM performance-driven-based and TMM error-
tolerance-based. The simulation carried out using the input parameters shown 
in Table 9.37 below: 
Number of Agents 50000 
Number of Transactions 100000 
α 0.7 
β 0.3 
Error Tolerance 0.02 
Algorithm FL Hybrid 
Brake option (performance-driven-based) 0.9 
Error tolerance (error-tolerance based) 0.03 
Percentage of TV1 – TV6 TV1= 0.05; TV2= 0.05; 
TV3= 0.1; TV4=0.3; 
TV5=0.25; TV6=0.25 
Table 9.37: Input parameters to compare TMM performance-driven-based with 
TMM error-tolerance-based (50000 agents, 100000 transactions) 
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Figure 9.54: Result of simulation to compare TMM performance-driven-based 
with TMM error-tolerance-based in 50000 agents carrying out 100000 
transactions (Outcome-based G-Benchmark) 
 
Figure 9.55: Result of simulation to compare TMM performance-driven-based 
with TMM error-tolerance-based in 50000 agents carrying out 100000 
transactions (Outcome-based GE-Benchmark) 
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Figure 9.56: Result of simulation to compare TMM performance-driven-based 
with TMM error-tolerance-based in 50000 agents carrying out 100000 
transactions (Checkpoint-based G-Benchmark) 
 
 
Figure 9.57: Result of simulation to compare TMM performance-driven-based 
with TMM error-tolerance-based in 50000 agents carrying out 100000 
transactions (Checkpoint-based GE-Benchmark) 
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Figure 9.58: Result of simulation to compare TMM performance-driven-based 
with TMM error-tolerance-based in 50000 agents carrying out 100000 
transactions (Weighted-based G-Benchmark) 
 
 
Figure 9.59: Result of simulation to compare TMM performance-driven-based 
with TMM error-tolerance-based in 50000 agents carrying out 100000 
transactions (Weighted-based GE-Benchmark) 
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Figures 9.54 – 9.59 present the results of simulation which compare TMM 
performance driven incentive with TMM error-tolerance-based. As we can 
observe, by using outcome based approach in trust final calculation with G-
Benchmark, the TMM performance-driven-based incentive has a higher 
percentage than TMM error-based incentive in four blocks of transaction. 
Moreover, their percentage of successful transaction is in the same at one 
block of transactions (occurs in 7000 transactions). The TMM error-tolerance 
based incentive performs better than TMM performance-driven-based 
incentive for five blocks of transactions. However, by using GE-Benchmark, 
the TMM performance-driven-based incentive has the same percentage of 
successful transactions which is 100%. This means that both incentive 
mechanisms are able to effectively support the deliverability of service and 
the trust maintenance. 
On the other hand, if we calculate final trust value by using checkpoint-based 
approach, in both G and GE-Benchmark, the TMM error-tolerance-based 
incentive has higher performance compared to the TMM performance-driven. 
A similar pattern also occurs if we calculate the final trust value using 
weighted-based. In both G and GE-Benchmark, the percentage of successful 
transactions which employ TMM error-tolerance based is higher than TMM 
performance-driven incentive.  From this observation, in comparison between 
TMM performance-driven-based incentive with TMM error-tolerance based, 
for transactions which employ the TMM error-tolerance based, the successful 
percentage is higher than TMM performance-driven-based incentive. 
Comparison between TMM occurrence-based and TMM error-tolerance- 
based. The simulation carried out using the input parameters is shown in 
Table 9.38 below: 
Number of Agents 50000 
Number of Transactions 100000 
α 0.7 
β 0.3 
Error Tolerance 0.02 
Algorithm FL Hybrid 
Brake option (performance-driven-based) 0.9 
Error tolerance (error-tolerance based) 0.03 
Percentage of TV1 – TV6 TV1= 0.05; TV2= 0.05; 
TV3= 0.1; TV4=0.3; 
TV5=0.25; TV6=0.25 
Table 9.38: Input parameters for simulation to compare TMM occurrence-
based with TMM error-tolerance-based  
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Figure 9.60: Result of simulation to compare TMM occurrence-based with 
TMM error-tolerance-based (Outcome-based G-Benchmark) 
 
Figure 9.61: Result of simulation to compare TMM Occurrence-based with 
TMM error-tolerance-based (Outcome-based GE-Benchmark) 
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Figure 9.62: Result of simulation to compare TMM occurrence-based with 
TMM error-tolerance-based (Checkpoint-based G-Benchmark) 
 
Figure 9.63: Result of simulation to compare TMM occurrence-based and TMM 
error-tolerance-based (Checkpoint-based GE-Benchmark) 
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Figure 9.64: Results of simulation to compare TMM occurrence-based and 
TMM error-tolerance-based (Weighted-based G-Benchmark) 
 
Figure 9.65: Results of simulation to compare TMM occurrence-based with 
TMM error-tolerance-based (Weighted-based GE-Benchmark) 
Figures 9.60 – 9.65 present the results of simulation used to compare the TMM 
occurrence-based approach with the TMM error-tolerance-based approach. Figures 
9.60 and 9.61 show the results of simulation if we calculate the final trust value using 
the outcome-based approach. As we can observe, by using G-Benchmark, the TMM 
error-tolerance-based have a higher percentage of successful transactions than those 
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with the TMM occurrence-based incentive. From ten blocks of transactions, the 
TMM error-tolerance-based incentive has higher performance in eight blocks. 
Moreover, by using GE-Benchmark, from ten blocks transactions, the TMM error-
tolerance-based incentive has higher successful rate than TMM occurrence-based 
incentive. Moreover, the percentage of successful transaction which using TMM 
error-tolerance-based incentive is 100%. It means the TMM error-tolerance based 
incentive help the trusted agent to maintain the trust level with trusting agent. The 
similar condition also can be investigate if we use the trust final calculation using 
checkpoint based and weighted based approach. In both G and GE-Benchmarks, the 
TMM error-tolerance-based incentive always delivers a higher percentage of 
successful transactions compare to the TMM occurrence-based incentive. Hence, we 
can conclude that in comparison between TMM occurrence-based incentive and 
TMM error-tolerance based, the TMM occurrence-based incentive is a better 
mechanism to help trusted agent maintain the trust level toward trusting agent. 
9.7.5 Discussion of Results Obtained for Objective 3 
Table 9.39 below presents a summary of results of simulations carried out for the 
purpose of comparing the successful ratio of interactions which use our TMM 
without incentive and those using TMM with incentive. The TMM with incentive is 
divided into three different approaches: performance-driven-based, occurrence-based 
and error-tolerance-based. The table shows the summary of the average simulation 
results from various parameters as described in the previous section. As we can 
observe, by using G–Benchmark, the performance of TMM without incentive is 
lower than TMM with incentive in performance-driven-based, incentive-based and 
error-tolerance-based approach. However, in occurrence-based, the performance of 
TMM without incentive is higher. A similar conclusion also can be drawn for the 
GE-Benchmark. We can conclude that the performance of TMM with incentive is 
higher than that of TMM without incentive for performance-driven incentive-based 
and error-tolerance-based methods. With the occurrence-based approach, the 
performance of TMM without incentive is slightly higher. That is, the performance 
of TMM in terms of successful transactions shows that by comparison, final trust is 
greater than trust initial. Hence, if the performance of TMM with performance-
driven-based incentive in the weighted-based approach using GE-Benchmark is 98%, 
this means that in any number of transactions, for 98% of them the condition of final 
trust is greater than initial trust. For example, if there are 100 transactions in the 
community, 98 of them are successfully maintaining their trust by using our TMM 
and employing one of our TMM incentive mechanisms.  
Based on the discussion above, it can be concluded that the incentive mechanisms 
support our methodology for maintaining trust. Additionally, because of an incentive 
on offer, the agent will be motivated to deliver service as closely as possible to the 
mutual agreement. It facilitates the continuity of service delivery during trust 
maintenance phase.  
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a. FL Triangular Dynamic Behaviour 
 
G -Benchmark 
 
TMM 
without 
incentive 
TMM with incentive 
Performance 
–driven-based 
Occurrence 
-based 
Error- 
tolerance - 
based 
Outcome-based 72% 74% 68% 72% 
Checkpoint-
based 
25% 55% 65% 68% 
Weighted-based 70% 65% 70% 75% 
 
GE- Benchmark 
 
TMM 
without 
incentive 
TMM with incentive 
Performance 
–driven-based 
Occurrence 
- based 
Error- 
tolerance - 
based 
Outcome-based 98% 100% 90.25% 100% 
Checkpoint-
based 
50% 80% 85% 100% 
Weighted-based 98% 85% 87% 100% 
 
 
b. FL Trapezoidal Dynamic Behaviour 
 
 
 
G -Benchmark 
 
TMM without 
incentive 
TMM with incentive 
Performance 
–driven-based 
Occurrence 
-based 
Error-tolerance 
- based 
Outcome-based 85.1% 85.9 78.9 85.7% 
Checkpoint-
based 
31.8% 84.5% 31.8% 75.6% 
Weighted-based 85% 85.7% 74.87% 79.36% 
 
 
GE- 
Benchmark 
 
TMM without 
incentive 
TMM with incentive 
Performance 
–driven-based 
Occurrence 
-based 
Error 
Tolerance - 
based 
Outcome-based 100% 100% 85.2% 100% 
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Checkpoint-
based 
48.3% 99.2% 82.3% 99.8% 
Weighted-based 99.9% 79.7% 85.2% 100% 
 
c. FL Hybrid Dynamic Behaviour 
 
 
G -Benchmark 
 
TMM 
without 
incentive 
TMM with incentive 
Performance 
–driven-based 
Occurrence 
-based 
Error-tolerance 
- based 
Outcome-based 81.8% 81.8% 78% 82.4% 
Checkpoint-
based 
50.4% 50.4% 78% 70.8% 
Weighted-based 80.6% 80.6% 73% 83% 
 
 
GE- Benchmark 
 
TMM 
without 
incentive 
TMM with incentive 
Performance 
–driven-based 
Occurrence 
-based 
Error-tolerance 
- based 
Outcome-based 93.6% 93.6% 100% 100% 
Checkpoint-
based 
61.7% 61.7% 100% 100% 
Weighted-based 92.5% 92.5% 95% 100% 
Table 9.39: Summary of results of comparison between TMM with incentive 
and TMM without incentive 
Moreover, from Table 9.39 above, we can ascertain which incentive mechanism 
approach best facilitates successful service delivery and trust maintenance. As we 
can see, for the outcome-based G-Benchmark, the performance-driven-based 
approach yields the highest percentage of successful service delivery followed by 
error-tolerance-based and occurrence-based. However, if we consider this from the 
checkpoint-based perspective for trust final value calculation, the best performance is 
shown by error-tolerance-based, follow by occurrence-based and performance-
driven-based. Another pattern can be inferred from the weighted-based approach. In 
this case, the error-tolerance has the highest performance, followed by occurrence-
based and performance-driven-based.  
In addition, if we consider this from the perspective of the dynamic behaviour of 
agents throughout the transactions, with the FL triangular approach, the performance 
of TMM non-incentive-based method is lower than for the TMM incentive-based. Of 
these three incentive mechanisms, the error-tolerance-based approach has the highest 
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performance in terms of percentage of successful transactions. In the case of 
representing dynamic behaviour using the FL trapezoidal, the performance of TMM 
non-incentive-based is slightly lower than that of the TMM incentive-based. Of the 
three incentive mechanisms, the error-tolerance-based approach shows better 
performance compared with the other two. However, if we determine the dynamic 
behaviour of agent using FL Hybrid approach, the performance of TMM non-
incentive-based is lower than for the TMM incentive-based. Of the three approaches 
to the incentive mechanism, the occurrence-based incentive approach and error-
tolerance-based approach shows the same better performance than performance-
driven-based incentive approach. Hence, we can conclude from comparing the TMM 
incentive-based and TMM non-incentive based approaches to dealing with the 
dynamic behaviour of agents, that the TMM incentive-based has a better 
performance than TMM non-incentive based. It means, by having an incentive 
mechanism in our TMM, the trust final has been maintained more successful than in 
transactions with TMM but do not have incentive mechanism. This is because the 
availability of incentives encourages or motivates the trusted agent to perform as 
closely as possible to the terms of the mutual agreement. For example, in the 
performance-driven-based approach, an agent will increase his performance level in 
response to receiving an incentive.  
The second scenario is the comparison of final trust value against initial trust value 
using the GE-Benchmark. In the outcome-based approach, the error-tolerance 
incentive-based approach and the performance-driven-incentive approach present the 
same percentage of successful service delivery which is 100%. This means that the 
incentive has been successful in encouraging the trusting agent to maintain its trust 
level in terms of successful service delivery. Moreover, by using the checkpoint-
based approach, the error-tolerance-based method produces a best result, followed by 
occurrence-based and performance-driven-based. And by using the weighted-based 
approach, the error-tolerance-based incentive approach has the highest performance, 
followed by occurrence-based and performance-driven-based methods.  
Based on the discussion above, we can conclude that if we use the outcome-based 
approach to calculate the final trust value, the performance-driven-based approach is 
the best incentive mechanism to facilitate the trust maintenance by means of 
successful service delivery. However, if we refer to the weighted-based approach in 
final trust calculation, the error-tolerance-based approach is the best for providing 
incentive in our TMM. This is because, in the performance-driven-based approach, 
the condition of intermediate performance which leads to the calculation of 
intermediate trust level is influenced by the availability of an incentive checkpoint. 
Hence, if by the end of the transaction we calculate the final trust using the outcome-
based final trust value approach, the intermediate trust value is not taken into 
account. Moreover, with the performance-driven incentive-based approach, the 
performance of the trusted agent increased after an incentive has been given. The 
incentive is designed to motivate the trusted agent to comply as closely as possible 
with the terms of the mutual agreement. Hence, by the end of the transaction, the 
trusted agent will fully comply according to its initial behaviour or trust level. As 
outcome-based final trust value is calculated after the actual delivery of service by 
the end of the interaction without considering how the trusted agent has actually 
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behaved at each checkpoint, the final trust value is the same as or may be greater 
than the original trust value. 
On the contrary, in the case of the weighted-based approach, error-tolerance-based 
has a greater ratio in terms of percentage of successful transactions. This is because 
in the weighted-based final trust value, the final trust is calculated by giving weight 
to intermediate performance and outcome-based performance. The error-tolerance-
based incentive mechanism is an incentive which is given if the trusted agent 
performs above the error-tolerance as agreed. Hence, the trusted agent does not need 
to show increased performance in response to receiving an incentive as is the case 
with the performance-driven-based incentive. 
9.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we presented the multi-agent system that we engineered to validate 
the proposed methodology for maintaining trust. In Section 9.2, we discussed the 
aims and objectives of engineering these systems. In Section 9.3, we gave an 
overview of each of the phases involved in running the multi-agent system. 
Subsequently, in Section 9.4 we discussed the parameters used in the multi-agent 
system.  Additionally, in Section 9.5 we demonstrated the effectiveness of our TMM 
when the behaviour of agents is dynamic. We evaluated the results by comparing the 
transactions which used our TMM with the non-TMM transactions. The results show 
that the percentage of successful transactions was higher for those employing our 
TMM than those not using TMM. Moreover, in Section 9.6, we demonstrated the 
effectiveness of our TMM when the behaviour of the agents in the transaction is 
dynamic. The results show that, although the behaviour of agents is dynamic, for 
transactions where our TMM is used, we achieve a better ratio of successful 
transactions than do those transactions which do not use our TMM.  
In Section 9.7, we presented the effectiveness of having an incentive mechanism in 
our TMM. By proposing three different approaches for an incentive mechanism to 
facilitate the successful delivery of service, it can be concluded that this mechanism 
successfully facilitates the TMM since it encourages the agent to comply as closely 
as possible with the mutual agreement. Of the three different approaches for 
incentive mechanisms (performance-driven-based incentive approach, occurrence-
based incentive approach and error-tolerance-based incentive approach), we 
concluded that the performance-driven-based incentive approach is the best incentive 
mechanism, followed by error-tolerance and occurrence-based. However, this 
situation depends on the way that final trust is calculated using our approaches. 
Nonetheless, by having an incentive mechanism, our TMM successfully helps the 
trusted agent to maintain its level of trust in the trusting agent. 
In the next chapter, we will propose some additional performance benchmarks to 
measure the effectiveness of our methodology.  
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Chapter 10 - Additional Performance 
Validation of TMM 
10.1 Introduction 
As discussed in the previous chapter, we measure the validation of our TMM in 
terms of 7 (seven) broad objectives. In Chapter 9, we presented the validity of 
methodology from the 3 (three) broad objectives which are: (a) the comparison 
between transactions with TMM and transactions without TMM, (b) the successful 
ratio in terms of comparison between initial trust and final trust in a transaction, and 
(c) the effectiveness of the incentive mechanism attached to the TMM. Additionally, 
we evaluated the performance of our TMM in both situations where the behaviour of 
the agent is either static or dynamic.  
In this chapter, we present the remaining 4 (four) broad objectives as additional 
performance validity to further rigorously validate our proposed TMM. In order to do 
so, we introduce and define additional performance testing benchmarks. These 
particular benchmarks are primarily to evaluate whether our methodology can be 
used to facilitate sustainability by maintaining the compliant behaviour of 
community members. Section 10.2 presents the aims and objectives of the 
engineering systems. Section 10.3 presents the parameters used in the simulations. In 
Sections 10.4 – 10.7, we present the workflow, simulation results and discussion. 
Section 10.8 concludes the chapter. The research outcome presented in this chapter 
regarding this validation has been documented in two publications (Fachrunnisa and 
Hussain, 2010; Fachrunnisa and Hussain, 2011). 
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10.2 Objectives of Engineering the Prototype 
System 
Unlike the objective of the engineering system in the previous chapter, the objective 
of the engineering system in this chapter is to determine the extent to which our 
proposed TMM contributes to sustaining a virtual community by either increasing or 
maintaining the level of trust amongst the members. The term „sustainability‟ has 
been broadly used in the literature to describe and refer to a number of concomitant 
issues related to continuity or continuance. In this thesis, we refer to and examine the 
sustainability of a virtual community from the perspective of the compliant / non-
compliant behaviour of its constituent members and the ability of an intelligent 
framework (such as our proposed methodology) to quickly identify non-complying 
members, so that the virtual community is able to continue over a longer duration of 
time. The central question that we intend to answer is: given the effectiveness of our 
TMM (as demonstrated in Chapter 9), does complying behaviour amongst members 
of a community lead to a sustainable virtual community? Additionally, this 
benchmark is also used to validate the third party agent selection mechanism as 
explained in Chapter 5. We evaluate the effectiveness of the availability of third 
party agent in the community or in the interaction between trusting agent and trusted 
agent in the trust maintenance phase. 
In order to measure this, we continue carrying out the validity test of our proposed 
TMM with the following four objectives:  
1. Objective 4: The accuracy of third party agent‟s information 
In this fourth objective, we make use of the engineered prototype to evaluate 
the effectiveness of the methodology in terms of the role of the third party 
agent in the community. This benchmark measures whether the third party 
agent is able to provide accurate information regarding the performance of 
any members in a community. This performance information is related to the 
compliance behaviour of an agent when carrying out a transaction in the trust 
maintenance phase. As was discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, the role of the 
third party agent is to supervise and monitor the interaction between trusting 
agent and trusted agent. Additionally, the third party agent will provide 
assistance to both parties if there is a performance discrepancy during the 
interaction. Therefore, the third party agent has information about the 
performance of each community member in carrying out the transaction. Any 
member in the community may have a query about the performance of the 
other member in such transactions during the maintaining phase. This 
member will refer to the third party who has supervised a transaction 
involving the queried agent. The aim of the simulation is to evaluate the level 
of accuracy of information provided by the third party agent.  
 
2. Objective 5: The ability to identify all non-compliant agents in a community 
We further investigate the role of the third party agent in the community. The 
fifth objective is to measure whether the third party agent can help the 
community to identify all its non-compliant agents. The aim of this 
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benchmark is to capture the number of interactions needed to identify all of 
the non-compliant agents in the community. This is directly related to the 
number of non-complying agents that have been identified accurately by the 
third party agents. We evaluate this benchmark by computing a correlation 
between number of transactions and the percentage of the correctly identified 
non-compliant agents in the community. The sustainability of a community 
can be achieved if the community comprises only compliant agents. 
  
3. Objective 6: Maximizing social welfare of the community 
The purpose of these experiments was to determine whether our proposed 
TMM can help the community to increase the social welfare of its members. 
We define social welfare as the amount of gain that community members 
obtain from interacting with other community members. The sustainability of 
a virtual community can be achieved if all community members derive 
maximum gain and suffer minimum loss from their interaction with any 
members in community. 
 
4. Objective 7: Measuring Sustainability Index 
In this chapter, we propose a metric to measure the community sustainability 
index. Such an index can be used by the administrator of the virtual 
community to measure the sustainability of their community. This is to assist 
communities to measure the extent to which their community is sustainable. 
This index is derived from two benchmarks as discussed in points (2) and (3) 
above: the ability to identify all non-compliant agents in the community, and 
the social welfare of members in the virtual community.   
In order to achieve these four objectives, we engineered a multi-agent system using 
the JADE Multi Agent-Based Framework similar to that in the previous chapter. The 
functionality of the JADE Multi Agent-Based Framework was extended using Java. 
The engineered multi-agent system has an interface, whereby the user can specify the 
necessary input parameters. The engineered multi-agent system is meant to reflect 
the interaction between entities in virtual communities. Hence, we created virtual 
communities in which agents have roles as community members, third party agent, 
and administrator. We then established several evaluation benchmarks to assess the 
performance of the proposed methodology and its ability to support sustainability in 
virtual communities. The simulation framework is available at 
http://blade1.debii.curtin.edu.au:8080/trustMaintain/. 
The phases of the multi-agent system for this simulation are exactly the same as 
those discussed in Chapter 9, Section 9.3; the objectives however, are different. In 
the next section, we explain the parameters used for simulations to achieve the above 
objectives. 
10.3 Parameters used in the Simulation 
In this section, we present the parameters that have to be specified by the user prior 
to the simulation. We present the parameters included for each objective as explained 
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in Section 10.2. The fourth objective of our engineered system in this thesis is to 
analyse the level of accuracy of third party agent information regarding the 
performance of community members in carrying out a transaction during the trust 
maintenance phase. Table 10.1 presents the parameters used in simulation 4 (the 
accuracy of third party‟s agent information). 
Parameter Description Valid Domain Values 
Agent No. The user can specify the 
total number of agents in the 
community.  
0 < x 
Where „x‟ is the 
maximum number of 
agents that can be 
specified by the user. 
Apply all non-
compliant ratio 
The user can specify the 
number (percentage) of non-
compliant agents in the 
community. The available 
ratio is from 0.1 to 0.9. If the 
user selects this option, the 
system will present the 
results (the number 
transactions needed to 
identify non-complying 
members corresponding to 
the specified percentage) 
with the percentage of non-
compliant agent in the 
community as 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 
0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8 and 0.9 
respectively. 
Select this option if 
the user wants to apply 
all non-compliant 
ratio. 
Apply one-by-one  
non-compliant ratio 
The user can specify the 
preferred percentage number 
of non-compliant agents in 
the community. 
0 ≤ x ≤ 1 
Where „x‟ denotes the 
percentage of non-
compliant agents in 
the community that 
can be specified by the 
user. 
Table 10.1: Parameters used in simulation for analysing the accuracy of third 
party’s information 
The fifth objective of the system is to analyse the ability of our proposed TMM to 
identify all non-compliant agents in the community. Table 10.2 presents the 
parameters used in the simulation for objective 5. 
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Parameter Description Valid Domain Values 
Agent No. The user can specify the total number 
of agents in the community.  
0 < x 
Where „x‟ denotes the 
maximum number of 
agents that can be 
specified by the user. 
N (to confirm non-
compliant) 
The user can specify the number of 
non-compliant performances shown 
by an agent to confirm that this 
particular agent is categorized as a 
non-compliant agent. Put simply, 
after how many non-compliant 
performances will an agent be 
categorized as a non-compliant 
agent? 
0 < x 
Where „x‟ denotes the 
maximum number of 
transactions to confirm 
non-compliant 
performance that can be 
specified by the user. 
Iteration number The user can specify the number of 
iterations or the number of repeated 
transactions in this same parameter 
0 < x ≤ 20 
Where „x‟ denotes the 
number of repeated 
transactions that can be 
specified by the user 
Apply all non-compliant 
ratio. 
The user can specify all the 
percentage numbers of non-compliant 
agents in the community. The 
available ratio is from 0.1 to 0.9. If 
the user selects this option, the 
system will present the results with 
the percentage of non-compliant 
agents in the community as 0.1, 0.2, 
0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8 and 0.9 
respectively. 
Select this option if the 
user wants to apply all 
non-compliant ratio in 
the community.  
Apply one-by-one non-
compliant ratio. 
The user can specify the preferred 
percentage of non-compliant agents 
in the community. 
0 ≤ x ≤ 1 
Where „x‟ denotes the 
percentage of non-
compliant agents in the 
community that can be 
specified by the user. 
Table 10.2: Parameters used in simulation for analysing the ability of third 
party agent in identifying all non-compliant agents in the community  
The sixth objective of our system is to analyse the correlation between successful 
interactions with the gain utility of all community members. This is to evaluate 
whether our proposed TMM can be used to help maximize the social welfare of 
community members. Table 10.3 shows the parameters used for this simulation 
objective. 
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Parameter Description Valid Domain 
Values 
Agent No. The user can specify the total 
number of agents in the 
community. 
0 < x 
Where „x‟ denotes the 
maximum number of 
agents in the 
community that can 
be specified by the 
user. 
Transaction No. The user can specify the total 
number transactions that will 
be carried out by agents. 
0 < x 
Where „x‟ denotes the 
maximum number of 
transactions carried 
out by agents in the 
community that can 
be specified by the 
user. 
Apply all non-
compliant ratio. 
The user can specify all the 
numbers (percentages) of 
non-compliant agents in the 
community. The available 
ratio is from 0.1 to 0.9. If the 
user selects this option, the 
system will present the 
results with the percentage of 
non-compliant agents in the 
community as 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 
0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, and 0.9 
respectively. 
Select this option if 
the user wants to 
apply all non-
compliant ratio in the 
community. 
Apply one-by-one non-
compliant ratios. 
The user can specify the 
prefer percentage number of 
non-compliant agent in the 
community. 
0 ≤ x ≤ 1  
Where „x‟ denotes the 
percentage of non-
compliant agents in 
the community that 
can be specified by 
the user. 
Table 10.3: Parameters used in simulation for maximizing the social welfare of 
the community  
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The seventh objective of the engineered system is to measure the sustainability index 
of a community. Table 10.4 presents the parameters used in the simulation for 
objective 7 (seven). 
Parameter Description Valid Domain Values 
Agent No. The user can specify the total number of 
agents in the community.  
0 < x 
Where „x‟ denotes the 
maximum number of 
agents in the community 
that can be specified by 
the user. 
Transaction No. The user can specify the total number 
transactions that will be carried out by 
agents. 
0 < x 
Where „x‟ denotes the 
maximum number of 
transactions carried out by 
agents in the community 
that can be specified by 
the user. 
Alpha (α) The user can specify the value of 
weighted for weighting the first criteria 
to measure the sustainability index. 
0 ≤ α ≤ 1 *) 
 
Beta (β) The user can specify the value of 
weighted for weighting the second 
criteria to measure the sustainability 
index. 
0 ≤ β ≤ 1 *) 
*) the total value of α + β 
= 1 
Apply all non-
compliant ratio. 
The user can specify all the percentages 
of non-compliant agents in the 
community. The available ratio is from 
0.1 to 0.9. If the user selects this option, 
the system will present the results with 
the percentage of non-compliant agents 
in the community as 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 
0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 respectively. 
Select this option if the 
user wants to apply all 
non-compliant ratios in 
the community. 
Apply one-by-one 
non-compliant ratio 
The user can specify the preferred 
percentage of non-compliant agents in 
the community. 
0 ≤ x ≤ 1 
Where „x‟ denotes the 
percentage of non-
compliant agents in the 
community that can be 
specified by the user 
Table 10.4: Parameters used in simulation for measuring the sustainability 
index of the community  
  
Page 281 of 319 
 
10.4 Simulation for Objective 4: The Accuracy 
of Third Party Agent’s Information 
In this section, we present the details of the simulation to analyze the accuracy of 
third party agents in providing information regarding the performance of community 
members in carrying out interactions during the trust maintenance phase. We also 
present the workflow of this simulation including the screenshot of the benchmark 
tool used to input the parameters prior to simulation. Subsequently, we present the 
discussion of the results. 
10.4.1 Workflow of Simulation for Objective 4: The Accuracy of 
Third Party’s Agent Information 
The steps involved in this simulation are as follows: 
a. Step 1. The user specifies all the parameter values used in this simulation as 
presented in Table 10.1. 
  
b. Step 2. During the bootstrapping phase, the agents are created and each of 
them is assigned a given behaviour level. In this simulation, each agent is 
assigned only one compliance level - either 0% (non-compliant) or 100% 
(compliant). A non-compliant agent is an agent who is not at all cooperative 
in any interaction. If this non-compliant agent carries out a transaction, s/he 
will never comply with the interaction agreement. On the other hand, a 
compliant agent with a 100% degree of compliance is an agent who always 
complies with the interaction agreement. From the trust perspective, a non-
compliant agent is an untrustworthy agent and a compliant agent is a 
trustworthy agent.  
 
c. Step 3. During each transaction, a trusting agent and a trusted agent are 
randomly chosen. The trusting agent is chosen such that it is always a 
compliant agent which means this trusting agent has a 100% level of 
compliance. However, the compliance level of the randomly chosen trusted 
agent could be either total compliance or total non-compliance. The agents 
carry out an interaction guided by our TMM. In order to achieve the objective 
of this scenario, we created a situation whereby for each block of interactions 
(the whole interactions are divided into ten equal blocks), a certain number of 
agents query the trust values of other agents in the community. The third 
party agents reply to the querying agents (with the trust value of queried 
agents) who then pass on the trust values to the administrator. The 
administrator agent collates all the replies and computes their accuracy by 
comparing the replied trust value with the actual trust value.  
 
d. Step 4. The statistical outcome of this simulation is gathered and presented to 
the user. It provides the number of transactions needed to identify all the non-
compliant agents, number of queries and amount of accurate information 
provided. We then analyze the results corresponding to the objective.  
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10.4.2 Simulation Results for Objective 4: The Accuracy of Third 
Party Agent’s Information 
Figure 10.1 below shows the simulation framework prompting the user to input the 
parameters as shown in Table 10.1. 
 
Figure 10.1: Screenshot of testing tool for analysing the accuracy of third 
party’s information 
 
Figure 10.2: Simulation using 1500 agents in the community with 10% of them 
being non-compliant agents. 
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1 0-1116 13 10 10 100% 
2 1117 - 2356 31 10 9 90% 
3 2357 - 3596 47 10 10 100% 
4 3597 - 4836 62 10 10 100% 
5 4837 - 6076 75 10 10 100% 
6 6077 - 7316 86 10 10 100% 
7 7317 - 8556 94 10 10 100% 
8 8557 - 9796 98 10 10 100% 
9 9797 - 11036 99 10 10 100% 
10 11036 - 12276 99 10 10 100% 
Table 10.5: Descriptive result for simulation with 1500 agents in the community 
with 10% of them being non-compliant agents. 
Figure 10.2 and Table 10.5 provide the results of a simulation using a community 
with a total of 1500 agents, with the total number of non-compliant agents in the 
community being 150 (10% of 1500). The results presented in Table 10.5 indicate 
that it takes 12276 transactions to determine all the non-compliant agents in the 
community. In other words, after 12276 transactions, the third party agent is able to 
identify all the non-compliant agents in the community. Additionally, as we can 
observe from the table, with the increasing number of transactions, the percentage of 
confirmed non-compliant agents in the community increases.  
 
In this scenario, for simplicity, we divided the number of transactions into ten equal 
blocks. At every block, there are ten queries and the number of accurate 
recommendations is shown in Table 10.5. As indicated by Table 10.5 and Figure 
10.2, the accuracy level of recommendations provided by a third party agent is 
almost 100%. It means that of 10 queries, 10 are provided with accurate information 
about the trust value (performance/behaviour) of the other agents in the community. 
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Figure 10.3: Simulation using 1500 agents in the community with 20% of them 
being non-compliant agents 
Figure 10.3 presents results of simulation from number of agents in the community is 
1500 and the percentage of non-compliant agents is 20%. As we can observe from 
Figure 10.3, the accuracy of the third party agent‟s information is more than 90%. In 
the first two ten blocks of interactions (shown above), the accuracy is slightly low; 
however, as the number of transactions increases, so too does the level of accuracy.  
 
Figure 10.4: Simulation using 5000 agents in the community with 70% of them 
being non-compliant agents  
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Figure 10.5: Simulation using 10000 agents in the community with 75% of them 
being non-compliant agents  
Figures 10.4 and 10.5 present the results of the simulation with particular input 
parameters. As we can observe from the figures, it takes 20097 transactions to 
identify all the non-compliant agents. Similar to the previous experiments, we 
divided the transactions into ten blocks to evaluate the accuracy of the third party 
agent in providing information. It is observed that for the first four blocks, the 
accuracy of the third party‟s information is less than 100%. Once it reaches 9947 
transactions, all information provided by the third party agent regarding community 
members‟ performance is accurate. We can also conclude that as the number of 
transactions increases, the accuracy of the third party‟s agent information also 
increases. 
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Figure 10.6: Simulation using 5000 agents in the community with the percentage 
of non-compliant agents varying from 0.1 – 0.9 
 
Figure 10.7: Simulation using 20000 agents in the community with the 
percentage of non-compliant agents varying from 0.1 – 0.9 
In addition, Figures 10.6 and 10.7 present the result of simulation using 5000 agents 
and 20000 agents in the community and where the percentage of non-compliance 
agents in the community varied in a range from 0.1 to 0.9. We divided the total 
number of transactions into 10 equal blocks. As can be observed from the figure, as 
the number of transactions increases, the accuracy of third party agent‟s information 
increases as well. In the first five blocks of transactions, with the different percentage 
of non-compliant agents in the community, the percentage of accurate information 
varies. However, once it reaches in sixth block, the accuracy level is 100%. Hence, 
we can conclude that the third party agent has correctly identified the non-compliant 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
%
 o
f 
A
cc
u
ra
te
 In
fo
rm
at
io
n
Block of Transactions
Accuracy of Third Party's Information
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
%
 o
f 
A
cc
u
ra
te
 In
fo
rm
at
io
n
Transactions Block
Accuracy of Third Party's Information
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
  
Page 287 of 319 
 
agents and retrieved accurate information for community members who query other 
community members‟ trust value.  
10.4.3 Discussion of Results Obtained for Objective 4: The 
Accuracy of Third Party Agent’s Information 
This simulation is designed to measure the effectiveness of the communicated 
recommended / information by the third party agent in facilitating the sustainability 
of the community. As was explained in Chapter 6, the role of the third party agent is 
to supervise and monitor the transaction carried out by both trusting agent and trusted 
agent. Hence, third party agents will have databases regarding the performance 
history of agents under their supervision. An agent in the community can query 
regarding the performance of existing members (or potential interacting partners) 
before making a decision to carry out a particular transaction. Third party agent will 
provide information in response to the query. In this context, the accuracy of the 
communicated information by third party agents is extremely significant. If the third 
party agent provides accurate information about the performance of an agent, then 
the agent who queries the information will make a correct decision about whether or 
not to carry out a transaction with the purpose of maintaining trust. With this 
benchmark, we evaluate the level of accuracy of information provided by the third 
party agent. This is to support an agent who intends to maintain trust with another 
agent in the community.  
Based on the results presented in the previous section, we concluded that the third 
party agents are able to provide accurate information regarding the performance of 
community members. We carried out simulation according to various parameters. 
The results show that on average, the accuracy level of information provided by a 
third party agent is more than 90%. Hence, we can conclude that our TMM supports 
the sustainability of a community by providing assistance to the neutral agent that 
supervised the transaction between trusting agent and trusted agent in the 
community. 
10.5 Simulation for Objective 5: The Ability to 
Identify All Non-compliant Agents in the 
Community 
The fifth objective is to evaluate the ability of the third party agent to identify all 
non-compliant agents in a community. The aim of this benchmark is to capture the 
number of interactions needed to identify all of the non-compliant agents in the 
community. This is directly related to the number of non-complying agents that have 
been identified accurately by the third party agents. In this section, we present the 
workflow of the simulation, the simulation results and the discussion of the results. 
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10.5.1 Workflow of Simulation for Objective 5: The Ability to 
Identify All Non-compliant Agents in the Community 
The steps involved in this simulation are as follows: 
a. Step 1. The user specifies all the parameter values used in this simulation as 
presented in Table 10.2.  
 
b. Step 2. During the bootstrapping phase, the agents are created and each of 
them is assigned a given behaviour. In this simulation, each agent will be 
assigned only one compliance level - either 0% (non-compliant) or 100% 
(compliant). A non-compliant agent is an agent who is not at all cooperative 
in any interaction. If this non-compliant agent carries out a transaction, s/he 
will never comply with the interaction agreement. On the other hand, a 
compliant agent with a 100% degree of compliance is an agent who always 
complies with the interaction agreement. From the trust perspective, a non-
compliant agent is an untrustworthy agent and a compliant agent is a 
trustworthy agent. 
 
c. Step 3. During each transaction, a trusting agent and a trusted agent are 
randomly chosen. The trusting agent is chosen such that it is always a 
compliant agent which means this trusting agent has a 100% level of 
compliance. However, the compliance level of the randomly chosen trusted 
agent could be either total compliance or total non-compliance. The agents 
carry out an interaction as described in our TMM. In order to achieve the 
objective of this simulation, we added a scenario by which the third party 
agent has a record of both agents‟ performance during the transaction. 
Following the last step of our methodology, the trusting agent will inform the 
third party agent of the „non-compliant‟ behaviour of the trusted agent. 
Subsequently, the third party agent will investigate this non-compliant 
behaviour and by using the performance track record, if a trusted agent is 
repeatedly non-compliant, this agent will be placed on the „black list‟ which 
is a list of community members who have been found to be non-complying at 
certain times. In each community, the administrator will establish a policy 
regarding how or when an agent will be placed on either the black or white 
list. A possible policy could be based on a certain number of repeated 
untrustworthy or trustworthy behaviours during a specified time period. The 
threshold of the number of times that an agent could behave in an 
untrustworthy manner so as to be characterized as an untrustworthy agent and 
placed in the blacklist, could be specified by the user as shown in Table 10.2 
(N (to confirm non-compliant)). 
 
d. Step 4. The statistical outcome of this simulation is gathered and presented to 
the user. It presents the number of interactions and the percentage of non-
compliant agents in the community. We then analyze the results in terms of 
the objective.  
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10.5.2 Simulation Results: the Ability to Identify all Non-
compliant Agents in the Community 
This simulation is designed to find the number of interactions needed to identify 
correctly all the non-compliant agents in the community. This simulation is intended 
to determine the number of interactions required in order for the system to be able to 
accurately identify all of the non-compliant agents in the community. Figure 10.8 
shows the benchmark tool used to input the parameters prior to the simulation. 
 
Figure 10.8: Screenshot of testing tool to identify all non-compliant agents in the 
community 
Figures 10.9 to 10.13 below present simulation results from various numbers of 
agents in the population with the percentage of non-compliant agents in the 
community ranging from 0.1 to 0.9 
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Figure 10.9: Simulation using 8000 agents in the community with the percentage 
of non-compliant agents varying from 0.1 – 0.9 
 
Figure 10.10: Simulation using 9000 agents in the community with the 
percentage of non-compliant agents varying from 0.1 – 0.9 
Due to the random nature of agent selection (trusted agents) during simulation, we 
conducted 20 series of experiments for every community size, as depicted in Figures 
10.9 to 10.13. In order to remove any selection bias, finally, we computed an average 
for those 20 experiments as shown in these figures. Results of experiments show that 
as the percentage of non-compliant agents in the community increases, the average 
amount of time required to identify all of them as a function of the number of 
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transactions, decreases. If the community has a large number of non-compliant 
agents, then it will be quicker to identify all of them. Consider, for example, Figure 
10.9 which plots the experimental results for a community size of 8000 agents. With 
10% of them being non-compliant agents, on average, it takes 320000 transactions to 
identify all the non-compliant agents in the community. However, if the percentage 
of non-compliant agents in the community is 90%, on an average, it takes only 90000 
transactions to identify all of them. We repeated the experiments with several 
different total numbers of agents in the community. Let us consider another 
experiment result from Figure 10.12 which illustrates a community size of 80000 
agents.  With 10% of them being non-compliant agents, on average, it takes 4500000 
transactions to identify all of them. However, if the percentage of non-compliant 
agents is 90%, on average, it takes only 100000 transactions to identify all of them. 
A similar pattern of results was also found for a community size of 9000 (Figure 
10.10), 70000 (Figure 10.11), 80000 (Figure 10.12) and 90000 (Figure. 10.13).   
 
Figure 10.11: Simulation using 70000 agents in the community with the 
percentage of non-compliant agents varying from 0.1 – 0.9 
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Figure 10.12: Simulation using 80000 agents in the community with the 
percentage of non-compliant agents varying from 0.1 – 0.9 
 
 
Figure 10.13: Simulation using 90000 agents  in the community with the 
percentage of non-compliant agents varying from 0.1 – 0.9 
Moreover, in this experiment, we also investigate the effectiveness of our proposed 
TMM in identifying all the non-compliant members in the community. The aim of 
this benchmark is to analyse the correlation between the number of transactions and 
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the percentage of non-compliant agents correctly identified in the community. This is 
directly related to, and dependent on, the number of non-complying agents that have 
been identified accurately by the expert agents. 
We created a virtual community with varying numbers of agent populations: 10000, 
55000, 100000 and 200000 agents. They carry out an interaction guided by our 
proposed TMM. The agent population size can be specified prior to running the 
simulation. For each different agent population size, we introduced a certain 
percentage of non-compliant agents into the community environment. The system 
randomly assigns a compliance level to each member agent of either 0% (non-
compliant) or 100% (compliant). A non-compliant agent is an agent who will not 
fully deliver according to criteria factors as agreed. This non-compliant agent will 
never comply with the mutual agreement. Conversely, a compliant agent is an agent 
who fully delivers the criteria factors as agreed or an agent who always complies 
with the mutual agreement. The percentage of non-complying agents in the 
community varies from 0.1 to 0.9. 
In this simulation, the user specifies the number of times that a non-compliant agent 
will behave as a „non-compliant‟ agent before it is placed on the black list. The 
simulation process described above is repeated for the number of interactions 
specified by the user at the start of the simulation. In the initial stages of simulation, 
the compliance of agents is not modelled completely or accurately, or both. By 
„complete modelling‟ of compliance levels, we mean that the third party agent should 
know the compliance levels of all the agents in the community. On the other hand, by 
„accurate modelling‟ of the compliance level, we mean that the actual level of 
compliance of the agents in the community should be as close as possible to the 
modelled or determined compliance levels established by the expert agents. Once the 
third party agent‟s information reflects accurately and completely the compliance of 
the agents in the community, non-complying interactions will not occur. In other 
words, this would create a community in which non-complying agents are blacklisted 
and only complying agents would be available to carry out transactions with other 
complying agents. 
As depicted in Figures 10.14, 10.15, 10.16 and 10.17, for each community size we 
have different experimental results. These results show that as the number of 
transactions increases, the percentage of non-compliant agents that are correctly 
identified by the third party agent increases as well. For example, Figure 10.14 
shows the result of simulation using 55000 agents, 65% of which are non-compliant 
and carried out 100000 transactions. In the first 1000 transactions, only 14.86% of 
non-compliant agents are correctly identified. However, as the number of 
transactions increases, the percentage of non-compliant agents that have been 
identified correctly by expert agents also increases. By the end of 100000 
transactions, 92.77% of non-compliant agents have been correctly identified. A 
similar situation is depicted in Figure 10.15 with 150000 agents, 30% of them being 
non-compliant and carrying out 200000 transactions.  
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Figure 10.14: Simulation using 55000 agents with 65% of them being non-
compliant and carrying out 100000 transactions 
 
Figure 10.15: Simulation using 150000 agents with 30% of them being non-
compliant and carrying out 200000 transactions 
Moreover, Figures 10.16 and 10.17 below present the result of simulation with a 
community population size of 100000 agents. In Figure 10.16, the agents carried out 
120000 transactions while in Figure 10.17, the agents carried out 200000 agents. The 
percentage of non-compliant agents in this community varies from 10% to 90%. As 
we can observe, as the percentage of non-compliant agents in the community 
increases, the percentage of them being correctly identified also increases as a 
function of time or as a function of the number of transactions. Figure 10.16 plots the 
simulation results for a community with 100000 agents after 120000 transactions 
have been carried out. We continuously analyze the percentage of non-complying 
agents identified at every 1000 transactions. For example, in the first 1000 
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transactions, the percentage of non-compliant agents who were correctly identified 
by the third party agent is less than 10% for every percentage of non-compliant 
agents in the community. However, after several thousand transactions, the 
percentage of those correctly identified is over 70%. A similar pattern of results is 
also shown when the number of transactions carried out by agent increases by 
200000 as presented in Figure 10.17. As the number of transactions increases, the 
percentage of correctly identified non-complying agent also increases.  
 
Figure 10.16: Simulation using 100000 agents that carried out 120000 
transactions, percentage of non-compliant agents varying from 0.1 – 0.9. 
 
Figure 10.17: Simulation using 100000 agents that carried out 200000 
transactions, percentage of non-compliant agents varying from 0.1 – 0.9. 
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10.5.3 Discussion Results Obtained for Objective 5: The Ability 
to Identify all Non-compliant Agents in the Community 
Based on several results presented in the previous section, we conclude from these 
experiments that our TMM is effective in identifying all the non-compliant agents in 
the community. The role of the third party agent in monitoring the interaction based 
on the mutual agreement is a key in identifying those who are not trustworthy. If all 
non-compliant agents are identified, then the community will consist of only those 
members who are trustworthy or fully comply when carrying out a transaction. When 
the community is comprised of only compliant agents, then community sustainability 
can be achieved. We also conclude from these experiments that our proposed TMM 
is effective in accurately and reliably identifying the non-complying members in the 
community.  
10.6 Simulation for Objective 6: Maximizing 
Social Welfare of the Community 
The purpose of this objective is to determine whether our proposed TMM can help 
the community to increase the social welfare of its members. We define social 
welfare as the amount of gain that community members obtain from interacting with 
other community members. The sustainability of a virtual community can be 
achieved if all community members derive the maximum gain and incur minimum 
loss from their interaction with other members in community. In this section, we 
present the workflow of the simulation, the simulation results and discussion of 
associated results. 
10.6.1 Workflow of Simulation for Objective 6: Maximizing 
Social Welfare of the Community 
The steps involved in this simulation are as follows: 
a. Step 1. The user specifies all the parameter values used in this simulation as 
presented in Table 10.3.  
 
b. Step 2. During the bootstrapping phase, the agents are created and each of 
them is assigned a given behaviour. In this simulation, each agent will be 
assigned only one compliance level - either 0% (non-compliant) or 100% 
(compliant). A non-compliant agent is an agent who is not at all cooperative 
in any interaction. If this non-compliant agent carries out a transaction, s/he 
will never comply with the interaction agreement. On the other hand, a 
compliant agent with a 100% degree of compliance is an agent who always 
complies with the interaction agreement. From the trust and QoS delivery 
perspective, a non-compliant agent is an untrustworthy agent and a compliant 
agent is a trustworthy agent in delivering on the service requirements.  
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c. Step 3. During each transaction, a trusting agent and a trusted agent are 
randomly chosen. The trusting agent is chosen such that it is always a 
compliant agent which means this trusting agent has a 100% level of 
compliance. However, the compliance level of the randomly chosen trusted 
agent could be either total compliance or total non-compliance. The agents 
carry out an interaction as described in our TMM. Additionally, in order to 
measure and quantify the objective of the simulation, we added a scenario by 
which the third party agent has a record of both agents‟ performances during 
the transaction. The third party agent then passes this information to the 
administrator. The administrator uses this information as an input for a 
database of the agents‟ behaviour when carrying out transactions in a virtual 
community.   
The administrator then gives the third party agent access to this database in 
order to determine whether an agent should carry out or otherwise terminate a 
transaction with another agent. Hence, our proposed methodology provides a 
mechanism by which a third party agent will help an agent to determine 
whether or not to carry out an interaction with another agent. The 
determinants of gain or loss from an interaction are as follows:  
 If a given agent (say A) intends to interact with another trustworthy agent 
(say B), and the third party agent suggests that the interaction go ahead, 
then agent A will gain. Conversely,  
 If a given agent (say A) intends to interact with another trustworthy agent 
(say B) and the third party agent suggests that the interaction not go ahead 
(due to incorrect trust modelling of that agent by the third party agent), 
then agent A will lose (or incur loss).  
 If a given agent (say A) intends to interact with another untrustworthy 
agent (say B) and the third party agent suggests that the interaction go 
ahead, then the agent A will lose. Conversely, 
 If a given agent (say A) intends to interact with another untrustworthy 
agent (say B) and the third party agent suggests that the interaction not go 
ahead, then agent A will gain. 
 
d. Step 4. The statistical outcome of this simulation is gathered and presented to 
the user. It presents the total units of gain or loss from various numbers of 
transactions. We then analyze the results corresponding to the objective.  
10.6.2 Simulation Results for Objective 6: Maximizing Social 
Welfare of the Community 
Figure 10.18 below shows the sustainability benchmark tool prompting the user to 
input the parameters as shown in Table 10.3. 
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Figure 10.18: Screenshot of testing tool for maximizing social welfare of the 
community 
 
 
 
Figure 10.19: Simulation using 10000 agents that carried out 1000 transactions 
with 50% of them being non-compliant 
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Figure 10.20: Simulation using 10000 agents that carried out 1000 transactions 
with 90% of them being non-compliant 
Figure 10.19 shows the result of an experiment using a population of 10000 agents, 
50% of which are non-compliant. They carried out a total of 10000 transactions. As 
we can observe, as the number of transactions increases, the total gain of community 
members increases and the total loss of community members decreases. It can be 
concluded that our mechanism can help community members to interact and transact 
with trustworthy agents only, so that the total community gain is high while total loss 
is low.  
On the other hand, Figure 10.20 shows the total gain and total loss from 10000 
agents in a community where 90% of them are non-compliant. As the percentage of 
non-compliant agents is very high, we can observe that in the first 1000 transactions, 
the total loss is higher than the total gain. However, with the passage of time, the 
third party agent is able to increasingly model the compliance of the agents in the 
community accurately and completely. As a result of increasing „accurate‟ and 
„complete‟ compliance modelling of the agents in the community by third party 
agents, we can observe that after 5000 transactions, the total gain of the community 
(between 4000 – 5000 transactions) is greater than the total loss of the community 
(between 1001 – 2000 transactions, 2001 – 3000 transactions, and 3001 – 4000 
transactions). Moreover, the total loss of the community is higher than the total gain 
in the initial interaction (between 1000 – 2000 transactions) and almost similar in 
interaction between 2001 – 3000 transactions. This is because, in the initial number 
of transactions, the third party agent is not yet modelling accurately and completely 
the compliance behaviour of the agents in the community. However, with the 
passage of time, after 5000 transactions, the total loss is almost „0‟. A similar 
conclusion can be drawn for the total gain and total loss in the community as the 
number of transactions (time) increases. 
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Moreover, Figures 10.21, 10.22, and 10.23 show a comparison of total gain and total 
loss from 50000, 100000, and 200000 agents in community and the percentage of 
them being non compliant varies from 10% to 90%. The community members 
carried out a total of 100000 transactions and we show the total gain and total loss of 
the community in ten separate continuous transactions. 
a. Simulation Results from a community with 50000 agents, the number of 
transactions is 100000, and the percentage of them being non-compliant 
varies from 10% to 90%. 
 
Figure 10.21: Simulation using 50000 agents that carried out 1000000 
transactions with the percentage of non-compliant agents varying from 0.1 – 0.9 
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Figure 10.22. Simulation using 100000 agents that carried out 100000 
transactions with the percentage of non-compliant agents varying from 0.1 – 0.9 
 
Figure 10.23: Simulation using 200000 agents that carried out 1000000 
transactions with the percentage of non-compliant agents varying from 0.1 – 0.9 
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10.6.3 Discussion of Results Obtained for Objective 6: 
Maximizing Social Welfare of the Community 
The purpose of this benchmark evaluation is to capture the correlation between the 
percentage of non-compliant agents in the community and the total gain and total 
loss of community members. The results from several experiments as described in 
the previous section indicate that as the percentage of non-compliant agents in the 
community increases, total gain decreases and total loss increases. As a measure of 
the effectiveness of our methodology in creating a sustainable community by 
ascertaining the social welfare of community, the figures of the simulation results 
above show that the total gain is always higher than the total loss for each number of 
transactions. We also conclude from these experiments, that by using our TMM, the 
social gain of the community members steadily increases over time and the social 
loss of community members steadily decreases over time.  
Another purpose of this benchmark is to determine whether the members of the 
community can derive a maximum amount of total gain and minimum amount of 
total loss from carrying out an interaction with other community members. The role 
of the third party agent is to identify correctly the non-compliant agents as described 
in objective 2 of the engineered system in this chapter, and attempt to exclude these 
non-compliant agents from membership of the virtual community at the next point in 
time, thereby successfully gaining maximum welfare for the community. If all non-
compliant members are correctly identified, then the community will consist of only 
those members who are trustworthy agents (or complying) who would comply with 
the mutual agreement when carrying out an interaction. Hence, the community‟s total 
gain will be greater than its total loss. When the social welfare of the community has 
been established, then sustainability can be achieved. 
10.7 Simulation for Objective 7: Measuring the 
Sustainability Index of the Community 
In order to calculate the level of community sustainability, in this section, we 
propose a metric to measure the community sustainability index. This is to assist 
communities to measure the extent to which their community is sustainable. Two 
benchmark factors as described in the previous section are taken into consideration: 
the number of non-compliant agents in the community who have been correctly 
identified, and the social welfare of the community. The quicker the community is 
able to identify all its non-complying members, the faster is its progress toward 
sustainability. The second factor is the net gain value derived from an agent always 
insisting on interacting only with compliant agents. If the administrator successfully 
identifies and isolates those who are non-complying members, and retains compliant 
members in the community, then the community has a large number of compliant 
members. It may lead to a higher sustainability index. The formula used to calculate 
this index is as follows:  
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Total number of non-complying members correctly identified at time 't'
 + 
Total number of non-complying members in the community
Total Gain - Total Loss at time 't'
 
Total Gai
Sustainability Index
n + Total Loss          
 
Equation 10.1 Equation 10.1 
where  denote the weighting for the number of non-complying agents in the 
community and social welfare (total gain and total loss) of community members. The 
total value of α and β are „1‟. The scores of the sustainability index range from „0‟ to 
„1‟. The higher the sustainability index, the more sustainable is the virtual 
community. In order to show the progress of the sustainability index as a function of 
time using our methodology, we created a virtual community similar to the 
simulation for objective 4 – objective 7. The user can assign varying population sizes 
and number of transactions which will be carried out by the agent and the percentage 
of community members who are non-compliant. Figure 10.22 below shows the 
benchmark software tool for measuring the sustainability index.  
 
Figure 10.24: Benchmark testing tool for measuring the sustainability index of 
the community 
Figure 10.25 below illustrates the result of simulation using 5000 agents in a 
community with 25% of them being non-complying agents. These 5000 agents 
carried out a total of 5000 transactions. We divided the total number of transactions 
into 5 x 1000 transactions. Hence, the sustainability index in time t‟ is a 
representation of the sustainability index after 1000 transactions cumulatively.  
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Figure 10.25: Sustainability index of community with 5000 agents, 25% of them 
being non-compliant agents and carrying out 5000 transactions.  
 
Figure 10.26: Sustainability index of community with 100000 agents, 70% of 
them being non-compliant agents and carrying out 100000 transactions 
As we can observe from Figures 10.25 and 10.26 above, as the number of 
transactions increases, the sustainability index also increases. It means that our 
proposed TMM is able to support the increasing sustainability of a virtual 
community. The role of the third party agent in identifying the non-complying agents 
in the community is significant for creating the social welfare of community 
members. Figures 10.27, 10.28, 10.29 show the progress of the sustainability index 
with a different community size with the predefined percentage of non-compliant 
agents in the community varying from 0.1 to 0.9. 
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Figure 10.27: Sustainability index of community with 50000 agents that carried 
out 100000 transactions, percentage of non-compliant agent varying from 0.1 - 
0.9 
 
Figure 10.28: Sustainability index of community with 100000 agents that carried 
out 100000 transactions, percentage of non-compliant agent varying from 0.1 - 
0.9  
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Figure 10.29: Sustainability index of community with 200000 agents that carried 
out 100000 transactions, percentage of non-compliant agent varying from 0.1 - 
0.9  
10.7.1 Discussion of Results Obtained for Objective 7: Measuring 
the Sustainability Index of the Community  
Based on the results of several experiments, we can conclude that: 
a. The larger the percentage of non-complying agents in the community, as a 
function of time, the quicker (less number of transactions) it will be to 
identify non-complying agents in the community. Hence, communities with a 
large percentage of non-complying agents will progress toward a higher level 
of sustainability faster relative to communities with a lower percentage of 
non-complying agents. 
b. Irrespective of the percentage of non-complying agents, we can observe that 
for a given population size, the sustainability index gradually increases from 
0 to the maximum value (which in some cases the value is 1). This 
demonstrates the effectiveness of our methodology (compared to 
communities with a lower number of non-compliant agents in the 
community). 
c. As the population size continues to increase, so too does the amount of time it 
takes to achieve sustainability. 
10.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we present an additional performance validation for our proposed 
TMM. We further evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed TMM in facilitating the 
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sustainability of a virtual community in terms of maintaining the trust level between 
members and identifying the non-compliant agents in the community. In this chapter, 
the effectiveness of our proposed TMM is measured from these 4 (four) perspectives: 
(a) the accuracy of information provided by third party agent, (b) the ability to 
identify all non-compliant agents in the community, (c) maximizing the social 
welfare of the community, and (d) measuring the sustainability index of virtual 
community. 
Based on several benchmarks to evaluate the proposed methodology, we conclude 
that our methodology can help the community to identify the non-compliant 
members so that the administrator can make a decision to eliminate them from the 
community. Therefore, after a certain number of interactions, the community will be 
primarily comprised of those members who perform in a compliant manner when 
carrying out a transaction with any other community members. The sustainability of 
a virtual community can be determined by decreasing the number of non-complying 
agents in the community who will not (or most likely not) deliver service as agreed 
by their interacting party. Using our proposed TMM, community members (either as 
service provider or service requester) will interact according to their mutual 
agreement and supervised by a third party agent. The role of the third party agent 
who is independent and unbiased is to proactively monitor this interaction. 
Furthermore, with the help of our methodology, communities are able to measure the 
gain (social gain) and loss (social loss) of the community. This social gain and loss 
indicates the social welfare of a virtual community. By having only those community 
members who always comply with the mutual agreement in carrying out interactions 
with their interacting parties, the social welfare of the community will increase. The 
experimental results show that the higher the percentage of non-compliant members 
in the community, the quicker the community can identify them, thereby increasing 
the sustainability index much faster. Hence, by using our methodology, the 
sustainability index of a virtual community will progress significantly as a function 
of time (number of interactions carried out by members).  
Furthermore, we presented a metric to measure the sustainability index for a virtual 
community. We used the two criteria for virtual community sustainability 
(identifying non-compliance agent and social welfare) as inputs to measure the 
sustainability index. The result shows that with the help of our methodology, as the 
number of interactions increases, a virtual community will be able to identify all the 
non-compliant agents in the community, thereby promoting and increasing social 
welfare. Hence, the sustainability index will progress significantly as a function of 
time (number of interactions).  
In the next chapter, we recapitulate this work and provide suggestions for future 
research. 
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Chapter 11 - Recapitulation and 
Future Work 
11.1 Introduction 
The field of trust management and modelling has been given much attention by 
researchers. One of the key strategies in trust management is trust modelling. Studies 
on modelling trust and reputation values in online environments have been extensive 
due to the growing importance of this area. Generally speaking, this research area 
(trust modelling) can be broadly classified into two parts, namely, 'trust 
determination' and 'trust prediction'. Trust determination refers to the process of 
computing the trust value of an entity, at the current point in time, by making use of 
the current or previous trust values of the corresponding entity. In contrast, trust 
prediction refers to the process of making use of the current trust value or previous 
trust values of an entity to reliably predict its trust value at a future time slot. Both 
the trust determination and trust prediction can be seen as attempts to assign a trust 
value to a trusted agent (Raza, Hussain et al. 2010). 
However, after a trusting agent assigns or holds a trust value to another agent in a 
specific context, it is important that this trust value be maintained. Maintaining trust 
means retaining this value or, preferably, increasing it over a pre-defined duration of 
time. Moreover, trust is dynamic by nature in any kind of interaction, particularly in 
virtual environments where the interaction is not face-to-face. The trust value that a 
trusting agent has in a trusted agent may change dynamically due to the changing 
behaviour and performance of the trusted agent. As is evident from the literature 
review in Chapter 2, the fostering of a trust-based relationship has an evolutionary 
pattern. The pattern of this evolution can be classified into two broad classes: 
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continuous increasing and non-linear increment. The continuous increasing assumes 
that a trust value will increase over time as a function of the length of the 
relationship. The non-linear increment assumes that the trust value in an interaction 
follows a life cycle pattern just like a biological pattern in life. The life cycle pattern 
starts with building, then moves on to maintaining and then goes to declining. 
However, most of the current literature on trust modelling focuses only on trust 
determination. From the perspective of trust evolution, the literature is mainly 
concerned with how to build trust between two entities in an interaction. Very few 
studies are concerned with ways to maintain this trust value after it has been 
determined and established. 
Additionally, as is evident from Chapter 2, several researchers have suggested or 
noted the importance of trust maintenance. Additionally, several proposals have been 
made by various researchers to address the need for trust maintenance. At the same 
time however, the major shortcoming of these proposals is that none can be regarded 
as a complete methodology for maintaining trust. The reason for this is that firstly, 
most of the proposals present factors, variables and certain mechanisms based on a 
single factor or single component or single activity in order to maintain trust. 
Secondly, they use the terms building trust and maintaining trust synonymously. 
According to our analysis and evaluation of the trust and relationship evolution as 
presented in Chapter 2, there are different characteristics and features of the trust and 
relationship condition in each phase of the trust evolution cycle. This leads to the 
distinction between building trust and maintaining trust. As is also evident in Chapter 
2, after closer examination it is apparent that several works which use the term 
'maintaining trust', do not define maintaining as part of maintaining the trust value 
after trust determination or as part of the phase following trust building. Hence, the 
term „maintaining trust‟ that they use is actually referring to „building trust‟. Thirdly, 
the factors or variables proposed to maintain trust lack empirical validation. 
In order to propose a complete methodology for trust maintenance in virtual 
environments, in this thesis we identified and addressed seven related research 
issues. In the next section, we discuss the problems related to trust maintenance in 
virtual environments that were addressed in this thesis. In Section 11.3, we outline 
and discuss the contributions of this thesis to the existing literature. Section 11.4 
concludes the thesis and sets the stage for future work. 
11.2 Problems Addressed in This Thesis 
In this thesis, we addressed seven major issues associated with trust maintenance in 
virtual environments. In this thesis, we have attempted to:  
1. Defined the concepts of trust evolution, trust building, trust maintenance and 
trust decline including the features and characteristics of trust condition and 
relationship in each phase of the trust evolution cycle. 
2. Propose a framework for third party agent selection. In a TMM, we 
introduced the notion a third party agent into the relationship between two 
parties. This third party agent is a neutral party that will help both the 
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interacting parties to establish a successful relationship and ensure that trust 
has been maintained. Our proposed methodology contains frameworks to 
select a third party agent to supervise relationships in virtual environments. 
3. Proposed a framework for formalization and negotiation of service 
requirements. This framework enables two interacting parties to arrive at an 
agreement or create an SLA for their interaction in the trust maintenance 
phase. It involves activities such as both parties articulating the service 
requirements, negotiating on the service requirements, re-negotiating on 
certain service requirements, etc. The framework also presents guidance on 
how to construct an SLA based on the outcome of the negotiation process. 
4. Proposed a framework for real-time, proactive continuous monitoring of 
service deliverability. This framework is used to proactively monitor the 
performance of both parties during the time space of interaction and to 
maintain the level of trust between the two parties. 
5. Proposed a framework for providing an incentive mechanism to ensure the 
service delivery. This framework is used to motivate interacting parties to 
perform as closely as possible according to the terms of the mutual 
agreement.  
6. Proposed a framework for trust re-calibration. This framework is used to re-
calibrate the condition of the trust level of both interacting parties at the end 
of the interaction time space. 
7. Validate the proposed methodology for proof of concept by simulation and 
experiments. 
11.3 Contributions of This Thesis to the 
Existing Body of Literature 
The major contribution of this thesis to the existing literature is that it proposes a 
complete methodology for maintaining trust in virtual environments. The complete 
solution for TMM encompasses five frameworks which form the major contribution 
of this thesis to the existing literature. The frameworks are as follows: 
1. A framework for third party agent selection and a service business model 
proposal for an ASTM (Arbitration Service for Trust Maintenance) company. 
2. A framework for formalization and negotiation of service requirements. This 
is a framework for formalizing service requirements, negotiation of any 
conflicting requirements, and SLA construction.  
3. A framework for real-time, proactive continuous monitoring of service 
deliverability. It is a framework to proactively monitor the performance of 
both parties during the time space of interaction and to maintain the level of 
trust between the two parties. 
4. A framework for providing an incentive to ensure the service delivery. This 
framework encourages better performance by an agent in order to deliver 
service as close as possible to the terms of the mutual agreement. 
  
Page 312 of 319 
 
5. A framework for trust re-calibration. This is a framework that enables the 
trusting agent to calibrate its trust level in the trusted agent by the end of the 
interaction which occurs in the trust maintenance phase. 
In addition to the abovementioned frameworks, this thesis proposes conceptual 
definitions of the notions of trust evolution, trust building, trust maintenance and 
trust decline in virtual environments. This thesis provides a comprehensive state-of-
the-art survey of the various proposals in the existing literature for trust evolution 
and trust maintenance, which is an additional contribution of this thesis to the 
existing literature. Finally, a comprehensive validation of the proposed methodology 
was performed by conducting several simulations and experiments, the results of 
which are presented in this thesis. Additionally, in order to incorporate the dynamic 
nature of trust in a relationship, in simulation and experiments, we model the 
behaviour of agents as being both static and dynamic. Finally, we discussed how the 
sustainability of virtual communities can be achieved using our proposed 
methodology.  
In this section, we provide a very brief overview of all the seven contributions made 
by this thesis to the existing literature. 
11.3.1 Contribution 1: State of the Art Survey of Present 
Literature 
In Chapter 2, we carried out an extensive survey of the existing research in trust 
evolution and strategies for maintaining trust. To the best of our knowledge, existing 
researchers who have presented studies on trust evolution (Jones and George 1998; 
Marcy and Skvoretz 1998; Currall and Epstein 2003; Vlaar, Bosch et al. 2007; 
Ybarra and Turk 2009) did not present details of the features and characteristics of 
trust and relationship at each stage or phase of the trust evolution process. Moreover, 
the literature survey carried out and presented in Chapter 2 of this thesis is the first of 
its type to focus comprehensively and in detail on the relationship characteristics and 
the trust level condition at each phase of trust evolution.  
Moreover, we present the definition of each phase of the trust relationship which 
comprises: building, maintaining and declining. In addition, we carried out an 
extensive survey of the proposals in the existing literature regarding trust 
maintenance. As we discussed in Chapter 2, none of them proposes a complete 
methodology for maintaining trust in virtual environments.  
For the purpose of discussion and evaluation, we divided the existing literature into 
three classes based on the research approach employed by a given proposal to 
maintain trust. The three categories under which we classified the existing literature 
are as follows: 
 
1. Factors / Variables-based Approach 
The existing approaches are classified under this class if they present factors 
or variables that need to be considered in trust maintenance. Put simply, we 
placed proposals into this class if they suggested what could be done to 
maintain trust between entities. 
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2. Process-based Approach 
The existing approaches are grouped under this class if they present 
mechanisms or events or activities to maintain trust. For simplicity, we 
placed the existing proposals into this class if they addressed the issue of 
how to maintain trust between entities. 
3. Hybrid-based Approach 
The existing literature is placed in this class if it provides a combination of 
factors-based and process-based approaches. 
 
We grouped the proposals by various researchers according to one of the above three 
classes and reviewed them. On reviewing them, we found shortcomings with the 
current approach which set the scene for solving the research problems addressed in 
this thesis. 
 
11.3.2 Contribution 2: Definition of Related Concept in Trust 
Evolution Pattern 
As was mentioned previously, the existing literature does not provide a definition of 
trust evolution or a definition of each phase of trust evolution. Additionally, the 
existing literature fails to provide details about the characteristics and features of 
trust level and relationship condition between both trusting agent and trusted agent in 
each phase of the trust evolution process. 
The second major contribution of this thesis is that it proposes a definition of trust 
evolution during a long-term interaction. The concept of trust evolution and its 
phases (building trust, maintaining trust and declining trust) were defined in Chapter 
4. The various characteristics and features of the trust and relationship in each phase 
were explained clearly in Chapter 4. To the best of our knowledge, this thesis is the 
first attempt to provide a clear distinction between and definition of „building trust‟ 
and „maintaining trust‟. 
11.3.3 Contribution 3: Framework for Third Party Agent 
Selection 
The third contribution of this thesis is that it proposes a framework for third party 
agent selection in virtual environments. The framework was discussed in Chapter 5. 
To the best of our knowledge, the existing literature does not discuss the role of a 
third party agent in such a relationship between trusting agent and trusted agent from 
the perspective of „soft trust‟. Most of the discussions in the existing literature 
regarding the provision of a third party agent are from the perspective of hard trust. 
In this thesis, we consider the role of the third party agent from the perspective of 
soft trust. The difference between hard trust and soft trust was explained in detail in 
Chapter 1, Chapter 2 and Chapter 4.  
Moreover, the third party agent that we proposed has a different role from that of the 
third party agent that has been widely discussed in the literature. Our proposed third 
party agent is a „proactive-corrective‟ agent, whereas in the existing literature, the 
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role of the third party agent is „corrective‟ only. Hence, ours is a novel framework for 
choosing a third party agent in virtual environments. Additionally, we also propose a 
new service business model in the case of an agent intending to build a new service 
company which offers the services of a professional third party agent in virtual 
environments. Finally, we validate this framework by analyzing the effectiveness of 
the role of third party agent in relationship between two parties in maintaining the 
trust level.  
11.3.4 Contribution 4: Framework for Formalization and 
Negotiation of Service Requirements 
The fourth major contribution of this thesis is that it proposes a framework for the 
formalization and negotiation of service requirements to construct an SLA. This SLA 
would be used as the basis for trust monitoring and trust re-calibration at the end of 
the interaction. The framework was discussed in Chapter 6. To the best of our 
knowledge, the existing literature does not propose any framework for formalizing 
and negotiating service requirements in the trust maintenance phase. The salient 
features of this framework are as follows: 
1. It presents a service formalization template by which both parties can 
articulate their service requirements in a structured way. This structured 
information will facilitate the negotiation process in order to reach a Service 
Level Agreement. 
2. It presents a service description map (SDM) to enable both interacting parties 
to identify any conflicting requirements that they will address in the 
negotiation phase.  
3. It proposes a method by which the interacting parties can negotiate and agree 
upon the service criteria which could be based on several previous 
interactions (interactions during the trust building phase). 
4. It proposes a method by which the interacting parties can determine and 
articulate the service requirements to formalize the delivery of service criteria 
being agreed to during the interaction. 
5. It provides a negotiation framework by which the interacting parties can 
negotiate any conflicting requirements. 
6. It provides a method by which the interacting parties translate the service 
criteria agreement into an SLA. 
11.3.5 Contribution 5: Framework for Proactive Continuous 
Performance Monitoring 
The fifth major contribution of this thesis is that it proposes a framework for 
proactive continuous performance monitoring which was discussed in Chapter 7. To 
the best of our knowledge, the existing literature does not propose any framework for 
proactive continuous monitoring which takes into account the dynamic nature of 
trust, the dynamic nature of an agent‟s performance and the characteristic features of 
the trust maintenance phase.  The salient features of this framework are as follows: 
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1. It presents a mechanism for determining the number of time slot(s) and 
checkpoints in an interaction. This number of time slot(s) and checkpoints are 
designed to review the performance of the trusted agent continuously and 
proactively. 
2. It proposes a mechanism by which both the interacting parties and third party 
agent can gather the information regarding the performance of both 
interacting parties in real time. 
3. It proposes a method for addressing the scenario in which there are 
performance gaps during the interaction. 
4. It presents a mechanism for calculating intermediate trust value in an 
interaction. 
5. It models the static and dynamic behaviour of agents in the community in 
delivering service as mutually agreed. 
6. We validate the effectiveness of the framework by comparing transactions 
which use our framework for proactive continuous monitoring with 
transactions which do not use this framework 
11.3.6 Contribution 6: Framework for Incentive Mechanism for 
Successful Service Delivery  
The sixth major contribution of this thesis is that it proposes a framework for an 
incentive mechanism during the interaction in the trust maintenance phase. The 
details of the framework were discussed in Chapter 8. To the best of our knowledge, 
the existing literature does not propose incentive mechanisms for trust maintenance.  
We validate the three different incentive mechanisms by running several simulations 
in our engineered prototypes. We show the effectiveness of transactions which use 
our incentive mechanism framework compared with transactions which do not use 
this framework. 
11.3.7 Contribution 7: Framework for Trust Re-calibration  
The seventh major contribution of this thesis is that it proposes a framework for trust 
re-calibration at the end of the interaction. It is important to note here that the trust 
re-calibration is carried out at the end of the interaction. To the best of our 
knowledge, the existing literature does not propose any framework for trust re-
calibration in interaction which occurs during the trust maintenance phase. The 
detailed framework was discussed in Chapter 9. The salient features of this 
framework are as follows: 
1. The framework takes into account all the criteria involved in the interaction 
with the trusted agent, when calculating the intermediate trust and final trust 
value.  
2. The framework takes into account whether a given criterion, based on which 
the trusting agent is going to assign a trustworthiness value to the trusted 
agent, has been mutually agreed to by the interacting partners. 
3. The framework takes into account the importance of each criterion involved 
in the interaction between the trusting agent and the trusted agent. 
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4. The framework takes into account the static and dynamic behaviour of agents 
during the interaction. 
5. The framework takes into account the incentive involved in proactive 
continuous performance monitoring. 
6. It proposes three different approaches for trust re-calibration, each of which is 
unique and can be used for preferences bases. 
7. In order to demonstrate the workability of this framework, we validate this 
framework by running several simulations under various conditions using our 
engineered prototype. 
11.3.8 Contribution 8: Facilitating the Sustainability of Virtual 
Community 
By using our TMM, in this thesis we additionally demonstrated how it can be used to 
promote the sustainability of a virtual community. Hence, the eighth major 
contribution of the thesis is that it proposes a framework for facilitating the creation 
of sustainability of a virtual community. It is important to note here that 
sustainability has been discussed widely in the existing literature. However, none of 
the works has considered the sustaining or maintaining of a trust value in interactions 
between members in the community as a factor that needs to be considered in order 
to sustain the community. The details of the framework were discussed in Chapter 10 
along with the validation process of the framework. The salient features of this 
framework are as follows: 
1. The framework is the first and only one of its type which is concerned with 
developing a sustainability measurement index as a means of capturing the 
sustainability of the virtual community. This is also the first work of its type 
to deal with the creation of sustainable virtual communities. 
2. The framework assists administrators or organizers of a virtual community to 
identify untrustworthy agents.  The presence of non-compliant agents in a 
virtual community can be seen as signal-to-noise that is very detrimental to 
the sustainability and growth of the virtual community. 
3. The proposed framework shows how a virtual community can be sustained by 
means of using a third party agent to conduct proactive continuous 
performance monitoring of members‟ interactions. 
4. In order to measure the overall sustainability of the virtual community, we 
propose a sustainability index or sustainability coefficient that represents the 
degree of sustainability of a virtual community and we validate the 
sustainability index by running several simulations under various parameters 
condition. 
In Chapters 9 and 10, we demonstrated the effectiveness of our TMM by carrying out 
several simulations and experiments. We developed various benchmarks to measure 
the effectiveness of our methodology and conclude that our methodology is capable 
enough of maintaining trust between parties in virtual environments. Although in the 
existing literature, policies and strategies have been proposed for maintaining trust in 
a relationship, there is a lack of empirical validation. Additionally, our TMM is also 
valid enough for facilitating the creation of a sustainable community in virtual 
environments. 
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11.4 Conclusion and Future Work 
The work that we have undertaken in this thesis has been published extensively as a 
part of proceedings in peer reviewed international conferences and international 
journals. We have attached list of selected publications including 4 (four) journal 
papers currently under review, 4 (four) international conference papers, and 3 (three) 
journal papers which are being written.  
Although we have undertaken much research on the topic of this study, we feel that 
there is plenty of scope for further work. It is our intention to continue working on 
this topic, primarily along, but not limited to, the following lines: 
1. Use ontology powered negotiation and formalization of service requirements 
in the trust maintenance phase. A domain driven negotiation ontology will be 
developed and would be leveraged during the negotiation and formalization 
process documented in this thesis. This would enable automated negotiation 
amongst agents and resolve conflicts (semantic in nature) during the 
negotiation process.  
2. Leverage the developed service formalization and negotiation approach to 
automatically monitoring the performance progress based on the agreed SLA. 
We will make use of process mining techniques to achieve this. 
3. Employ a Fuzzy-logic-based method for trust calculation and measurement 
which includes the measurement of intermediate trust value and final trust 
value. Currently, our trust calculation uses crisp data inputs (level of 
importance and clarity of criteria). In our future work, we intend to use fuzzy 
logic to deal with uncertainty and the tolerance of imprecise data inputs such 
as level of importance and clarity of criteria when measuring the intermediate 
trust and final trust. 
4. Develop a methodology for trust dissolution. The methodology would enable 
a given trusting agent to produce a well-planned interaction dissolution 
without losing or decreasing the current trust level with its interacting partner. 
In our future work, we intend to make use of machine learning methods that 
would enable both the interacting parties to create a formal structure or plan 
to dissolve a trust based relationship. Such an approach for trust dissolution 
would result in a win-win solution for both the interacting parties when the 
parties no longer intend to continue their strategic interaction. 
5. Develop a Sustainable Community index for dynamic behaviour in a virtual 
community. As a part of our future work, we intend to use the dynamic 
behaviour of members in a virtual community. Currently, in our simulation 
for creating a sustainable community, we considered the behaviour of 
members in the community to be static. Additionally, the behaviour of the 
trusted agent comprises only two types: a compliant or a non-compliant 
agent. This is unlike the validation to measure the effectiveness of our 
methodology by comparing initial trust and final trust, whereby the trusted 
agent can behave according to six classes of trustworthiness value. We intend 
to carry out further simulations and experiments in which members in the 
community behave according to six different classes of trustworthiness value.  
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6. Implement the methodology and framework proposed in this thesis in a 
virtual marketplace. 
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ABSTRACT 
Trust is widely acknowledged as being important for the efficient 
and effective operation of business in virtual environments. This 
is because trust functions like a glue that holds and links virtual 
agents together as they relate and collaborate remotely. In virtual 
environments, trust needs to be established swiftly as there is little 
time to build it gradually in the absence of face-to-face meetings.  
However, the manner in which trust develops and is maintained is 
a critical factor in relationships, both physically and virtually. In 
virtual environments, trust needs to be managed including 
network connection as well as social aspects of interaction. 
Maintaining trust in virtual environments is defined as an effort to 
maximize the benefits of such virtual relationship and to prevent 
the level of trust from decreasing. In this paper, we undertake a 
general survey of the current situation of trust maintenance in 
virtual environments. We review several researches from the 
perspective of terminology, strategies presented, and types of 
strategies. We describe the benefits and shortcomings of each 
strategy, conduct an integrative review of these strategic 
approaches, and make suggestions for future research. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
E.m [Miscellaneous]: Trust 
General Terms 
Human Factors, Security. 
Key Words 
Trust Maintenance, Virtual Environments.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The emergence of virtual business denotes an important new type 
of business strategy [1]. In virtual business, physical location is 
not important, since network technology and the Internet are used 
to link members or companies across the world. It allows them to 
share information, resources and costs that enable them to 
compete on a world wide scale. Traditionally, a manager is linked 
to his subordinates through skill, authority and physical location. 
In virtual environments, companies are linked together on projects 
for which they may have no prior history, and that negate a 
manager’s ability to provide his knowledge of the task at hand if 
he/she has never encountered it before. This type of company has 
many advantages over traditional ones, including the ability to 
bridge time and space, and better utilize distributed human 
resources without physical relocation of employees. The strengths 
of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) play a 
significant role in supporting business activities. 
Kanawattanachai and Yoo [2] state that trust is one of the 
fundamental factors that drive the success and failure of virtual 
business. This is because trust functions like an adhesive that 
holds and links virtual agents together as they operate remotely 
from each other. However, virtual relationships lack a shared 
work history which, coupled with the absence of face-to-face 
communication, makes it harder for virtual agents to gather 
information and evaluate one another’s behaviors. Trust is said to 
be one party’s expectation of the other party’s competence, 
goodwill and behavior [3]. However, this definition ignores the 
temporal and context-specific nature of trust. Chang et al. 
proposed a definition of trust which takes into account its 
temporal dimension [4]. They define trust as ‘the belief the 
trusting agent has in the trusted agent’s willingness and capability 
to deliver a mutually agreed service in a given context and in a 
given time slot, as expected by the trusting agent’. In a business 
context, both competencies in a given context and goodwill to 
deliver are required in order for trust to develop. Competencies 
such as technical capabilities, skills and knowledge are also 
required for building trust in a business exchange.  
  
Moreover, Chang et al. state ‘in a virtual environment, a trust 
relationship is established between two parties who normally have 
never met or may never meet and where communication takes 
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place through a virtual interaction medium’. [4].  Kasper-Fuehrer 
et al. argue that trust is essential for the functioning and success of 
the virtual relationship because it acts as a substitute for two 
critical factors that exist in most traditional business interactions, 
but which are usually absent in virtual environments [5]. The first 
of these factors is an endogenous factor: the hierarchical control 
associated with traditional business. The second is exogenous: the 
legal framework needed to regulate the formation, operation and 
dissolution. Therefore, assessing and maintaining the 
trustworthiness in virtual environments need a different approach 
as neither party is familiar with the other. This trust has been 
termed a ‘swift trust model’, because of the lack of time to build 
trust gradually. It is assumed from the beginning and then either 
confirmed or dispelled throughout  the duration of the project and 
both parties’ interactions [6]. 
Trust has evolutionary phases both in physical and virtual 
environments [7, 8]. The pattern of this trust life cycle involves 
building, maintaining and destroying. In the first stage of a 
relationship, the trust level starts from a baseline of either trust or 
distrust. However, as the relationship progresses, we may find that 
the level of trust may either increase or decrease (relative to the 
initial trust level). The direction of the movement of trust value 
(increase / decrease) and the amount of increase/decrease is 
dependent on the capability and willingness of the other 
interacting party. With the passage of time, one may find that trust 
between two parties reaches a high level (which may be greater 
than positive trust). This is the optimum time to maintain the 
relationship between parties as neither party has taken any action 
that erodes the trust. If, however, trust-destroying occurs, then the 
level of trust drops quickly into the lower level or may enter the 
domain of distrust. A significant effort in this destroying stage 
needs to be made in order to return to just the initial, baseline 
trust. According to [9], trust in virtual environments appears to be 
fragile. Despite the fragility of trust in virtual environments, it is 
important to both build and maintain it.. 
 
In the field of virtual trust evolution research, most of the 
discussions focus on ways to produce and develop trust in virtual 
environments. Some models have been proposed for producing, 
developing and enhancing trust. However, in virtual 
environments, agents meet only occasionally, or not at all. This 
type of trust is known to be fragile; however, it is dispersed easily. 
Hence, it is more important to maintain trust than to build it in 
virtual environments [7]. Some studies also suggested the need for 
research into ways to maintain the trust level in virtual 
environments [4, 10] Therefore, in this paper,  we briefly review 
some of the research work on trust maintenance in virtual 
environments. Additionally, we discuss some strategies on how to 
maintain trust in virtual environments and provide an integrative 
review of these strategies. 
2. The Dynamic Nature of Trust 
Trust is not static and automatic; it involves calculated risks and 
requires time to build [11].  The traditional models of trust 
explain the evolution of trust that is mainly built upon 
accumulated personal knowledge, while the swift trust in virtual 
environments explains the high levels of trust observed in 
situations where personal and history-based knowledge is not 
available [9].  Initial high trust is more robust when the parties 
have frequent face-to-face interaction.  However, in virtual 
environments, agents have never previously met or worked 
together and have a limited time to work on completing a task.  
They do not have ways to engage in more traditional, enduring 
forms of confidence-building activities that contribute to the 
development and maintenance of trust.  Lacking the traditional 
sources of trust – familiarity, shared experience and reciprocal 
disclosure, people are expected to demonstrate low levels of 
trusting behaviors; however, studies have found the existence of 
high levels of trust during such virtual interactions [12].  
Studies of global virtual teams (GVTs) also have observed high 
initial trust among team members. According to the traditional 
view of trust evolution, limited trusting behaviors are expected in 
GVTs where members have no common past or future physical 
relationship, are culturally diverse and geographically dispersed, 
and communicate via various ICTs [9]. The traditional 
developmental view of the dynamic nature of trust assumes that 
trust resides in personal relationship. Past or future membership in 
common social networks would define the shared norms of 
obligation and responsibility. Rapid development of virtual trust 
is helped by role-based interaction (rather than person-based 
interaction), and by the greater use of category-driven information 
processing. With insufficient time to build proper expectations 
from prior interactions, agents in virtual environments tend to use 
expectations built on categories reflecting roles, cultural cues, or 
occupation and identity-based stereotypes [13].  
Moreover, in co-located teams, agents have the opportunity to 
easily develop relationships. Face-to-face interactions in the 
physical location allow members to interact socially and get to 
know each other. They can discuss each other’s work and their 
reactions can be expressed verbally or non-verbally. Both the 
social bonds and the professional respect leading to trust can be 
developed during these interactions. On the other hand, when they 
are dispersed, it is more difficult to create emotional bonds that 
can lead to trust based on assessment of benevolence [14]. Hence, 
in virtual environments, where many of the traditional ways in 
which humans establish bonds through physical contact and 
socializing are absent or at best limited, the importance of 
building and maintaining trust assumes pivotal importance [15] 
Based on the review of the dynamic nature of virtual trust above, 
we argue that in virtual environments, the greatest attention 
should be given to the maintaining phase. Once positive trust has 
been established in such a relationship, it should be maintained to 
maximize the benefits of the relationship. However, there is no 
definition in the existing literature that differentiates between 
creating, building, developing and maintaining trust. Some 
models or practices presented in the literature use the terms 
building, developing and maintaining trust in virtual 
environments as synonyms. 
3. Strategies for Maintain Trust in Virtual 
Environments 
In the existing literature, there are many discussions on strategies 
for maintaining trust in virtual environments. However, they are 
more focused on building and establishing the level of trust than 
on the maintaining phase. In addition, most of the studies 
presented some good management practices and legal frameworks 
that can adopted by virtual business entities for building, 
establishing or maintaining trust in virtual environments [5, 9, 12, 
13]. However, there is no clearly established difference between 
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creating, building, developing and maintaining the level of trust. 
In the next section, we discuss some of the strategies for trust 
maintenance in virtual environments and conduct an integrative 
review based on our analysis of 12 articles (see table 1). 
3.1 Effective Communication of 
Trustworthiness 
Trust has traditionally been assumed to be based on a history of 
interactions, through which people come to ‘know and trust’ one 
another. However, in a virtual environment, agents meet only 
occasionally, or not at all. They interact through computer-
mediated communication [9]. Therefore, communication of 
trustworthiness, which is predicated on appropriate use of ICT, 
has been emphasized by some scholars as a main strategy for 
building and maintaining trust in virtual environments. 
Communication of trustworthiness is defined as ‘an interactive 
process that affects, monitors, and guides members’ actions and 
attitudes in their interactions with one another, and that ultimately 
determines the level of trust that exists between them’ [5]. Some 
authors make a distinction between effective communication to 
manage this virtual trust based on physical ICT components, and 
human ICT components. 
3.1.1 Physical ICT Components 
One characteristic of virtual environments is the lack of face-to-
face meeting and physical relationship. Its communication system 
is mediated by technology such as instant messaging/IM, email, 
audio and videoconferencing, etc. Some studies say that this 
electronic linking in order to complete the production process and 
building trust depends on the good structure of information and 
communication technology that they used [16]. Adequate quality 
of communication technology is a requirement among team 
members to initiate and respond. Therefore, the physical quality 
of information technology is an enabler of trust in virtual 
environments [13]. An adequate infrastructure of technology 
becomes the most important factor to develop communication of 
trustworthiness and hence, it will develop trust among virtual 
agents. Moreover, Mezgar [17] argue that there are two 
approaches in building trust. One of them is the IT approach. In 
this approach, communication security has to increase by different 
architecture, protocols, certification, cryptography, authentication 
procedures and standard. Generating trust by this security service 
will increase confidentiality, integrity, authentication and 
identification. As virtual agents lack a social relationship for 
building trust, computer technology mediated communication has 
to be extended with more senses (such as touch, taste, smell). It 
needs to make use of more than just hearing and vision. These 
arguments show that strategic impact depends on virtual business 
entities being able to provide satisfactory ICT equipment. 
3.1.2 Human ICT Components 
This approach is based on the argument that technology does not 
do anything to improve effective trustworthiness communication 
in virtual environments without human intervention [9]. Human 
factor intervention is regarded as an important means of building 
effective and efficient communication. Mezgar [17] argues that 
the structure, the communication systems and the collaborating 
people/teams/organizations must be harmonized to accomplished 
complex and demanding tasks in virtual environments. Therefore, 
human habit communication plays a significant role in effective 
communication to build and maintain trust. Iacono and Weisband 
[16] suggest that the forming of good communication habits (e.g., 
checking and responding to email as demanded by task) is 
important to build active communication and consistent 
interaction in virtual environments. It becomes a foundation for 
cooperative and interdependent work in a virtual team. Moreover, 
Coppola [12] presents a study of trust development in online 
courses. It suggests that establishment of early communications is 
needed to perceive that the instructor is physically present among 
virtual class members. This situation will develop a positive social 
atmosphere to build trust in virtual environments. Moreover, the 
reinforcement of predictable patterns in communication and 
action will encourage the involvement of team members in task 
completion. In order to achieve this communication pattern, 
instructors need to motivate, encourage and require participation 
of virtual members to communicate often. Furthermore, Xiao and 
Wei offer some principles for trust construction and maintenance 
in virtual relationship [7]. One of them is the importance of 
repeated communication to restore trust among members. They 
argue that communication not only fosters trust development, but 
it can also  re-establish the trust level in their relationship and 
avoid the existence of distrust. 
Therefore, a virtual business network is characterized by face-to-
face contact that is too costly or simply not possible. Trust is 
floating and sustained throughout the ability of communication 
between trusting parties. Effective communication by means of 
adequate ICT and communication behaviors of humans is one way 
of building and maintaining trust in virtual environments.  
3.2 Relational Contract or Agreement on 
Norms and Procedures 
Mezgar [17] and Greenberg et al. [14] state that in virtual 
environments, formal rules, procedures, clear reporting 
relationships and norms are absent as agents more extensively use 
informal computer mediated communication and they are distant 
from each other. However, some authors argue that virtual a 
business network should agree on the norms or procedures in their 
relationship in order to improve trustworthiness. Kashper-Fuehrer 
et al. offer two important factors for development of trust across 
virtual relationship. Common business understanding (production, 
cooperation and agreement) is needed to collaborate and achieve a 
common goal between virtual network members. This common 
business understanding can be achieved through negotiating a 
relational contract [5]. Secondly, a high standard of business 
ethics is also needed amongst virtual collaborators. These two 
factors will create a mutually agreed behavior or communication 
pattern in a virtual trust relationship. Even though agents may 
never or meet rarely, their behavior should be guided by stable 
normative form that is agreed upon between them.  
In addition, Clases et a.l [13] argue that for the building, 
development and emergence of trust, virtual business entities need 
to create a culture of proactive collaboration that requires de-
contextualized ‘rules of the games’. Although their findings show 
that the clarity of this ‘rules of games’ has a weaker influence on 
the emergence of trust, personal-based and trust-based on de-
contextualized rules support each other in building reliable 
relationships. Nevertheless, it seems that various roles need to be 
institutionalized to direct the collaboration and communication 
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style of virtual agents.Nevertheless, it seems that various 
proponents of this view, Hung et al. [6] suggest one of the 
strategies that they offer for managing trust in computer mediated 
communication is to create well established rules and patterns of 
using various communication to increase the level of control. This 
is in order to address one of the characteristics of virtual 
environments which is the absence of vertical control, hierarchical 
authority and formalized procedures and policies [18], Javernpaa 
et al. explain the role of control actions in virtual environments. 
Control actions such as proactive and task output based, explicit 
time and process management, frequent and predicative 
communication will facilitate the development and maintenance 
of trust in virtual situations [19]. Hence, formalization of control 
action is an important factor to assist in trust maintenance in 
virtual environments. The most effective way of maintaining these 
trust attitudes in virtual environments is to create obligations 
amongst trusting parties. 
3.3 Attention on Task and Group Life Cycle 
Some authors argue that the characteristics of virtual business are 
similar to those of a temporary group setting [9, 16, 20]. Virtual 
temporary networks and electronic teams convert individual skills 
into interdependent work products in a short period of time while 
using computer-based communication technologies to coordinate 
their work. Members of a virtual network have no prior history of 
working together and little prospect of working together again in 
the future. As a result, a temporary virtual group must move 
forward quickly to accomplish its goal; members must act swiftly 
and need to work continuously and consistently to maintain 
expectations of trust [16]. Hence, some authors explore the 
communication behaviors to develop and maintain trust through 
the life cycle of a virtual team.  A study by Javernpaa et al. [9] 
divided the communication behaviors and member actions that 
facilitate trust into early Group’s life and later Group’s life. Social 
communication such as communication of enthusiasm to build 
trust is needed in early group life. At this stage, coping with 
technical uncertainty and individual initiative from members will 
facilitate trust early in the group’s life. While later in a group’s 
life, positive leadership, predictable communications, substantial 
and timely response to crises are communication behaviors that 
maintain the level of trust.  
Moreover, Greenberg et al. [14] propose actions from managers 
and team leaders for each life cycle virtual team stage on how to 
help members develop and sustain trust throughout the project to 
its successful completion. They divide the virtual team stage into 
five stages: establishing the team, inception, organizing, transition 
and accomplishing the task. In the first stage, choosing members, 
training and a clear reward structure are needed to build 
dispositional trust. In the second stage, the introduction of team 
members and team building exercises are needed to swiftly build 
and sustain trust. In the third stage, there is an evaluation of 
member participation and members are encouraged to participate 
in communicating in a virtual environment in order to change the 
form of trust from ability- and integrity-based to benevolence- and 
integrity-based. Moreover, in the fourth stage, transition, leaders 
and managers must always be available to support and guide 
members and move their focus from procedures to the 
accomplishment of the task. In the last stage, the type of trust is 
based more on benevolence and integrity. Leaders and managers 
need to encourage supportive communication among members in 
order to accomplish the task. 
Both of those studies focus strongly on communication behavior 
among virtual agents in order to complete a common task within a 
finite life span. As they argue that a virtual team is similar to a 
temporary group setting, the type of trust in each task life cycle 
would be different. Consequently, they argue that the strategy 
used to manage trust between members and communication 
behavior would be different at each stage of the task and group 
life cycle. 
3.4 Benefit and Shortcomings of Each 
Strategy 
3.4.1 Effective Communication of Trustworthiness 
Effective communication of trustworthiness is in fact a tool for 
building and maintaining trust in virtual environments. All of the 
studies note that efficient and repeated communication is needed 
to show the sign of trustworthiness between trusting parties. 
Because they interact in a virtual medium, the quality of ICT 
requires significant attention. Some authors pay more attention to 
the technology infrastructure [5, 17] while others focus on the 
human component [6, 9, 16]. Both of these components - physical 
quality and human behavior - are important and must be 
harmonized in creating, developing and maintaining a virtual trust 
relationship. However, we note that there is no discussion on how 
to provide feedback in virtual communication to show the level of 
trustworthiness. Feedback is known as an evaluative response to 
an action, process or event. We argue that performance feedback 
is a significant part of the communication process. They do not 
provide a clear explanation of how to give feedback or evaluations 
in virtual communication.  
3.4.2 Relational Contract or Agreement on Norms 
and Procedures 
Although a virtual business relationship is characterized by a lack 
of control and authority, some authors argue that a formal, legal 
framework is still needed to guide the interaction between trusting 
parties in virtual environments. This argument is reasonable, 
because the risk of opportunistic behaviour by trusting parties is a 
challenge to the success of virtual business relationship. However, 
there is no control design mechanism provided. Most of authors 
only provide a theoretical foundation on the need of control or 
legal framework in virtual relationship. The discussion on 
relational contract also ignores the importance of negotiation to 
discuss the contract or agreement between parties. As relationship 
in virtual environments is lack of central authority, hence, control 
form or legal framework must be negotiated by the trusting 
parties. Moreover, control approach that offered by [9] only with 
respect to problems within hierarchical relationship. In inter-
organization virtual relationship such as joint venture, outsourcing 
relationship or value adding partnership (VAP), it is lack of 
hierarchical structure. Therefore, it needs to develop a negotiation 
mechanism about control forms that they will use. 
3.4.3 Attention on Task and Group Life Cycle 
Two authors are concerned with one of the characteristics of 
relationships in virtual environments that are similar to temporary 
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work groups [9, 14]. Therefore, they provide a different 
mechanism for building and maintaining trust in each team’s life 
cycle. If, however, the task is repeated many times, it should be 
not necessary to pay attention to each team life cycle. Hence, 
attention should be paid more to the dynamic nature of trust or 
trust life cycle in virtual environments. 
4. Integrative Review and Suggestion for 
Future Research 
In this section, we briefly discuss twelve articles for maintaining 
trust in virtual environments from the perspective of use of terms, 
strategic approaches offered and type of strategy. It is observed 
that most studies use the terms building, developing, and 
maintaining as synonyms of each other, which indicates that in 
the existing literature, there is much confusion between the terms 
‘trust formation’, ‘trust building’, ‘trust developing’ and ‘trust 
maintaining’. They do not distinguish between these activities. 
However, based on trust evolution theory, there are different 
phases and activities in the trust life cycle. Therefore, every stage 
or phase in trust evolution would have a different model or 
method of organizational practices.  
In addition, most of works that have been undertaken by scholars 
as discussed above offered only some practices, policies and 
procedures to create, build, engender and maintain a trusting 
agent relationship in a virtual environment.  Moreover, these 
practices and policies stand alone or run in isolation in virtual 
environments. Therefore, no complete methodology exists for 
maintaining trust in an organization. We define methodology as a 
sequence of steps that can be used by trusting parties to maintain 
their trust levels in such a relationship. Further research is needed 
to provide a complete and comprehensive methodology for 
maintaining trust in virtual environments.  
We also note that there is a need to provide an independent third 
party in a virtual trust relationship. Two of the twelve articles 
provide the role of managers to develop and maintain this trusting 
relationship [9, 14]. We argued that a manager plays a role as a 
third party in virtual relationships between peers. However, there 
is still need to give attention to the important role of an 
independent third party in a trusting relationship between a 
trusting agent and a trusted agent. Firstly, effective 
communication in virtual environments is more task-performance-
based than affective or emotion-based. Although there are many 
ways to develop emotion-based trust in computer mediated 
communication, it probably will not suffice to maintain task-
competence-based trust in virtual environments. Because 
competence-based trust is derived from a calculative and rational 
process, the role of this third party is important. The third party 
needs to provide task-relevant background information or 
recommendations on trusting parties in virtual environments. It 
will make it easier for trusting parties to develop task-
performance-based trust as well as emotion-based trust. 
Secondly, members’ interaction and communication in a virtual 
environment is computer mediated. The risk of conflict in this 
situation is higher than in a face-to-face relationship. This is 
because non-verbal cues are absent in virtual communication. 
Third party agents should focus on the maintenance as well as the 
building of trust in this situation. Consistent with the study of 
Kanawattanachai and Yoo [2], high performing virtual teams were 
able to maintain high levels of trust in their relationship until the 
end of the task. The role of the third party agent here is not only to 
develop trust between parties, but also to monitor the relationship 
between agents. In order to maintain the level of trust between 
agents in a virtual network, the third party must have various 
conflict management capabilities. This capacity is to alleviate 
conflict before it leads to the degradation of trust between trusted 
agent and trusting agent. 
 
Thirdly, in virtual environments, agents are free to establish 
relationships with other agents. In a virtual network, there is no 
formal and hierarchical authority between trusting agents and 
trusted agent [20]. Hence, a network broker or integrator is 
needed to coordinate agents as the complexity of the task 
relationship increases [20]. We argue that this network broker has 
a role as an intelligence agent that has mutual trust with trusting 
parties, is independent and unbiased and therefore able to monitor 
the performance of a trust relationship. The role of this agent is to 
advocate or mediate or judge when conflicts or contract 
disagreements occur that could destroy existing trust levels. 
Furthermore, a mechanism is needed to determine who this third 
party will be, how this third party will be chosen, and how the 
trusting parties report their trust performance to the third party. 
Additionally, a mechanism is needed to enable a third party to 
gather information about the performance of the trusted agent and 
the trusting agent in order to maintain their levels of trust. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we undertake a brief review of twelve articles on 
how to produce, build, develop, enhance and maintain trust in 
business environments, particularly in virtual environments. We 
conclude and summarized that three strategic approaches have 
been widely used by scholars to manage the levels of trust in 
virtual environments. We review these researches based on the 
use of terms, strategic approach offered, and type of strategy. We 
describe some of the benefits and shortcomings of each approach, 
conduct an integrative review of those approaches, and suggest 
directions for future research. As we can see, a substantial amount 
of work has been done on trust maintenance but the concept of 
trust maintenance itself is not properly defined. Additionally, 
there are some existing strategies for maintaining trust in virtual 
environments. However, there is no comprehensive and coherent 
methodology for maintaining trust in virtual environments. 
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Table 1. Strategies for Maintaining Trust in Virtual Environments 
 
No Author (s) Use of term  
(s) 
Strategic Approach Dimensions of Strategy 
Practices Policies Methodology 
1. 
 
[16] Produce and 
maintain trust 
Active communication and consistent interaction 
among team members 
v x x 
2. [19] Reinforce trust Proactive behavior, empathetic task 
communication, positive tone, rotating team 
leadership, task goal clarity, role division, time 
management, frequent interaction with 
acknowledged and detailed responses to prior 
messages 
v v x 
3. [9] Develop and 
maintain trust 
Different communication style in each group life 
cycle 
v x x 
4. [5] Building, 
developing, 
establishing and 
maintaining 
trust 
- Effective Communication  
- Appropriate use of ICT both on physical 
component and human component  
v x x 
5. [13] Building, 
developing, and 
emergence trust 
- Agreement of contract by decontextualized 
rules of the games 
v v x 
6. [12] Building and 
developing trust 
- Effective Communication of trustworthiness v x x 
7. [6] Managing trust - Effective Communication 
- Establish rules and patterns of communication 
v v x 
8. [17] Building and 
maintaining 
trust 
- Effective Communication with attention on IT 
approach and human approach 
v v x 
9. [22] Bettering and 
maintaining 
trust 
Clear definition of objectives, the emphasis in 
internal communication, the manager as a role 
model, the worthiness of the people 
v v x 
10. [18] Build, develop 
and maintain 
trust 
- Effective Communication 
- Sharing values and goals 
v x x 
11. [14] Develop and 
sustain trust 
- Different communication style in each team 
life cycle 
v x x 
12. [7] Construction 
and 
management of 
trust 
- Effective Communication 
- Share mutually-valuable information 
v v x 
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Abstract— The nature of trust in business 
relationships is dynamic rather than static. Trust has 
evolutionary phases or a life cycle. This pattern of 
evolution can be described as building, maintaining 
and destroying. Building trust comes at high cost and 
hard effort. Therefore, once trust has been established 
in a business relationship, every effort must be made 
to maintain it. Maintaining trust can be defined as an 
effort to maximize the benefits of a relationship and to 
prevent the level of trust from decreasing to the 
destroying phase. Grounded in state-of-the-art 
literature, this paper presents current insights for the 
research into trust maintenance and suggests 
directions for future research in this field. 
 
Keywords: Trust maintenance 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Trust research has increasingly attracted growing 
interest from academics and practitioners, due to its 
importance and due to the increasing number of business 
relationship such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, 
outsourcing relationships and other forms of inter-
organizational and intra-organizational exchange [1-3].  
However, trust has evolutionary phases. This pattern of a 
trust life cycle can be described as building, maintaining 
and destroying [4]. Initially in a relationship, both parties 
(trusted agent and trusting agent) enter that relationship 
with activities that establish a level of trust. At this stage, 
the trust level is zero because the interacting parties lack 
information about each other. As this relationship 
proceeds over time, if trust building actions are 
acceptable, the overall level of trust will remain constant 
with some minor variations. Both parties then should 
agree to maintain their level of trust. If, however, they do 
not agree to maintain the level of trust, the trust will be 
destroyed. Therefore, the level of trust rapidly decreases 
to a lower level or may even enter the domain of distrust. 
In this paper, we offer a brief review of existing 
researches regarding trust maintenance.  
Trust is said to be one party’s expectation of the other 
party’s competence, goodwill and behavior [5]. However, 
this definition ignores the temporal and context-specific 
nature of trust. Chang et al. proposed a definition of trust, 
which takes into account its temporal dimension [6]. They 
define trust as ‘the belief the trusting agent has in the 
trusted agent’s willingness and capability to deliver a 
mutually agreed service in a given context and in a given 
time slot, as expected by the trusting agent’. This 
definition considers the nature of trust as being dynamic 
rather than static. In a business context, competencies in a 
given context, as well as goodwill to deliver, are required 
in order for trust to develop. Competencies such as 
technical capabilities, skills and knowledge are also 
required for building trust in the professional setting of 
business exchange. Following an evolutionary process, 
the more we observe of these three characteristics in other 
parties, the more likely is our level of trust to increase or 
decrease. Hence, the level of trust will evolve as the 
parties interact and are driven by the factors mentioned 
above. 
In the field of trust evolution research, most of the 
discussion focuses on ways to build and develop trust in 
such relationships. Some good management practices and 
policies have been proposed for building and developing 
trust. However, trust building is a gradual and incremental 
process. It can be easily and quickly destroyed by a single 
negative behavior or trustworthiness inconsistencies [4, 
7]. Despite the fragility of trust, companies must carefully 
consider how they can better build and maintain trust to 
improve long-term business performance. Therefore, 
another objective in this paper is to discuss some 
theoretical approaches on how to maintain trust. In 
addition, we briefly review several approaches to 
maintaining trust. 
II. THE LIFE CYCLE OF TRUST 
The ways in which trust develops and is maintained 
have been recognized as critical factors in human 
relationships [8]. Trust will evolve and change over time 
in relationships as knowledge and information about other 
parties’ trustworthiness also evolve in those relationships. 
Some studies have described this evolutionary pattern. 
For instance, Curral and Epstein divide the trust evolution 
pattern into three phases: developing, maintaining and 
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destroying [4]. This evolutionary process is shown in fig. 
1.  
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Figure 1. The pattern of trust life cycle 
 
In the first stage of a relationship, the trust level starts 
from a baseline, as either trust or distrust. As the 
relationship proceeds over time, the trust level may 
increase and remain at a certain level depending upon the 
information and knowledge of other trustworthiness. The 
trust cycle then enters the maintenance stage. This stage is 
a very beneficial period during which the relationship 
between the parties is maintained, as long as neither party 
takes any action that will destroy the relationship. If, 
however, the trust level is not well maintained, the level 
of trust may drop quickly into the lower level or may 
enter the domain of distrust.  
In addition, Rousseau et al. propose that in such 
relationships, trust changes over time [9]. Research into 
organizations as well as broader society indicates that a 
distinct pathway exists in relationships going from 
developing, building, declining and even resurfacing in 
long-standing relationships Therefore, trust is a dynamic 
rather than a static process, as a business relationship can 
also be considered as a dynamic social system.  
Based on trust evolution and trust level changes over 
time in business relationships, Curral and Epstein argue 
that the most attention should be given to the maintenance 
phase [4]. Although the constituents may vary, trust 
determines the performance of most industries. Members 
of organizations may come and go, leaders may change, 
but the determinants of trust, the decision to trust and the 
level of trustworthiness are applicable across companies. 
They contend that once trust has been built, parties may 
actively reject evidence that the other party whom they 
trust is actually untrustworthy. However, this situation 
may make trust decrease rapidly to a lower level or even 
to distrust. Furthermore, they suggest that despite the 
fragility of organizational trust, managers must think in a 
systematic manner about what they can do to cultivate 
and maintain trust with and among the various elements 
in their industry and company [4]. 
III. CURRENT RESEARCH ON TRUST MAINTENANCE 
Trust maintenance can be defined as an effort to keep 
the level of trust in a relationship stable, or even to 
increase it to a higher level. The existing research in trust 
management focuses more on building and developing the 
level of trust than on maintenance. Most studies offer 
some management practices and policies that can adopted 
by organizations to build and develop trust relationship 
either between organizations or within an organization 
[10-12]. However, they sometimes treat the terms ‘trust 
formation’, ‘trust building’, ‘trust developing’ and ‘trust 
maintaining’ as if these were synonymous [10, 13-15]. 
Therefore, much confusion exists in the current literature 
regarding the definitions of these terms.  
In addition, there are many organizational theories that 
are used by scholars when suggesting good management 
practices for developing and maintaining trust. This 
theoretical approach is often the basis for methods or 
models of ways to build and maintain trust. In the next 
section, we discuss some aspects of this approach based 
on our review of thirteen articles (Table 1). 
A. Relational Signalling Theory Approach 
Relational signals play a crucial role in trust building. 
This theory states that in such a relationship between 
trustor and trustee, both parties learn about each others’ 
trustworthiness based on behavior signals that they 
deliver. A trustor looks for two things in the behavior and 
intention of the trustee in order to discover whether the 
trustee is interested in maintaining the relationship. 
Firstly, the trustor perceives whether the behavior 
indicates competence to perform according to expectation 
(dimension of ability in trustworthiness). Secondly, a 
trustor looks for signs of whether the behavior of the 
trustee indicates an interest in maintaining the relationship 
in the future (intentions dimension). We call these signs 
as relational signals. Relational signals are ‘behavioral 
cues that allow us to make inferences about other people’s 
interest in maintaining a mutually rewarding social or 
work relationship with us’ [11].  
There are two forms of relational signals: positive 
signal and negative signal. A positive relational signal is 
any behavior that reassures another party (e.g. trustor) and 
is perceived by the second individual (e.g. trustee) as a 
clue that the other party wants to maintain a mutually 
trusting relationship. On the other hand, a negative 
relational signal is any behavior which makes another 
individual feel uncomfortable, judging others’ behavior as 
a clue that the other party does not want to maintain a 
mutually benefit relationship. 
This theory is based on two basic assumptions about a 
reciprocal process in which both parties are involved 
interactively in building trust [11]. Firstly, human 
behavior is goal-directed and any effort which explains 
social phenomena must consider the goals of the 
individual. This rationale is strongly bounded by the fact 
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that the various potential goals are not all given equal 
consideration. Secondly, human behavior is context-
dependent and guided by the normative context in which 
the individual is embedded. This theoretical approach has 
been used by Dirks [13], Six [11] and Six and George 
[10] to offer a model for building and maintaining 
organizational trust.  
 Dirks [13] proposed a two qualitatively-relational signal 
in a different theoretical perspective for building trust in a 
leader. This model comprises two practices and policies 
from a relationship-based perspective and a character-
based perspective.  A relational-based perspective focuses 
on the nature of a leader-follower relationship and more 
precisely, on how the follower understands the nature of 
the relationship. This model deals with employee 
willingness to reciprocate care and consideration which a 
leader expresses in a relationship. On the other hand, the 
character-based perspective focuses on the perception of a 
leader’s character and how it impacts on a follower’s 
vulnerability in a hierarchical relationship. This 
perspective is concerned with the importance of the 
leader’s character. The leader may have the authority to 
make decisions that have a significant impact on a 
follower’s ability to achieve his or her goals. 
 From both of these two perspectives, trust in the leader 
– subordinate relationship is a psychological state 
experienced by both parties (leader and follower) and 
involves confident positive expectations about the 
behavior and intentions of both parties. Dirks’ model [13] 
emphasizes that organizations must encourage leaders to 
show behaviors that are perceived as being trustworthy by 
their subordinates in some way through actions such as 
encouraging participative decision making and open 
communication, and attempting to understand individuals’ 
explanations of the cause of events and individual 
perception and judgment about others. 
 Six [11] proposed some organizational policies for 
building trust based from the relational signaling 
perspective. Six argues that in building trust, the actions 
of involved parties should be guided by a stable 
normative frame that meets four conditions. These 
conditions are: suspension of all opportunistic behaviors, 
exchange of positive relational signals, avoidance of 
negative relational signals, and stimulation of frame 
resonance. This normative frame is suitable for building 
trust in a leader – subordinate relationship. The reciprocal 
action of exchanging positive relational signals and 
avoiding negative relational signals is important in order 
to maintain the trust level in a relationship. 
 Moreover, Six and Sorge [10] also used the relational 
signaling perspective to build a model that contains  
practices and policies to build, maintain and enhance trust 
in a leader – subordinate, and co-worker relationship. This 
model is a combination of four inductive activities. If an 
organization wants to build and maintain the level of trust 
among organization members, the creation of a 
relationship culture, facilitation of relational signaling, 
explicit socialization for new members and a mechanism 
for managing professional competencies are types of 
organizational policies that can be adopted by various 
organizations. 
B. Social Exchange Approach 
The social exchange approach is widely used by some 
scholars to develop a model for building and maintaining 
trust in relationships. In this approach, both parties engage 
in ‘exchange’ relationships because they expect that they 
will derive some benefit(s) from doing so. This involves 
accepting some degree of vulnerability in the hope of 
gaining some benefit at the discretion of another person. 
In a leader and co-worker relationship, perceiving other 
organization members to be trustworthy increases the 
likelihood that the trustor will engage in an exchange 
relationship. Presumably, individuals should be able to 
complete their job responsibilities more effectively when 
they receive valued information, knowledge, resources 
and so on from their leader or co-worker. Moreover, 
individuals who are perceived as being more trustworthy 
have the potential to receive more task-performance 
related resources from others than do individuals who are 
perceived to be less trustworthy. Therefore, the former 
will gain a performance advantage.  
In addition, exchange theory explains how past 
behaviors in the relationship are used to diagnose 
trustworthiness in future exchanges. This social process-
based theory also proposes that trust will develop through 
interaction between two parties. Hence, as trust 
maintenance is an activity that involves an agreement 
between two parties in order to maintain their trust level 
in a future relationship, this approach is one way of 
maintaining trust. 
Whitener proposed an exchange framework of 
initiating managerial trustworthy behavior [17]. This 
framework consists of organizational factors, relational 
factors and individual factors that influence any effort to 
initiate trust in leaders. Some organizational strategies 
used to build trust in management include the 
establishment of an organizational structure, 
organizational culture and Human Resource policies and 
practices. The relational factors which develop from 
social exchange theory and relational signaling theory 
include such things as initial interactions, expectations, 
and cost of exchange; whereas individual factors that 
influence initiating trust in leaders are propensity to trust, 
self efficacy and personal values. The focus of this 
framework is the identification of factors that affect 
trustworthy behavior. Some Human Resource practices 
and policies in organizations such as training, reward, 
control and performance appraisal, may facilitate building 
trust in leaders or trust in higher level management. 
576
C. Organizational Justice Theory 
The concept of organizational justice for maintaining 
organizational trust is based on the perception of fairness. 
Fairness and honesty are perceived by other parties as 
being components of trustworthiness. Three of the most 
commonly studied facets of organizational justice include 
distributive, procedural and interactional justice. 
Distributive justice is defined as the perceived fairness of 
outcomes received; procedural justice is the fairness of a 
company’s policies and procedures used to determine 
one’s outcomes; and interactional justice is the manner in 
which the reasons behind the outcome are explained. 
Interactional justice refers to the quality of interpersonal 
processes and treatment of individuals as well as the 
extent to which the reasons behind the outcome are 
explained [18].   
Ferres, Connel et al [2] provide three theories as a 
basis of organizational practices and policies to determine 
trust in leaders. These theories relate to organizational 
support, procedural justice and transformational 
leadership. The authors conclude that leaders can 
influence trust in their relationships with subordinates in a 
number of ways. These include the adoption of a 
transformational leadership orientation, by ensuring 
procedural justice and supporting employees at every 
organizational level. Moreover, they also indicate that the 
formation of trust in leaders goes beyond an employee’s 
general preference when trusting others. Managers can 
significantly engender trust in their relationships with 
subordinates in a number of ways. These include 
practicing transformational leadership and ensuring the 
adoption of practices that are both supportive and fair. 
Furthermore, the empirical research conducted by 
Forret and Love strongly supports the notion that 
perceptions about distributive, procedural and 
interactional justice correlate to perception of co-workers 
[18]. The distribution of rewards, organizational policies 
and procedures, and interpersonal treatment by 
supervisors are important and relate to co-worker trust. 
Therefore, the authors suggest that leaders in an 
organization need to enhance the perception of 
distributive, procedural and interactional justice in the 
workplace if they want to build and establish trust within 
a leader – follower relationship. 
D. Institutional Theory Approach 
Institutional theory states that organizational structure, 
policies and control mechanisms should be legalized and 
legitimized in order to foster trust through the perception 
of individual and institutional legitimacy. Managers use 
organizational clues to establish or maintain the 
legitimacy of their actions and consequently to be seen as 
trustworthy individuals. Institutional theorists have shown 
numerous ways in which adherence to widely shared 
beliefs, widely accepted norms, formal rules and 
procedures can enhance trust. The driving force behind 
these methods can be explained most succinctly as ‘the 
logic of appropriateness’. When managers wish to 
preserve or enhance trust in themselves or their 
institution, they often attempt to influence perceived 
choice appropriateness, which is judged not merely on 
contextual criteria of technical effectiveness, but also on 
what is expected and viewed as legitimate in a particular 
context. 
In [19], the focus is on structural isomorphism or the 
use of standardized structure, procedures and actions as 
indicators of trust building, legitimacy-driven behavior. In 
a leader-subordinate relationship, the leader as a decision 
maker can institutionalize their decision in order to build 
trustworthiness. They argue that control as a legitimate 
power from a leader must be legitimized and 
institutionalized in order to enhance trust.  
In addition, Dwyer and Beauvais [15] propose some 
principles based on institutional theory that can be used 
by organizations to build, enhance and maintain trust in a 
leader – follower relationship. They argue that, although 
trust is complex both in its composition and in terms of 
the number of bases on which is rests, the following 
principles when institutionalized within an organization 
would enable the organization to enhance levels of both 
trust and organizational success. The authors then 
conclude that building and maintaining trust within an 
organization is not a simple or rapid process. It requires a 
commitment to creating and sustaining a culture that is 
focused and respectful of employees. Unlike 
organizations that only talk about values, organizations 
that institutionalize the value or principles of trust will 
build trust in process and promote trust as an important 
element in the building of a successful organization. 
Pucetaite and Lamsa [12] also argue that the 
development of trust within an organization can be 
stimulated by raising the level of work ethic through 
organizational practice. They explain that work ethics are 
moral principles, norms and rules that guide a person’s 
behavior at work. Moreover, work ethics play a role as 
principles, particularly regarding compliance with quality 
standards, self-discipline and commitment to professional 
norms and the job itself. Accordingly, the idea of 
enhancing work ethics, as a consequence of management 
practices that are institutionalized and legitimized by an 
organization, is a particularly interesting means of 
developing trust. 
E. Control Theory Approach 
This approach suggests that managers who build trust 
often reduce the time and effort needed to measure and 
monitor the work of their employees, while enhancing the 
quality of their subordinate’s contributions and their 
capacity to achieve organizational objectives. This control 
theory is based on the notion that managers integrate their 
trust-based and control-based actions in ways they think 
appropriate for specific situations. This theory also argues  
577
that managers should actively concern themselves with 
promoting organizational trust by combining with task 
control activities that are appropriate for the task and 
relational context, thereby ensuring that organizational 
goals are accomplished and positive superior – 
subordinate relationships are developed and maintained. 
Moreover, in order to address the dynamic nature of 
relational and institutional arrangements, managers must 
balance the mix of trust and control in their organization 
if they want to achieve organizational goals and cultivate 
positive social relationships. 
 
 
TABLE 1. THEORETICAL APPROACHES IN TRUST MAINTENANCE RESEARCH
 
Dimensions of Model for Trust Maintenance No. Author (s) Use of term (s) Theoretical Approach 
Practices Policies Methodology 
Type of Relationship 
1. [10] Building, 
Maintaining 
Enhancing  
Relational Signaling 
Theory (RST) 
v v x Leader – subordinate,  and  
Co-worker 
2. [12] Developing Social Exchange 
Theory 
v x x Leader – subordinate, and 
Co-worker  
3. [14] Building 
Maintaining 
 v x x Co-worker Relationship  
4. [11] Building RST x v x Leader – Subordinate  
5. [18] Enhancing  Organizational 
Justice Theory 
x v x Leader – Subordinate, and  
Co-worker Relationship 
6. [15] Building 
Enhancing 
Maintaining 
Institutional Theory x v x Leader – subordinate Relationship 
7. [21] Developing 
Trust 
Procedural Approach v x x Co-worker Relationship 
8. [20] Building Trust Control Theory v x x Leader – Subordinate Relationship 
9. [13] Building 
Maintaining  
RST in Leadership x x x Leader – Subordinate Relationship 
10. [19] Building Trust Institutional and 
Control Theory 
v v x Leader – Subordinate, and Co-
worker Relationship 
11. [2] Engendering  Relational Theory v v x Manager-Subordinate  
12. [22] Building and 
Developing  
Social Exchange 
Theory (SET) 
v x x Team work based Relationship  
13. [16] Developing  SET v x x Leader – Subordinate  
 
Furthermore, Long and Sitkin [20] examine the ways by 
which managers balance their interpersonal trust-building 
and control-based efforts in order to maintain trust in 
subordinates. Their study focuses on describing task 
controls which range from formal mechanisms (written 
contracts, monetary incentives and surveillance), to informal 
mechanisms (values, norms and beliefs). Managers can use 
these mechanisms to direct subordinates toward the efficient 
completion of organizational tasks. There are various  
control applications for directing subordinate tasks: input 
controls, process controls and output controls. The purpose 
of input controls is to acquire a high quality employee 
through training and socialization to guide the selection and 
preparation of human and material production process. 
Process controls are a means of controlling subordinates’ 
performance of tasks to ensure that they follow prescribed 
task production methods. Output controls measure the 
employees’ outputs (or productivity) against established 
metrics to ensure that prescribed performance standards are 
met.  
IV. INTEGRATIVE REVIEW AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
In this section, we briefly discuss research in trust 
maintenance from the perspective of terminology used, 
theoretical approach, model offered, and type of relationship 
(table 1). It is observed that most studies use terms such as 
‘building’, ‘developing’, and ‘maintaining’ synonymously. 
They do not distinguish between these activities. However, 
based on trust evolution theory, there are different phases 
and activities in the life cycle of organizational trust. 
Therefore, every stage or phase in trust evolution should 
have a different model or method. 
In addition, there is no theoretical approach that 
specifically addresses ways to maintain the level of trust. 
Those theoretical approaches have argued can be use in the 
same way on to create, build, engender and maintain leader-
subordinate trusting relationship. Further, the most 
commonly-used theoretical approach is a basic model 
concerned with maintaining trust based on the completion of 
organizational tasks. The Social Exchange and Relational 
Signaling theory approach is concerned with the 
vulnerability and reciprocity of both parties when sharing 
valuable resources in order to accomplish a task. Institutional 
theory focuses on the importance of institutionalized and 
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legalized work ethics and the procedures and norms to be 
followed when undertaking organizational tasks. Control 
theory is concerned with measuring and controlling input, 
process and output of work performance. However, these 
theoretical approaches work separately as a basis for 
maintaining organizational trust, specifically in a work 
relationship. Further research is needed to provide a 
complete and comprehensive methodology for trust 
maintenance. We define methodology as a sequence of steps 
that can be used by trusting parties to maintain their trust 
levels in a relationship.   
We argue that future research into a methodology to 
maintain trust should incorporate some of these theoretical 
approaches in an integrative framework. We also note some 
basic assumptions for trust maintenance activities that may 
be derived from these theoretical approaches. Firstly, both 
parties (trusting agent and trusted agent) are vulnerable to 
reciprocal action. This assumption concurs with the social 
exchange approach to maintain trust. In social exchange 
theory, both parties that are involved in a relationship are 
able to share valuable resources in order to achieve a 
mutually rewarding goal. The second assumption is that both 
parties agree to and demonstrate cooperative behavior in 
order to maintain their level of trust. This assumption 
correlates with the relational quality approach for 
maintaining trust in a relationship. The relational quality 
approach is one whereby parties exchange a positive signal 
to maintain the relationship and avoid a negative signal that 
can destroy a trusting relationship. The third assumption is 
that the level of trust has been reached to a positive high 
level. Once trust has been established and is at a positive 
level, it needs to be maintained at that level. When the level 
of trust is still fairly low or neutral, it needs to be developed 
or enhanced to a higher level.  
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have presented a brief review in the 
field of trust maintenance research. We considered and 
summarized, from the existing literature, five theoretical 
approaches for maintaining trust. We reviewed these 
researches based on the terminology used, theoretical 
approach, model offered, and type of work relationship 
described. Evidently, substantial work has been done on trust 
maintenance, but the concept of trust maintenance itself has 
not been properly defined. Additionally, there are some 
existing good management practices and policies or 
principles for maintaining trust in an organizational setting. 
However, there is as yet no comprehensive and coherent 
methodology for trust maintenance.  
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A BST R A C T 
 
There is much interest in using the virtual community as a 
business medium to establish a relationship between customer 
and stakeholders. While studies on virtual communities have 
widely discussed ways to sustain this community, there is the 
need for a complete framework or methodology to regulate 
members interactions so as to produce sustainability. In order to 
achieve this sustainability, it is important to consider the existing 
trust relationship between community members and ways to 
identify an untrustworthy agent in a community. In this paper, 
we propose a framework for creating a sustainable community 
in Virtual Environments. The role of a third party agent and the 
effectiveness of continuous performance monitoring are the 
main keys to creating a sustainable virtual community. We also 
present the results of an experimental study. The study shows 
that the framework will help the administrator to identify all 
non-compliant agents after a transaction or interactions. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
E.m [Miscellaneous]: Trust, H.5.3 [Information Interfaces and 
Presentation]: Group and Organization Interfaces  Web-based 
interaction. 
General Terms 
Algorithms, Management, Measurement, Performance, 
Reliability and Security. 
K eywords 
Sustainable Virtual Community, Trust 
1. IN T R O DU C T I O N 
 
The rapid growth of virtual communities on the Internet raises 
the question of what encourages members to join and interact 
within this community. There is an enormous amount of 
literature discussing the benefits of virtual communities and 
social networks. These encourage knowledge sharing [1], 
provide social space and a social network [2], create co-product 
innovation based on customer feedback [3], and provide a vast 
pool of experts able to discuss any ideas virtually [4]. From the 
business perspective, the new digital economy has resulted in 
many more virtual communities in business ecosystems. 
Businesses are encouraged to establish communities in order to 
foster relationships with their customers and stakeholders [3]. 
Understanding virtual communities can provide valuable 
information about the digital economy. Both the knowledge base 
of the community and the members themselves can be extremely 
valuable to companies. The knowledge base which is usually 
	
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provides insight into the member likes, dislikes, demographics, 
behaviors, and concerns. Members often critique products and 
services, and thus, organizations can conduct market research by 
reading the conversation. Although there are many research 
discussions on the benefits of a virtual community, little 
research has addressed ways to sustain this community.  
The sustainability of a virtual community depends on the 
behavior of the community members, in this case, their 
responsiveness and confiding behavior in such interaction. In 
order that communities be successful and sustainable, there must 
be trustworthy behavior amongst members. Trust as a socially 
acceptable behavior is important for the continuity of the 
community in virtual environments where the workable rules are 
absent. This is especially noteworthy for virtual communities 
because research has shown that people in traditional 
communities work better with those whom they trust, while 
actively avoiding contact with those they do not trust [5]. 
Ridings [6] also argued that trust is a significant predictor of 
virtual community members desire to exchange information, 
and especially to obtain information. People access virtual 
communities to exchange information  either by providing it to 
others or by soliciting it from others. This exchange is based 
upon the trust level that members have in each other, and 
without trust, there would no exchange and the virtual 
community would cease to exist.  
Virtual communities are typically emergent, that is, they arise as 
a natural consequence of people coming together to discuss a 
common hobby, mutual interest, personal experience, or even to 
develop a relationship. These relationships are usually 
established informally without any involvement of a specific 
organization. The members of communities are typically 
strangers to one another. In the virtual community, trust 
develops between an individual and the group of strangers in 
his/her community, eventually providing a positive outcome for 
the community as a whole. Repeated interaction with others and 
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the open public reply and discussion of any messages may also 
enable trust to evolve. However, untrustworthy behavior may be 
widespread in a virtual community where malicious members 
might behave dishonestly or inconsistently. For example, some 
members might flame or ridicule posts or provide members 
email addresses to external organizations without permission. 
Untrustworthy behavior and non-compliant agents are usually 
considered undesirable in any community. However, there is 
always a certain probability that an agent is malicious due to 
opportunistic behavior. The management of this behavior is a 
difficult task in Virtual Environments where physical social 
controls are not available. Nevertheless, trust has been 
acknowledged as a tool which can reduce risk and opportunistic 
behavior in virtual environments [7].  
Therefore, a Virtual Community which wishes to remain viable 
should have a mechanism for sustaining the 	

member interaction and for supporting the formation of a 
sustainable virtual community. A sustainable virtual community 
can be created by: (1) providing norms and procedures of 
interaction for the community survival; (2) identifying and 
isolating malicious agents in the community; and (3) accepting a 
new member based on his/her reputation in conducting 
interactions. In this research, we propose a framework that can 
be used to monitor  	 community. 
This framework can be utilized to identify any malicious or 
untrustworthy agents in a community. The other purpose of this 
mechanism is to protect the community from anyone in the 
community who demonstrates  non-compliant behavior.  
Additionally, a Virtual Community should have ways of 


	behavior and in turn 
removing or isolating them from the community. The signs of 
non-compliant behavior can be gathered by outlining the 
performance reputation of agents in such interaction. The 
proposed framework in this research provides a mechanism for 
monitoring community behavior in carrying out an interaction 
with other agents (i.e. 
  	  
performance). By continuously monitoring their performance, 
the performance monitoring report can show the pattern of the 


or untrustworthy.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines 
the background and related work on the model of sustainability 
of a virtual community. Section 3 describes the proposed 
framework for interaction between community members. 
Section 4 shows the experimental results. The conclusion and 
proposed future work are presented in Section 5. 
2. B A C K G R O UND A ND R E L A T E D 
W O R K 
 
Abdul-Rahman et al. [8] argued that virtual communities are as 
real as communities that meet physically or whose members 
exist in close or convenient proximity. Some researchers argue 
that Virtual Communities in e-Commerce have a life cycle and it 
is usually short, even though it hopes to be longer [9-11]. 
However, only a scant amount of literature focuses on how this 
longer life can be achieved. The life cycle of Business 
Ecosystems is explained through a number of stages: birth, 
expansion, leadership and self-renewal [11]. If the last stage, 
self-renewal, does not occur, the community disappears.  
Moreover, Venkantesh [9] described a pattern of origin, 
stabilization and change that is embedded in the life cycle of the 
virtual network. The first stage is origin. In this stage, the 
network is created based on the m
the passage of time, members have a greater awareness of assets 
and resources of their community and start to demonstrate a 
willingness and capability to exchange. At some point in time 
after its origin, a community network may become more stable. 
At this time, the community should become well organized. This 
can be achieved in several ways. This can be done, firstly, by 
institutionalizing the relationship between community members. 
Secondly, it can be achieved through better interaction regarding 
service delivery. However, after some institutionalization and 
  	    
community may face a change cycle. This is because the virtual 
interaction may not be adequate, or members perceive that the 
community has become formal and strict in its interactions.  
It is clear from the discussion above that the existence of virtual 
communities depends on the amount of effort put in by the 
administrator or users in this regard. Thus, research is needed to 
identify the factors that contribute to the sustainability of virtual 
communities. 
Wagner et al. [4] defined sustainability as a demonstration of the 
growth rate and members renewal over a certain period. The 
growth rate is determined not only by the size of readership in 
online communities such as wiki, but also by the sustained 
contribution from other users which feeds the community and 
gives it life. On the other hand, Porra and Porks [12] explained 
that Virtual Community sustainability has an intrinsic longevity 
over very long time periods (i.e. over generations). The larger 
the user membership of a virtual community, the greater is its 
sustainability. However, Koh et al. [13] argued that the most 
important factor for the sustainability of a virtual community is 
the degree of member participation. The most basic activity in 
social virtual communities is the exchange of information 
between requester and provider. We argue that this information 
exchange should occur in a trustworthy manner in both 
providing information and requesting information. The higher 
the quality of information that is exchanged between users in a 
virtual community, the more likely it will be that this 
community can be sustained. This is because members of this 
community derive positive benefits from consuming good 
quality information. 
Porra & Parks [12] introduced a systematic model of Virtual 
Communities Sustainability based on the colonial system model. 
This model suggested that humanness, ideals and the ability to 
acquire new members by creating stability within current 
generation and radical change over generations, determines the 
sustainability of a virtual community. This model also 
recommended that effective interaction mechanisms and a high 
degree of awareness to maintain the community humanness is 
important to create a sustainable virtual community. Due to the 
nature of the relationship and interaction in virtual environments 
where face-to-face meetings do not occur, three necessary 
components of a sub-community are: persistent people, 
continuous support by an online space, and flexibility. All of 
these will promote the growth of the sub-community. Wagner et 
al. [4] explored the key success factors for a sustainable 
professional community. By analyzing Slashdot, a highly 
popular online community, they found five criteria that make 
Slashdot special and viable. These criteria are: (1) Good content 
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of information exchange that occurs in online discussion. This is 
measured by news provided and the discussion among 
participants that encourages users to derive a positive gain from 
the interaction; (2) Good support of technology quality that 
enables community members to easily link up with other 
members; (3) Discussion engine or software that is fair, 
trustworthy, and quality enhancing; (4) Active participation 
from members in taking and giving information; and (5) the 
longevity of members in the community. The longer that 
members have been part of a community, the more sustainable is 
this community. However, these findings fail to explore how 
community members balance the reason to communicate with 
the effort to communicate, and ultimately place their resources 
into the community so that community sustainability can be 
achieved.    
Based on the discussion above, it can be concluded that several 
models have been proposed to support the creation sustainability 
of virtual community. However, some of them propose only a 
single practice and policies to sustain the current virtual 
communities. Other research focuses on the key factors that 
contribute to the longevity of a virtual community. Yet, none of 
them proposes a complete framework or methodology to 
regulate members interactions so as to produce virtual 
community sustainability. Moreover, few of them consider the 
importance of the existing trust relationship between community 
members to sustain the community and how to identify an 
untrustworthy agent in a community. Additionally, only some of 
the related works above have been verified empirically.  
In this paper, we propose a framework for creating a sustainable 
community as mentioned in Section 1.  The benefits of this 
framework for virtual communities are twofold. Firstly, it assists 
users or administrators to identify untrustworthy entities.  The 
presence of a non-compliant agent in a virtual community can be 
a signal of noise. A case study of Usenet groups conducted by 
Ostrom in [14] concluded that a virtual community can be 
sustained if it has low signal-to-noise ratios. Signal-to-noise 
ratios refer to the number of non-active users in a community. A 
low noise ratio signifies a low number of non-active members in 
the community. If the number of non-active participants is low, 
then this community will be sustained. Conversely, if the 
number of non-active participants is high, then the community 
will not last. The second benefit is that our proposed framework 
shows how a virtual community can be sustained by means of 
using a third party agent to conduct continuous performance 
monitoring of members interactions. Kollock and Smith [14] 
also argued that mechanisms which allow members to 
participate in the negotiation of governing rules such as 
monitoring others behavior, designing a system of sanctions 
and access to low cost conflict resolution etc. contributed to the 
sustainability of virtual community. By designing a system that 
is able to monitor others behavior, signal-to-noise can be easily 
detected. An overview of the proposed framework is presented 
in the next section. 
3. T H E PR OPOSE D F R A M E W O R K 
 
In this section, we provide an overview of the proposed 
framework for creating sustainable virtual communities. The 
purpose 		s in 
service exchange. From the perspective of service exchange in a 
virtual community, its members can be categorized as service 
requester and service provider. A service requester is an agent 
who requests a service or any information and the service 
provider is an agent who provides the service. A virtual 
community can be seen as a collection of agents who can offer 
services to other agents or obtain services from others. First and 
foremost, sustainability requires a stable relationship between 
service requester and service provider in this community. To 
sustain the community, all members should be able to participate 
and interact in a trustworthy manner. However, at the same time, 
the community members or the administrator must be able to 
identify those who are disrupting the community interaction. In 
other words, the system should have a mechanism whereby 
untrustworthy agents can be identified and isolated so that the 
community is comprised only of trustworthy agents.   
 
3.1 An Overview 
The conceptual framework is outlined in Fig. 1 below: 
 
Service Requester Service Provider
The Administrator
Selecting Third 
Party Agent
Interaction 
Agreement
Interaction 
Monitoring by 
Third Party Agent
QoS Assesment
 
F igure 1. Conceptual F ramework 
 
The whole workflow of the system is as follows: 
1)  First of all, the administrator of a virtual community selects 
a third party agent or a neutral agent that will be involved in 
an interaction between service provider and service 
requester. This is as a pre-interaction activity. The third 
party agent is a professional agent who is experienced in 
judging and monitoring an interaction and has particular 
knowledge about the domain of the community.  
2) At the same time, there are the two parties who are involved 
in any kind of interaction in a virtual community. As a 
simple example, consider that there is a service requester 
who requests information or an opinion and there is a 
service provider who provides information or argument as 
required. In order to have a guideline for their interaction, 
and to ensure the satisfaction of both parties during the 
information or service exchange, the service requester and 
service provider need to have an interaction agreement that 
defines the type of service and time frame for service 
delivery. Let us consider an example from a digital 
photographer community. An agent requests information on 
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how to select a good lens from the new series of a particular 
digital camera. This agent has certain criteria regarding 
information that s/he wants from provider. For instance, the 
provider should have experience or expertise in camera 
lenses and this particular camera, and information must be 
provided within one week after the request. There are 
several other agents (service providers) who are willing and 
able to provide information based on the requester 
requirements. These provider agents also have certain 
criteria pertaining to the requester. For instance, the 
requester should be able to provide the information about 
their camera and lens that they want to use. Moreover, they 
should reply to any information that provided by provider, 
etc. Then, both parties make an agreement to interact or 
exchange information that they need. 
3) After both parties have an interaction agreement, the 
administrator of the virtual community will inform the third 
party agent about this agreement. The third party agent will 
use this agreement to monitor the performance of both 
parties.  
4) Subsequently, both parties engage in interaction. They 
exchange any information that has been agreed upon in the 
interaction agreement. Both service requester and provider 
should transact according to this mutual agreement. At the 
same time, the third party agent monitors the performance of 
their interaction. Hence, this interaction agreement is 
primarily used as a guide to monitor both parties 
performance progress. Continuing the above example, as a 
virtual group discussion, other agents (either with a role as 
requester or provider) may then become involved in the 
interaction. If the discussion is interesting enough, such 
activities like requests for further information, replies to 
requests, discussions of the validity and accuracy of replies, 
and further questions are prompted by the discussions. Thus, 
the number of interactions based on this agreement may 
increase. During performance monitoring, the third party 
agent will obtain a record of compliant and non-compliant 
agents in this interaction. A repeated non-compliant agent 
will be placed on the list of untrustworthy members, while a 
repeated compliant agent will be listed as a trustworthy 
agent. Hence, the third party agent would have a data base 
that contains a black list and white list of agents in a 
community. This database is updated every time and for 
every interaction between community members. Moreover, 
this database will be publicly available so that another agent 
who wants to joint this community can access information 
about an agen reputation in such interactions.  
5) At the end of the interaction, both service provider and 
requester assess the Quality of Service (QoS) that they have 
exchanged. We use a CCCI metrics that was developed by 
Hussain et al. [15, 16] to measure the QoS. CCCI metrics is 
a set of metrics that can be used to measure QoS based on 
service criteria, clarity of each criterion, and level of 
importance of each criterion.  
6) Finally, both parties will provide the third party agent with 
the result of QoS assessment. Hence, the third party agent 
will have information about the performance of both service 
requester and service provider. 
7) With this information, the third party agent will inform the 
administrator of the untrustworthy agents in this community 
based on a certain number of interactions. The administrator 
can then use this information either to isolate these agents 
from the community or to take the necessary steps to 
eliminate untrustworthy agents from the community in order 
to ensure the sustainability of the virtual community. 
 
4. E XPE RI M E N T A L R ESU L TS 
 
We conducted a simulation in order to test the performance of 
the proposed methodology. We repeated a series of experiments 
with a certain number of total agents in the community: 200, 
500, 1000, 2000, 3000, and 4000. In each particular community 
with its different agent population size, we introduced a certain 
percentage of non-compliant agents into the community 
environment. The user assigns a compliance level to each agent 
either 0% (non-compliant) or 100% (compliant). A non-
compliant agent is an agent who is not at all cooperative in any 
interaction. If this non-compliant agent carries out a transaction, 
s/he will never comply with the interaction agreement. On the 
other hand, a compliant agent with a 100% degree of 
compliance is an agent who always complies with the 
interaction agreement. From the trust perspective, a non-
compliant agent is an untrustworthy agent and a compliant agent 
is a trustworthy agent. The percentage of non-compliant agents 
varies from 10% to 90%.  
During simulation, a user randomly selects 
!
 " For example, a !  a non-compliant agent; 
hence, this agent does not comply with the interaction 
agreement. By the end of the 	 "a low 
QoS !.  Following the last step of our methodology, 
agent "   the third party agent   non-
		 by agent B. The aim of the simulation is to 
determine the number of interactions needed in order to identify 
all of the non-compliant agents in the community. This is 
directly related to the number of non-complying agents that have 
been identified accurately by the third party agents.  
Throughout the initial part / rounds of simulation, the 
compliance of agents is not modeled completely or accurately, 
or both. "
	f compliance levels we mean 
that the third party agent should know the compliance levels of 
all the agents in the community. On 
		
the compliance level, we mean that the actual level 
of compliance of the agents in the community should be as close 
as possible to the modeled or determined compliance levels 
established by the third party agent. Once the third 

information reflects accurately and completely the compliance 
of the agents in the community, it would eliminate non-
complying interactions. In other words, this would result in a 
community in which non-complying agents are blacklisted and 
only complying agents are available for interaction. 
Due to the random nature of agent selection during simulation, 
we conduct 20 series of experiments for every community size. 
As depicted in Figures 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, for every community 
size we have 20 different experiments and finally we draw an 
average line of those 20 series. Experiment results show that as 
the number of non-compliant agents increases in the community, 
the average amount of time to identify all of them as a function 
of the number of transactions decreases. If the community has a 
large number of non-compliant agents, then it will be quicker to 
identify all of them. Figures 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 in the Appendix 
show the experimental results of simulation with the total 
number of agents in communities  200, 500, 1000, 2000, 3000 
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and 4000 members respectively. Consider, for example, Figure 2 
plots the experimental results for the community size 200. With 
10% of them being non-compliant agents, on average, it takes 
441 transactions to identify the entire non-compliant agents in 
the community. However, if the percentage of non-compliant 
agents in the community is 90%, on average, it takes only 174 
transactions to identify all of them. We repeat the experiments 
with several different total numbers of agents in the community. 
We conclude from those experiments, that the framework is 
effective in producing virtual community sustainability. The role 
of the third party agent to monitor the interaction based on  
interaction agreement is effective as a means of identifying 
those who are not trustworthy. 
5. C O N C L USI O N A ND F U T UR E W O R K 
 
In this paper, we propose a framework to create a sustainable 
community. From the trust perspective, a sustainable community 
can be achieved if there are no non-compliant or untrustworthy 
agents in the community. Non-compliant agents are agents who 
never meet an interaction agreement. Thus, from the perspective 
of service exchange, such agents never deliver service properly, 
or they never deliver service fully as agreed. The framework 
provides a model by which the third party agent and both 
interacting parties can conduct performance monitoring during 
such interaction between agents in the community. Both 
interacting parties will inform the third party agent the result of 
QoS assessment. Hence, the third party agent will have a data 
base of non-compliant agents in the community. Further, the 
third party agent will be forwarding this information to the 
administrator. The mechanism is experimentally evaluated for 
robustness by varying the number of parameters in the domain. 
A good performance can be seen over a range of community 
size population and certain percentage of non-compliant agents 
in the population during simulation. Since the number of non-
compliant agents keeps increasing in the population, the average 
number of interactions to identify all of them is decreasing. We 
plan to extend the simulation by varying the size of communities 
in our future works. 
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Appendix 1. 
 
F igure 2. Experimental results in Community size of 200  
 
F igure 3. Experimental results in Community size of 500  
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F igure 4. Experimental results in Community size of 1000  
 
F igure. 5. Experimental results in Community size of 2000  
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F igure. 6. Experimental results in Community size of 3000  
 
 
F igure. 7. Experimental results in Community size of 4000  
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Abstract— This paper proposes an appropriate incentive scheme 
design for service delivery systems to ensure service 
deliverability. We use proactive continuous performance 
monitoring to provide qualitative observations and data on how 
well services are being provided and whether desired service 
outcomes are being achieved as a result of interaction between 
two parties (service provider and service requester). The paper 
provides a general framework for analyzing the effectiveness of 
incentive and proactive continuous monitoring in ensuring
successful service delivery. The objective of the incentive is to 
motivate the service provider to deliver service as agreed to by
both parties. We show the robustness of the framework by 
running several simulations under various conditions. It is shown 
that proactive continuous monitoring and incentive are essential 
for increasing performance which will result in successful service 
delivery.
Keywords: incentive, service delivery, digital ecosystems
I. INTRODUCTION
The new paradigm of Digital Ecosystems is built not only on 
transactions but on establishing, sustaining and improving 
relationships with existing or potential stakeholders. Hence, 
trust is always seen as a value which strengthens the business 
relationship [1, 2]. A key research issue relating to the 
formation of a successful business relationship is service 
guarantee and service deliverability. However, the existing 
literature does not focus on this. By ‘service deliverability’, 
we mean a guarantee of continued delivery of service as 
mutually agreed to by both of the parties involved. A business
relationship depends on the strength of the trust and 
commitment both interacting parties to deliver service 
according to the terms of a mutual agreement. In this paper, 
we consider ‘trust level’ to be a representation of quality of 
service delivered. Quality of Service (QoS) is defined as ‘the 
fulfillment of the service agreement or mutually agreed 
service’ [3]. Trust is the degree of belief or faith that an 
interacting party has in another party [3] that forms the basis 
of QoS and the subsequent establishment of a business 
relationship [4]. Hence, trust level is the extent to which the 
trusted agent is capable of delivering service as mutually 
agreed to by both parties. 
In this paper, we present an incentive-based mechanism to 
improve the performance of a trusted agent in delivering
service to the trusting agent.  The incentive is an increase in 
the performance level of the trusted agent in delivering agreed 
service; hence, we term it ‘performance-driven, incentive-
based’. Reward and incentive are widely acknowledged as 
motivators which can encourage agents to improve their 
performance. Badenfelt [5] stated that trusting agents may use 
rewards to change the trust levels in organizations. Although 
several researches have shown that the use of incentives can 
successfully increase the performance of agents in a non-
virtual environment, Ferrin and Dirks [6] suggested that the 
effects of rewards in trust building in the context of virtual 
environment should be examined.
In order to support an incentive mechanism, we propose a
proactive continuous performance monitoring mechanism for 
interactions between trusting agents and trusted agents. It is 
designed to monitor the service delivery at every checkpoint. 
Checkpoints are intermediate milestones that are created in 
order to check service delivery during the time space of a 
transaction. With our mechanism, a service task is 
decomposed into several intermediate deliveries to ensure the 
continuity of service delivery until the final desired outcome
has been achieved. The main purposes of this checkpoint 
mechanism are to identify early disagreement (or non-
compliance) between actual performance and mutually agreed 
performance and to resolve any issue(s). 
This continuous monitoring enables performance variances 
to be timely identified. Consequently, both parties will be able 
to quickly close the performance gap before it inflates into an 
unmanageable and undelivered service by end of the 
transaction. The incentive would be used to encourage trusted 
agents to always comply at each checkpoint. It will guarantee 
successful delivery of that service. If an agent has not fully 
delivered service at a particular checkpoint, the remaining 
undelivered service needs to be delivered at the next 
checkpoint. If at this checkpoint, the agent increases his 
compliance performance compared to the previous checkpoint, 
then this agent will receive an incentive. As a result of
receiving an incentive, their performance level at the next 
checkpoint will increase. We present details of this mechanism 
in the next section.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
presents a model overview. Section 3 presents the experiment 
results. In Section 4, we validate the framework by means of a 
series of experiments. We briefly review the current 
researches in the field of incentives and rewards for increasing 
performance in Section 5. Conclusions are drawn and future 
works are outlined in the final section.
5th IEEE International Conference on Digital Ecosystems and Technologies (IEEE DEST 2011), 31 May -3 June 2011, Daejeon, Korea 
ISBN: 978-1-4577-0872-5 (c) 2011 IEEE 324
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Several existing works suggest that the level of trust in such 
service relationships should always be monitored to ensure the 
success of service delivery. Therefore, although trust has been 
established between the trusting agent and trusted agent in a 
transaction relationship, monitoring still plays an important 
role in ensuring that the partnership relationship continues to 
operate as intended [7, 8]. Henceforth, even in situations 
where there is a sufficient level of trust between trusting 
agents, this trust needs to be underpinned by robust 
monitoring and, where necessary, reward and sanctioning 
processes could be utilized [6, 9].
Such continuous performance monitoring activities enable 
performance discrepancies to be identified early and be 
resolved. Kumaran et al. [10] proposed a MDBT (Model 
Driven Business Transformation) for transaction monitoring 
between service provider, outsourcer and service requester. It 
provides a service delivery performance management platform 
which includes notification of any violation of SLAs. The 
performance is monitored by comparing actual performances
against Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). The platform aims 
to model performance metrics for service delivery and 
describe how the monitoring and management of KPIs are 
supported as an integral part of SDM (Service Delivery 
Management) platform. However, this platform does not 
provide any mechanism, using reward and incentive, to 
motivate the service provider to fully comply with SLAs.
Reward and incentive have been acknowledged as factors 
which contribute to the success of interactions or to increase 
the involvement of interacting parties [11]. Long and Sitkin 
[9] examine the various ways to balance interpersonal trust-
building and control-based efforts in order to maintain trust-
based relationships. Written contracts, surveillance and 
monetary incentives are examples of formal mechanisms for 
controlling the delivery of service from trusted agent to 
trusting agent. They maintain that trusting agents can use 
incentive mechanisms to direct trusted agents toward the 
efficient and effective completion of tasks. However, the
incentive is given after the completion of tasks at the end of 
the interaction.
Ferrin and Dirks [6] carried out laboratory experiments to 
examine whether rewards have a direct effect on trust or 
whether they represent a catalyst that may set in motion other 
processes that influence trust. Their research concludes that 
rewards have a strong impact on the formation of trusting 
beliefs. However, the incentive is given after the trusted agent 
had completely delivered the service. They do not propose any 
mechanism that provides an incentive at intermediate intervals 
during the delivery of service.  
Unlike the existing works in the literature regarding 
incentives for task completion, in this paper we combine a 
mechanism of proactive continuous monitoring and 
performance-driven incentive specifically to support 
successful service delivery. The service delivery is monitored 
at intermediate checkpoints and incentives are given at
intermediate checkpoints rather than at the end of the 
interaction. We do not intend to provide an incentive after task 
completion; instead, it is given during the course of the
transaction to minimize the discrepancy between actual 
performances and mutually agreed to performance.
III. MODEL OVERVIEW
The objective of our system is to motivate trusted agents to 
maintain their performance in delivering service to the trusting 
agent. We propose to include the following properties in the 
design of our incentive mechanism: 
1. Mutually Agreed Performance. For each transaction, 
both parties have agreed on mutually agreed 
performance. This agreement clearly states each 
service criterion and its associated level of 
importance. 
2. Time Space. Before each transaction, the trusting 
agent and trusted agent determine the entire duration 
of time over which the complete delivery of agreed 
service will occur. We term this the ‘time space’. 
3. Check point. In order to ensure the continuity of 
service delivery, the trusting agent divides the time 
space into a certain number of checkpoints. At each 
checkpoint, the agreed performance of service 
delivery is expressed. This checkpoint system is 
intended to facilitate continuous performance 
monitoring during the interaction. With the designed 
checkpoints, the trusting agent can observe or track 
changes in the performance of the trusted agent over 
a time space.
4. Intermediate Performance. The performance of the 
trusted agent in terms of delivering the service is 
monitored at each checkpoint. It is reflected in the
correlation between actual service and mutually 
agreed upon service at each checkpoint. Hence, at 
each checkpoint, the trusting agent will allocate a 
value of intermediate performance. We measure the 
performance of trusted agent by correlating actual 
performance with mutually agreed performance. The 
intermediate performance is calculated using the 
following formula: 
1
1
CPnint
  * * Imp
(1)
 * * Imp
6 *  
N
criterionc criterionc criterionc
C
N
criterionc criterionc criterionc
C
In Actual Perf Clear
In MAP Clear
P  
 
§ ·¨ ¸¨ ¸ ¨ ¸¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹
¦
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Where,
intP CPn denotes intermediate performance at 
checkpoint n
6 represents the highest level of performance
criterioncIn Actual Perf denotes the actual / delivered
criterion representing the fulfillment of each criterion 
of the trusted agent at an intermediate checkpoint. 
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criterioncInMAP denotes mutually agreed performance 
of the trusted agent according to the given criterion at 
the intermediate checkpoint.
criterioncClear represents the clarity of each criterion in 
the service agreement (contract) and whether it is 
understood in the same way by both parties. For a 
given criterion, criterioncClear can have two levels (a) ‘0’ 
– This criterion or its output or both have not been 
mutually agreed to by both parties and (b) ‘1’ – This 
criterion along with its output has been mutually 
agreed to by both parties. 
Impcriterionc denotes the importance of each criterion 
that affects the determination of trustworthiness. For 
a given criterion, Impcriterionc can have three levels: (a) 
‘0’ – not important (b) ‘1’ – important, and (c) ‘2’ –
very important. 
5. Incentive CP. The incentive at each checkpoint will 
be issued if the performance of a trusted agent at the 
current checkpoint is higher than for the previous
checkpoint. Hence, if PintCPn > PintCPn-1, the trusting 
agent will give an incentive to the trusted agent, 
while PintCPn is intermediate performance at current 
checkpoint and PintCPn-1 is the intermediate 
performance at the previous checkpoint. We term the 
checkpoint which receives the incentive as the
‘incentive CP’. During one transaction, there would 
be several checkpoints. It is important to note that the 
incentive is given only if the agent has shown an 
increase in performance. 
6. Incentive value. The trusting agent will give an 
incentive value as a kind of ‘trust value’. In this 
paper, the highest trust value as an incentive during a 
transaction is ‘1’. Hence, the value of incentive for 
each ‘incentive CP’ is calculated as follows:
1=                     (2)
total number of CP
Incentive CP
7. Increasing performance as a response of incentive.
Once an agent has received an incentive at a certain 
checkpoint, as a response to this incentive, he 
increases his performance level for the next 
checkpoint. The level of increasing performance is 
calculated as follows:
CPnIPL = CL  * initial performance level * brake option   (3)
Where IPL denotes as increasing performance level, 
CLCPn denotes the compliance level at checkpoint n. 
This CLCPn is chosen randomly by the system at each
initial checkpoint. Initial performance is randomly 
assigned early in the simulation. Brake option is a 
value of 0 – 0.9, which represents the degree of 
performance increasing after receiving an incentive.
8. Final Performance. At the end of the interaction or 
time space, the final performance as a representation 
of successful service delivery is calculated by 
aggregating the intermediate performance during the 
transaction. It can be calculated by using the 
following equation:
N
int
c=1
finalP =                                                               (4)n
P
§ ·¨ ¸¨ ¸¨ ¸¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹
¦
While Pint is performance at intermediate point and n
denotes the total number of check points in an 
interaction. Pint value can be calculated by using (2)
above. 
Let us consider the following case study for elucidation 
purposes. Agent ‘A’ is a trusting agent who requests that agent 
‘B’ delivers 1000 service units for the duration of one month 
time space. Agent ‘A’ then divides the time space into 4
checkpoints. At each checkpoint, it is agreed that agent ‘B’ 
will deliver 250 units. As explained previously, the checkpoint 
is designed to monitor the progress of performance 
continuously rather than at the end of the interaction. 
Let us consider that at the first checkpoint, agent ‘B’ 
delivers only 200 units which is below the intermediate 
mutually agreed performance. At this first checkpoint, by 
using (1), the intermediate performance for this checkpoint 1 
is 4.8. In our model, we propose a mechanism by which the 
performance gap at the previous checkpoint is handed over to 
the next checkpoint. Hence, in this case, the agreed 
performance for the second checkpoint is 300 units instead of 
250 units. If at this checkpoint, the ratio of actual performance 
against the mutually agreed performance is greater than 
checkpoint 1, this checkpoint is characterized as an incentive 
checkpoint. For example, if the agent delivers 290 units, using 
(1) the PintCP2 is 5.8. As PintCP2 is greater than PintCP1, this 
checkpoint 2 is marked as incentive CP.
As a result of receiving the incentive, this agent will 
increase his compliance level at checkpoint 3. The increasing 
performance level is calculated by using (3). This mechanism 
continues until the end of the transaction time space. Finally, 
at the end of the transaction, we measure the final performance 
as the aggregate value of intermediate performances. If the 
final performance is greater than the initial performance, we 
may conclude that incentive has facilitated the successful 
delivery of service by increasing the agent’s performance
level.
The initial performance and final performance are 
compared in order to show that the trusted agent has been 
increasing his performance level in response to receiving an 
incentive. This will lead to the completion of service delivery 
from trusted agent to trusting agent.   
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IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS
In order to determine the effectiveness of our mechanism,
we engineered a multi-agent system using the JADE Multi 
Agent-Based Framework which has an interface enabling the 
user to specify the parameters prior the execution. The user 
can specify the total number of interactions (or transactions) 
that need to be simulated. Additionally, the user specifies the 
total number of agents in the multi-agent system that needs to 
be classified into six classes, with each class corresponding to 
one particular trustworthiness value and associated compliance 
level.
During the bootstrapping phase, the agents are created and 
each of them is assigned a given behavior, to represent the 
degree of their performance level. Hence, each agent would 
have an initial performance level. Each performance level
corresponds to one trustworthiness value. For example, the 
behavior belonging to agents with trustworthiness value ‘1’ 
(TV1) would contain a behavior that would specify the action 
or the way that agents carry out a transaction. Hence, we 
propose that the performance level of an agent is the degree to 
which an agent complies with mutually agreed performance.
Since there are six different trustworthiness values, there are 
six different performance behaviors. In this simulation, we 
propose a correctness of agent’s compliance level using Fuzzy 
Trapezoidal Performance Level. In this approach, the behavior 
of each agent corresponding to a trustworthiness value is 
represented using a membership function as shown in Table 1. 
The degree of compliance behavior of an agent in each trust 
value is determined with the help of a statistical graph which 
corresponds proportionally to the measurement of 100 scale 
intervals. The number ‘0%’ denotes the lowest level of 
compliance, meaning that the agent is totally non-compliant, 
and ‘100%’ denotes perfect performance or full compliance. A 
fuzzy trust grade set is defined as the fuzzy measurement 
result, which is denoted by Trust Value (TV) = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6]. These six grades TV1, TV2, TV3, TV4, TV5, and TV6
denote the gradational measurement results ranging from the 
fully compliant to fully non-compliant as depicted in Fig. 1
below. 
28.33 38.33 45 55 78.33 90 10016.67 61.6
TV1 TV2 TV3 TV4 TV5 TV6
71.67
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Fig 1. Trapezoidal Membership Degree and Compliance Value.
The graph above shows the degree of membership and value 
of compliance for every agent in each trust value. It can be 
seen that the nature of membership functions is primarily 
trapezoidal; hence, we term this set of compliance ‘fuzzy 
trapezoidal compliance’. An agent with a certain level of 
compliance will have a certain trust value. Membership degree 
(y) which ranges from 0 to 1 is a mapping called the 
membership function of the fuzzy set TV, and level of 
compliance (x) indicates the degree of belongingness or 
membership value of ‘x’ in any Trust Value. Therefore, a 
certain compliance level acquires two trustworthiness 
(membership) characteristics. 
During simulation, the user randomly selects an agent with 
the probability of having a compliance value ranging from 0% 
to 100%. There are six grades of TV1, TV2, TV3, TV4, TV5,
and TV6. Each compliance value will correspond to a certain 
degree of trust value membership. For example, if the user 
chooses an agent with level of compliance 28%, his behavior 
will express some degree similarity of TV1 and TV2 
characteristic as this point has a certain degree of membership 
in TV1 and TV2. However, the total degree of membership is 
always 1.
The equations representing fuzzy trapezoidal compliance 
corresponding to TV1, TV2, TV3, TV4, TV5, and TV6 are 
shown below:
TABLE 1 
TRAPEZOIDAL COMPLIANCE LEVEL FUZZY RULE
TV Membership Degree  valuex
TV1
0 28.33x t
67.1633.28
33.28

 x
16.67 28.33x 
1 0 16.67xd d
TV2
0 16.67x 
67.1633.28
67.16

 x
16.67 28.33x 
1 28.33 38.33xd d
33.3845
45

 x 38.33 45x 
TV3
0 0 38.33xd d
33.3845
33.38

x 38.33 45x 
1 45 55xd d
5567.61
67.61

 x 55 61.67x 
TV4
0 0 55xd d
5567.61
55

x 55 61.67x 
1 61.6 71.67xd d
67.7133.78
33.78

 x 71.68 78.33x 
TV5
0 0 71.67xd d
67.7133.78
67.71

x 71.67 78.33x 
1 78.33 83.33xd d
33.8890
90

 x 88.33 90x 
TV6
0 0 88.33xd d
33.8890
33.83

x 88.33 90x 
1 90 100x d
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In this approach, consider for example that we have an agent 
with a compliance level of 60%. This agent will behave 
according to some degree of TV3 and to some extent of TV4.
Therefore, the calculation of compliance behavior is as 
follows: 
3
4 
Compliance Behavior = (membership degree * TV ) +
(membership degree * TV )                  (5)
char
char
                                                         
Membership degree is the level of membership based on 
calculation using the fuzzy rule above, while TVn char  is a
characteristic of trust value as derived from the crisp 
compliance level. Based on the above rule, the compliance 
level of this agent is 62.5% as a result of the following 
calculation:
TABLE 2
COMPLIANCE BEHAVIOR CALCULATION
TV x value Membership Degree Compliance 
Behaviour
TV3 5567.61
67.61

 x
61.67 60
61.67 55


0.25*50=12.5 
TV4 5567.61
55

x
60 55
61.67 55


0.75*66.67 =
50.0025 
Total  0.75 + 0.25 = 1
12.5 +50.0025
= 62.5025 
Moreover, the user can also specify the bonus bias which 
ranges from 0.1 to 0.9. This bonus bias is a parameter to 
determine the increasing behavior of an agent after an 
incentive has been given. 
In order to show the effectiveness of the incentive 
mechanism in supporting successful service delivery, we
compared the simulation results from transactions with
incentive and without incentive. In transactions without an 
incentive mechanism, if an agent performs better than at the 
previous checkpoint, there is no incentive and no increasing 
performance for the next checkpoint as well. 
Figure 2 below shows the comparison result from 
simulation of interactions with incentive and without incentive
from 1000 agents who carried out 1000 transactions; bonus 
bias in the incentive mechanism benchmark is 0.9.
Fig. 2. 1000 agents carried out 1000 transactions (bonus bias 0.9)
As we can see from figure 2 above, the successful service 
delivery resulting from a transaction with incentive is higher 
than for a transaction without incentive. We measure the 
successful delivery as a comparison between initial 
performance level and final performance level. If the final 
performance level is greater or equal than the initial 
performance level, then it indicates that an agent in that 
particular interaction has increased his compliance level. It 
does not mean that the service has been delivered at a full 
compliance level (100%); rather, it depends on the initial
compliance level as a representation of the trustworthiness 
value of agent. 
As observed in interactions with incentive, the successful 
service delivery remains 100% throughout the interaction. It 
means that all agents have shown an increase in performance 
as a result of the incentive. In contrast, for interactions without 
incentive, the successful service delivery is less than 60%. 
This means that during transactions, only 60% of agents have 
shown improved behavior.  
Figure 3 below illustrates the results of an experiment 
using transactions with 3000 agents who carried out 2000 
transactions and the bonus bias is 0.9.
Fig. 3. 3000 agents carried out 2000 transactions (bonus bias 0.9).
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Fig. 4. 2500 agents carried out 5000 transactions (bonus bias 0.5)
It is also observed from Figures 3 and 4 that with the larger 
number of agents and interactions, there are significant 
differences between two transaction scenarios. Interactions 
with an incentive mechanism have a higher rate of success 
than do those interactions without an incentive mechanism.
It can be inferred from the simulation results, that incentive 
is effective as a means of increasing the performance of 
trusted agents to deliver services to the trusting agents at each 
checkpoint. Moreover, the proactive continuous monitoring 
with checkpoints is designed to support the continuity of 
service delivery. With the proactive continuous monitoring, 
the trusting agent will be updated about the performance of the 
trusted agent and this will help to close the performance gap in 
real time. Hence, it guarantees service deliverability at the end 
of transactions. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we present a mechanism for proactive 
continuous monitoring and performance-driven incentive in 
business interactions between service providers and service 
requesters. These two mechanisms are intended to support the 
successful delivery of service. At each transaction, the service 
task is decomposed into several intermediate deliveries as 
agreed to by both parties. Hence, the service delivery is 
monitored at intermediate checkpoints and incentive is given 
at intermediate checkpoints if the trusted agent has shown an 
increase in performance.
Unlike existing works, incentive is given at transaction 
milestones as a part of continuous performance monitoring, 
rather than at the end of transaction. If an agent performs 
consistently according to the mutually agreed performance at 
each checkpoint, then this agent receives an incentive. As a 
result of this, the agent will increase his performance or 
compliance level. Therefore, any performance gap is identified 
and resolved in real time. It will guarantee the successful of 
delivery of service by the end of the transaction. 
In our future works, we intend to introduce another scheme 
of incentive according to the degree of compliance level. We 
also plan to design a penalty system for unsuccessful service 
delivery.
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